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Preface 
THIS volume of essays on United States trade with Asia and the
Far East deals with a timely subject the import of which cannot be over­
emphasized. The extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act 
in 1958 for an unprecedented four-year period and the increasing aware­
ness in this country of the expansion of the foreign economic relations 
of the Soviet Bloc countries, which were hitherto of little quantitative 
importance in world trade, have provided the setting for the symposium. 
While the essays do not constitute a handbook or pretend to offer a 
blueprint of foreign economic policy from the point of view of any 
particular country, their scope is sufficiently wide and their authorship 
suitably varied so that the airing of the problems confronting United 
States trade in Asia and the Far East through these pages may well 
fulfill a special function in the present international situation and in the 
face of what we believe to be the American mood that something posi­
tive be done. 
The essays were first presented at a Conference on American Trade 
with Asia and the Far East held on April 17-18, 1958 at Marquette 
University under the auspices of the Institute for Asian Studies in co­
operation with the Marquette Management Center. These have been 
edited by Professor Robert J. Barr who has also contributed the intro­
ductory chapter in which the principal issues are outlined. In so far as 
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this volume is found useful by its readers, credit should go to its editor, 
the individual authors, and the Marquette University Press. 
Yuan-Ii Wu 
Director, Institute for 
Asian Studies 
Introduction 
THE FOLLOWING papers explore the factors influencing the nature 
and volume of United States trade with Asia and the Far East.* In a re­
stricted setting, this exploration could be pursued by examining the 
demands of the various countries for imported commodities, and the 
productive potentialities of these countries for exportable commodities. 
But this would not be adequate for the countries under survey at the 
present time. 
Asian countries exhibit a diversity of economic and social condi­
tions. Some of them, recently released from colonial status to inde­
pendence, aspire to full membership in the world community of nations, 
and particularly to living standards rapidly rising to approach parity 
with the rest of the world. Some, long accustomed to unchanging 
economic, social and political patterns, are now affected by Western 
ideas of progress and democracy. Some wish to achieve a greater de­
gree of economic independence and self sufficiency. Finally, some lie 
under the threat of external aggression. 
All nations, and especially the Asian nations, are determined to 
subject to conscious control the direction and velocity of their domestic 
* The term "Asia and the Far East" includes the following countries: India,
Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Malaya, 
Republic of Indonesia, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Korea, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. 
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development. No nation is any longer willing to allow its economic 
fortunes to be determined either by other nations upon which it has 
become economically dependent, or by the play of undirected economic 
forces. Nations supplying raw materials to the world are insisting upon 
a greater degree of stability in their markets. The ferment of progress 
is a heady stimulant whose results are not always predictable. The 
threat of aggression distorts the normal development of economic life. 
Underlying all the other problems of the area is the great problem 
of food for the teeming populations. Agricultural development is of 
urgent necessity. Counterbalancing the obstacles to this development 
which leap to mind are advantages of rich natural endowment, and in 
some countries, an almost virgin frontier comparable in a measure to 
that of the United States in the last century. 
Hence in a broader setting the explorations of United States-Asian 
trade problems necessarily include consideration of a whole range of 
factors in their application to the specific conditions of the countries 
under review. Consequently, the papers explore the objectives and 
methods of consciously elaborated domestic development plans and 
programs. They explore requirements inherent in these plans, the bal­
ance, consistency and attainability of their objectives and the reasons 
why attainments have fallen short of objectives if they have done so. 
They explore the· peculiar difficulties facing colonial economies in their 
attempts to diversify production and trade and in so doing to develop 
commercial, industrial and financial institutions, entrepreneurship and 
saving. The tensions both between the Asian nations and others, and 
between classes and groups within the Asian nations themselves are 
the subject of some consideration, though it is obvious why problems 
of this sort, important as they are, could not receive adequate con­
sideration in the space available in this volume and under its title. 
Attached to the main body of papers is a series of background 
papers which aim to present a summary of the factual information 
pertinent to the subject. 
* * * 
It may be worthwhile to analyze here a little more fully the prob­
lems which present themselves in a study of the "factors influencing 
the nature and volume of American trade with Asian countries." 
From the standpoint of the United States the aspects of trade with 
Asian countries are: ( 1 ) the commodity composition of our imports 
from and exports to those countries; (2) the countries to which we 
xii 
export and from which we import specified commodities; ( 3) the pro­
portions which this trade bears to our total trade, and to our trade with 
other specified regions and countries. The same analysis can be made 
for each of the Asian countries, from its standpoint, of its trade with 
the United States, or with the world as a whole, or with specified 
regions or countries. And in setting forth the present status of this 
trade, its origins and likely course of development should be discussed. 
International trade is a network of interdependent movements of 
commodities, services and funds. Like all true networks, the individual 
elements enter relationships of mutual dependence and determination, 
not only with each other but with the network as a whole. It is also 
clear that each element at any particular moment is what it is because 
of historical circumstances. Finally, a little thought will produce the 
conclusion that consistency is the fundamental rule of the international 
trade network. That is to say, an individual movement seen from the 
sending or from the receiving country is an identity; a flow in one di­
rection must be balanced by an opposite flow of an equally valuable 
asset in the other; each nation's total outward flows must balance its 
total inward flows. It would, however, impose an unnecessarily re­
strictive condition on the magnitude of the flows to require that each 
nation's outward flows must balance its inward flows with each other 
nation individually. 
A simple illustration may clarify these remarks. The invention of 
the automobile resulted in a rapidly increasing demand for rubber. 
From Brazilian seeds grown in Kew Gardens, rubber trees were planted 
in Malaya, and the dominant element of the United States-Malayan 
trade pattern was determined - a combination of adventitious cir­
cumstances, conscious planning and natural endowments. The flow of 
rubber from Malaya to the United States was accompanied by a flow of 
other commodities from the United States to the United Kingdom and 
a flow of still other commodities from the United Kingdom to Malaya. 
Since the values of these commodity flows were not identical, the bal­
ance was achieved by payments of United States dollars earned by 
British-owned rubber plantations in Malaya first to the United Kingdom 
and ultimately to the United States. Thus, omitting numerous com­
plicating details, the trade and payments pattern between the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Malaya developed in response pri­
marily to an originally French invention. The subsequent invention of 
synthetic rubber - itself a combination of adventitious circumstances, 
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conscious planning and "natural" economic progress - produced strains 
in this sub-network necessitating numerous adjustments. As a rule, the 
strains and adjustments are accompanied by profits to some, losses to 
others - to individuals and to countries - and thus tend to create 
conflicts of interest which spread over from economic to political and 
social relationships. 
It should be noted that the international network of trade and 
payments is duplicated in detail by similar internal networks within 
each country. 
As a first classification of factors determining trade we may take: 
( 1) those natural advantages of countries and regions of which Ricardo
spoke when he first clarified the theory of international trade; (2) those
adventitious (historical) circumstances which the economist may note
but which may not necessarily originate within the economic world;
( 3) those purposefully elaborated development plans which have be­
come so numerous in postwar years and which impose upon the net­
work a pattern different from that which would arise solely from the
background of natural endowments; and ( 4) those requirements of
consistency imposed by the nature of trade and payment networks,
internal and international.
The first two classes of factors, important as they are, lie on the 
periphery, or outside, the area of economic science. It is with the last 
two classes that we are primarily concerned. Thus. more elaborate dis­
cussion of their characteristic problems is called for. Yet certain natural 
and historical factors have been so important in forming the present 
· structure of Asian economies and trade that a discussion of their
nature and effects is also in order.
The dominant influence on some of the Asian countries under re­
view is colonialism. This means that the economic potentialities of the 
colonial area were developed primarily in subservience to the demands 
of the economically advanced industrialized countries of the world -
not necessarily solely the demands of the metropolitan center though 
these of course were often of great weight. It means also that the 
bargain that was struck as remuneration was often disadvantageous to 
the colonial area - though here certain consideration must be given 
to the notoriously "adventurous" character of many early concessions 
and the fact that losses as well as great profits emerged. What is really 
at issue is the fact that "contracts" which turned out to be unduly dis­
advantageous to the colonial area could not easily be revised since one 
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of the contractors was not really free and equal. It means also that the 
people of the colonial area were not seriously accorded the equal rights 
of full copartners in the economic development of their areas. Here 
too, however, we must recognize the contemporaneous existence of 
similar disparities in class privileges within advanced industrial nations 
_ disparities which have only lately been reduced or eliminated. 
All this is well known but is here brought out into the open to em­
phasize the reason why certain types of problems have emerged in the 
former colonial areas of Asia. It is understandable that not only the 
fact but also the sign of their former dependence must be abolished. 
And since this sign is the excessive and unbalanced development of 
the raw material sector of the economy, this unbalance must be re­
dressed by compensatory hurried development of the industrial sector 
- in the course of which it may be forgotten that the raw material
sector was perhaps the one exhibiting the greatest existing comparative
advantage. Not only former colonial areas, but independent though
underdeveloped areas have been affected by the drive for industrializa­
tion.
Another influence has not yet had as significant results as may be 
expected in the future. Prices of raw materials ( the commodities which 
Asian countries typically export) fluctuate with greater amplitude than 
those of manufactured products ( the commodities which Asian coun­
tries typically import). Also, the volume of raw material imports by 
industrial countries varies in the same direction as their prices. Con­
sequently, the terms of trade and the level of productive activity of 
Asian countries are excessively unstable. The demand is insistent that 
some control over these matters be exercised by international agreement. 
The effort to accelerate diversification and industrialization puts 
demands upon government coordinating agencies, central banking sys­
tems, financial institutions related to the flow of savings-investments, 
entrepreneurship and labor training institutions which would strain even 
advanced economies. All of these institutional establishments must 
undertake tasks of great magnitude involving highly seasoned judgment 
and extensive statistical fact finding, in circumstances where these re­
sources are inadequate. It is no wonder then that honest misjudgments 
as well as naive blunders have resulted in misdirection of effort, do­
mestic inflation and balance of payments crises. Even advanced eco­
nomies have not always made better records in these respects. Positive, 
and sometimes more emotional than wise, efforts are made to change 
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the direction of trade away from the former metropolitan center toward 
countries which did not participate in the former economic and po­
litical dominance of the colonial area. Economic stress is then created 
in all three areas. Above all, in view of the generally low level of pro­
ductivity and savings potential, is the necessity of a massive flow of 
capital from advanced nations, preferably private capital. Yet private 
foreign capital has been perhaps justifiably timid about embarking upon 
the needed investments in public utility or even industrial installations 
in the conditions of resurgent independence in the postwar world. 
The reverse side of the diversification-industrialization program is 
that of agricultural production. Conditions of land ownership inherited 
from the past, techniques of agricultural production and allocation of 
land and labor resources to nonfood crops for export, have conspired 
to hold many Asian countries on a subsistence level. It is true that 
some countries have produced a surplus to alleviate the deficits of 
others. The region as a whole, however, has produced little agricul­
tural food surplus above a subsistence level. In conjunction with dense 
and rapidly growing populations, the effort to industrialize has some­
times got out of balance with the base in agricultural food production. 
Here again everything must be done at once - changes in land oc­
cupation, own�rship and exploitation, in social custom, in technique 
and in capital investment. 
Not all the Asian countries fall into the group of former colonies. 
Another historical condition is  the result of the war with its disruption 
of prewar international economic relations and physical destruction of 
productive facilities. Not to be overlooked are population movements 
- influx of refugees, displacement and loss of skilled manpower.
Productive facilities must be re-established when savings potentials
have been impaired; market connections must be re-established when 
commercial rivals have successfully penetrated one's former preserves. 
A prime requirement for this sort of rehabilitation is again a ready 
flow of international investment funds. In the long run the flow of 
private funds is to be hoped for, but in the meantime international 
institutions were established to facilitate the process. However, even 
these arrangements have proved inadequate to the severe postwar cir­
cumstances and extraordinary governmental assistance has proved nec­
essary. The form in which government aid has been extended has in 
its turn raised difficult problems. 
Finally, another circumstance has affected some of the countries 
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under review, that is, technological developments and in particular the 
development of industrially produced substitutes for natural products 
of the area, e.g., synthetic rubber and synthetic textile fibers. Not to 
be overlooked in this sector also is the development of material-saving 
processes, e.g., thinner tin plating. Also worthy of note here is the 
application of machine methods to the production of agricultural prod­
ucts, in special circumstances and usually in conjunction with govern­
ment pricing schemes, resulting in an "unnatural" temporarily reversed 
flow of agricultural products from industrialized to underdeveloped 
countries. These circumstances have produced problems of enforced 
and hurried structural adjustment and of strained competitive relation­
ships - in some sense they have produced an "upside down" inter­
national world. 
Upon this already troubled scene in recent years has come the 
threat of further deliberate disturbances arising from politically inspired 
Communist trade maneuvers. The direction which commodity trade 
would normally take under the influence of cost-price considerations is 
distorted, placing additional adjustment strains upon the economies of 
the countries involved, strains which are made more tense by the fear 
that at any moment the trade relationships will again be disturbed and 
further adjustments will thus be called for. Associated with the threat 
of trade war is that of military aggression, direct or indirect, although 
this factor is more limited in the range of countries affected at the
moment. Both these threats introduce considerations of military as 
well as economic assistance, primarily from the United States. 
Although former colonial areas have been especially forward in 
promoting development plans, other nations also participated in this 
characteristic postwar phenomenon. The essence of a plan is the con­
scious direction of economic progress along certain selected lines, gen­
erally in the industrial sector as this is the sector of the economy which 
most obviously distinguishes the developed from the underdeveloped 
countries. Results of this redirection of economic effort include shift­
ing direction and commodity composition of trade: new imports - par­
ticularly capital goods which are likely to come from different countries 
of origin; possibly reduced exports - at any rate in the short run less­
ened production of former export goods along with increased con­
sumption of domestic production. The effort to accelerate investment 
very likely exceeds the domestic saving potential and can only be ac­
complished by the import of foreign capital, lacking which domestic 
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inflation results. Altered cost-price relationships, exchange difficulties 
and modified import and export demands are a consequence. An at­
tempt to accommodate to or control all these difficulties may be made 
by restrictive commercial policy; in fact, such restrictive policy may 
from the beginning be a part of the controls by means of which the 
development plan is executed. And it goes without saying that monetary 
and fiscal policy of a high order of effectiveness is required if disastrous 
consequences are to be avoided. 
The special role of the United States in relation to these problems 
follows both from the historical role which this country has played in 
Asian affairs, and the position it occupies at the present juncture of 
being the largest reservoir of capital. Our imports from Asian coun­
tries have been the natural products of the specific areas, typical prod­
ucts of their climate - tea, spices, rubber, jute, etc., but also including 
tin; and other "artificial" products of economic development silk, 
handicraft articles of wood, fiber and other materials. Our exports 
were usually smaller in total than our imports and extended over a 
wide range of products. These relationships have changed. Except for 
silk, the commodity composition of our in1ports remains substantially 
what it was with some increases in mineral raw materials, which, after 
all, are the commodities in which these countries possess great natural 
advantages. . It ls in the overall balance of trade and in the composition 
of our exports that significant changes have taken place. Specifically, 
the Asian countries have come to the United States for capital goods, 
for investment capital and for agricultural products. We have de-
. veloped a substantial export surplus and have extended economic and 
military aid in large amounts as partial compensation. 
The problems which arise in this connection are those of com­
mercial policy (our own as well as Asian) by which those trade and 
capital movements are facilitated which further the aims of general 
policy, and those are hindered, which interfere with achievement of 
these aims. 
The wide range of problems raised by the circumstances mentioned 
in the preceding paragraphs may be brought into focus in relation to 
the "rule of consistency." It is not simply that a particular country 
must make an adjustment once and for all to a new condition of its 
economic life. The adjustment made involves other adjustments in its 
domestic economic arrangements, and each of these in tum is likely to 
constitute a change in the conditions facing other countries. Thus, any 
xviii 
disturbance is transmitted from its point of origin throughout the trad­
ing system; and its effect is finally absorbed by a diffused and complex 
set of adjustments including those intended to insulate a country from 
disturbances and adjustments in its trading partners. 
In the large, the general effects of postwar events have been to 
distort the prewar trade and payments network as follows: 
1) First have come a series of structural changes in the pattern of
domestic production as adjustments to technological changes, acceler­
ated diversification and industrialization. 
2) Second have come shifts in the direction of trade which are, on
the whole, surprisingly small considering the powerful incentives at 
work, though one may venture to guess that the prewar pattern was so 
firmly founded on natural endowments that only a long course of de­
velopment could produce substantial change. 
3) Third have come shifts in the commodity composition of trade,
mainly in imports into Asian countries, in response to efforts at in­
dustrialization. 
4) Fourth have come changes in the total volume of trade in re­
sponse to unsettled domestic affairs, restrictive practices and diversion 
of resources from export lines to lines for domestic consumption. 
5) Following upon many of these changes have come balance of
payments difficulties. 
6) Problems of adjustment to economic forces of cost-price rela­
tionships are frequently severe enough in all conscience; when exacer­
bated by the political forces of politically inspired trade war their mag­
nitude is often enhanced beyond the adjustment capacity of the normal 
economic mechanisms. 
One may be forgiven for being dismayed at the magnitude of all 
these problems, but the following papers push on to concrete proposals 
for their amelioration or solution. No panaceas are offered. But 
people who wrestle intimately with the problems, as have all the au­
thors of this collection of papers, come away from their experience 
with practicable and effective suggestions for improvement. It is the 
purpose of these papers not only to lay bare the problems which beset 
the development of American trade with Asia and the Far East, but 
also to propose policies to private business and to official organization 
which might facilitate this development in the belief that the enlarge­
ment of this trade would benefit the peoples of all countries. 
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The political climate 
of America's trade with Asia 
The Honorable Clement]. Zablocki 
Member of Congress 
l
' 
THE CHANGING ROLE of the United States in the wodd economy, 
together with the impact of the tremendous military, political and so­
ciological developments of the past two decades, call for a better un­
derstanding, on our part, of our foreign trade and assistance policies, 
and of their effects upon the lives and aspirations of countless other 
peoples. 
I am particularly conscious of the fact that much more light needs 
to be shed on the complex issues of our trade with other nations. In 
this respect, the specialized, regional approach should prove especially 
helpful. It should be helpful to our businessmen - to our industry, to 
our investors, to our importers - whose interests are increasingly af­
fected by the issues of foreign trade. It should be helpful to our 
citizenry at large - to the millions of men and women throughout our 
land who at times fail to appreciate the full impact of foreign trade on 
their own welfare. And it should prove of great value to our govern­
ment, and to the governments of the nations with whom we trade, be­
cause governmental policies can greatly encourage, or impede, the 
growth of trade and its consequences. 
THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF FREE ASIA 
Asia and the Far East is a vitally important area with which I 
have become familiar through my work as the Chairman of the Sub­
committee on Southeast Asia, the Far East, and the Pacific, of the 
United States House of Representatives. 
2 American Trade with Asia and the Far East 
The strategic importance of this area to the Free World, and to 
the United States in particular, cannot be overemphasized. The bal­
ance of power between the Free World and the Communist bloc may 
very well lie in the arc which stretches from India, Pakistan and Af­
ghanistan on the west to Japan and Korea. These nations, located on 
the periphery of the Communist bloc have a population of a billion 
and one-half, possess rich resources of raw materials and have an 
overwhelming industrial production potential. The conquest of this 
region by the Communists - be it military conquest or domination 
through subversion, infiltration or economic penetration - would give 
the Communists the raw materials and the industrial production po­
tential which would bolster their drive for world domination. 
Let us make no mistake about this fact: it is essential to the Free 
World that the arc of defense and cooperation in the Pacific hold firm, 
and that the independence of the Far East and Southeast Asia be 
fully preserved and strengthened. 
A realistic appraisal of American foreign trade and assistance 
policies with respect to Asia and the Far East must be made against 
this background. An appraisal based on any other premise can lead 
to mistaken and dangerous conclusions as far as the security of the 
United States and of the Free World is concerned. 
OUR GOVERNMENT'S POLICY 
Our government's policy with respect to the free nations of South­
east Asia and the Far East is firmly based on the recognition of the 
strategic importance of that region to mutual long-range security. The 
United States has embarked upon a long-range program of assistance 
in the Far East - assistance intended, first, to halt the spread of Com­
munism, and secondly, to bolster the internal strength of the countries 
which stand as bulwarks against this threat to democratic ideals and 
world peace. 
The cardinal principle of our foreign policy programs with re­
spect to this area has been to aid the peoples of the Far East to help 
themselves. Some people, either misunderstanding or wilfully mis­
interpreting our objectives, have charged that the United States is try­
ing to dominate the free nations of that region. Such is not the case. 
We have not attempted to defend them with our own troops and mili­
tary equipment, to feed them with our own food, and to support them 
with our own money. Such forms of assistance would defeat our over­
all objectives. Instead, we have tried to give the peoples of the Far 
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East, through their governments, a better opportunity of improving 
their lot in life. We are giving them such an opportunity by sharing 
with them our technological "know-how," by aiding them in solving 
their own economic problems, by making development capital avail­
able to them, by encouraging wider trade and through other means. 
To date, by far the largest portion of our assistance to this region 
has consisted of direct military aid and defense support. Our purpose 
is to strengthen the economies of those countries, to assist them in 
getting economic development under way, and, in the meantime, to 
bolster their defense capacity, at least for a "holding" operation. We 
have embarked upon this course in full understanding of the fact that 
we are all engaged in the common cause of defense against the inroads 
of the Communists and our programs are designed to accomplish our 
collective security objectives in the most effective and economic way. 
In our efforts to help the nations of Southeast Asia and the Far 
East to help themselves, our trade policy plays a vital role. This is 
an area in which private enterprise, and private investment, can con­
tribute greatly to the success of our over-all national objectives. 
THREE POINTS TO BE MADE 
With this background, I would like to comment, first of all, on 
the general characteristics of our trade with Asia. Secondly, I shall 
briefly review the political aspects of this trade - both from the stand­
point of our own government, and from the standpoint of the govern­
ments of the free nations of the Far East. Finally, I shall outline my 
personal observations and suggestions as to the ways in which our na-
. tional policy can be better implemented, and our trade with Asia ex­
panded, by positive action on the part of our government and on the 
part of the governments of the nations with which we are trading. 
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TRADE WITH ASIA 
The trade of any area depends on many factors, among which the 
stage of economic development of the area is of particular significance. 
When we consider the nations of the Far East, two things come 
to mind, immediately: one, their large resources of raw materials; and, 
secondly, their teeming populations. These two elements, combined 
with an intense desire to attain a higher level of living, can produce 
economic progress and industrialization, when aided by favorable gov­
ernment policies and the availability of capital. Such economic prog­
ress is the ambition of the countries of the Far East. 
Apart from industrially-developed Japan, however, most of the 
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countries of that area are still in the early stages of economic develop­
ment. Their general economic conditions have been favorable in recent 
years and they have achieved widespread gains in production, parti­
cularly in newly-developing industries. Their earnest efforts to improve 
the plane of living of their peoples have begun to show encouraging 
results. 
The value of trade in this region has been increasing, with imports 
amounting to $10.7 billion dollars, and exports to $8.8 billion, in 
1956. One-third of this volume is traded within the region. Of the 
remaining trade, about 25 per cent is with northwestern Europe, and 
about 20 per cent with the United States. The balance - about 21 
per cent - is scattered among the Latin American countries, Canada, 
Africa and, to the extent of about 5 per cent, with the Communist 
bloc. The area, as a whole, has a trade deficit which has been rising 
in recent years. 
American trade with Asia includes many commodities, with Japan, 
the Philippines, India, Korea, Pakistan, Indonesia and Taiwan ac­
counting for the bulk of the transactions. In 1956, our exports to that 
area amounted to $2. 7 billion dollars while our imports were less than 
$2 billion. We have an export surplus with respect to our major trading 
partners in the Far East, with the exception of Indonesia, Malaya, 
Thailand and Ceylon. That export surplus, as I mentioned, applies 
also to the area as a whole. 
The trade deficit which the free nations of Southeast Asia and the 
Far East are experiencing together with their dire need for capital, 
have direct bearing on many of their governmental policies. 
THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN THE FAR EAST 
Most countries in this part of the world have two firm objectives. 
In the first place, they are determined to preserve their political and 
economic independence, not only from the Soviet Union, but also from 
the United States or any other nation. Secondly, they are anxious and 
determined to speed up their own economic development. Foreign 
trade policy is important to them from both points of view. 
The urgent need for substantial amounts of development capital, 
necessary if they are to fulfill the mandate imposed upon them by their 
peoples, often places the governments of these countries in a tough 
spot. Their countries' export earnings are insufficient to pay for con­
sumption imports and development capital from abroad. They are, 
consequently, faced with a dilemma. 
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They may be unable to increase their exports to the nations of 
the Free World for one of many reasons: barriers to expanded foreign 
markets, embargoes, fluctuations in foreign demand, inability to pro­
duce more, and the like. On the other hand, they are reluctant to 
grant any concessions, or to make any commitments to foreign gov­
ernments and to foreign private capital which could be interpreted as 
infringements of their sovereignty. 
To solve this dilemma, they have turned in their search for mar­
kets and for capital to the Communist bloc, adopted various trade re­
strictions, and at times imposed onerous regulations upon foreign 
enterprise within their boundaries. Some of these practices have done 
little to encourage American and Western European capital to par­
ticipate to a greater extent in the economic development and indus­
trialization of this region. 
There is a special factor which the free countries of the Far East 
- and Japan in particular - have had to face, and which is directly
related to the policies of our government. I refer to our embargo on
trade with Red China and Communist Korea, and on our restrictions
on trade in strategic goods with the rest of the Communist bloc.
THE POLITICAL CLIMATE: 
UNITED STATES POSITION 
Our over-all foreign policy is based on the assumption that the 
United States has one real enemy in the world: international Com­
munism. We further believe that the Communists are striving for 
world domination, either through military conquest or through less 
overt, but equally effective programs and policies. 
We have, therefore, used our foreign aid and trade policies to 
halt Communist expansion and to strengthen the free nations of the 
world against Communist subversion and aggression. Further, we 
have used those policies - and particularly our trade policy - to pre­
vent the Communist bloc from receiving any strategic or vital goods 
from the free world. Our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organi­
zation, and other recipients of our Mutual Security assistance, have 
cooperated with us in this embargo on the shipment of strategic goods 
to the Communist bloc. 
It would be unrealistic to presume that the restrictions on trade 
with the Communists, and particularly the total embargo on trade 
with Red China and Communist Korea, have no effect on the free 
nations of Southeast Asia and the Far East. In some instances, these 
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restrictions have disrupted their normal channels of trade, and barred 
them from at least potential markets in contiguous territories dominated 
by the Communists. 
The effect of our foreign assistance and trade policies is parti­
cularly conspicuous when we consider the case of Japan. Industrially 
speaking, Japan is more highly developed than other countries in the 
Far East. Fundamentally, however, the economy of Japan is in a 
sensitive position. Her principal resource is the skill and industrious­
ness of her people. She is greatly dependent on other countries for 
raw materials and for markets. Japan has been called the "Great 
Britain of the Orient." 
If Japan is to survive, and to provide a tolerable plane of living 
for her people, she must export. Southeast Asia, unfortunately, does 
not have the purchasing power to buy the goods which Japan must 
sell. The only other possibilities are to trade with the West - or to 
turn to Red China and Soviet Russia. 
Thus far, Japan has cooperated in refraining from expanding her 
trade with the Communist bloc. At the same time, she has been im­
porting more goods and services from the United States than we pur­
chase from her. In 1956, for instance, Japan exported $547 million 
dollars' worth of goods to the United States, while her imports from 
the United States amounted to $887 million. We had a net export
trade balance with Japan in that year of $340 million. 
By virtue of her strategic position, and her industrial production 
capacity, Japan is important to the United States and to the Free 
World. At the same time, our restrictions on trade with the Com­
munists are necessary from the standpoint of our over-all strategy 
against the Communist menace. A constructive solution to the re­
sulting problem would rest, it would seem to me, on the adoption by 
our country of a more realistic trade policy - a trade program which 
would effectively support our national policy goals not only by restrain­
ing trade with the Communists, but also by vigorously promulgating 
wider trade opportunities within the Free World. 
The United States, working in cooperation with other free nations, 
should strive more actively, it seems to me, to assist Japan in selling 
her merchandise in the free world's markets. This does not mean that 
we should throw our markets open to unlimited quantities of Japanese 
goods. Such a course could hardly be considered as a remedy. I be­
lieve, however, that with some imagination and good will we could 
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evolve some formula that could afford wider Free World market op­
portunities to Japan, at the same time diffusing the competitive effects 
over the entire economy instead of allowing a few vulnerable domestic 
industries to bear the full impact of Japanese exports. 
The political climate in this country toward United States con­
tinued and expanded trade with Asia is characterized by some rigid 
and rather shortsighted attitudes. We use our trade policy, and rather 
effectively, to prevent the Communists from being strengthened in 
their plans for world domination by obtaining strategic goods in the 
Free World. At the same time, we tend to forget at times that trade is 
a two-way street. Our trade policy could use more imagination, and 
more flexibility, in effectively implementing our national security policy 
by actively stimulating trade and investment within the Free World. 
SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR 
UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY 
To this end, I should like to submit some suggestions which, op­
erating within the established framework of our national policy, may 
help to increase private participation in the economic development of 
the free countries of Southeast Asia and the Far East, and to stimulate 
a greater volume of trade with that important region. 
In our democracy, as in many countries of Asia, public opinion 
has an impqrtant effect on government decisions. As our first ob­
jective, therefore, I would suggest that greater effort be exerted to pro­
mote public interest in; and understanding of the· issues and benefits 
which can follow from a well-coordinated trade policy. 
As far as direct government action is concerned, I have two spe­
cific suggestions. 
First, I believe that there is a need for the simplification, and 
better coordination with our allies, of United States restrictions on trade 
with the Communist bloc. At present, the United States system of 
economic defense and strategic trade controls rests on four basic docu­
ments: the Export Control Act, controlling goods which originate in, 
or pass through, the United States, administered by the Department of 
Commerce; the Foreign Assets Control Regulation, governing all trans­
actions with Communist China and North Korea, administered by the 
Treasury Department; the Transaction Control Regulations, govern­
ing all transactions with the Communist-dominated countries of Eastern 
Europe, also administered by the Treasury; and the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Control Act, known as the Battle Act, administered by the 
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International Cooperation Administration. The Battle Act provides for 
the termination of United States military, economic or financial aid to 
countries exporting strategic goods to the Communist bloc. 
The scope of these different controls is extensive, and the maze of 
regulations, licensing requirements, penalties and the like, confronting 
American businessmen interested in doing business with Asia and the 
Far East, is at times discouraging. It seems to me that much of the 
red tape attendant upon the administration of these trade controls could 
be reduced, and that the restrictions which have to be maintained for 
strategic reasons could be simplified and better coordinated with other 
free nations. 
Secondly, I would recommend that our government implement the 
often-expressed conviction that private investment in the Far East and 
in Southeast Asia can appreciably contribute to the attainment of our 
nation's foreign policy objectives. To this end, it would appear ad­
visable to provide closer coordination between our government pro­
grams in that region with the goal of increasing private investment in 
Southeast Asia and in the Far East. A close review of our Federal tax 
policies, relating to business transactions abroad, also seems to be 
indicated. In this respect, the differential treatment of Americans doing 
business, for instance, in South America, as compared with those doing 
business in Southeast Asia and in the Far East, should be reviewed. 
I believe that modern reforms along the lines which I have sug­
gested would help in assuring greater, and more effective, participation 
of private enterprise in the economic development of our friends in 
Southeast Asia and in the Far East. 
OUR ALLIES CAN ALSO CONTRIBUTE 
Action on the part of the United States government, however, 
can achieve only a part of our objectives. In order to encourage pri­
vate enterprise, and foreign trade, to make maximum contribution to 
the economic development of the free nations of Southeast Asia and 
of the Far East, the governments of those nations may wish to review 
and reconsider some of their own policies. 
American businessmen who trade with that area, and who have 
invested there, appear to have three major complaints. First, they are 
somewhat discouraged by quota and other barriers intended to limit 
the importation of foreign consumer goods. Secondly, they complain 
of high taxes, apparently administered at times in an arbitrary manner, 
and of various restrictions imposed by the governments of those coun-
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tries on foreign enterprise operating within their boundaries. And, 
thirdly, they point to problems which arise because of the uncertainty 
about future governmental nationalization policies, and casual attitude 
toward the sanctity of contracts. 
Some steps have already been taken to remedy the situation. I 
am confident that, with patience and good will, even greater progress 
can be achieved in removing these deterrents to wider, more active 
participation of private capital in the important task of developing the 
full economic potential of the free peoples of Southeast Asia and of 
the Far East. 
CONCLUSION 
The technological developments of our age have helped to over­
come the barrier of distance, and brought the United States into much 
closer contact with the free peoples of other continents. Simultaneous­
ly, however, these developments, as well as the military and political 
problems of our era, have greatly increased the interdependence of the 
entire free world. 
In full understanding of our interdependence, we should strive to 
attain an ever higher degree of peaceful cooperation within the Free 
World in solving our mutual problems - be they military or economic 
in nature. 
There is still much to be done to improve the plane of living of 
free men and women everywhere. I am certain, however, that the 
enthusiasm with which the free peoples have tackled this task is one 
of the brightest characteristics of our age. 
If we proceed in an enlightened, realistic manner, I believe that 
the future will have rich rewards in store for all of us. I am particularly 
confident that the United States will find the stimulus to even greater 
progress for our own people in the economic and political advancement 
of our friends across the Pacific. 
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Oceania's place 
in United States foreign trade 
�Varren ]. Holmes 
Manager of Sales, 
Engineering Products 
Al/is-Chalmers International 
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I WILL TRY to brief and point up the overall position of United 
States trade with the total area here under study - Australia, New 
Zealand, Borneo, Singapore, Malaya and Hong Kong. To do this, of 
course, requires some reference to trade statistics. I cannot claim pre­
cise accuracy for the resultant data to be presented. Except for Aus­
tralia and New Zealand, comprehensive trade figures are hard to come 
by. Borneo, Sarawak and the like, do not seem to be too much in­
terested in compiling such material. It can be observed, however, that 
in the broad sense certain relationships can be determined. Further, 
I believe decent conclusions can be drawn. 
Comparing United States trade in the six areas under study with 
our country's Asian trade as a whole gives us a result that is reasonably 
acceptable. But comparing this trade with United States world-wide 
trade, the area, business-wise, takes on much different and smaller 
proportions. 
Trade dollars do not tell the whole story of the strategic materials 
of the area such as its tin, rubber, oil and base metals. Trade dollars 
also take no recognition of the impact resulting from that trade on local 
economies, peoples and politics. Totaling up and reckoning trade dol­
lars, therefore, is simply a means of gauging the pace of business and 
in only one way defines the significance of the commerce involved. 
When considering the total trade of the area under study we should 
keep in mind that all of the political entities are within the sterling 
bloc. They have a general and overall import policy which establishes 
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that hard-currency exchange can only be had for goods which are not 
available from soft-currency areas, and particularly from the sterling 
area. At one time, when there was stringent dollar management, the 
term "not available" was literally interpreted as meaning "physically 
unavailable." Today this has been liberalized somewhat by the import 
authorities sometimes taking into consideration the price, delivery and 
quality of the soft-currency goods vis-a-vis goods from the United 
States. The net result of this liberalization, however, has not meant 
any startling improvement in our exports to these countries. Our 
Malayan trade is a good example. There was a heavy unbalance in 
favor of Malaya at a rate of better than one to four in 1957. Through 
its rubber and tin Malaya has been the strongest dollar earner in the 
sterling bloc. With its independence, there is the hope that Malaya 
will press for greater use of its earnings for purchases in the United 
States - Malaya's best single customer. 
A change in Malaya's buying habits will not substantially alter 
the overall trade pattern of this group. One example points this up. 
In 1956, United States exports to Australia and New Zealand totaled 
about 270 million dollars. We bought from them about 165 million. 
Total trade 435 million dollars. The United Kingdom at the same time 
was selling Australia and New Zealand over 1.1 billion dollars worth 
of goods and rightfully bought about a billion dollars worth of Aus­
tralian and New Zealand products. Total trade, 2.1 billion dollars or 
about five times the volume of business the United States did. There 
is no real basis for believing United States traders will make any sus­
tained inroads into this United Kingdom-Australian-New Zealand trade 
pattern if we count on supply only from the United States. 
To place our trade with Oceania in proper perspective let's con­
sider these latest figures: 
a) Total United States exports to the area were $390 million.
b) Total United States exports to all of the Asiatic countries, as
covered in this volume, were about $2.6 billion.
c) Thus this territory, dominated by British trade, absorbed 15
per cent of our total Asiatic exports.
d) But compare these $390 million with a total United States ex­
port trade of about $19 billion and we find this area accounts
for only slightly more than 2.0 per cent of our country's over­
all export business.
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As for imports : 
a) Total United States imports from the area were $425 million.
b) Total United States imports from all of the Asiatic countries
were $1.85 billion.
c) This group of six entities thereby provided 23 per cent of our
total Asiatic imports.
d) When compared to total United States imports, however, the
area supplied about 3 .4 per cent of our national requirements.
On an overall export-import trade basis, Australia, New Zealand, Bor­
neo, Singapore, Malaya and Hong Kong accounted for just over 2.5 
per cent of our world-wide two-way trade. Not too significant as a 
statistic! But please remember this 2.5 per cent is only a statistic. The 
content of the trade and other considerations have much more meaning. 
To assign a further proportion to our trade with Oceania, let us 
compare it with the business we do with some of our foreign trade 
partners in Latin America. For example, our two-way trade with 
Colombia is in the same class dollar-wise as our trade with Oceania. 
Colombia is much smaller in population and land area. But in Col­
ombian trade the United States takes the dominant role both as a 
buyer and a supplier comparable to that of the United Kingdom in 
Australia and New Zealand. United States' two-way trade with Brazil 
alone or with Cuba alone is about one and a half. times the volume we 
do with all of Oceania. We do about twice as much business with 
Mexico as we do with the six countries of the group under study. And 
one last comparison; United States trade with our number one partner 
in Latin America - Venezuela - is carried on at almost three times 
the dollar volume we do in Oceania. 
United States trade with Latin America does in some measure 
dwarf our business with the countries of Oceania. But American 
foreign traders cannot stand by and hope good things will just happen 
to them in the area. Here is a statistic that deserves our consideration. 
The global imports from all sources of this group of six countries 
reached an interesting 4.7 billion dollars in 1956. The United States 
having sold only 390 million dollars worth of this total means we only 
obtained about 8 per cent of the business available. We ought to be 
looking for ways and means to improve our national position. We 
know who is getting the bulk of that business - the United Kingdom. 
And they are doing it primarily via a money blockade. There is one 
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sure way of running such a blockade and that is to be equipped to 
operate in the currencies available. 
Many United States companies are already on the move in that 
direction. They are either supplying the market from United Kingdom 
facilities or they have set up in Austraila as my company has. The 
value of such an investment is not necessarily measured in terms of 
the profit return on the investment itself. We have found that once we 
start up in a country this operation stimulates trade, in other of our 
product lines, between the factories in the United States and the foreign 
country of our new operation. In effect, we begin to sell more Milwau­
kee-made goods in the country in which we have made the investment. 
Additionally, we can ship products from the new operation to third 
country areas to which we could not previously sell from Milwaukee. 
At the time of making a foreign investment the question arises, 
of course, as to the remission of profits in dollars to the parent com­
pany. It is the usual practice that new manufacturing operations in 
foreign countries must receive the sanction of the foreign governments. 
At that time arrangements are made for the remission of profits in 
dollars. It isn't always possible to get a firm guarantee as to the avail­
ability of dollars for this purpose. But in any event it has been our 
experience, up to this time, that we do not accumulate enough in the 
way of profits to allow for remittances to the parent company. Our 
capital requirements for foreign operations have regularly been beyond 
our foreign earnings. The day can be expected, however, when profit 
dollars will be returned to the United States. 
Given reasonable conditions and stability, United States business 
- just as we and others are doing - will be prepared to use its capital,
its talents and its machinery to the benefit of the host country. De­
cisions to move in are not easily made at this time. But it would seem
we are approaching the point of whether to jump now or later. This
may not be the propitious "now" but the day will come when United
States business, if it is to fully participate in the important Oceania
trade, will have to become resident in the area. We think the future
and the prospects are great - and we are betting our money on it!
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United States trade 
with Australia and New Zealand 
Allen G. B. Fisher 
Chief Editor, 
International Monetary Fund 
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FOR MANY YEARS the most important exports of Australia and New 
Zealand have been wool and wheat, dairy produce and meat, fruits, 
and certain minerals such as lead. The experience of both these coun­
tries shows that a high degree of dependence in international trade upon 
primary products is quite consistent with the establishment, and, in­
deed, with the steady improvement, of high standards of average real 
income. Standards of living in Australia and New Zealand compare 
very favorably with those in the most advanced industrialized countries. 
Indeed, if the distribution of the working population can be taken as 
a reliable criterion, Australia and New Zealand might themselves be 
regarded as already fairly highly industrialized. The proportion of the 
total working population that earns its income from farming and other 
primary production in Australia and New Zealand is now less than 20 
per cent. It is, however, mainly in relation to production of this kind 
that Australia and New Zealand have the greatest comparative natural 
advantages. The concentration of their export trade upon the goods 
mentioned above is thus entirely in accord with the principle that the 
concrete details of the trade relations between any two countries al­
ways depend in the first place upon the conditions which make it ad­
vantageous in each of the countries concerned to specialize in one or 
another type of production. The importance of the part played by 
these commodities in the economic life of Australia and New Zealand 
is a natural consequence of the natural conditions of these countries -
their climate, soil, temperature, mineral resources and the like. And on 
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the foundations thus laid by nature, the ingenuity of men has, by the 
application of the results of scientific research, built a highly efficient 
structure of production. 
History too, however, is usually important in determining where 
a country's exports shall be sold. To some extent it may be a matter 
of chance where exporters first find a satisfactory market outlet for 
their products. But after a trading link has once been established and 
been proved to be mutually satisfactory, the mere fact of its existence 
creates at least a presumption that it will be continued, whatever may 
have been the original reasons for building it up. Buyers and sellers 
who have become accustomed to mutually beneficial commercial re­
lations are not likely suddenly to change their habits. The exports of 
Australia and New Zealand will obviously most easily find a market in 
countries whose consumption habits and standards of living create a 
brisk demand for them. But which of these countries actually pro­
vides the best export outlet has inevitably been much influenced by 
the history of Australia and New Zealand, countries which were colon­
ized more than a century ago mainly by immigrants from the United 
Kingdom, and accustomed at many stages of their history to being large­
ly financed by capital imports from the same source. It was natural 
for these immigrants to deal first with their friends in the country of 
their origin, and today the United Kingdom still provides the largest 
export market for both Australia and New Zealand. In recent years 
around 30 to 40 per cent of Australian exports have been sold in the 
United Kingdom; the corresponding ratio for New Zealand's exports has 
been close to two-thirds. The habit of buying British goods is also at 
least as firmly rooted in Australia and New Zealand as the habit of 
buying Australian wool and New Zealand butter is in the United 
Kingdom. During the last few years between 40 and 50 per cent of 
Australia's imports have come from the United Kingdom, and for New 
Zealand, the percentage has been around 55. 
Whatever "natural" tendency there may have been for Australia 
and New Zealand to cultivate close trading relations with the United 
Kingdom, this tendency has been considerably strengthened by two 
deliberate acts of policy. First, during the Great Depression of the 
thirties, when export markets everywhere were shrinking, there was a 
desperate endeavor in every part of the world to build up protective 
walls around such markets as were still open. For the British Com­
monwealth this endeavor took the form of the organized system of 
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imperial preference embodied in the Ottawa Agreement of 1932. Both 
Australia and New Zealand had already, for a number of years before 
that time, granted significant tariff preferences designed to increase the 
proportion of their imports that were purchased in the United Kingdom. 
At Ottawa an effort was made to systematize these preferential arrange­
ments, and to extend them so that Commonwealth exports would also 
receive preferential tariff treatment in the United Kingdom. The drive 
for the extension of imperial preference came at that time mainly 
from the Dominions, which were faced with the consequences of 
catastrophic falls in the prices of their staple exports. It was indeed 
always doubtful whether there was not some tendency to exaggerate 
the advantages likely to accrue from preferential tariff treatment for 
exports such as wheat, of which the total volume produced by the 
Commonwealth countries was so great that a substantial part of it had 
to find a market somewhere else. It has since been more widely un­
derstood that in some circumstances an apparently simple straight­
forward preference may be rather delusive. It would be rash to gen­
eralize confidently about the current balance of public opinion on im­
perial preference. Some of the export preferences which have been 
granted to the Dominions still give them significant advantages. Some 
recent discussions, however, leave the impression that enthusiasm for 
the maintenance of imperial preference is now more evident in the 
United Kingdom, where it can be regarded as a means for maintaining 
steady market outlets for some United Kingdom manufactures. 
Since the outbreak of World War II a second important influence 
'has affected the geographical distribution of Australian and New Zea­
land trade. During the war it was an urgent necessity for all the mem­
bers of the British Commonwealth that demands for goods that had to 
be paid for in currencies other than sterling did not exceed the limited 
supplies of these currencies, and in particular of United States dollars, 
that were then available. All the members of the sterling area ac­
cordingly agreed that during the war they would apply similar measures 
of exchange control so that the foreign exchange available at any time 
to the sterling area should be spent in the most efficient way. These 
sterling area arrangements were maintained after the end of the war, 
when earnings of foreign currencies, and in particular of United States 
dollars, were still far from sufficient to pay for all the imports that 
otherwise might have been thought desirable. The same basic exchange 
controls are still in operation today, though, as world trading condi-
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tions have improved, their rigor has been much relaxed and there is no 
longer the sharp distinction that once existed between the restrictions 
imposed on imports from dollar countries and those imposed on other 
imports. The general effect of these controls has been to limit in vary­
ing degrees the freedom of importers to do business with the United 
States and other parts of the dollar area, while trade with countries in 
the sterling area and with other parts of the world where payment in 
sterling is acceptable has been much freer. 
This is the general background within which the development of 
United States trade with Australia and New Zealand should be examined. 
Even for a dynamic growing economy it is obviously important to 
avoid, if possible, any sudden collapse of old traditional trade channels. 
The trade problems that are really important for such an economy. 
however, if its growth is to be rapid and effective, are those which are 
directly related to the conditions under which relatively new trade con­
nections might be developed. The actual marginal trade expansion, 
upon which economic growth largely depends, may not be very large 
in comparison with the total which includes the old reliable stand-bys, 
the continuance of most of which can be taken for granted. Its real 
significance, however, is not adequately indicated by its size. What 
happens at the margin of expansion will to a substantial extent deter­
mine the health of the economy as a whole. Neither Australia nor 
New Zealand has lost interest in the possibility of further expansion 
of their United Kingdom trade, and it would obviously be very foolish 
for them to do so. At the moment, one of New Zealand's most press­
ing concerns is the current threat to the maintenance of its dairy prod­
uce exports to the United Kingdom. On any long-run view of eco­
nomic development, however, steadily increasing attention should be 
paid to the development of the trade of the two countries with the rest 
of the world outside the British Commonwealth. There has been grow­
ing interest in the expansion of markets on the continent of Europe and 
in Asia, and, as both Australia and New Zealand still find that dollars 
are harder to earn than sterling, their trading relations with the United 
States necessarily have special importance in this development. 
When we seek to examine the influences which have hampered 
and still hamper expansion of trade with the United States, we shall 
find that we are also in fact probing into the problems raised by the 
criticisms frequently made in this country both of the sterling area as it 
operates today and of the policy of imperial preference. At least in 
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broad outline United States policy has as a major objective the restora­
tion over as wide a field as possible of a freely functioning multilateral 
system of international trade. The sterling area and imperial preference 
have often been regarded as obstacles to the attainment of this ob­
jective. Many people in Australia and New Zealand would agree that 
a multilateral trading system is a proper objective for international 
policy. The adjustments that would be necessary in the world as it 
exists today if the attempt were made to adapt policy to the requirements 
of a pure multilateral system would, however, in their view be much 
too disturbing to be contemplated in any immediate future. It is im­
portant to understand the facts that are held to justify this attitude. 
There has, of course, always been a significant volume of trade be­
tween the United States on the one side and Australia and New Zealand 
on the other. There has often also been a tendency for the volume of 
United States exports to these countries to exceed substantially the 
volume of their exports to the United States. Australian exports to the 
United States have recently averaged around $126 million per annum, 
nearly 7 per cent of Australia's total exports, and imports from the 
United States have averaged around $200 million, or some 12 per cent 
of Australia's total imports. The trend in New Zealand has been more 
irregular, with exports to the United States in some years well above 
New Zealand's imports from that country. During the five-year period 
1952-56 New Zealand's exports to the United States averaged about 
$50 million per annum, rather more than 7 per cent of total exports, 
and slightly exceeded the average annual value of New Zealand's im-
. ports from the United States. But, in neither Australia nor New Zea­
land is the volume of imports from the United States as great as it 
would be if purchases could be made freely, unimpeded by trade bar­
riers and import restrictions of various kinds. Some of these barriers 
and restrictions have been erected on the Australian and New Zealand 
side. These will be examined in another part of our discussion. They 
are not unimportant, but it is not unfair to direct attention particularly 
to the barriers on the United States side. In the present state of world 
economy, the ability of Australia and New Zealand to increase their 
purchases in the United States depends very much on their success in 
selling an increasing volume of their export products in countries which 
pay United States dollars for them. And far and away the most im­
portant of the markets in which dollars are paid for imports is the 
market in the United States itself. 
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In considering the directions in which outlets might be sought for 
the expansion of their international trade, Australia and New Zealand 
have already been giving increasingly serious attention to exports of 
certain manufactured goods. Australia is pressing in this direction in 
its trade with some of the Asian countries, and New Zealand has am­
bitions, for which there is a good foundation, ultimately to become an 
important exporter of woodpulp and woodpulp products. However 
important these trends may be for long-run general economic develop­
ment, they have little significance in relation to the expansion of trade 
with the United States, where in nearly every kind of manufacturing 
activity the domestic producer has very great competitive advantages. 
If Australian and New Zealand exports to the United States are to be 
expanded, they will certainly for many years be in the form of primary 
products. The exporter must always be alert to the necessity of adapt­
ing his product to the changing requirements of his market. It may be 
that the kind of product that is suitable for the United States market 
is not precisely the same as Australian and New Zealand exporters 
have been in the habit of sending abroad, but when all the necessary 
adjustments have been made, most of any expansion that may take place 
during the next few years in their exports to the United States will 
probably be in exports of the same staple items as have dominated the 
trade of these countries in the past. 
It is obviously in the interests of Australia and New Zealand to 
increase their dollar earnings, and thus make it easier to increase their 
dollar imports and at the same time to diminish and eventually to eli­
minate the discrimination against dollar imports that is at present be­
lieved to be unavoidable. There is nothing mysterious or esoteric about 
the impediments which, according to Australian and New Zealand 
views, are slowing down the desirable trend. The two sore points 
which invariably arise in discussions of this question are the United 
States tariff and the United States policy of agricultural surplus disposal. 
The concern frequently expressed about the tariff is not confined to 
actual tariff rates or to details of tariff administration. Several of the 
customs duties payable on some of the most important exports from 
Australia and New Zealand are at present of no great importance. There 
is, however, often a fear, which a careful reading of current United 
States tariff history does nothing to allay, that it may be risky for an 
exporter to be highly successful. If he penetrates too deeply into the 
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United States market, the pressure to exclude him by raising the tariff 
against him may become irresistible. 
The wide variety of problems which have to be faced in expand­
ing Australian and New Zealand trade with the United States may be 
conveniently illustrated by brief comments on the position of wool, of 
dairy produce, of meat and of lead. We shall conclude with a reference 
to agricultural surplus disposal which affects mainly wheat for Australia 
and dairy produce for New Zealand. 
For both Australia and New Zealand, wool is much the most im­
portant export. In recent years it has accounted for about half the 
total value of Australian exports. In New Zealand, the proportion has 
been about one-third. The great long-term question for wool producers 
is the relation of their product to synthetic substitutes. There has been 
a good deal of intelligent adaptation to the problems created by the 
invention of substitutes, and in some postwar years wool growers have 
done very well. In contrast with some other primary products, the 
marketing of wool is still organized on strictly competitive lines, most 
of the output being disposed of at auctions in Australia and New Zea­
land to which buyers come from all parts of the world. The reports of 
these auctions make frequent references to the activities and influence 
of United States buyers, and wool has often accounted for more than 
90 per cent qf the total value of Australian exports to the United States. 
United States demand for wool is, however, obviously always to some 
extent influenced by the United States tariff on imports of wool. In 
194 7, the United States duty on finer wools was reduced by 25 per 
· cent, from 34 cents per pound, established in the Hawley-Smoot tariff
in 1930, to 25 .50 cents. A substantial stream of trade flows over this
barrier; it does not, however, for that reason cease to be a barrier.
For New Zealand, exports of dairy produce, and particularly of 
butter and cheese, are only slightly less important than exports of wool. 
They constitute about 30 per cent of the total. For Australia, the ratio 
has been around 6 per cent. Here, straightforward customs duties are 
for the most part low and of no great importance. Much more signi­
ficant and effective as a check upon any increase of sales in the United 
States market has been the imposition of import quotas, the purpose 
of which is to prevent the entry into the United States of imports that 
might endanger the support prices that have been accorded to pro­
ducers of dairy products. The quotas are generally related to the 
volume of imports in some standard period, which may mean a period 
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back in the thirties. The quotas have to be arbitrarily fixed when they 
are to be applied to a new product for which no standard reference 
period can be found in the past. The allocation of quotas, combined 
with a vigorous marketing policy, has given New Zealand a substantial 
fraction of the permitted United States imports of dairy produce. The 
quantities involved are, however, quite small in comparison with either 
total United States consumption of dairy products, or with New Zea­
land's exports to other countries. The system, moreover, comes pretty 
close to imposing a complete ban on the further expansion of trade, 
including the development of market possibilities for new and improved 
products. 
Meat accounts for nearly one-quarter of New Zealand's exports� 
For Australia, the proportion is about 7 per cent. As for dairy produce, 
customs duties are not at present a serious problem. There has been 
more trouble in adapting the New Zealand and Australian products to 
the requirements of the United States sanitary and health regulations, 
to which both imported and domestically produced meat are required 
to conform. There is obviously every reason for exporters to make 
themselves thoroughly familiar with the regulations imposed in the 
country where they hope to sell their exports. So long as there is no 
reason for suspecting that the real motive behind sanitary or health 
regulations is protective, there can indeed be no serious criticism of 
them. In the last resort, the customer is entitled to decide what he 
wants, and in this case he makes his decision through the medium of 
sanitary and health regulations enforced by law. In relation to such 
a commodity as meat, however, a good deal of discretion is necessarily 
left to the inspectors, and this may mean that trade seems to be sub­
jected to arbitrary and unpredictable decisions. Difficulties that seemed 
acute some time ago are, however, being gradually overcome. Sub­
ject to the penalties to which too successful exporters may expose them­
selves, the current prospects for trade in meat are reported to be 
encouraging. 
Australia's exports of base metals amount to rather more than 5 
per cent of her total exports. Of these, lead is the second most im­
portant dollar earner, bringing in recently around $20 million a year. 
The claims which are currently being pressed upon the United States 
administration for an increase in the import duty on lead have an ob­
vious relevance for forecasts of Australia's capacity to increase its 
dollar earnings. 
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It is not at all easy to make practical suggestions about what might 
or ought to be done to deal with these problems, and perhaps in any 
event this is not the place to make any such attempt. Even where 
changes in commercial policy receive serious attention, the fashion 
these days favors nothing more radical than piecemeal amendments of 
the current practice, the effects of which are nearly always difficult to 
summarize in a crisp, brief statement. For the purposes of the present 
discussion, it is sufficient to outline the facts as they are at the present 
time. 
Finally, something should be said about the problem of agricul­
tural surplus disposal. This problem has little bearing upon any direct 
trading relations between the United States and Australia and New 
Zealand. It may have, however, a very important bearing upon the 
trading relations of Australia and New Zealand with third countries, 
and therefore with the prospects for rebuilding a sound structure of 
multilateral trade. There has developed in the United States a sub­
stantial surplus of agricultural produce which cannot be sold here at 
the prices guaranteed to producers by the government. Various means 
have therefore been sought to dispose of these surpluses elsewhere on 
more or less favorable terms. These disposal efforts may constitute an 
alarming threat to other potential competitors who would like them­
selves to operate in the same markets and are eager to do so on strictly 
competitive terms. The problem is certainly not an exclusively United 
States problem. Today there are few, if any, countries prepared to al­
low their agricultural production to develop on strictly competitive 
lines. Everywhere the interests of some sections of the farming popu­
lation have been protected by devices of one kind or another, and the 
emergence of surplus production is merely one symptom of this phi­
losophy. Criticisms of United States policy should, moreover, be tem­
pered by the recollection that to some extent the growth of agricultural 
surpluses in the United States was a consequence of the strenuous ef­
forts made to solve the special problems of widespread war and postwar 
food shortages. If these efforts had not been made, the course of world 
recovery from the dislocations inflicted by the war would have been 
much less satisfactory. Even today there are still many countries 
where the standards of food consumption are deplorably low, and 
humanitarian sentiment can scarcely withhold approval from action 
taken to relieve famine and malnutrition. However, it cannot be 
seriously maintained that such considerations as this today constitute 
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the most important force behind the surplus disposal program. The 
program is, in fact, a direct result of measures taken primarily to pro­
tect the interests of domestic farmers. Such protection may be a 
legitimate objective of public policy, but the steps taken to implement 
it naturally cause concern in other countries where it is felt that some 
of the benefits which normally they might have expected to enjoy as 
a result of productive activity based on strict attention to efficiency 
may be frustrated by the unpredictable gifts or near-gifts of a surplus 
disposal program. If the United States sells wheat or dairy produce 
on favorable terms in countries where the Australian or New Zealand 
exporter is trying to build up a market on a sound competitive basis, the 
effects upon Australian and New Zealand trade as a whole may be not 
unlike the direct effects of a high United States tariff or a prohibitive 
import quota. A thorough discussion of this problem would carry us 
far beyond the reasonable limits of this paper. It should be sufficient 
here to register the fact that it is a real problem, and that the per­
sistence of Australian and New Zealand criticisms of the policy adopted 
by the United States should not be interpreted as implying any in­
sensitivity to the urgency of the needs of the poorer countries which 
are sometimes in part satisfied by surplus disposal transactions. 
The essence of the situation, from the standpoint of Australia and 
New Zealand, may be summed up as follows. The United States is 
often concerned to proclaim to the rest of the world the virtues of free 
enterprise. It preaches the gospel of efficiency. If the tenets of this 
gospel are thoroughly digested and applied, it is implied, all other 
things will be added unto you, and your international trade troubles 
will disappear. Australia and New Zealand find, however, that when 
it comes to detailed questions of trade with the United States, their 
efforts to apply the gospel of efficiency do not receive an unqualified 
welcome. No one can reasonably expect a sudden reversal of policy 
trends which have now been powerful for many years, but it is not 
unreasonable to press for a gradual movement away from the hamper­
ing limitations that in the United States have been placed on effective 
market responses to efficient production elsewhere. 
27 
' 

Progress 
in Commonwealth East Asia 
and American trade prospects 
Frank H. H. King 
Economist, 
Chinese Economic and Political Studies Program, 
Harvard University 
29 . 
COMMONWEAL TH East Asia comprises six distinct political entities 
- the sovereign Federation of Malaya, the British protected state of
Brunei and the Crown colonies of Hong Kong, North Borneo, Sarawak
and Singapore. As we survey the over-all problem of American trade
with Asia, the $3 million worth of trade which, for example, North
Borneo had with the United States in 1956 might hardly seem worth
discussion.1 Yet each of these territories is a potentially expanding
�rket, each has its own economic hopes, its plans, and its problems 
and in each American trade and investment may play a role which, to 
the territory itself, could well be vital. 
Commonwealth East Asia has a tradition, inspired by the British, 
of free enterprise. The fulfillment of the peoples' desire to modernize, 
to industrialize and to enjoy the high standards of living which such 
progress promises has been planned within the context of this demo­
cratic and liberal economic philosophy. The nationalism which has 
inspired the Federation's course to independence or Merdeka, which is 
causing unrest in Singapore, and which is awakening even in the more 
undeveloped areas of Borneo, is not essentially unfriendly to Western 
enterprise nor fanatically exclusive. American investors and traders 
have been invited to play a role in the economic development of this 
The author wishes to acknowledge the facilities made available to him through 
his association with the Center for East Asian Studies, Harvard University. 
In preparing this paper he has been kindly assisted by last minute observa­
tions from the governments concerned and also from the Bureau of Foreign 
Commerce of the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
1 Figures in this paper have been rounded for ease of presentation. More ac­
curate statistics are available in the statistical sources cited in the bibliogra­
phy. All figures are from government sources, the United Nations' ECAFE 
Economic Survey or from U.S. Department of Commerce publications. 
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area, and they will surely gain, as will all the world, from the higher 
standards of living which the people of Commonwealth East Asia 
eventually achieve. 
I shall devote the major part of my paper to the Federation of 
Malaya, and, secondly, to Singapore. I shall group the three Borneo 
territories next and, finally, discuss the economically important city­
state of Hong Kong with its flourishing industries and entrepot trade. 
I 
The basis of the Federation of Malaya's economic prosperity and 
growth is to be found in her current five-year plan, which calls for a 
total capital expenditure of $376 million, including $43 million for 
defense and unallocated reserves, and a consequent recurrent expendi­
ture of $30 million by 1960. This plan is typical of those of the other 
Commonwealth territories in that it is designed to provide the economic 
and social overheads without which, under present world conditions, 
rapid economic development would be unlikely and private investment 
would be unprofitable. 2 
The development plan allocates $333 million to economic and 
social development of which 58 per cent is for the economic sector, 
with priority for those primary industries which are responsible for 
the country's relatively high income. Rubber replanting schemes re­
ceive the largest single allocation. Replanting with improved stock 
and new planting of rubber are projects designed to increase national 
income; but stability through diversification is also a goal, and re­
planting includes the use of alternative crops including cacao, coconuts, 
coffee, oil palms, hemp, paddy, pepper, pineapples, ramie and tea. The 
government also intends to encourage stability by reorganizing the rub­
ber market to prevent unnecessary speculation, while research by the 
industry should continue the series of improvements both in quantity 
and quality with the expectation that the market for the natural product 
2 Hong Kong does not have a development plan as such, but it has a program of 
rural improvement and a series of individual public works projects which 
are, in fact, a development scheme. The government of Hong Kong appears 
to dislike the term "plan," but an economist cannot help but question 
whether the colony's present prosperity was not in some sense planned, even 
though the role of private enterprise was basic and vital. For details of the 
plans see The Colombo Plan (Sixth annual report), Cmnd 315, (H.M.S.O., 
1957) and the Report on Economic Planning in the Federation of Malaya, 
(Kuala Lumpur, 1957). 
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will consequently improve while costs are kept competitive.3 The tin in­
dustry has been hampered by the activities of Communist terrorists but 
conditions are rapidly improving. Production, however, is regulated by 
Malaya's adherence to the International Tin Agreement. 
The government also plans improvements in drainage and irriga­
tion, in the road and railroad network, in port improvement and tele­
communciations. A hydroelectric scheme to generate up to 85,000 kw 
is dependent upon current negotiations with the International Bank. 4 
Of the $106 million allocated to the social sector, 32 per cent is for 
improvements in education, housing and health, with $32 million going 
to education alone, a basic prerequisite for an industrial labor force. 
How does this ambitious program affect the United States? 
The investment policy of the Federation has been stated as follows: 
To encourage and safeguard the investment and re-investment of 
local and overseas capital required to promote this expansion not 
only of secondary industries but also of primary export industries 
on which the general prosperity of the country depends. The gov­
ernment will welcome the assistance of overseas capital in such 
development, particularly in fields of industry in which local 
capital an� technical knowledge are at present insufficient. The 
governinent will especially welcome industrial projects in which 
overseas capital is associated with local capital. 5 
This policy statement should be read in conjunction with the De­
velopment Plan and with the other concrete steps the Federation is 
taking to encourage investment. The Colombo Plan is providing an 
3 Rubber output is already reported as increasing due to the production of higher 
yielding trees. "Malayan Business Uptrend Retarded," Foreign Commerce 
Weekly, January 13, 1958. Some 1.5 million acres have been earmarked 
for new planting under the five-year plan, but as noted in the text some 
former rubber areas may be replanted with other crops to implement the 
diversification program. 
4 In 1956 total Federation production of electricity, including purchases from 
Singapore, was 82 million kw hours. Singapore production was 36 million 
kw hours. For details on Federation loans, see Foreign Commerce Weekly, 
January 13, 1958. 
5 A statement by H. E. Dr. Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman, Malayan ambassa­
dor to the United States, when he was minister for commerce and industry, 
quoted in Foreign Commerce Weekly, August 26, 1957. 
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Industrial Development Advisor.0 The federal government will co­
operate with the state governments in the planning of industrial estates 
and factory sites. 7 They will promote research facilities and are now 
establishing an Industrial Development Finance Corporation with an 
initial capital of $5 million to provide medium and long term loans to 
new industry. 8 Tax exemption on the income and dividends of certain
new industries for five years, exchange provision for the remission of 
profits and the repatriation of capital are additional financial induce­
rnents. 9 And, with a wider view, the prime minister of the Federation 
has proposed that undeveloped Asian nations draw up a joint charter 
guaranteeing "justice, rights and interests" for private foreign investors. 10 
The trade statistics of the Federation of Malaya include those for 
the Crown colony of Singapore. Total Malayan exports for 1957 were 
$1.39 billion; imports totaled $1.46 billion, an unfavorable balance more 
than covered by the income from invisibles.n The United States share 
of this trade in 1957 was 4 per cent of the imports or $55 million and 
5 per cent of the exports or $64 million. Our share in Malaya's im­
port trade has been fairly stable over the past few years, but the value 
of her exports depends upon the prices of tin and rubber. The most 
important items of our export trade to Malaya appear to be: petroleum 
6 The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and 
Southeast Asia is not a development plan in the sense usually understood, 
but rather a coordinating concept through which member nations can discuss 
their national plans, receive from other members economic and technical 
assistance, and consider common problems. By June 30th, 1957 the United 
States had given assistance to Colombo Plan nations of over $3 billion, none 
of which was allocated to the nations discussed in this paper. Now that the 
Federation is sovereign, it may seek aid outside the Commonwealth. 
7 Under the federal constitution, land is a subject reserved for state legislation. 
However, there is a National Land Council and there are other constitu­
tional provisions to allow the federal government sufficient power to acquire 
land for approved development schemes. 
8 Malayan Bulletin, February 25, 1958. The capital is mainly supplied from 
non-government sources. 
9 Cf. Interim Statement of Industrial Development Policy, No. 30, 1957. See
also the Pioneer Industries (Encouragement) Ordinance, No. 13, 1957 for 
the Colony of Sarawak. 
10 Report in the Christian Science Monitor. H. E. Dr. Ismail bin Dato Abdul 
Rahman's paper printed in this collection, provides the latest and most 
authoritative position of the federation government on foreign investment. 
11 Balance of payments data are not available for any of the territories involved. 
However, estimates for Malaya were made by the International Bank Mis­
sion in their The Economic Development of Malaya (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1955). 
33 
products, $4.6 million; fabrics, both cotton and synthetic, $4.3 million; 
tractors and tractor parts, $3.7 million; cigarettes, $3.4 million; and 
oranges, waste paper, paperboard and old newspapers, detergents, parts 
for construction, hoisting, conveying and mining machinery, air condi­
tioning units, refrigerators, fountain pens, and other metal manufac­
tures. We are also successful in selling excavating and levelling ma­
chinery, accounting and calculating machinery, tin plate waste and sci­
entific equipment. 
The direction of Malaya's trade has shown no important changes 
in the past five years. Eighteen per cent of Malaya's imports come from 
the United Kingdom and 38 per cent from Sterling Area countries. Some 
60 per cent originate in Asia and the Far East. China accounts for 4 
per cent; Japan, for 6 per cent. Malaya's economic connections with 
the United Kingdom, including direct British investment in the country 
and the sterling basis of the currency, explain in part the important 
role played by the United Kingdom in her trade. There is no reason 
to suppose that this pattern will change solely for political reasons. 
Malaya's import trade with China is mainly in foodstuffs, but 
manufactured goods from the mainland, selling far below cost, are 
finding their way into the markets of Southeast Asia. For example, in 
1957 China shipped $125 thousand worth of sewing machines into 
Malaya. These· goods have an initial fascination for the Chinese con­
sumer, who, regardless of his political affiliations or his loyalties to 
Malaya, is quite naturally proud of the achievements of fellow-Chinese 
on the mainland. Thus far, however, the shipments have more political 
· than economic significance and do not as yet appear to constitute a
threat to America's Malayan trade.12
Japan's exports of fabrics to Malaya totalled $36 million in 1957 
compared with $4 million from the United States and $3 million from 
China. Galvanized sheets worth $7 million and sewing machines worth 
$2 million were imported from Japan. There is competition in East 
12 As noted below in the section on Hong Kong, China is exporting not only for 
prestige but also for foreign exchange. However, the initial attraction of her 
products rests in part upon nationalistic sentiments, on pride in the fact 
that China is at last competing with the industrial nations. Recently China 
and the Soviet Union bought up Malaya's growing rubber stocks (Foreign 
Commerce Weekly, January 13, 1958), and the United States may expect to 
see Malaya's trade with mainland China expanding, although lack of foreign 
exchange will limit China's ability to continue her rubber purchases unless 
political factors dominate her policy. 
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Asia between the United States and Japan for certain types of capital 
equipment, but Japan is unable to supply all needs, and Japanese in­
vestment in Malayan development may even mean an increased demand 
for American goods. 
Singapore and Penang are free ports, but the Federation levies 
duties the intensity of which for 1956 imports was 16 per cent. At 
present the tariff, which may be increased, is for revenue only, but the 
government is considering tariff protection for local industries.13 
Although administered separately, Singapore has always been in­
tegrated economically with the Federation. To a great extent this is 
still the situation, but the Federation is now sovereign and it is ap­
parent that certain readjustments in the economic relations of the two 
terriories will be attemped. Singapore, however, must continue as an 
important port for the Federation, since the new port developments 
there are only sufficient to keep up with the normal increase in trade. 14 
The role of Singapore as a banking center for Malaya and the future 
of the now uniform monetary system will depend upon decisions soon 
to be taken relative to the founding of a Malayan central bank or 
banks.15 
1a American investors and traders should also know that income tax is at 40 per 
cent for incomes of $11,700 or over. See (Foreign Commerce Weekly, 
November 20, 1956). Tax policy in the past been generally pan-Malayan, 
because of the free communication between the Federation and Singapore. 
If regulations restrictive of Singapore-Federation commercial relations 
should be increased, however, the Federation would be freer to pursue its 
own tax policy. 
u Singapore has traditionally served as the wholesale distributing center for
Johore and certain other southern Malayan districts. For example, the 
currency note requirements of Iohore banks were met from Singapore 
rather than Kuala Lumpur. If taxes and immigration restrictions are in­
creased, however, this pattern may be changed, and Iohore Bahru itself may 
become more important as a commercial center. Already industrial expan­
sion has been reported; see note 19 below. 
15 For additional information on this subject, see G. M. Watson and Sir Sidney 
Caine, Report on the Establishment of a Central Bank in Malaya (Kuala 
Lumpur, 1956); P. W. Sherwood, "The Watson-Caine Report on the Estab­
lishment of a Central Bank in Malaya," The Malayan Economic Review, 
II, 1 (April, 1957) and my "Notes on Malayan Monetary Problems," ibid, 
III, 1 (April, 1958). Although different currencies would be unnecessarily 
costly and confusing, there is no reason why their basic soundness should be 
destroyed or why they could not be kept at a relationship which varied 
within the limits now set by the cost of internal transfers. No concrete 
steps have been taken to implement this report; the Federation's Central 
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Singapore trade has already been considered in pan-Malayan terms. 
Focussing now on local problems of the colony's economy, it is ap­
parent that the small size of the territory and the peculiar political 
problems make sound development essential. Yet the future is un­
certain. Her entrepot trade is dependent in large measure on political 
considerations, and many of the new nations of Southeast Asia would 
prefer to keep their trade out of the hands of the Singapore middle­
man. The prohibition of the Indonesian barter trade alone is said to 
be costing the port some $10 million in trade this year. 16 Unless un­
reasoning nationalism is absolute, however, the economically strategic 
position of Singapore combined with her financial and other commercial 
facilities, including extensive harbor improvement schemes, insures that 
the colony will continue as an important entrepot port and that large 
shipments to Southeast Asia will be broken down there for distribution 
to the secondary ports of the Federation, to British Borneo, Vietnam 
and Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia and Burma.17 
The Singapore government's development plan has not been pub­
lished in the same detail as has that of the Federation. However, its 
spirit is the same, and it includes such projects as improvement of the 
harbor and the Singapore river, the expansion of electricity, water, gas, 
telephone, sewagl? disposal and flood prevention facilities, low cost 
housing, building and improvement of roads, the building of schools 
and hospitals, and agricultural and industrial research and training. 
The stage, at least, is being set for economic expansion and industrial 
Banking advisor (Mr. Willcock, formerly of the Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia) has only recently been appointed. 
1a This estimate is given in the Malayan Bulletin, January 25, 1958. Presumably, 
it assumes that the order will be enforced. 
17 Singapore-Indonesian relations have not been good, and Indonesia has been 
reported to be buying from, e.g. African suppliers, goods which were in 
Singapore and which were shipped to Indonesia via an African port. The 
origin of the goods was not realized! However, this antipathy to the mid• 
dleman is not confined to Indonesia; in fact, it is one basis of the antagon­
ism between the Federation and Singapore. It is a manifestation of the old 
conflict between city and country. Many Federation politicians would like 
to see the head offices of companies dealing with Malaya moved from 
Singapore to the Federation, and all shipments diverted to Federation 
ports. They would prefer to have a Federation central bank and currency, 
and a wholly Federation tax system. Many of these moves would be costly 
not only to Singapore but also to the Federation, and, in many cases, practi­
cal considerations will prevent their implementation. But the trend should 
be noted and watched. 
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development. But it is in the field of industrial development that 
Singapore faces further difficulties. Labor unrest has discouraged long­
term investment and capital has moved to Hong Kong.18 The political 
trend is not encouraging for the private sector, and the possibility of 
Federation protective tariffs account for a tendency to consider indus­
trial expansion in the Federation rather than in Singapore, despite the 
latter's cheaper access to overseas markets.19 These negative factors 
must, however, be weighed against the many positive features of the 
colony's economy its capital resources, the availability of its labor 
force, its commercial connections and the proved success of several new 
industrial enterprises. 
Based upon this general survey of the Malayan economy, I shall 
now make several comments on specific problems which appear to be 
of interest to American investors and traders. 
Although Malayan development programs are based on a liberal 
economic philosophy and upon the concrete heritage of such British 
accomplishments as rule of law at one extreme and good railways at 
the other, the peninsula has also inherited an economy heavily de­
pendent upon the fortunes of natural rubber and tin. In this sense it 
is economically unbalanced. With the exception of Malay peasant hold­
ings, the domestically-owned economy is largely, although not ex­
clusively, in the hands of the Chinese; in this sense it is communally 
unbalanced.2-0 The development plan of the Federation goes far to 
correct the extreme hazards of the former, but the communal problem 
is not so easily solved. The Federation has so far avoided the arbi­
trary and excessive communal legislation of some other Southeastern 
Asian nations, although there are provisions both in the constitution 
1s Labor unions in Singapore have become to a large extent the tools of political 
parties. This is especially true of the so-called middle road unions domi­
nated by the Peoples Action Party. The unions affiliated with the Singapore 
Trade Union Council support the less radical government party, the Labour 
Front, and their activities have been more related to the problems of 
industrial relations. However, officials of the International Council of Free 
Trade Unions in Singapore have charged that the die-hard opposition of 
some foreign firms to labor unionism or to the reasonable demands of 
moderate unions have forced labor into the hands of more radical unions 
which may be Communist infiltrated. 
19 For example, a $700,000 power-operated textile mill and a foam rubber factory 
have recently been established in Johore. Malayan Bulletin, January 25, 
1958. 
2° For a discussion of communal problems in the economy, see my The New
Malayan Nation (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957). 
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--
and in statute which are designed to insure that the imbalance does not 
grow. Thus the question is whether the Chinese will accept the po­
litical and economic compromises of the constitution, whether the 
course of Federation politics will be dominated by the present con­
servative politicians and whether the growing political and economic 
power of labor will be used to win concessions within the framework 
of a free enterprise system. 
A newly sovereign nation might have been expected to react 
against the former imperial power thus presenting a trade opportunity 
for other nations. This has not been the case, and American business­
men will have to base their competition on the usual economic propo­
sitions of price, quality and delivery. As a sovereign nation, the 
Federation's bargaining position relative to the allocation of dollars 
from the sterling area pool should be much stronger, especially since 
Malaya continues to be the area's largest dollar earner. However, this 
will not in itself mean an expansion of American trade since Common­
wealth East Asia has already been able to buy almost all the dollar 
area goods it desired, either directly through normal dollar permits, or 
indirectly through Hong Kong, where the payments were made in ster­
ling and the imports financed in the Hong Kong open-dollar market.21 
In 1957 almost one-half of Malaya's United States imports were shipped 
through Hong Kong. The procedure adds from 5 per cent to 20 per 
cent to shipping charges,22 and, therefore, to this e?(tent, an increased 
dollar allocation would allow a larger percentage of American imports 
to be shipped directly and offered at lower prices. This is one potential 
source of trade increase. Another is to be found in the requirements 
of the development plan itself, and the ending of the government's tie 
with the Crown purchasing agents in London. 
Yet this is a time of change in Malaya and, therefore, an op­
portunity for reassessment of individual trade and investment relations. 
A distinction must be made between securing new and sound com­
mercial relations with the area and expecting an immediate increase in 
the sale of a particular product. 
Malaya's foreign trade has traditionally been conducted through 
agency houses, commercial firms with local knowledge which handle 
many types of goods varying from automobiles to marine insurance, 
21 For commercials details, see the International Trade Reporter, Import Export 
Controls Manual, Singapore section. 
22 Ibid.
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from rubber to shipping. The general criticisms, sometimes uninformed 
and unfair, have been that the larger of these houses rest on the profits 
of a few famous products and do not push all their lines and that their 
mark-ups are excessive. An American manufacturer should be careful, 
therefore, to select his local agents not only on the basis of the fame 
of their name, a fame which may have been achieved in other fields. 
Small but enterprising Chinese or Malay firms may be more capable 
of establishing a market for some new product than the older houses, 
and growing nationalism may suggest that this is wise for other than 
the normal business reasons. 23 Local agents may also be aided by 
manufacturer's representatives, especially where technical advice is re­
quired by consumers. And, finally, since price rather than quality is 
often a decisive factor in competition with, for example, Japanese 
products, the policy of burdening agents with costly inventories and 
parts should be reviewed. A centrally located Asian supply depot, in 
Hong Kong or in Singapore, maintained at the producer's expense or 
shared by all Asian agents can in these days of rapid transportation 
provide a substitute which the American businessman may wish to 
consider. 
Although nationalism has not aroused such intense sentiments in 
the Federation of Malaya as elsewhere in the non-Western world, it 
would be wrong and even unfair to underestimate it. Federation policy 
statements indicate that the government welcomes foreign investment 
but makes it clear that the government expects foreign business to 
associate as much as possible with local capital and local labor. The 
use of local employees in only minor clerical positions will not long be 
tolerated whatever the declared policy, and American business must 
be prepared to employ local citizens in executive positions. This re­
quires a new outlook, the elimination of old-style managers who think 
in "treaty-port terms"; it makes a sound personnel policy the basis of 
business success. But even the company wishing to employ local 
executives will have difficulty. First, there is no pool of trained per­
sonnel, and not all companies can institute training programs, especially 
23 Size is obviously not a sound criterion. Many of the larger Agency Houses 
either have specialists most capable of handling a particular line or sub­
sidiaries which are designed to service a particular type of product. How­
ever, these specialists are not always available in the smaller branch offices 
of the Agency Houses where sales may well be increased. The important 
point is that thorough investigation of all possibilities should be made rather 
than relying on names and past reputations. 
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since graduates may leave for competitive positions. :Secondly, the 
practice of paying local personnel lower wages for the same job under 
whatever guise - for example, housing provisions, expatriation al­
lowances - is no longer sound. It is bound to create two classes of 
t:mployees based not on ability or work performed but on nationality. 
Such distinctions can lead to nothing but trouble for foreign business. 
A serious political problem in democratic Asia today is the lag 
between the supply of and demand for young men partially trained in 
modern-type occupations. Their opportunities in government are li­
mited; the economies are not as yet sufficiently developed to absorb 
them all in modem enterprise. They naturally resent their exclusion 
from foreign companies which often, in the first stages of development, 
form an important part of the private sector of the economy. And 
these are the politically articulate young men. 
In conclusion to this section on Malaya, it appears that the long­
run prospects are good, though continual reinterpretation of the political 
trends is always necessary. But as the U. S. Department of Commerce 
reports: 
The outlook for U.S.-Malayan trade and investment relations in 
the near future is somewhat less favorable than the long-run pros­
pects. At present, lower rubber prices and cutbacks in tin produc­
tion are causing an economic slowdown. Recently private pur­
chasing power and Government revenues have declined, and the 
Federation Government has decided to curtail proposed 1958 
expenditures under the 5-year Development plan.24 
The Malayan economy is subject to such changes, however, and Ameri­
cans should not be deterred from taking this opportunity in the im­
mediate post-merdeka period to review our trade and investment re­
lations with the area. 
II 
Political changes may soon be expected in the three territories of 
British Borneo. At present administered separately, they may be 
joined in a loose federal union of very limited powers with a single 
governor general or high commissioner ruling in the Queen's name 
with three sets of advisors. He would be responsible for certain inter-
2• Paul A. Mayer, "Malaya," Foreign Commerce Weekly, April 7, 1958, p. S-14. 
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territorial activities such as defense and external relations, internal se­
curity, communications, civil aviation and meterology, posts and tele­
communications and, as they are already combined, the judiciary and 
the geological survey. Later perhaps, trade and customs, banking and 
currency, and certain specialist services would be federalized.23 
The most important single problem is the uneven distribution 
of wealth. Throughout the last century Sarawak and North Borneo ap­
propriated the territory of the once powerful Sultanate of Brunei leav­
ing it an area of only 2,226 square miles and, as it turned out later, 
oil, production of which in 1956 was valued at $103 million. Total 
revenue for the state in 1956 was estimated at $39.0 million compared 
with $8.9 million for North Borneo and $15.3 million for Sarawak. 
Therefore, it is likely that, unless oil is discovered in the two adjacent 
colonies - and explorations there continue - the three territories will 
each control their own revenue and be independent governments. 
The development plans of these territories call for the opening up 
of virgin territory and the improvement of communications and trans­
port, the building of air strips, and improvement in agriculture as well 
as for the social overheads so essential in this sometimes primitive 
area. American exports can and do play an important role in supplying 
the development needs of these territories but American trade is pri­
marily affected by exchange difficulties. 26 Like other sterling area 
countries they are restricted in the volume of dollar goods which can 
be bought and, except for goods imported via Hong Kong, they are 
limited to the essentials required for the execution of the development 
plans. These include equipment in the field of bauxite mining, trans­
port and road construction, and outboard engines for the movement of 
goods and passengers over the river networks of Brunei and Sarawak. 
American manufacturers are urged that such equipment requires pro­
fessional and technical advice and that local agents or representatives 
25 A Monthly Survey of Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 56 (February, 
1958), pp. 7-8. Published by the Conservative Research Department, 
London. One possible capital for such a federation would be the free-port 
island of Labuan, strategically located with access to both Brunei and North 
Borneo, although a little remote from Kuching. Once a separate Crown 
colony, it became part of the Straits Settlements until 1946 when it was 
joined with North Borneo. But so far this is speculation. 
26 For many of the comments on American trade with Borneo, I rely on cor­
respondence from the governments concerned. There is very little pub­
lished information available. 
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capable of handling such matters should be appointed. For consumer 
goods, agents in Singapore may suffice, although, in view of the in­
creasing volume of direct shipment from Hong Kong, agents there 
should watch the Borneo market. 
Direct investment in Brunei is bound by the very strict immigra­
tion laws in effect, but then Brunei is not short of capital and rather 
requires more local private enterprise to onset the necessary role which 
the state must play in the development of such an economy. In North 
Borneo and Sarawak, legislation is in effect giving certain tax and ex­
change privileges to pioneer industries, for these territories are, like the 
Federation, too dependent upon the fluctuations of primary exports -
for example, rubber, pepper and timber. 
Thus the future of American trade and investment in British 
Borneo is one of expansion limited by exchange problems and by the 
rate of development. Although not dramatic in view of the overall 
problem, any American trading with Southeast Asia should be careful 
to cover the Borneo market, for its potentials, especially in certain 
specified fields, are improving. 27
III 
Hong Kong with an area of a little less than 400 square miles and 
a population of nearly two and a half million has witnessed an indus­
trial revolution unparalleled in Asia. When United Nations and United 
States embargoes against China threatened her traditional entrepot 
trade, Hong Kong mobilized her assets, and changed not only the 
direction of her trade but also the emphasis of her economy. Her 
assets were, first, her traditional banking and port facilities, secondly, 
the thousands of refugees - many of whom brought both industrial 
skills and capital with them from China and especially from Shanghai 
- and, thirdly, a sensible government which placed economic prob­
lems first on its priority list.
Today, Hong Kong may have the highest per capita income in 
Asia, despite the conditions in which thousands of refugees must still 
live.28 Hong Kong has become an important source of low-priced 
27 This very brief survey has hardly done even comparative justice to the Borneo 
territories. Reference is made to the annua l reports of the three territories 
which are available through H.M.S.O. in London or the British Information 
Services in New York. The Colombo Plan report also gives details of the 
economies. 
28 National income statistics for Malaya and Hong Kong, both contenders for 
first position, are not complete and some speculation is involved in their 
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consumer goods and a market for both consumer goods as local incomes 
rise and for capital goods as industry expands. With 3,000 factories 
employing 150,000 workers and an additional 200,000 workers in cot­
tage industries, Hong Kong's industry may now be supporting some 
50 per cent of the population. 29 In addition, of course, her entrepot 
trade continues to grow, although its direction has changed to include 
all the countries of Free Asia. Hong Kong is a capitalist state and an 
example not only to the Communist economies but also to those neo­
capitalist countries whose businessmen look continually to government 
for assistance. 
The total of Hong Kong's import trade in 1957 was $888 million; 
its export trade $520 million - the difference being easily accounted 
for on invisible account. Some 40 per cent of her export trade con­
sisted of locally produced manufactures including in their order of 
1957 importance: textile products, enamelled household utensils, foot­
wear, electric flashlights, lacquers, varnished and prepared paints, linen, 
metal lanterns, preserved fruits, plastic articles, iron and steel, aluminum 
ware, vacuum flasks and cement. Export to the United States of lo­
cally manufactured goods, especially of clothing and a great variety of 
miscellaneous manufactured articles of a kind that used to be imported 
from mainland China, has steadily increased. Since Hong Kong's 
typical industries are small concerns lacking an export department, it 
has often proved easier to deal with a Hong Kong merchant house 
familiar with the market. 30
calculation. In addition, the concept of national income in an economy 
where foreign owned mines and plantations predominate is subject to 
question when it is used in comparison with economies of a different nature. 
But see Ronald A. Ma and Edward F. Szczepanik, The National Income of 
Hong Kong, 1947-50 (Hong Kong and London: 1955); F. Benham, The 
National Income of Malaya, 1947-49 (Singapore: 1951) and the Inter­
national Bank Mission, The Economic Development of Malaya. 
29 P. Y. Tang, "This is Hong Kong." Trade Bulletin of the Hong Kong Depart­
ment of Commerce and Industry (February, 1958), pp. 58-60. Mr. Tang 
is the governing director of the South Sea Textile Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 
and Mayfair Industries Co. Ltd. 
3° For detailed information on trade with Hong Kong, including exchange regu­
lations, certification of origin, Hong Kong trade names, shipping, etc., see 
the authoritative Commerce Industry and Finance Directory of the Hong 
Kong Department of Commerce and Industry. Hong Kong maintains trade 
representatives in Tokyo and London and further information can be ob­
tained by writing the Department of Commerce and Industry or the various 
chambers of commerce, including the Hong Kong Junior Chamber of 
Commerce. 
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United States trade with Hong Kong and participation in this 
great industrial growth has been hampered by American trade restric­
tions on business with China. These restrictions included Hong Kong, 
since onward shipment to the mainland was difficult to control. At the 
same time the sale of Hong Kong products in the United States was 
hampered by treasury presumption of the China origin of certain 
goods. Our exports to Hong Kong slumped to less than $40 million in 
1952. They have been rising since then, reaching approximately $90 
million in 1957, with total trade at $127 million. This increase has 
been made possible by the improvement of trade controls under which 
the illegal trading of American goods with the mainland has been 
checked. 
Hong Kong has never been so British-oriented in its trade con­
cepts as have Singapore and the Federation. This is partly because of 
the long tradition of American trade with China through Hong Kong 
and the larger percentage of Chinese merchants and industrialists in 
Hong Kong having personal contacts with the United States. Since the 
war, there has been the additional factor of the absence of the usual 
sterling-exchange restrictions on American imports, providing, of course, 
they were financed at the open-market rate which usually ran at least 
1 per cent above the official rate. 
However, the 1957 trade statistics show that Hong Kong obtained 
22 per cent of its imports from China, 15 per cent from Japan, 13 per 
cent from the United Kingdom, and only 10 per cent from the United 
States. (The percentage of our share of the Malayan import trade for 
1957 was 4 per cent.) The dominant position of China is due to the 
large exports of food to Hong Kong, but there is an increasing export 
of Chinese manufactured goods, partly for prestige purposes but also to 
earn foreign exchange, and the importance of these exports which are 
in part re-exported to countries of Southeast Asia may be increasing. 
In 1957 the United States ranked fourth as a source for Hong 
Kong's imports, fifth as a market for her total exports, and fourth as 
a market for her locally manufactured exports.31 But the United States 
still finds Japanese competition severe, especially in textiles, certain 
31 This is based on figures given in the Trade Bulletin (February, 1958). The 
Foreign Commerce Weekly states that the United States ranked third 
(rather than fourth) as a source of Hong Kong imports, but the figures 
given by the Hong Kong Government do not support this. See F. Dubas, 
"Hong Kong," Foreign Commerce Weekly, April 7, 1958, p. S-12. 
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building materials and a wide rnnge of other industrial and consumer 
items. The United States is able to compete in such items as sewing 
machines, air-conditioning equipment, refrigerators, various appliances, 
office equipment, certain chemicals and plastics materials, lubricants, 
some lines of building equipment, pharmaceuticals, processed foods, 
artificial fabrics and yarns, ,ind certain finished textile items. The Hong 
Kong market is highly competitive; there are no tariff barriers on most 
imports, and exchange controls, as applied, permit the Hong Kong 
customer to make the world his shopping place. To sell Hong Kong 
one must have the right product quoted at the right price at the right 
time. 
The stakes are high. however, for !·long Kong is a re-export center 
through which the American trader may reach certain dollar-short 
countries.32 We have already seen how some 50 per cent of Malayan 
imports from the United States have been transshipped through Hong 
Kong for exchange reasons. And although the rate of industrial growth 
may fall somewhat in 19 58, American direct investment in Hong Kong 
is still possible and its potentialities should be fully considered, for in 
a sense, Hong Kong is the key to the trade doors of Free Asia. 
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THIS PAPER WILL discuss some of the determinants of the exports of 
the United States to Australia and New Zealand.' First the growth of 
the market as a whole will be examined and then the composition of 
imports will be cursorily described. Finally, and mainly, an analysis 
of the determinants of the share - past and present- of the United 
States in this market will be presented. 
I. THE SIZE OF THE MARKET
There are considerable similarities in the experience of Australasia 
and of North America in matters concerning natural population growth. 
Their birth rates at present rank somewhere between the very low 
ones of western Europe, and those of most underdeveloped countries, 
where they are very high2 ( see table 1, p. 62), while their death rates 
are among the lowest in the world. 
But while the natural growth rate has been close to that of the 
North American countries,3 the actual rate has been consistently higher, 
and the difference between the actual rates of the two areas has grown 
1 The term "Australasia" will be used synonymously with the addition of these 
two countries, a mistake perhaps forgivable in a symposium entitled "Amer­
ican Trade with Asia and the Far East." 
2 The statement is obviously an oversimplification, (a) because the birth rate 
in India, for example, is, in fact, lower than in Canada, and (b) because 
there are significant differences in the rates of different underdeveloped 
countries. 
3 United States and Canada. 
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considerably in the postwar decade ( see table 2, p. 62) . The difference 
between natural and actual rates, besides discrepancies in measurement 
and computation, stems from the appreciable migration into Australasia, 
especially Australia, since the war. 4 
This migration has had profound impacts on the region in many 
respects. The inflationary pressures of the postwar period can in part 
- only in part - be explained by it. The requirements for investment
in housing, public utilities and capital goods of all types which were
needed for the immigrants, found expression in high levels of demand
in the private sector and in government policies - especially fiscal
policies - which added to rather than offset these pressures. There
were also more subtle changes which, although they are less easily
quantified and demonstrated, may have greater long-term significance.
Although the largest single group among the immigrants was that of
British origin, it was considerably less than one-half of the total in the
case of Australia and, in the case of both countries, considerably less
than the proportion of the persons of British descent to the population
as a whole. The net effect was therefore to make the populations more
heterogeneous in culture, religion, consumption standards, labor habits,
skills, entrepreneurial talent, etc. than they had been hitherto. 5 
It is difficult to predict the future course of population growth 
with tolerable accuracy even under favorable circumstances; when a 
major factor in it is immigration, it becomes next to impossible. It 
seems a definite part of Australian policy to stimulate immigration from 
Europe and North America. But while in the past it has been possible 
to absorb this inflow, and while on the long-run it will continue to be 
• According to the 1954 census of Australia, out of a population of 9 million, 
1.3 million were born outside Australia and out of these over 0.5 million 
had come within the last five years while almost 0.6 million had been there 
for over fifteen years. The arrivals during 1950-54, at an annual rate of 
100,000, therefore represented an addition of about 1.1 per cent per year, 
or almost as much again as the natural additions to Australia's population. 
In New Zealand, 1952-54, the contribution of immigrants to total popula­
tion, while less spectacular, was still substantial: at about 0.75 per cent 
it was half as much again as the natural rate. 
5 Persons of United States descent were a minor group among the total number 
of immigrants. But for what a personal judgment may be worth: it would 
seem to me that their impact in setting consumption standards and affecting 
the direction of demand has been out of proportion to their small number. 
This might not have been so, however, had it not been for the impact of a 
large number of United States servicemen during World War II, who were 
stationed in the area. 
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possible, situations can be envisaged in which the existence of domestic 
unemployment would provoke strong resistance to such a policy es­
pecially from labor. Traditionally the outflow of migrants from the 
United Kingdom has occurred in waves directly related to cyclical de­
clines in business activity there, and has served, in fact, as an im­
portant factor in bringing them to a halt. 6 But there is little likelihood 
nowadays of anything but a rapid transmittal of depressions from the 
United Kingdom to Australasia, so that potential immigrants may be 
most willing to move when there is least willingness to receive them, 
and vice versa. This argument does not apply with the same force to 
migration from continental Europe but even there the desire to emigrate 
may continue to fall as the memory and the effects of World War II 
recede. In New Zealand, where the unexploited natural resources per 
head are considerably less than in Australia, it is difficult to see how a 
long-term continuation of the past rate of immigration can be main­
tained without reducing appreciably the rate of growth of real income 
per head.7 
The rapid postwar population growth was accompanied by an even 
more rapid expansion of output. In 1956 the real national income of 
Australia was 22 per cent and that of New Zealand 41 per cent above 
the 1948 level. In the United States, in the same period, it rose by 
32 per cent. ,Bui again it is difficult to speculate about the continuation 
of this trend. On the one hand, it is of course linked to the future of 
population growth itself. On the other hand, since both countries have 
extremely high proportions of their national income deriving from 
'foreign trade, to make a prediction about the course of income growth 
involves forecasting the future terms of trade among other things. It 
is well known that the experts in this field differ widely; we have on 
one hand Dr. Prebisch's theory of a persistent tendency of primary 
commodity prices to deteriorate vis-a-vis industrial products and, on the 
other, Mr. Colin Clark's forecast of a long-term improvement of the 
terms of trade of primary commodities. For our purposes, more li­
mited speculations are appropriate: wool and butter are not likely to 
share fully in such an improvement even if it came about, since they 
will probably be under pressure from man-made substitutes for a long 
6 See Brinley Thomas, Migration and Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cam­
bridge University Press, 1954). 
7 Cf. Horace Belshaw, Population Growth and Levels of Consumption (New 
York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1956). 
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time. Wheat, on the other hand, ought to be in a less vulnerable po­
sition if the growth of income and population in the poorer countries 
continues anywhere near its postwar rate. In any case, as long as 
foreign trade continues to loom as large as it has traditionally in the 
national incomes of both countries, their income growth rates will be 
strongly affected by those of their trading partners, namely the indus­
trial countries. 
Contrary to what happened in the United States, imports in Aus­
tralia and New Zealand in the postwar period rose at a somewhat 
faster rate than did real national income. But while this in itself might 
promise a continued rapid rise in the demand for imports, it also has 
less promising implications for the suppliers of imports inasmuch as it 
may imply more spectacular declines in the volume of imports in times 
of falling incomes. The empirical evidence is far from satisfactory, but 
some estimates indicate price and income elasticities in the neighbor­
hood of unity for New Zealand.8 The true form of the import demand 
function may be considerably more complicated, being closer to a 
Duesenberry-Modigliani "ratchet" function, but this could only operate 
downward, in the absence of exchange reserve constraints. For mem­
bers of the sterling area such constraints are likely to remain operative 
for a long time, so that the "simple" income-import relation may be 
more realistic, although it may not be the one that describes best what 
would happen in a free market without public intervention. 
II. THE COMPOSITION OF TRADE 
Broadly speaking, the structures of trade of Australia and New 
Zealand are similar. In 1956, exports of food and crude materials 
accounted for over 85 per cent of total exports in both countries while 
imports of manufactured goods and machinery represented around 60 
per cent of total imports (see table 3, p. 63). In both cases the New 
Zealand figure is the higher one, representing the less diversified--and 
diversifiable - character of the New Zealand economy, i.e., the fact 
that its natural resource endowment puts a more restrictive absolute 
limitation on the extent of possible industrialization. 9 
8 See A. Harberger, "Some Evidence on the Price Mechanism in International 
Trade," Journal of Political Economy, (December, 1957); and my "Eco­
nomic Policy for A Dependent Economy," Southern Economic Journal, 
(July 1956). 
9 New Zealand is roughly self-sufficient in coal but has only insignificant other 
mineral resources, so that a considerable part of its industry represents 
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Australia's export structure is somewhat more diversified, but both 
countries depend on the export of wool, meat and dairy products, with 
wheat and sugar added in Australia. On the import side, besides the 
two major categories mentioned, both depend on foreign petroleum and 
its derivatives, although some promising strikes of oil have been made 
in Western Australia. The primary sources of these imported fuels are 
Indonesia and the Middle East. 
In both countries electrical machinery, appliances and transport 
equipment constitute about 60 per cent of the imports of this group, 
while machinery, especially power generating equipment, makes up 
the rest (see table 4, p. 64). As for other manufactured goods, a sur­
prisingly large proportion is made up of textiles, especially cotton fab­
rics10 ( see table 5, p. 65). Beyond this, iron and steel in various forms 
of semimanufacture, especially girders, bars, plates and sheets are of 
considerable importance. 
In their geographic structure of trade, both countries show con­
siderable concentration, although Australia less so than New Zealand 
( see table 6, p. 66). In both countries the United States is a relatively 
marginal supplier and customer, for reasons that will be discussed in 
section III. In both countries the United Kingdom is the chief source of 
imports and purchaser of exports, but in New Zealand its role as cus­
tomer is, proportionally, twice as large as in Australia. 
III. THE SHARE OF THE UNITED STATES
What accounts for the low share of the United States in the 
Australasian market? At first glance the question may seem naive, 
-since a number of obvious explanations come to mind, but it is just the 
multiplicity of such "obvious" explanations, that creates considerable 
difficulty. For, although they are not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
it would seem desirable to attempt to assess them individually and, if 
pertinent, at least rank them in order of importance. 
( 1) American Restrictive Practices
It is tempting to explain away the low level of Australasian imports
from the United States by the inability of these countries to sell their 
assembly, rather than manufacture. Australia, on the other hand, has a 
steel industry using domestic coal and iron. 
10 Surprising in the sense that the textile industry is typically one of the first
to develop in primary exporting areas. See Processes and Problems of 
Industrialization in Under-developed Countries, Department of Economic 
Affairs, United Nations, 1955. 
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products in the United States: wool, dairy products and meat are all so 
heavily protected in the United States that ( comparative costs to the 
contrary notwithstanding) relatively little is imported from these highly 
efficient producers. 
But Australia and New Zealand are members of the sterling area 
and it is not necessary for any one country to balance its accounts with 
each individual trading partner. It would, in principle, be quite pos­
sible - and was in fact quite normal in the past - for a group of 
countries to run permanent trade deficits with a given currency, pro­
vided these deficits could be financed out of the surpluses earned else­
where.11 The ability of Australia and New Zealand to buy in the United 
States, according to this reasoning, is therefore not limited by their 
sales to this country, but rather by the total amount of dollars which 
the rest of the sterling area is willing and able to let them have for the 
purpose. American trade restrictions, the argument would run further, 
cannot be blamed therefore for the low volume of sales to this particular 
area except inasmuch as they limit the total dollar earnings of the rest 
of the world, or in a world of limited convertibility, of the sterling area. 
The argument seems to me convincing as far as it goes but there 
is a major qualification to it which much reduces its relevance. The 
geographic location of Australia and New Zealand tends to make them 
terminal points for transportation services. Thus, if they were to sell 
a great deal less to the United States than they bought, it would imply 
that ships would have to return empty from there, with the correspond­
ing rise in over-all transport costs, since freight charges for shipments 
from the United States to Australia would have to be high enough to 
cover the costs of a round-trip rather than a one-way voyage. The 
price disadvantage to which this would put American goods might be 
appreciable on many items. One need not press this argument too far 
( after all, Australasian exports are far bulkier per dollar of commodi­
ties transported than Australasian imports) but that it is of some 
relevance is evident from the relative lack of shipping ties. In fact, 
transportation is only one - albeit the most important - item in this 
argument. The whole structure of service industries that are ancillary 
to foreign trade, is very much oriented to trade with the United King­
dom than with the United States: banking, insurance, brokerage, etc., 
11 See League of Nations, The Network of World Trade (Geneva: 1942), for 
an account of the traditional pattern. 
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are all in the hands of houses that are able to spread theu overnead by 
servicing two-way trade. And while again important other reasons 
exist for this, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the lack of 
Australasian sales to the United States contributes its share. 
(2) The Dollar Shortage
As was stated above, the over-all lack of dollars in the sterling 
area is a major limiting factor on purchases from the area and the oc­
casional statements of intent of the Annual Conference of Common­
wealth Prime Ministers are eloquent testimony to the fact that import 
control policy has been handled with this in mind. In other words, 
when some members of the sterling area were net dollar earners and 
others net dollar spenders, ( since the dollar reserves of all are under 
pressure) administrative policy in all countries was expected to restrain 
dollar imports. As far as the postwar shares of the United States in 
Australasia's imports are concerned, it is therefore entirely reasonable 
- on logical grounds - to think that they might have been higher if
the sterling area as a whole had been in a stronger position.
But to throw the whole burden of causation on this factor will 
clearly not do since it would assume a number of unacceptable premises: 
a) First, it would assume that the United States share in the area's
imports was very much larger in times of no noticeable dollar shortage 
for the sterling area. Reference to tables 7, 8 and 9 (pp. 67-69) will 
show that this was not so, if 1937 is taken as an acceptable comparison. 
In Australia, the United States share was 16 per cent, while in 1956 it 
was 13 per cent. In New Zealand the relevant figures were 12 and 8 
per cent. While a decline did occur, the prewar figures were not high 
enough not to raise precisely the same question for that period as that 
under discussion for the present: what accounts for the low American 
share? 
b) Furthermore, to take the postwar dollar shortage as the only
or even the principal causal variable would imply that in its absence 
the United States share would be very much higher, but it tells us 
nothing as to the approximate actual proportion. This we could only 
know if we had information on two further unknowns: the total de­
mand of Australasia for each of the major commodity groups and the 
relative advantage or disadvantage of the United States ( over Great 
Britain, we may say for simplicity's sake) in each of these same com­
modity groups. Only then would it become possible to estimate what 
the "proper" share of the United States would be under conditions of 
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free currency convertibility and non-discriminatory import policies in 
Australasia. 
( 3) Empire Pref ere nee
The last set of considerations mentioned above suggests a further
line of inquiry. To what extent is the low share of the United States 
merely a consequence of preferential treatment of goods of British 
origin in the importing countries? 
Both countries have granted preferential tariff treatment to goods 
produced in the British Commonwealth for a long time.12 But it was 
the 1932 Ottawa Agreement that made the margins of preference sig­
nificant and firmly established the principle of Imperial Preference and 
Reciprocity. While it was a depression phenomenon it has continued 
to exist after the war, perhaps partly because opinion on both sides 
was that sooner or later depression conditions would reappear. 
Both Australia and New Zealand are signatories of the General 
Agreement on Tarifis and Trade and as such accord the United States, 
another signatory, most favored nation treatment. But "most favored" 
refers to countries other than members of the Empire. 
It is impossible to give a perfect estimate of the over-all degree of 
preference without weighing each rate by the value of the goods im­
ported under it - an experiment of manifest impracticality in this 
context. An acceptable alternative would be to take the total duties 
collected on imports from the United States as a proportion of total 
imports from this country and compare the result with the same ratio 
for imports from the British Empire. The result would be an approxi­
mate measure of the degree of preference. But even for this the 
necessary data are not readily available. 
It is however possible to take selected duties on important com­
modities so as to gain a rough impression of the degree of preference 
( see table 10, p. 70). The rates chosen seemed fairly representative of 
most others in their relations to each other and, in the event, cover 
rather important categories. The impression one gains from them is that 
the degree of preference on many commodities was significant enough 
to turn the price advantage to British goods, but at the same time was 
not important enough to overcome really overwhelming differences in 
the relative costs of production or in the qualities of products. It does, 
12 In New Zealand the Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act was introduced in 
1903. 
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however, seem a safe inference that the preference system is a more 
important factor than the dollar shortage in the list of possible ex­
planations of the low share of United States goods in the Australasian 
market. 
(4) Costs and Demand
As was suggested earlier, another possible chain of events might
exist which, if observable, could account for the phenomenon under 
discussion. If it were to be shown that the structure of demand in the 
importing countries happens to be such that most of their expendi­
tures on imports happens to be made on commodity groups in which 
the United States is not well able to compete, this in itself would give 
an explanation - the most satisfactory one for an economist - of the 
low relative level of United States exports to the area. 
To make this term "not well able to compete" operational it would 
at least have to mean "where the c.i.f. price is higher for the American 
product than for all competitors who are able to deliver the necessary 
quantities." Preferably it should mean more than this, namely, a 
statement about the relations of labor productivity and wages plus a 
statement of capital efficiency relations and the cost of capital in the 
United States and its competitors. Ideally, in other words, money price 
ought to be analyzed by components in terms of individual factor pro­
ductiveness and factor prices. No usable data of the latter kind exists 
although a judicious use of input-output tables ought to be capable of 
producing approximations to it. 
There are, however, some data on relative labor costs and 
productivities in some industries for Great Britain and the United 
States, and in view of the overwhelming importance of the former in 
this market, there seems little objection to using such information. The 
data are prewar and cover only certain industries, so that only tentative 
answers can be expected from such an approach. 
The industries in which the United States seemed to have a clear 
advantage in 1937 over the United Kingdom, inasmuch as the output 
per worker was decidedly more than double that of the United King­
dom ( the premise being that money wages in the United Kingdom 
were about one-half of those in the United States at existing exchange 
rates), included radio and valves, pig iron, automobiles, glass containers, 
tin cans, machinery, paper, electric lamps, rubber tires, soap, biscuits 
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and matches.is In a world of no product differentiation and, less un­
reasonably in view of the small Australasian market, constant marginal 
costs, the United States in 1937 ought to have supplied all of Austral­
asia's requirements in these products. If it had no advantages in any 
other industry the United States should have supplied nothing more. 
The proportion of actual imports of such products to total imports 
would then give the "correct" United States share, if no other in­
fluences had been at work. A generous estimate of these proportions 
yields about one-third for Australia in 1937-38 and the same figure 
for New Zealand in 1937. The rather surprising conclusion emerges 
that even without any other factors interfering with the flow of trade, 
the share of the United States would not have been even one-half of 
total imports into the area. 
The oversimplification of this argument is perhaps too obvious to 
be spelled out in detail. For one thing, only manufactured goods are 
included in the study, so that the advantage of American tobacco, to 
take one example, is suppressed. For another, the trade statistics are 
not comparable enough with the industrial statistics to give more than 
the merest indications of orders of magnitude. Again, product dif­
ferentiation is vital in some industries: automobiles are the most ob­
vious example. Other theoretical objections could also be cited. 
Nevertheless I believe that the conclusion is warranted, that even 
under non-discriminatory trade policies the British share in this area 
would have been larger than the American one, simply because the 
area happens to want so many commodities in which British prices 
were lower, i.e., British disadvantages in labor productivity were not 
great enough to offset lower wage rates. 
(5) Historical Factors
There is another set of factors, the least tractable to quantitative 
appraisal, that needs consideration. They might be called historical or 
institutional factors and are, in my opinion, of more than slight im­
portance. Some have already been noted, and some more may now 
be mentioned. 
13 See G. D. A. MacDougall, "British and American Exports, A Study Suggested
by the Theory of Comparative Costs," Economic Journal, (December 
1951), using data from L. Rostas, Comparative Productivity in British 
and American Industry, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948). 
The industries covered accounted for about one-half of total British exports. 
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The ties between Great Britain and this area have historically 
been so close that the flow of trade is to a considerable extent deter­
mined by the past rather than the present. The fact that it was British 
capital that installed much of the existing fixed capital equipment im­
plies that spares and replacements for many items must be bought in 
the United Kingdom because of questions of size and other specifica­
tions. The railroads are narrow gauge. Electric appliances run on a 
different voltage than the American ones. Houses, typically not cen­
trally heated, require many room heaters of types not common in the 
United States. In many instances, in other words, the past installations 
simply predetermine where purchases for replacement are made. 
The links with the United Kingdom furthermore have built up 
national preferences so that often among identically priced products, 
the British one will be preferred. It is possible for a toothpaste to 
advertise "Buy X toothpaste and be British to the teeth," because it 
does thereby appeal to a socially accepted value. British magazines 
and newspapers arc read more than American ones, hence British ad­
vertising is, on an equal expenditure basis, more visible. 
All these factors are important. But they ought not to be over­
stressed. Product differentiation also works in another direction. 
American automobiles have, I think, in the consumer's eye an advan­
tage which is,. at •the very least, no smaller than their true excess value 
over British ones when one views automobiles as mean of locomotion 
rather than expressions ·of one-upmanship. American films, provided 
they conform to a certain stereotype, seem to be assured of a good 
market, regardless of critical dispraise. Other examples can easily be 
found of instances where consumers' product differentiation favors the 
American rather than the British product, although on balance no doubt 
the reverse is true. 
The generalization might be ventured that the competitive dis­
advantage of American products in the eyes of the consumer tends to 
be least in relatively new industries in which no strong tradition of 
trade with the United Kingdom yet exists. These traditions, as was 
mentioned earlier, are supply as well as demand traditions. Where 
there is no well established structure of import houses, often branches 
of British firms, with traditional links to British suppliers, insurers, 
brokers, etc., American products are more likely to compete success­
fully. One inference from this would be that the tie to Great Britain, 
as far as institutional preference is concerned, is bound to weaken 
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gradually. How much this will tend to increase the American share in 
the market however is, I think, determined by the other factors, men­
tioned earlier. 
( 6) Conclusions
Of all the factors mentioned, I therefore conclude that the single
most important one is the structure of demand in the importing 
countries combined with the structure of costs in Great Britain and the 
United States. This alone would, in the prewar days, have accounted 
for a United States share of less than one-half and perhaps no more 
than one-third. The divergence between these figures and the actual 
shares appears to have been caused primarily by Empire preference 
and what have been called historical and institutional reasons. Ameri­
can import restrictions on the exports of this area have probably played 
a smaller role than the other factors mentioned. The postwar dollar 
shortage is probably the main factor responsible for the further decline 
of the American share after the war,14 but this decline itself could not 
be so very large simply because the United States share was already 
rather low before the war. Before these conclusions could be more 
firmly established or refined by assigning quantitative weights to each 
of the factors mentioned - as opposed to a mere ranking - much 
further research would be necessary. 
14 The assumption being that the more rapid rise of American productivity during
the war was roughly offset by more rapidly rising United States wages and 
by the devaluation of sterling. 
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TABLE 1. Natural Rate of Population Growth and 
Components, Selected Countries, 1956 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Canada 
United States 
France 
United Kingdom 
India 
Malaya 
Chile 
Mexico 
World* 
Birth Death Natural 
rate 
22.5 
24.7 
28.0 
24.9 
18.5 
16.1 
27.4 
45.5 
35.4 
46.2 
34.0 
rate growth rate 
(Per thousand of population) 
9.1 13.4 
9.0 15.7 
8.2 19.8 
9.4 15.5 
12.5 6.0 
11.7 4.4 
11.6 15.8 
11.3 34.2 
11.9 23.3 
13.7 32.5 
18.0 16.0 
Source: United Nations, Demographic 
Bulletin of Statistics, February 1958. 
Yearbook, 1956, and Monthly 
*Average 1951-55.
TABLE 2. Selected Rates of Population Growth 
Australasia 
Australia 
New Zealand 
North America 
Canada 
United States 
India 
World 
(Per cent per year) 
1930-40 1945-56 
0.9 2.3 
0.9 2.2 
0.9 
0.7 
1.1 
0.7 
1.3 
1.1 
2.3 
1.7 
2.3 
1.7 
1.3* 
1.2*** 
Source: United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1956. 
* 1945-55.
*"'1930-55.
0 *1940-55.
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1930-56 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.2 
1.6 
1.2 
1.3** 
1.2** 
TABLE 3. Australasia: Trade by Major SITC 
Commodity Groups, 1956 
Australia New Zealand 
Value Proportion Value Proportion 
(£A (£NZ 
million) (per cent) million) (per cent) 
Exports: total 833.5 272.5 
Food 275.6 33.1 156.9 57.5 
Beverages and tobacco 2.3 0.3 0.1 
Crude materials, in-
edible ( except fuel) 434.7 52.2 107.7 39.5 
Mineral fuels, lubri-
cants, etc. 10.9 1.3 
Animal and vegetable 
oils and fats 5.9 0.7 2.2 0.8 
Chemicals 8.2 1.0 2.2 0.8 
Manufactured goods 68.9 8.3 2.4 0.9 
Machinery and trans-
port equipment 18.8 2.3 0.4 0.1 
Imports: total 743.9 235.4 
Food 30.8 4.1 19.9 8.5 
Beverages and tobacco 14.5 1.9 5.4 2.3 
Crude materials, in-
edible ( except fuel) 66.4 8.9 9.4 4.0 
Mineral fuels, lubri-
cants, etc. 92.9 12.5 18.8 8.0 
Animal and vegetable 
oils and fats 4.7 0.6 0.6 0.3 
Chemicals 43.7 5.9 15.5 6.6 
Manufactured goods 205.6 27.6 77.7 33.3 
Machinery and trans-
port equipment 236.1 31.7 67.3 28.8 
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1956. 
63 
TABLE 4. Australia and New Zealand: Composition of 
Imports of Machinery and Transport Equipment, 1956 
SITC Australia New Zealand 
Code (percentage) 
7 Machinery and transport equipment 100 100 
71 Machinery other than electric 42.3 41.9 
711 
712 
713 
714 
715 
715 01 
715 02 
716 
716 03 
72 
Power generating equipment 
Agricultural machinery 
Tractors other than steam 
Office machinery 
Metal-working machinery 
Cutting tools 
Others 
Machinery n.e.s. 
Construction and mining 
Electric machinery and appliances 
721 01 Generators, motors, 
21.8 
5.1 
6.7 
2.5 
5.5 
(3.0) 
(2.5) 
15.3 
(3.6) 
transformers (7.5) 
17.9 20.7 
73 Transport equipment 38.6 37.3 
731 Railway vehicles 2.6 
732 Road motor vehicles 30.0 
734 
735 
Aircraft 
Ships and boats 
3.5 
2.5. 
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1956. 
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TABLE 5. Australia and New Zealand: Composition of 
SITC 
Code 
6 
64 
641 01 
65 
651 
652 
653 
653 05 
656 01 
66 
664 
666 
68 
681 
681 04 
681 05 
69 
Imports of Manufactured Goods 
Australia New Zealand 
(percentage) 
Manufactured goods classified by material 100 100 
Paper, paperboard and manufactures 
Newsprint (5.8) 
Textile yarn, fabrics, etc. 
Yarn and thread 
Cotton fabrics 
Miscellaneous fabrics 
Synthetic and spun 
glass fabrics 
Bags and sacks for packing 
Non-metallic mineral manufactures 
Glass 
Pottery, household 
Base metals 
Iron and steel 
Girders, bars, etc. 
Universals, plates, sheets, 
6.8 
16.0 
9.2 
(5.0) 
(4.6) 
2.1 
1.9 
17.9 
(4.5) 
uncoated (2.4) 
Manufactures of metals 
12.2 8.0 
45.1 38.1 
6.8 6.0 
22.4 26.2 
10 15.8 
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1956. 
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TABLE 6. Australia and New Zealand: Geographical 
Structure of Trade, 1956 
Trade ...._ Trade
with ...._ of
Exports 
Australia New Zealand 
United Kingdom 
Canada 
Australia 
33 65 
New Zealand 
Malaya 
Hong Kong 
India 
Ceylon 
1 
5 
2 
2 
1 
Sub-total, principal 
Commonwealth 44 
Belgium-Luxemburg 3 
France 9 
Western Germany 5 
Italy 4 
Netherlands 1 
Sub-total, principal 
continental 
Western Europe 22 
Japan 
United States 
Total, 
11 
7 
countries shown 82 
1 
3 
6 
75 
2 
6 
4 
2 
2 
16 
1 
7 
99 
Imports 
Australia New Zealand 
43 54 
3 3 
1 
2 
3 
1 
53 
1 
2 
4 
1 
2 
10 
3 
13 
78 
14 
1 
1 
1 
74 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
7 
1 
7 
90 
Source: United Natiorui, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1956, 
vol. 1.
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TABLE 7. Australia and New Zealand: Prewar Proportions 
of Imports of United States Origin to Total Imports 
Electrical machinery 
Agricultural machinery 
Metal working machinery 
Iron and steel plate and sheet 
Automobile chassis 
Automobile bodies and parts 
Textile piece goods 
Gasoline 
Kerosene 
Lubricating oil 
Total 
Australia New Zealand 
1937-38 (Percentages) 1937
15 17 
27 45 
24 45 
50 5 
34 18 12 18 
1 
19 33 20 
92 73 16 12 
Source: United States Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce Year• 
book. 
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TABLE 8. Australia: Imports from the United States and All 
Areas, Selected Commodity Groups, 1956 
SITC 
Code 
074 
121 
231 
312 
313 
512 
641 
651 
652 
653 
656 
681 
699 
711 
713 
715 
716 
721 
732 
734 
899 
From United 
Total States Percentage 
(Millions of dollars) 
Tea and mate 0.9 
Tobacco, unmanufactured 
Crude rubber, etc. 
Petroleum, crude and 
partly refined 
. Petroleum products 
Organic chemicals 
Paper and paperboard 
.Textile yarn and thread 
Cotton fabrics 
Miscellaneous fabrics 
Made up textiles, n.e.s. 
Iron and steel 
Manufactures of metals, n.e.s. 
Power generating machinery 
Tractors, other than steam 
Metal working machinery 
Machinery, n.e.s. 
Electric machinery 
Road motor vehicles 
Aircraft 
Manufactures, n.e.s. 
27.3 
33.8 
117.8 
90.1 
26.0 
55.7 
31.4 
73.8 
42.0 
24.9 
82.2 
41.9 
48.9 
35.3 
28.9 
81.2 
94.7 
157.4 
26.5 
24.5 
20.3 
6.7 
14.4 
2.2 
1.0 
0.2 
0.2 
0.5 
0.1 
10.2 
3.3 
11.8 
16.1 
9.4 
22.5 
10.0 
18.3 
9.4 
2.8 
74.4 
19.8 
16.0 
8.4 
1.8 
0.6 
0.3 
1.1 
0.4 
12.4 
7.9 
24.1 
45.6 
32.5 
27.7 
10.6 
11.6 
35.5 
11.4 
68. 7 per cent of total
imports in Australia
Total imports, f.o.b. 
1,145.0 
1,666.2 
159.4 
221.3 
13.9 
13.3 
Source: United Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics, January-December, 
1956 (Series D, vol. VI, No. 4). 
Note: Imports chosen were those accounting for more than £ A 10 million 
( 1.3 per cent of total exports). 
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TABLE 9. New Zealand: Imports from the United States and 
All Areas, Selected Commodity Groups, 1955 
Total From United States Percentage 
Wheat 
( Thousand £NZ) 
4,920 
Raw sugar 
Tea 
Beverage spirits 
Tobacco, unrnanufactured 
Woven cotton piece goods 
Rayon piece goods 
Woolen piece goods 
Woolen carpets 
4,021 
2,684 
2,332 
2,087 
7,489 
4,026 
3,747 
2,166 
Motor and aviation spirit 9,888 
Diesel and fuel oils 4,055 
Iron and steel: 
Pipes, tubes, fittings 2,459 
Plate, sheet, hoop, strip 7,907 
Wire 2,620 
Bar, rod, billet, bloom. pig 3,262 
Copper 2,329 
Electric motors and parts 2,575 
Insulated cable and wire 2,706 
Elec. switchboards, switches 2,152 
Radio and radar apparatus 2,365 
Tractors and parts 4,724 
Raw,synth.,reclaimedrubber 2,240 
Newsprint 
Books, magazines, 
newspapers, music 
Motor cars 
2,451 
Commercial motor vehicles 
Railway and tramway 
2,887 
16,106 
3,637 
vehicles and parts 
-,-- 45 per cent of 
total imports 
Total imports 
3,244 
111,085 
250,661 
Source: New Zealand Yearbook. 
2,053 
206 
155 
384 
21 
13 
203 
16 
128 
2 
49 
1 
78 
26 
1,751 
58 
228 
622 
141 
1,628 
7,763 
21,305 
98 
3 
4 
4 
1 
l 
3 
1 
4 
2 
4 
37 
3 
8 
4 
4 
50 
69 
7.0 
8.3 
1 
TABLE 10. New Zealand: Selected Tariff Rates under Empire 
Preference and Most Favored Nation Agreements 
Motor vehicles, c.k.d. 
Motor vehicles, assembled 
Cultivators, harrows, plows, drills 
Reapers, binders, harvesters, mowers 
Other agricultural implements 
Dairying: chums 
Dairying: others 
Electric batteries 
Electric appliances for electro-plating, 
electro-chemistry, etc. 
Rails 
Iron (angle, bolt, rod, rolled girders, etc.) 
Iron ( sheet, plate) 
Wire, plain or barbed 
EP MFN 
5% 40% 
15% 50% 
10% 35% 
3% 3% 
3% 25% 
3% 25% 
3% 3% 
15% 35% 
Free 15% 
Free 20% 
Free 20% 
Free 20% 
Free 10% 
Source: Customs Department, The Customs Tariff of New Zealand, Well• 
ington, 1949. 
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As THE REPRESENTATIVE of the Government of the Federation of 
Malaya, I am very glad to have this opportunity of presenting the 
attitude of my government toward American investment. I would like 
first of all to describe to you briefly the economic and financial position 
of the Federation of Malaya before the country became independent 
and the problems that the newly independent country faces in the field 
of economic development. 
Before August"31, 1957, the Federation of Malaya, as a dependent 
territory of Britain, was probably a classic example of the working of 
the colonial economic system. The country's chief function was to 
play a complementary part to the larger and dominant economy of 
Britain. It produced the raw materials which the manufacturing in­
dustries of Britain needed. Large tracts of land were alienated on at­
tractive terms for the production of rubber, palm oil and copra and the 
mining of tin, iron ore, a little of coal and gold. The development of 
the basic services - roads, railways, electricity, drainage, telecommuni­
cations, harbor and port facilities - was undertaken primarily to 
facilitate the production of these raw materials for export. As a mar­
ket for the manufactured goods of foreign countries, particularly Bri­
tain, the country offered a constantly expanding market for machinery 
and equipment, textiles, tinned foodstuffs and other consumer goods 
which a country needs, dependent as it was on imports for its food 
supplies. Preferential rates of import duties for goods from the British 
Commonwealth encouraged these imports. Foreign import houses, 
particularly British, had a virtual monopoly of the import trade, as 
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well as the export trade, functioning in association with Asian traders 
only for the wholesale and retail distribution of the imported goods. 
The financing of the import and export trade, until quite recently, was 
in the hands of foreign, mainly British, banking houses with their local 
managers and executive staff being all European. 
The monetary system was again a classic example of the auto­
matic working of the colonial financial machinery. The local currency 
was fully backed in cash and other Sterling investments purchased over 
the years from the revenue of the country and deposited in London. 
These assets, used as 100 per cent cover for the currency, were con­
siderable. All other funds of the government, such as the deposits of 
the country's Post Office Savings Banks, are invested in London and 
it is only quite recently that the legislation concerning these was 
amended to permit the investment of a part of these funds locally in 
the country. 
The budgetary system was also typical of the financial practice of 
the colonial system. The balanced budget was almost an article of 
faith with the colonial financial officers. Revenue was mainly from 
indirect taxes and it was only quite recently that income tax was in­
troduced into the country. If revenue was insufficient to meet essential 
social services, such as schools and hospitals, and the development of 
basic public services, the colonial power would meet the deficits in the 
budget by means of grants or loans, through such forms as the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Acts of the British government. And de­
pendent as the country was on a few export products, whose prices on 
the world markets are subject to wide fluctuations, revenue was also 
subject to its ups and downs. 
There was no economic planning as we know it today, and in fact, 
far from having a department of statistics, the services of qualified 
statisticians were until very recently considered a luxury by the colonial 
treasury officials of the government. And it was not until the end of 
1950 that the government employed as economic advisor an official 
who has fully adequate economic and financial qualifications. Even in 
the case of rubber production, for example, the major industry on which 
the economy of the country depended, planning to improve its efficiency 
was not undertaken or a major replanting project started until this 
decade. 
That briefly is the broad economic and financial picture of the 
Federation of Malaya before independence. The general problem faced 
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by the country when it became independent was one of reorientation, 
from a colonial economy to that of a fully sovereign and independent 
entity. Our population is a growing one, at a rate as high as 3 per 
cent a year with a high proportion of the lower age groups. Between 
two-thirds and three-fourths of the country remain undeveloped, mostly 
under jungles, and while it might be economically and politically ex­
pedient for the former colonial power to develop only the accessible 
western part of the country, it is no longer so for the new independent 
elected government which is answerable to the electorate. Economic 
and social development, moreover, has to be more evenly spread 
,,throughout the country instead of being largely concentrated in the 
urban areas of the country. Roads, electric power, postal facilities, 
schools and hospitals have to go into these rural regions and must not 
remain, even in magnificence and splendor, only in the urban areas. 
This is particularly so when the population has become far more 
settled than it was some years ago. Some diversification of the eco­
nomy has to be undertaken in order to provide employment for the 
growing population and to lessen the dependence of the economy on 
too few export products. 
To undertake the economic development of the country in keep­
ing with its changed status as an independent country, the financial 
resources of the country are, of course, not unlimited, so that a system 
of priorities has to be established. But first there would have to be a 
review of needs and potentialities and studies have to be undertaken. 
To a certain extent this was accomplished and the report of the mission 
from the World Bank three or four years ago was invaluable to us. 
I should mention that it was not without opposition and much difficulty 
that we were able to have a visit from the World Bank mission. Next, 
a system of priorities calls for planning in the economic and financial 
field. This in turn requires certain tools. After some difficulty, we are 
enlarging and modernizing our department of statistics. A population 
census was undertaken last year and a survey on the cost of living, 
both in the urban and rural areas, has recently been completed. 
At the same time, the financial mechanism which has worked for 
nearly two centuries and which has now outlived its usefulness, needs 
to be overhauled. It is no longer possible for us to have a monetary 
system which is purely automatic in its working. It is no longer pos­
sible for the independent government to have abosolutely no control 
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over the volume and character of credit in the country, particularly 
when it has to undertake economic development of the country on a 
considerable scale. We have to have a central banking machinery to 
control and regulate the currency and to function as the bankers' bank. 
The difficulties of setting up a Central Bank are apparently immense, 
particularly in view of the fact that we have a common currency with 
Singapore which is a separate government and remains a British colony. 
We have decided out of our own free will to remain in the Com­
monwealth of Nations and in the sterling area. The great bulk of our 
foreign trade is with countries in the Commonwealth of Nations, par­
ticularly Singapore which takes about 40 per cent of our total trade 
and the United Kingdom which takes 15 per cent. Our trade with the 
United States and Canada accounts only for about 10 per cent of our 
total trade. Although Malaya has a persistently favorable balance of 
trade with the dollar and European currency areas, she has an uncer­
tain balance with other countries, particularly Indonesia and Japan. 
Malaya has played a vital part in the postwar history of the sterling 
area and her contributions to the overseas earnings of that area, in the 
sale of rubber and tin to the dollar and other non-sterling areas, have 
been greater than those of any other single member of the sterling area. 
Our country, together with Singapore, has had a substantial overall sur­
plus on our balance of payments for several years past. Our surpluses 
with America and Europe have been converted into sterling and have 
not merely paid off our deficits with softer currency areas, such as 
Indonesia and Japan, but have released a large surplus of dollars for 
use by other members of the sterling area. Technically speaking, 
Malaya could establish the Malayan dollar as an independent currency. 
Since all our reserves are held in sterling, an independent Malayan 
dollar would have to be closely linked to Sterling, at least until adequate 
reserves could be built up in the dollar area. This, however, would 
take many years and it would depend also on the prices of our rubber 
and tin as well as on the extent to which other countries, such as 
Indonesia, with which Malaya has adverse trade balances, demand set­
tlement of these balances in dollars. If Malaya left the sterling area, 
she would no longer be able to have, as she now has, the advantage of 
the convertibility of the Malayan dollar with all currencies except those 
of the dollar area. Those countries with which Malaya has trading 
surpluses would no longer automatically allow her to convert those sur­
pluses into sterling for spending elsewhere as they do at present, while 
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the countries with which Malaya has deficits, would press for settle­
ment of these deficits in American or Canadian dollars. All this would 
not only impose a serious burden on the machinery of government, it 
would also be bound to lead to some interruption in the free flow of 
trade. Dependent as we are on the export of rubber and tin for our 
dollar earnings and because of our need to import a great deal of capital 
equipment for the economic development of the country, the risk in­
volved in leaving the sterling area is too great for us to take, however 
strong we are at present in our payments positions with other countries, 
particularly the dollar area. Indeed, because of this strong position, 
we are able to import direct from the dollar area any goods which we 
consider essential and indirectly through Hong Kong any other goods 
from the United States or Canada. To remain in the sterling area, 
therefore, is to enjoy an important measure of economic security and 
freedom in trading relationships with other countries in the sterling and 
the European areas, at the expense of accepting some limitations in our 
relationship with the dollar area. 
Our decision to remain in the sterling area does not mean that we 
wish to preserve the previous pattern of our foreign trade. We have 
now become a contracting party to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade and we are beginning a series of trade negotiations with a 
number of c;ountries, starting with Australia. We have informed other 
Commonwealth countries that we wish to review the existing system 
of Commonwealth tariff preferences which have· not worked to our 
advantage. In some respects, the preferential treatment given to im­
ports from Commonwealth countries adversely affects our revenue, 
handicaps local industry and places undue barriers to our trade with 
such countries as Japan and the United States. 
Our decision to remain in the Sterling Area also does not mean 
that we wish to preserve the traditional sources of our private and 
public capital and to limit the inflow of investment from the United 
States, the largest source of capital in the free world today. As I have 
mentioned, our population is growing rapidly and a large part of th� 
country remains undeveloped. We badly need a large amount of 
capital to undertake the economic development of the country, capital 
which the local sources are unable to provide in sufficient quantities. 
It is the policy of my government to encourage foreign investment in 
the Federation of Malaya, particularly for industrial development. 
Legislation is now being prepared to attract pioneer industries by giving 
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tax-free holidays to such industries up to a period of five years. Re­
mittances of profits and repatriation of capital are assured and my 
government has agreed to enter into agreement with foreign govern­
ments, including the United States, to guarantee foreign private in­
vestments in the country. On the other hand, we would like to see 
that foreign investment is associated as much as possible with local 
interests and that our own nationals are trained and absorbed into the 
management of industrial ventures in the country. 
The government itself for its part has embarked upon a program 
of basic development which is essential if we are to attract foreign 
investment in the industrial development of the country. In its de­
velopment plan, the government has decided that its capital expendi­
ture should be allocated in the proportion of 60 per cent to the eco­
nomic sector for the increase of productive capital, the stimulation of 
output and other productive activities; 30 per cent to the social sector 
for the development of health, education, housing and other social 
services; and 10 per cent to the government sector for the building 
and improvement of offices, government housing, houses for our labor, 
etc. In our objectives for the economic development of the country, 
first priority is given toward improving the efficiency of the rubber and 
tin industries, which are the twin pillars of our economy, the con­
struction of an adequate port near Port Swettenham, the nearest port 
to Kuala Lumpur, our capital, and the encouragement of industrial 
development. Under the latter, negotiations have been going on for the 
setting up of an Industrial Development (Finance) Corporation to pro­
vide financial facilities for the industrial development of the country. 
As far as the economic development of the country is concerned, 
the present government of the Federation of Malaya, which is the first 
elected government of the country, has embarked on a policy of free 
enterprise. In spite of the examples in the independent countries 
around us in South-East Asia, we consider that we should give private 
enterprise the opportunity to develop the country. We have large num­
bers of small enterprises in the country; almost half of the acreage 
devoted to rubber-growing, for example, which is the biggest primary 
producing industry, is small holdings of less than 25 acres owned by the 
small farmer. The spirit of free and private enterprise has even per­
meated some of our labor plantation workers. Moreover, our own 
people, particularly those of us who are of the Chinese race which is 
the dominant trading influence in the country, are essentially of an 
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individualist character, like the American people. lt 1s in ms narure 
to use his individual ingenuity and skill to venture into the commerce 
and industry of the country, beginning in a small way and perhaps 
succeeding through his own efforts in an atmosphere of free com­
petition. 
I should mention, however, that although the commerce and in­
dustry of my country have been successfully developed, largely through 
British capital and under the previous British regime, we would wish to 
see that private capital change its character. Under the previous 
colonial rule, private capital has prospered because of its methods 
which the colonial system permitted. It was in certain respects re­
strictive in character; the import and export trade, for example, was 
almost entirely the monopoly of a small group of foreign companies. 
Now that the country has become independent, private capital has to 
change its character and to adapt itself to the changing circumstances 
in the country if it is to survive. 
It is for the reason that American private capital has all the in­
herent characteristics of being modern and adaptable that we would 
welcome American investment in the Federation of Malaya. Free 
competition, for example, is the basic concept of your industrial and 
trading economy. Your government frowns on trusts, rings and cartels. 
Your large industrial enterprises readily accept their obligations to their 
labor employees. I understand also that American companies, having 
branches and agencies in foreign lands, prefer to have the nationals of 
these countries as their representatives as a matter of policy. In my 
· country, it is only very recently that foreign firms are beginning to take
in our own nationals into their executive levels. Moreover, and this
is becoming quite important to us as an independent nation, we wish
to diversify the sources of our foreign capital. The main traditional
source of foreign capital has been the United Kingdom and we feel
it would be much safer if we are not too dependent on one principal
source. The United States as the biggest source of capital would, there­
fore, be an obvious one to which we should tum.
I would end by saying that as a newly independent country we 
have many problems to solve; one of our chief problems is the private 
financing of our economic development, particularly in the industrial 
field. We would very much welcome American investment in the 
Federation of Malaya and we feel sure that the private investment of 
your capital in my country would be to our mutual advantage. 
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ALTHOUGH MANY people may visualize Taiwan (Formosa) as a 
very small island in the Pacific, by population this province of China 
is comparable to a number of the countries in Asia. Taiwan has a 
population of about 11,000,000 people. It has all the problems, and 
more, when compared to the other countries in Asia. It has limited 
resources, a tremendous annual population increase 3 per cent -
and very few sources of capital other than United States aid. It is a 
rugged country ·with 60 per cent of the land consisting of a mountain 
range running its entire length with peaks up to 14,000 ft. This 
mountainous area is relatively unpopulated. It is a land of earth­
quakes and typhoons, beautiful scenery and, most fortunate of all, a 
· very industrious people. More importantly, Taiwan is the seat of the
Central Government of the Republic of China, whose aim is to ulti­
mately retake the mainland from the Communists. As a result, military
expenditure totals 70 to 80 per cent of the entire central govern­
ment budget. When comparing the problem of the development of
Taiwan with other countries, therefore, it is found that the difficulties
are equal to, if not greater than, the others. In the discussion of the
industrial development of Taiwan which follows, the problems of the
supply and fmancing of direct military items, will not be taken into
consideration.
It is my opinion that, if it were not for this extraordinary military
burden, Taiwan could be considered as having become a developed
rather than underdeveloped area by the end of 1957. By this, it is meant
The cooperation of the J. G. White Engineering Corporation in making Mr.
de Beausset's contribution possible is gratefully acknowledged. 
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that all types of basic and consumer industries have been established or 
started, that agriculture has been well developed to supply the island's 
needs, universal education is well established and the group diseases 
have been suppressed. Continued growth and improvement is, of course, 
required, which is true of any area. In 1949-1950, however, Taiwan was 
truly underdeveloped. Let us look, therefore, at conditions and trade 
at that time to understand the subsequent changes that have occurred. 
The Japanese had done considerable development there prior to 
and during the initial period of World War II, particularly in agricul­
ture, including irrigation, communications, and some industries like 
aluminum and magnesium. Most of these efforts were destroyed by 
bombing, typhoons and general lack of maintenance during and im­
mediately after the war. From 1945 to 1949, the Government of the 
Republic of Chnia was preoccupied with rehabilitation and Communist 
revolution on the mainland, thus very little was done on Taiwan. Its 
development really began in 1949, when Chen Cheng, the present Vice 
President and Premier, was sent there as its Governor. 
Prior to the war this area was an exporter of agricultural products, 
mostly to Japan, but after the war it was short of food. For the food 
it exported to Japan, it used to get textiles, manufactured goods and 
consumer items in return. From 1945 to 1949, practically nothing 
was traded with Japan or any other country. By 1949, the estimated 
value of total imports was $34,900,000 and the exports was $33,900,-
000. These are Bank of Taiwan figures but they do not show the true
picture since there were a great many supplies brought in from the
mainland by evacuees and others. An estimate of the actual minimum
import needs made a year later was about $200,000,000 per year.
This was estimated on the basis of a minimum standard of living for
the populace. The deficiency was made up through United States
economic aid. The government had established a strict austerity pro­
gram, prohibiting all imports of semi-luxury items and limiting imports
on others. For example, the tax on new automobiles, sedans, was
about $800 per year. In looking around in 1949, most of the people
didn't have leather shoes, and winter jackets were made from gunny
bags for almost all workers and farmers. In 1949, I saw the One­
Hundred and Second Regiment, after being retrained, head off to de­
fend Quemoy Island, just off the mainland. Their clothing consisted
of T-shirts, shorts, straw hats and straw sandals. In other words, here
was an economy at an extremely low level.
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What was the trade picture at this time? What was imported and 
what was exported? The major imports were textiles and chemical 
fertilizers, plus a small amount of machinery to rebuild and build up 
some of the key industries and services. Realizing the importance of 
development, the Chinese Government had started their policy of in­
dustrialization in 1949. The textiles came from Japan and the chemical 
fertilizers mostly from the United States. By 1950, out of a total 
import figure of $123,000,000, food and fertilizer were valued at 
about $30,000,000, textiles and related products at about $35,000,000, 
machinery, industrial products and vehicles about $14,000,000 and 
crude oil and gasoline products at about $5,000,000. As stated before, 
the major imports were food and clothing. By 1950, rehabilitation 
efforts began to improve agricultural conditions, particularly sugar, and 
this export was about $70,000,000, with rice, tea, salt, citronella oil 
and bananas making up most of the balance. All this was not a very 
impressive trade picture but is one that I feel is generally representative 
of an underdeveloped country (usually one or two main exports). 
Were it not for United States aid, the only trading with such an area 
would be textiles, fertilizers ( or food) and little of anything else, or 
hope for anything else, since that was all the money they had. 
Taiwan could not support itself, but the government was anxious 
to develop the area, so that it could do so in the future. How does a 
government develop its country? Where does it start? How does it 
keep such development within bounds of available exchange, etc? 
What would be the effect on trade? 
The methods and the route taken in Taiwan, with variations, 
shouldn't be too different from those to be followed, or being followed, 
in other areas with limited arable land and a rapidly increasing popula­
tion. Through studies made by the Chinese and the J. G. White En­
gineering Corporation, who are their consultants, it was decided that 
some degree of industrial development was the answer. 
The first steps were to determine the availability of capital, of 
skills, training capability for additional skills and the determination of 
the effects on the economy, such as inflation. After some study and by 
trial and error, the investment in development in Taiwan was set at 
$40,000,000 to $60,000,000 per year, about half of which was in local 
currency. During the first few years this was found to be a limiting 
amount in many ways. Some people there (industrialists and builders) 
will argue that it was too small and others ( economists and bankers 
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worried about inflation) thought it too large. This capital came from 
earnings of traders and from existing industries, from overseas Chinese, 
from landlords, and from the government, but the major portion from 
United States aid. The development did not start with those amounts, 
in the first years it was much less, but gradually grew to those amounts 
and more or less stabilized there in the last four years. 
Once the policy was set and limited capital became available, 
there was the question of what to do with it. The first thing was to 
avoid, or at least reduce, the prestige projects at the initial stages. 
Projects, such as huge hydro-electric schemes, integrated steel mills, 
and automobile plants, take too much out of a small country in the 
initial development phases; the beneficial effects don't reach the people 
and the general economy soon enough. In Taiwan the Chinese got 
down to the root of the problem and began to develop the textile and 
fertilizer industries in order to supply food and clothing for the local 
market. This initial concentration on major needs for the local market 
is what we believe to be a natural development. In other words, here 
is an assured market, so this could be the pattern used in other areas 
also. 
In 1949 our company estimated that the populace needed about 
$45,000,000 worth of textiles per year. This was figured at very low 
living standards, one pair of pants, and shorts at that, per year, plus 
the other needs. You can see from their foreign exchange earnings in 
1949 that the $34,000,000 would not go very far in the supply of this 
one item alone. In order to get enough food, the agriculturalists esti­
mated that $25,000,000 worth of chemical fertilizers had to be im­
ported. To develop production of chemical fertilizers is complicated 
and takes much capital, but textiles are relatively easy and quick. The 
Chinese had the skills for this and some machinery had been brought 
over from the mainland. Some United States aid cotton diverted from 
the mainland was also available. We estimated that 150,000 spindles 
could supply the initial needs. The Chinese Government appointed a 
special committee to direct the development, and work started. With 
relatively no foreign exchange to buy imported textiles, material that 
did get into the country was sold at a very high price. Very high 
profits were assured for those companies that got set up first. Work 
proceeded rapidly and in two years a number of factories were built, 
totalling about 150,000 spindles. 
How does the development of the textile industry, as the initial 
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step, affect trade patterns with the United States? Taiwan became an 
importer of raw cotton. As other countries repeat this process and 
their living standards increase, they will use more textiles and the de­
mand for cotton will increase all over the world. You might ask 
"What about textile machinery?" There was not much business here 
initially for the United States manufacturer. American machines are 
designed for production of high grade textiles and for as complete an 
automatic operation as possible. Compared to non-automatic ma­
chines, say from Japan, we found at that time that they cost about 
three times as much. Labor in countries like Taiwan is readily avail­
able, but capital is scarce and high grade textiles (fine counts) were 
not initially required. Japan, in this case, controlled the textile ma­
chinery exports to Taiwan. Another big advantage of the textile in­
dustry as the first development in countries where foreign exchange of 
any type is really short, is the large and quick capital return possible 
on the investment. For this industry, raw material is a major cost and 
it is easier to arrange short term financing for raw material than for 
capital equipment. The consequent large capital return to the textile 
manufacturers in Taiwan was used by them for further industrial de­
velopment and tended to broaden the development base. So, in a few 
years, good textiles became available at stable and low prices and had 
a pronounced effe�t on improving the living conditions and stabilizing 
the economy. 
As the textile industry was developing, the government then turned 
toward the production of chemical fertilizers. During the early stages 
of World War II, the Japanese had set up some carbide furnaces on 
Taiwan, evidently to be used to produce acetylene for synthetic fuel. 
In one area they had a production of 11,000 tons per year of calcium 
cyanamid fertilizer. Also, they had two small superphosphate factories. 
These were what we would have called completely destroyed by bomb­
ing, but the Chinese engineers remelted and rebuilt the machinery and 
put it back into operation. The fertilizer needs for the island were 
estimated at 90,000 tons of nitrogen per year and 36,000 tons of 
phosphate. The island produced 2,000 tons of N and 5,000 tons of 
P205 in 1948. To make up this differential becomes quite an under­
taking when you consider that it costs about $300 to $600 to build a 
plant for each one annual ton of fixed nitrogen, but the Chinese started 
in. They kept costs down by initially building two cyanamid plants 
before they went into the regular ammonia plants, again plowing back 
84 American Trade with Asia and the Far East 
earnings from the lower cost units and building bigger, more modern 
units later. 
During the years from 1949 to 1957, other industries, primarily 
with a short range effect, also were developed. This balancing step was 
important to broaden the industrial base and reduce inflation pressure 
as a major long range industry was being built. It is my opinion that 
each type of industry or plant shown in the listing below as having 
been developed on Taiwan in these years should be similar to that 
which could be undertaken in other countries with only a slight variation 
due to different raw materials and crops. 
The big export industry for Taiwan was sugar which was de­
veloped specifically for the Japanese market by the Japanese prior to 
the war. To compete on the world market, the yield per acre had to 
be doubled. Only the profitable mills were kept in operation and 
improved and, finally, extensive by-product development from sugar 
and sugar materials was undertaken. These products included protein 
yeast, hog and chicken feed, celotex board, resin wood substitute, all 
types of paper and paper board, fuels, etc. These improvements en­
abled the country to produce some of the world's lowest priced sugar. 
Mining was developed, concentrating principally on coal, but 
gold, silver and copper mining was expanded, principally for export. The 
solar salt fields were improved. More drilling was undertaken for oil 
and natural gas, but little additional supplies were found. Pyrite and 
sulfur deposits were opened up, even if small and of low grade, pri­
marily as raw material for the fertilizer industry. 
The small topping unit at the oil refinery was expanded into 
modern facilities, including hydroforming and cat cracking to supply 
civilian and military needs, mostly from imported crude. 
The chemical and paper industries were improved and greatly 
expanded. The food processing industry, such as pineapple, beers and 
wines, vegetable oil, fish canning and vegetable dehydration, were 
well established. 
The rebuilt aluminum factory was expanded to make all types of 
finished aluminum products. Old cement mills were improved and 
new ones built. The small steel bar plants were expanded, cast iron 
pipe was made, shipbuilding was undertaken, and numerous small 
items of machinery, instruments, toys, automotive parts, plastics, bi­
cycles, tires, tubes, shoes, glass, insecticides and handicraft items were 
manufactured. 
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To provide power to all these factories, transportation and com­
munications had to be expanded to meet requirements and this was a 
major portion of the development on Taiwan. Power alone took up 
30 to 50 per cent of the yearly development funds available. For the en­
tire island, about 70 per cent of all power generated went to industries, 
a very high ratio showing the extent of the development taking place. 
At all times, careful limitation of total expenditures for these serv­
ices had to be maintained since these facilities by themselves did not 
add productive units to the economy. Only as these were utilized by 
manufacturing plants and personnel, did they contribute to the eco­
nomy. When these services are in short supply or limited, it is a 
great temptation to expand them to meet requirements 100 per cent, 
plus adequate reserve capacity, which would upset the balance on the 
use of available funds. 
All these manufactured items were primarily aimed at local de­
mand; rapid development was most important in order to supply this 
demand for a sufficiently large portion of the average necessities or 
wants of the population. By this method, along with sharply limited 
imports, inflation was more or less controlled. Every effort was made 
by the government in putting whatever capital was available into those 
industries that wou!d result in an overall balanced development. Along 
with heavy industry, such as fertilizers and chemicals, light industry was 
expanded. The rather quick return on capital from these light industries 
was reinvested and, during the long period of construction of the heavy 
in?ustry, supplies were available to absorb the increased purchasing 
power. This procedure was quite different from the method of indus­
trialization used by Communist countries and even countries like India. 
Nehru told the Indian National Development Council on January 21, 
1956: 
If you want India to industrialize and go ahead, you must in­
dustrialize and not bother with adding little factories producing 
hair oil and the like. You must go to the root and the base on 
which you will build the structure of an industrial India. There­
fore, it is heavy industry that counts. 
We think that the balanced development, not just heavy industry, was 
a major factor in the successful industrialization of Taiwan. 
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By 1956 and 1957, the results of the development that had taken 
place began to show up as changes in the trade pattern. In 1957, ex­
ports were valued at $170,000,000, quite different from the $34,000-
000 of 1949. Imports totaled $252,000,000 with United States aid sup­
plying $99,000,000 of the total value of the imports. The major items 
of import and export and their variation by 1957 was as follows: 
IMPORTS 
I. Soya Beans From 1950 to 1954, imports increased rapidly
from about $5,000,000 per year to $15,000,000, but in subse­
quent years, as varieties suitable for local growing conditions were
developed, this dropped to $10,000,000 by 1957. That figure
could possibly keep decreasing as local production of beans and
substitutes increases.
2. Wheat Importation of wheat also increased rapidly until 1954,
then began to decrease. The import value was about $16,000,000
in 1954 and about $11,000,000 in 1957. As population grows,
local production of food may decrease this figure in the immediate
future, but after that it will probably increase.
3. Raw Cotton In 1949, this import was negligible, since finished
textiles were imported. By 1957, the cotton imports totalled $18,-
000,000. We estimate this will continue to increase in the immedi­
ate future and then slow down as synthetics are developed locally.
4. Fertilizers Even with some local production coming on the line
in increasing quantities each year, the annual imports were about
$20,000,000 per year from 1950 to 1956. In 1957, they began
to drop and as the big units being built come on the line in 1958
and after, these imports will be sharply curtailed.
5. Medicine, Drugs, etc. As living standards increased, these im­
ports increased rapidly till they reached a figure of over $6,000,000
in 1952. As local repacking units and some production came on
the line, this remained at about that figure even though local
consumption increased.
6. Chemicals This reached a figure of $5,000,000 in 1957, and,
even though local production increases steadily, this import item
will probably continue to increase.
7. Galvanized Sheets and Wires This reached a peak in 1952 with
total imports at about $3,000,000 and then decreased as local pro­
duction met local needs.
8. Textile Machinery and Parts These imports reached a peak of
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about $4,000,000 in 1953, when the industry was being estab­
lished. Imports decreased thereafter, totalling only about $2,-
000,000 in 1957. 
9. Machinery and Parts This will be a big and continually grow­
ing item, even as local production takes over the manufacture of
certain items. In 1950, the imports totaled about $2,000,000 but
were $15,000,000 in 1957.
10. Vehicles and Vessels These imports totaled about $7,000,000
or $8,000,000 each year since 1950. Local production of jeeps
and scooters as well as vessels, plus the strict import control on
such items, have kept the total from increasing even though the
demand is there.
l l. Crude Oil and Diesel Fuel This steadily increases, primarily
for military purposes. Imports were over $2,000,000 in 1950 and
over $20,000,000 in 1957.
12. Remaining Import Items These are quite varied and usually
small in any one category. In 1950, the figure was about $50,-
000,000, and in 1957 it was $65,000,000.
EXPORTS 
13. Sugar In 1950, the exports were about $55,000,000 and in
1957 this increased to over $100,000,000.
14. Rice The.se exports vary in the $15,000,000 to $20,000,000
range each year.
15. Others These consist of tea, citronella oil, cement, coal, salt,
bananas, canned pineapples, cotton piece goods, ores, metals and
some metal products. By 19 5 7, coal exports were stopped since
it was needed locally, but the other items are generally increasing
each year.
This is the general picture of how the trade patterns changed in
this initial development period on Taiwan. As the development con­
tinues, the changes will be more pronounced on machinery imports and 
the exports of processed products. Exports are a major problem since 
they must be increased to balance the foreign exchange shortage now 
made by United States aid. The living standards could be decreased 
to live within present earnings, but already they are very low. There­
fore, considerable thought has been given to increasing exports from 
Taiwan. I feel that this could best be developed by concentrating on 
higher cost items requiring a lot of labor. For example, the Aluminum 
Company used to make only ingots and costs were high. This was 
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changed to include the manufacture and export of fabricated aluminum 
products and the company operated much more profitably and export 
earnings increased. Also, many of these countries that want to grow 
don't mind doing unpleasant work. In this category, I think of gal­
vanizing, which requires work around the hot and fuming dip tanks. 
Steel for Taiwan and even areas in the vicinity could stop off and be 
galvanized there. In Taiwan, because of the raw material situation, the 
chemical industry will perhaps develop into the major heavy industry 
on the island. Another possibility that I think has a lot of merit is 
research. The Chinese engineers and scientists have a special aptitude 
for this work. I believe that the research efforts of many Western in­
dustries can be economically and efficiently supplemented by research 
staffs on Taiwan. Many of the interesting side leads that arc un­
covered by United States researchers and developers that are dropped 
in order to follow the main objective could be picked up and economic­
ally carried forward in countries like Taiwan. Although the initial de­
velopment of Taiwan has been well accomplished and could serve as 
an excellent pattern for other areas, continued development is still re­
quired. After the major imports are manufactured locally, the next 
step, exports, is quite difficult, since the competition is not only local but 
world wide. We feel, however, it can be accomplished. 
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T H�RE ARE THREE elementary points with which I like to preface
any discussion of Japanese trade and exchange problems. 
The first point is that, contrary to most American opinion, many
Japanese, including most urban Japanese, feel themselves worse off 
than they were before World War II. The index of industrial produc­
tion reached 255 per cent of its 1934-36 average in November of last 
year for a popµlation only 120 per cent of its 1934-36 level. Agricul­
ture has lagged, however, and much of the industrial output serves as 
a substitute for imports which are no longer available, or which Japan 
can no longer squeeze from the Empire at bargain prices. Aggregate 
income per capita is slightly above the best prewar year (1937), but 
this slight aggregate increase is compounded of a substantial rise in the 
rural areas and a somewhat smaller fall in the cities. Welfare, more­
over, is not entirely a matter of current income; Japan suffered capital 
losses from wartime destruction and loss of her overseas Empire 
amounting to 40 per cent of her total capital, and these losses have 
been restored only partially. 
My second point relates to the reason Japan needs to export. 
One hears a great deal of loose talk that Japan must export because 
Japanese workers' and farmers' incomes are too low to buy back the 
products Japan produces. This is convenient doctrine for those who 
want to exclude Japanese competition from American markets; we 
may expect to hear it occasionally as long as we live. It has, how­
ever, the minor disadvantage of being almost 100 per cent false. The 
92 American Trade with Asia and the Far East
reason Japan must export is that she must import some 20 per cent 
of her staple food supply, plus most of the raw materials for all her 
principal exports ( except silk, fish and pottery products) , and needs 
exports to pay for these imports. For those not repelled by statistics, 
a few specific commodity percentages may be interesting. Japan im­
ports about 11 per cent of her rice, 46 per cent of her wheat, 88 per 
cent of her iron ore, 28 per cent of her coking coal, 97 per cent of her 
petroleum, 61 per cent of her soy beans and 79 per cent of her salt. 
Japan is, like Great Britain, minus coal and iron; her basic assets are 
almost limited to man power and electricity. The essential nature of 
her imports and exports makes the price elasticity of both her import 
demand and her export supply much less than they would otherwise be. 
My third preliminary point follows at once. Any increase in 
Japan's standard of life makes Japan's foreign exchange problem not 
less but more acute. It increases Japan's demand for imports, es­
pecially food and textile fibers, as the Japanese eat and dress better. 
At the same time it decreases Japan's supply of exports of almost every 
kind, because the Japanese themselves buy more of these things. The 
better Japan lives, the more trouble she has in paying for imports. 
Japan's limmu Keiki ("biggest boom in history") foundered in just 
this way in 1956-57. Let me give you a running quotation from the 
London Economist (March 8, 1958) on this precise point. 
As the hectic boom progressed, the swollen demands of industry 
for imported raw materials came up headlong against Japan's in­
ability to pay for them by selling enough exports. As the re­
serves of foreign exchange fell, the government was forced to 
slow the economy down. 
This experience was a sample of the dilemma Japan faces. The 
nation's industry can give the Japanese a steadily improving 
standard of life - if Japan can pay for enough raw material from 
abroad. If it cannot, the same process may occur again and 
again; first an acceleration of investment and production, to keep 
pace with the population statistics, and then a painful thud as the 
balance of payments runs into trouble. 
If you look at the figures for recent years, Japan's balance of pay­
ments does not look particularly precarious. After losing $194 million 
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of foreign exchange with the end of the Korean War m 1y.:,:.;, she ac­
cumulated $887 million in the next three years. These figures conceal 
one major difficulty, namely Japan's dependence on "special dollar 
receipts," arising almost entirely from the presence in Japan of United 
States forces which are now being reduced in partial accordance with 
Japan's desires. If it were not for these special dollar receipts, which 
represent "thirty pieces of silver" to many Japanese, the price of re­
duced independence, the balance of payments figures for 1953-56 in­
clusive would have shown Japan losing a total of $2,874 million of 
foreign exchange. Japan hopes to eliminate them by 1960. Much of 
the expansion of Sino-Soviet bloc trade is intended to finance their 
elimination, chiefly by replacing imports from America by cheaper 
Chinese produce. 
Given this unhappy situation, can it in any way be remedied by 
exchange rate manipulations? The yen-dollar rate, keystone of Japan's 
foreign exchange system, was set at 360 yen to the dollar in April 1949, 
following nearly three years of inflationary chaos. There has been no 
depreciation since, despite the devaluation of most competing Com­
monwealth and European currencies at least once during the period 
under review. 
There has been a certain amount of sentiment in Japan in favor 
of devaluation ·of the yen, to permit Japan to increase exports by cutting 
their dollar prices. There have occasionally been sQggestions that up­
ward revaluation might be in order, to decrease import costs by lower­
ing their yen prices. But since devaluation would raise import prices 
in yen, while upward revaluation would raise export prices in dollars, 
the advantages and disadvantages of these two proposals have can­
celled each other out and nothing has been done along either line. 
Rather, some export industries have been favored by a number of 
special ad hoc devices: specially low interest rates, preferential access 
to credit, special tax treatment, preferential award of profitable import 
licenses for unrelated products, and so on. 
I am not a specialist in international trade and finance, but let 
me try to take you part way into the complex theory of the relations 
between exchange rates and balances of payments. The most important 
variable in this case, I think, is the foreign or dollar demand for yen, 
relative to the price of yen in terms of dollars, i.e. the reciprocal of 
the yen-dollar rate. If this demand can be expressed as a curve, as 
in the two parts of Figure I, the total amount of dollars obtained at any 
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exchange rate is the rectangular area under the curve. If the dollar 
price of the yen is 1/360, as at P, total dollar receipts are (OP x 00). 
If, as in Figure I-a, the demand function for yen (meaning Jap­
anese goods) is elaslic in dollar terms, a fall in the dollar price of the 
yen, say to 1/400, or P', will increase total Japanese dollar receipts, 
since (OP' x OQ') is an area larger than (OP x OQ). This is the nub 
of the case for devaluation when, as in the Japanese case, her export 
supply and import demand are both inelastic, so that we need not 
concern ourselves with them to a first approximation. But if. as in 
Figure 1-b, the foreign demand for yen (meaning Japanese goods) in 
dollar terms is inelastic, dollar receipts can be increased by an upward 
revaluation of the yen, say to l / 300 or P", since ( OP" x OQ") is an 
area larger than ( OP x OQ). This is the nub of the case for upward 
revaluation under the same conditions. 
P' r------1----""'!-. 
Japanese 
Export'> 
O �- -----'-0-----'0-- (y<n) 
Figure 1 � a 
Japanese 
E.l:porb 
O �-----Q_,_ _ _,_0-
-(:,en) 
Figure I� b 
My diagnosis of the Japanese difficulty, the reason why Japan 
has hesitated to tamper with the exchange rate, is drawn as Figure IL 
If Japan devalues, the yen prices of imported raw materials will rise. 
The yen prices of imported foodstuffs will also rise, and yen wage 
rates will rise with them. The result is that the dollar prices of 
Japanese exports will fall little if at all after these adjustments take 
place, little more will be taken in the world market, and accordingly, 
the demand curve will be inelastic below OP. In the diagram, (OP' x 
OQ') is less than ( OP x OQ), and nothing is accomplished. 
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Rate 
Now consider an upward revaluation, to lower the yen prices of 
imported food and raw materials. The trouble here is that yen prices 
of Japanese exports will probably not fall. Money wages in most 
export trades are held up by powerful trade unions, and money prices 
of many export products are likewise administered by monopolistic 
or cartel arrangements of various kinds. If the yen prices of Japanese 
exports do not fall, their world or dollar prices will rise when the yen 
is revalued upward. If the dollar prices of Japanese exports rise, the 
Exchange 
Rate 
P" 1-----=.,..._� 
Japanese 
Exports 
.0 
'-----'0'-,. ----�0�0-, 
_(yen) 
Figure JI 
quantity sold with fall off drastically, since most of these exports are 
highly competitive with British, German, Indian, or American products, 
not only in these countries themselves but all over the world. On the 
diagram (Figure II), the demand function for yen is therefore drawn 
as elastic when the yen is priced above OP. There is a kind of kink 
or comer in the neighborhood of the existing exchange rate. (OP" x 
OQ"), like (OP' x OQ'), is less than the initial receipts (OP x OQ). 
There is little scope for overall exchange rate manipulation. 
This sort of situation is probably not unusual. It is commonly 
dealt with by economists interested in oligopoly problems, but is not 
often considered in treatments of international exchanges. It has, I 
suspect, played its part in inspiring many experiments with direct im­
port controls, with exchange controls and with multiple exchange rates. 
It is the last of these alternatives, namely a simple double exchange 
rate, which I should like to consider for Japan - not the Japan of 
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1958 perhaps, but for the Japan of 1960 if "special dollar receipts" 
decline and trade with the Soviet-Chinese bloc proves a disappointing 
substitute. 
Specifically, consider two proposals. Proposal 1: Pay all exporters 
a generalized export subsidy of, say, 40 yen for each dollar of exports, 
either anywhere in the world or specifically to convertible-currency 
areas. This would give these exporters the advantage of a 400-to-1 
exchange rate in permitting them to cut dollar prices while maintaining 
yen prices. It would not entail any offsetting rise in the prices of im­
ported staple food and industrial raw materials. Or as an alternative, 
Proposal 2: Pay all importers of the major industrial raw materials 
(and possibly also some staple foods but definitely not other con­
sumption goods) a subsidy of, say, 40 yen for each dollar of imports. 
This would provide to Japanese exporters the advantage of a 320-to-1 
exchange rate in cheaper raw materials. It might also provide Japanese 
workers the advantage of cheaper food and higher real wages, without 
the disadvantages of a cheaper yen in international markets. 
Of these two double-rate proposals, the first, or generalized ex­
port subsidy, seems somewhat preferable on balance. The government 
gets more for its money, focussing the subsidy directly on exports, 
whereas import subsidies also assist imports which get into the domestic 
market. Conflict is avoided with the downward rigidity of yen cost 
prices and wage rates, which we have said might be maintained despite 
import subsidies. Conflict is also avoided with the Japanese farm and 
mining blocs, which are interested in high food and mineral prices to 
build up domestic products. Of course, an export subsidy discommodes 
domestic consumers by diverting production to exports rather than 
domestic sales. Furthermore, the export-subsidy plan is clearly a type 
of "exchange dumping" which would arouse a greater volume and 
vehemence of foreign denunciation than import subsidies, which, 
strictly speaking, are not dumping at all. Urban support for the 
taxation necessary for a subsidy would also be easier to obtain if, as 
in the import subsidy case, it could be linked with lower food prices. 
Finally, an import subsidy would cost less, since only selected imports 
rather than total exports would receive it. 
Like any other subsidy, this one must be paid for. In many such 
cases, financing might be by taxes on luxuries, especially imported 
ones. Economists give the name "selective depreciation" to policies of 
subsidizing some exports or imports by taxes on others. Selective de-
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preciation is, however, impractical in Japan because taxes on such 
imports are extremely high already. Most of the financing must be by 
considerably broader-based methods - either tax increases, or open 
inflation, or suppressed inflation with direct controls, or some combina­
tion of the three. This is true even though its net cost may fall short 
of the gross by making possible the elimination of some of the special 
gadgets and favors to particular export industries which we have men­
tioned before. How the Japanese might choose to divide the cost of 
an export or an import subsidy between taxation, inflation, and con­
trols I have no idea - but taxation to rescue the balance of payments 
should be easier to sell the Japanese, dependent as they are on inter­
national trade, than it would be to a more self-sufficient country like 
the United States. 
The International Monetary Fund, I have been assured informally 
and anonymously by a high ranking member of the Fund bureaucracy 
( not Dr. Liang or Professor Fisher), would look with extreme disfavor 
on either of these types of exchange rate at the present time. (It is not 
entirely clear how this disapproval would be translated into effective 
sanctions.) But when and if the reduction of Japan's special dollar 
receipts brings into the light of day a "fundamental disequilibrium" in 
Japan's balance of. payments, modification of the Fund's attitude may 
be anticipated with a good deal of confidence, barring better solutions 
along more conventional lines. 
The main arguments of this paper usually provoke a crucial ques­
ti\:m. It may be phrased somewhat as follows: "What do your pro­
posals, either or both of them, accomplish which cannot be accom­
plished by economic pressure on Japanese wage and profit rates (which 
are higher in many export industries than in the rest of the economy) 
or on Japanese practices of hiring surplus labor?" To which I must 
answer, nothing and yet everything. On paper, nothing; in fact the 
deflationary orthodox proposals are simpler and neater. In practice, 
everything. These proposals preserve what has been called the "social 
equilibrium" of Japanese society. They resolve conflicts particularly 
between the wage rates and labor practices necessary for Japanese in­
ternational equilibrium and the wage rates and labor practices necessary 
to conform to Japanese ethical notions of industrial fair dealing. As 
a result, they may preserve Japanese capitalism under circumstances 
where orthodox proposals require revolution from the Right to avoid 
revolution from the Left if they should be attempted in the near future. 
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THE TRADE OF the three countries of China (Taiwan), Japan and 
Korea (South) with the United States has both common features and 
divergent trends. Taking the three countries as a whole, one outstand­
ing fact is that they occupy a very insignificant place in the supply of 
United States imports. During the six year period from 1951 to 1956 
for which complete and consistent trade data are available, their total 
exports to the Unfred States amounted to only 3.4 per cent of total 
United States import (see Table 1). Comparative data for the prewar 
trade of Taiwan and South Korea are not available. It is known, how­
ever, that Japan by itself provided 6.6 per cent of total United States 
prewar (1937-38) import. With regard to United States exports, the 
share of these three countries for the recent six year period amounted 
to 5.4 per cent, not counting United States exports under the aid pro­
gram for which a country classification is not available. While the 
true United States export situation with respect to these three countries 
is somewhat obscured by the aid program, the obvious fact remains that 
they are more important to the United States as markets than as sources 
of supply. 
The small volume of exports from this part of the Far East, and 
especially of exports to the United States, is due to many special de­
velopments. As is well known, Japan lost much of its prewar terri­
tories after the war. Both China and Korea have suffered from the 
loss of control of much of their domain. All three countries sustained 
great war damage and have to support a population which is growing 
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TABLE 1. Percentage Share of China (Taiwan), Japan and Korea (South) 
in the Total United States Exports and Imports* 
China (Taiwan) Japan Korea (South) Total 
Year Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import 
1937 8.6 6.6 
1938 7.8 5.8 
1937 /38 Average 8.2 6.6 
1948 2.6 0.9 
1949 3.9 1.2 
1950 4.1 2.1 0.2 ** 
1951 0.3 0.1 3.9 1.8 0.3 ** 4.5 1.9 
1952 0.4 0.1 4.1 2.2 0.6 1.8 5.1 4.1 
1953 0.5 0.1 4.3 2.4 0.6 0.3 5.4 2.8 
1954 0.6 0.1 4.5 2.7 0.6 0.2 5.7 3.0 
1955 0.7 0.1 4.2 3.8 0.8 0.1 5.7 4.0 
1956 0.5 0.1 4.6 4.4 0.9 0.1 6.0 4.6 
1957 (Jan.-Oct.) 0.5 0.1 6.0 4.6 1.3 ** 7.8 4.7 
*Imports include silver; export of military and economic aid are included in totals but are not included in country figures.
**Less than 0.1%. 
Source: Direction of International Trade, United Nations. 
rapidly as a result both of natural increases and of the repatriation or 
refugees. Their progress in production techniques has lagged much 
behind that of the United States. This is true not only for Taiwan and 
South Korea but also for Japan, which, after the long period of war 
and isolation during the first postwar years, has not been able to keep 
up with current technological advances. Annual exports to the United 
States from Taiwan and South Korea have been of the order of only 
a few million dollars in recent years. The principal export of Taiwan 
is sugar. Taiwan is one of the ranking sugar export countries of the 
world, but the comparative rigidity of the United States sugar import 
quota system has strictly limited Taiwan's prospects of satisfying some 
of the tremendous United States demand for sugar imports. Trade 
relations with South Korea have been a new postwar development for 
the United States, inasmuch as before the war trade between the two 
countries was negligible. United States postwar imports from Korea 
have consequently been limited to a small amount of a few Korean 
products such as tungsten, raw silk and bristles. The percentage share 
of Japan in United States imports, which has been increasing in recent 
years, reached 4.6 per cent in 1957 (Jan.-Oct.). It is still below the 
prewar figure of 6.6 per cent ( see Table 1). In addition to the general 
influences mentioned above which have limited exports from the Far 
Eastern region to the United States, Japanese exports have also been 
affected by the loss of some of Japan's prewar trade advantages, such 
as cheap labor and the cartelization of its foreign trade. Those exports 
have also been affected by the decline in demand for Japan's principal 
prewar export, raw silk, which before the war accounted for about 
one-half of Japanese exports to the United States. On top of these 
unfavorable developments, Japanese trade now has to face sales re­
sistance against Japanese products in the United States, especially with 
regard to textiles, tuna fish, porcelain, plywood and silverware. Last, 
but not least, the postwar cost and price relationships in these three 
countries may not always have been such as to give their export prod­
ucts competitive advantages in the United States market. 
The problem of United States exports to this region is much more 
complicated than that of imports. In the first place, United States aid 
exports cannot be accurately appraised because no data are available 
to show how they have been distributed among the countries in receipt 
of aid. Even excluding aid exports, the United States has increased 
its exports to this region from 4.5 per cent of United States total ex-
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port in 1951 to 7.8 per cent in 1957 (Jan.-Oct.) (see Table 1). The 
imports, other than aid, of these three countries from the United States 
have increased much more than their exports. The result has been 
large trade deficits in their commercial trade account (i.e., not includ­
ing aid imports) with the United States (see Table 2). In recent years 
the trade position of Japan has been more favorable than that of Taiwan 
and South Korea; Japan's exports to the United States have neverthe­
less covered only about 30 to 50 per cent of its imports from the United 
States (see Table 3). In the first 10 months of 1957, Japan had a 
big trade deficit with the United States of $925 million.1 The trade 
deficits of Taiwan and South Korea were offset by United States aid 
while those of Japan were met by United States and United Nations 
military expenditures. 2 The reasons for these large exports from the 
United States to these countries are mostly the same as those mentioned 
above as an explanation of the small volume of United States imports 
from them. The list should however be supplemented by reference to 
some additional factors. The high import demand in these countries 
is partly due to their great need for both defense and development, and 
they practice very little of the discrimination against dollar goods that 
is common in other countries with similar payments difficulties. 
It seems to follow from all these considerations, that no significant 
reduction of imports by these countries from the United States is likely. 
With regard to their exports, some increase appears possible and there 
may therefore be some improvement in their trade balances with the 
United States. To what extent this can become a reality and in what 
way the volume and pattern of trade between these countries and the 
United States will be affected, depends on a variety of factors. Some 
of these factors are related to the policies of the United States, some 
are contingent on economic development in the three countries con­
cerned while still others are quite beyond their control and have their 
origin in the world outside. 
One of the most important of these factors is the trade policy of 
the United States. It has been the firm desire of the United States 
Government to help friendly countries stand on their own feet eco­
nomically so that they can contribute to the full employment of the 
1 This figure is from Japanese sources (Table 3) and is different from that pre­
sented in Table 2 which is based on United States statistics. 
2 United States investments in these countries have so far not been an important 
factor in financing their trade deficits. 
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Year 
1937 
1938 
1937/38 
TABLE 3. Japan's Trade with the United States, 
1937, 1938 and 1948-57 
(In millions of United States dollars) 
Q) 
Total Trade Trade with U.S. As% of Total u 
-; . - - - - - - .cl� .... .... .... .... .... .... .,� 0 0 0 0 0 0 
"'O ..c: � r:,.. r:,.. r:,.. r:,.. r:,.. >< s >< s «I-Ill - Ill - Ill - �-�
914.8 1,089.9 188.1 366.0 20.6 33.6 _ 177.9 
766.5 759.0 124.0 261.1 16.2 34.4 _ 137.1 
840.7 924.5 156.1 313.5 18.6 33.9 _ 157.4 
Average 
1948 258.6 682.6 65.7 441.4 25.4 64.7 _ 375.7 
1949 510.6 899.8 83.6 575.8 16.4 64.0 _492.2 
1950 820.1 969.9 183.0 427.0 22.3 44.0 _ 244.0 
1951 1.354.5 1,955.0 189.7 687.3 14.0 34.5 _497.6 
1952 1,272.9 2,028.1 234.3 768.3 18.4 37.8 _ 534.0 
1953 1,274.8 2,409.6 233.9 757.5 18.3 31.4 _ 523.6 
1954 1,629.3 2,399.4 282.9 849.1 17.4 35.3 _ 566.2 
1955 2,010.8 2,471.6 457.1 774.0 22.7 31.3 _ 316.9 
1956 2,495.4 3,229.6 551.5 1,067.3 22.1 33.0 _ 515.8 
1957 2,320.5 3,720.9 491.6 1,416.3 21.1 38.1 _ 924.7 
(Jan.-Oct.) 
Source: Direction of International Trade, United Nations. 
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51.4 
47.5 
49.8 
14.9 
14.5 
42.9 
27.6 
30.5 
30.9 
33.3 
59.1 
51.7 
34.7 
world's resources and become useful members in the councils of the 
free nations. The interests of the three countries in the Far East region 
have been of particular concern to the United States. Ever since 1934 
the Reciprocal Trade Act, passed in that year, has been an instrument 
used by the United States in order to expand world trade and to pro­
mote world economic welfare. At the same time the United States has 
not been too critical of the policies of protection and sometimes of 
discrimination practiced by other countries when there appeared to be 
legitimate reasons for such measures. Very recently, however, there 
has been some change of thinking in the United States with a tendency 
toward more protectionism for American industries. The "Buy Ameri­
can" provision with regard to government procurement was introduced 
for the reason of national defense and security. There are various kinds 
of informal restrictions, particularly against certain Japanese products. 
In order not to provoke any increase of import duties on Japanese 
products, Japan has "voluntarily" imposed a quota on its exports of 
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textiles. A revival of protectionism in the United States would have 
very unfortunate consequences. An example might be set which other 
countries would follow, and in the end this might mean that the 
United States would retreat from its economic leadership of the world. 
There might be a setback to the trade not only of the three countries 
in the Far Eastern region but of the whole world. Restrictions upon 
imports from any individual country may indeed fail to produce the 
expected benefits even for the United States industries most directly 
affected. For the restrictions may merely intensify competition with 
United States exports in third markets. This point has not always been 
given sufficient attention. Let us take Japanese trade as an illustration. 
Japan has succeeded in recent years in promoting a g�eater volume of 
exports to Latin America, and it has also a plan to increase its exports 
to Southeast Asia. United States restrictions upon Japanese imports 
are likely to intensify Japan's efforts to push exports in these two 
regions, and this might mean a reduction of imports by these regions 
from the United States. Nor would Japan's increased export earnings 
from other regions necessarily lead to an increase of Japanese imports 
from the United States, because under present circumstances such 
export earnings may not be in the form of convertible currencies. It is 
true that Japan must import raw materials before it can export, but 
Japanese demand for imports might be diverted from the United States 
to some third countries. In order that the three countries in the Far 
East region should absorb more imports from the United States, apart 
from aid, they must first be able to earn more United States dollars. 
Tlieir chief hope for achieving this lies in a liberalization of United 
States imports of Far East products, such as Taiwan sugar and tea, 
Korean minerals and raw silk and Japanese textiles and fishery products. 
This might necessitate more than a mere extension of the Reciprocal 
Trade Act by the United States. 
The ability of these countries to import United States goods may 
also be improved by an increase in some of their invisible earnings, 
such as those from shipping. This is particularly important for Japan. 
Before the war, Japan's net earnings from shipping exceeded its trade 
deficit. In each year during the postwar period it has had to make 
net payments on this account. In 1956, Japan's net payment for 
transportation amounted to $303.2 million (see Table 4). On the 
other hand, Japan has rapidly become the world's largest shipbuilding 
country. The tonnage of its merchant marine has recovered to more 
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than half the prewar peak tonnage of 8 million tons. Taiwan has also 
made progress in ocean shipping. Its gross earnings from shipping 
have increased from $3.1 million in 1955 to about $16 million in 
1957. At the present time, there is a United States regulation which 
reserves 50 per cent of any United States financed cargoes to American 
bottoms. In view of the large volume of United States aid goods going 
to the Far East, a liberalization of this provision would enable both 
Japan and Taiwan to increase their transportation receipts. 
The future volume of United States exports (including aid ex­
ports) to the three countries in the Far East depends very much on 
aid policy. The high value of United States exports to this region in 
the past has been made possible by the large amount of aid and of 
American military expenditures. From 1948 to 1957, American aid 
of $871 million was authorized for Taiwan and of $1,181 million for 
South Korea. Similar American aid authorized for Japan has been 
small, but Japan's annual exchange receipts from foreign government 
military expenditures have been very large, reaching a figure of $803.3 
million in 1953. These receipts have since been on the decline, but in 
1956 they still amounted to $498 million ( see Table 4). In view of the 
great importance of American aid in sustaining United States exports 
to these countries, it must have been very gratifying to them that the 
administration has urged the public to support a larger budget for the 
United States aid program. A related question is the United States 
program for disposal of surplus agricultural products. This program 
has been subjected to unfavorable comment in certain countries. It is 
interesting to note that the three countries in the Far East region are 
all beneficiaries of this program. The American surplus products, such 
as cotton, grains and tobacco, are their deficit items, and through the 
surplus disposal program they can be obtained on a loan basis. There 
will indeed be a continuing need for many of these products in all 
these countries. 
Many countries are very much concerned about economic fluc­
tuations in the United States. The impact of such fluctuations on the 
economy is different in each of the three countries with which we are 
concerned. Taiwan's exports of sugar and rice are less sensitive to 
world cyclical fluctuations than Korean exports of mineral products. 
Japan has the advantage of a great diversification of exports with re­
spect both to their destination and to their composition. 
It is quite natural that the prospects of United States trade with 
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::i.. TABLE 4. Certain Invisible Items in Japan's Balance of Payments, 1950 to 1956
� (In Millions of United States Dollars) ... �- Invisible 1950 1951 1952 1953 t:l 
;:s Items Credit Debit Balance Credit Debit Balance Credit Debit Balance Credit Debit Balance 
"-3 Foreign Travel 21.3 0.9 20.4 8.9 4.4 4.5 8.2 5.0 3.2 10.0 7.0 3.0 
� Transportation 16.5 134.5 _118.0 41.0 255.7 _214.7 71.4 223.4 _152.0 76.6 247.0 _170.4 
� Investment Income 0.3 5.9 - 5.6 1.1 6.4 - 5.3 6.1 11.0 - 4.9 11.8 34.9 _ 23.1 Government Military 
� Expenditures* 153.6 153.6 624.2 624.2 787.8 787.8 803.3 803.3 -. Total 191.7 141.3 50.4 675.2 266.5 408.7 873.5 239.4 634.1 901.7 288.9 612.8 -
::i.."' Invisible 1954 1955 1956 
E;· Items Credit Debit Balance Credit Debit Balance Credit Debit Balance 
t:l Foreign Travel 11.2 6.8 4.4 14.3 8.1 6.2 16.5 12.3 4.2 
;:s Transportation 89.7 255.9 _166.2 127.4 276.0 _148.6 209.8 513.0 _303.2 t:l.. Investment Income 8.2 47.0 _ 38.8 14.1 55.5 _ 41.4 27.3 66.1 _ 38.8 -
::i- Government Military � Expenditures* 602.3 602.3 505.2 505.2 498.0 498.0 
� Total 711.4 309.7 401.7 661.0 339.6 321.4 751.6 591.4 160.2 ... Source: Balance of Payments Yearbook, Vol. 8 ,1950-54 and Volume 9, November 1957 issue. 
gi *The entries cover sales of goods and services to military personnel stationed in Japan, sales to United Nations forces under the"' special procurement program in connection with the Korean war, and, for 1952-54, United States expenditures for the main-- tenance of forces in Japan.
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Japan, Taiwan and South Korea should also be affected by economic 
developments within each of these three countries. The first considera­
tion is their development plans. Export promotion is one of the most 
prominent objectives of the Five Year Economic Plan of Japan, ef­
fective from 1958. Japan's share of world total export was only 2.7 
per cent in 1956 compared with 3.9 per cent in 1937. Japan has now 
some idle capital equipment capable of producing more exportable 
goods. The value of Japan's exports during the next five years is ex­
pected to increase by l 0.5 per cent every year. Exports to the United 
States are expected to increase and competition in the world market 
between Japan and the United States will be intensified. In the second 
Four-Year Plan of Taiwan, in effect since 1957, certain import sub­
stitutes, such as fertilizer, are to be developed, and the production of 
new export commodities is to be promoted. Commercial imports from 
the United States may decrease somewhat. Whether Taiwan will suc­
ceed in promoting more exports to the United States is difficult to 
assess. Its principal export, sugar, as mentioned above, is affected by 
one single factor, the American import quota system rather than by 
anything else. Korea's development plan is still at the stage of de­
liberation. The general thinking is that Korea will put more emphasis 
on the development of mining and fishery. Any success in this direction 
may create the possibility of exporting more Korean mineral and 
fishery products to the United States. The mere availability of more 
export goods, however, does not necessarily result in a better pay­
ments position as so much depends on the cost-price relationships of 
goods to be expected, which in turn hinges on the implementation of 
a stabilizing fiscal and credit policy. Apart from the question of the 
price level, marketing is also an important problem. Korea, strictly 
speaking, is a newcomer in the postwar world market, and not many 
countries have yet familiarized themselves with the export products of 
Taiwan. Even in Japan, the technique of promoting exports is still 
behind that of some other leading trading countries. Japan should 
place more emphasis on the appeal of quality and finish than on price 
cutting and should prefer the creation of distinct new designs to mere 
imitation of popular patterns. However, great efforts have been made 
by Japan to overcome its previous shortcomings, and great hopes cen­
ter around the efforts made by the Japanese External Trade Recovery 
Organization ( JETRO). 
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Progress in international economic relations in certain directions 
can be brought about only by the collaborative efforts of the trading 
partners. Foreign investment is one of these. Promotion of foreign 
investment by the United States in this region depends, on the one 
hand, on the creation of a good economic atmosphere in the capital­
receiving countries and, on the other hand, on the willingness of the 
investing countries to take risks. The United States has increased its 
foreign investment in recent years, and in 1956 total United States 
direct foreign investment reached $3.6 billion. However, not much 
of this has gone to the Far East region. The largest recipient of United 
States investment among the three Far East countries was Japan, with 
an inflow of direct investments from the United States of $16 million 
in 1956. Japan and Taiwan have each enacted a foreign investment 
law, the provisions of which are considered to be quite liberal with 
regard to the kind of industries open to foreigners, guarantees against 
expropriation, and the right to repatriate capital and transfer profits. 
Legislation for encouraging foreign investment is now under study in 
Korea. Japan has had large credits from the Ex-Im Bank, totaling 
$693 million up to the end of 1957. China has also had loans from 
the Ex-Im Bank, totaling $222 million. Korea has not yet had any 
loan from this source. These loans have been effective in promoting 
United States trade. Heavy purchases by Japan of United States cot­
ton had much to do with several loans of $60 million granted to Japan 
in previous years. Tourism is another factor of some importance in 
United States-Far East economic relations. The three Far East countries 
have not yet had any considerable share of the United States tourist 
dollar. The chance for strengthening their invisible receipts through 
the development of the tourist trade again depends on the mutual 
efforts to be made by both the United States and the Far East countries. 
Much work has been done by the latter to make travelling there more 
attractive. If more facilities and encouragement were to be provided 
to tourists on the United States side, an important contribution could 
be made to the development of a better balance in the payments ac­
counts of these countries with the United States. 
The trade between any two countries cannot be divorced from 
economic developments in the world at large. In this regard, some 
recent significant events will not fail to have their impact on United 
States trade with the Far East. One of these developments is the 
European Economic Community which is to establish a free market 
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among six European countries and a common tariff in association with 
some other countries. The impact of this arrangement will fall more 
on Japan than on Taiwan or South Korea, since Japan has had a sizable 
volume of trade with the member countries of this common market. 
If Japanese exports to these countries should be checked, export shifts 
to some other markets, including the United States may become a 
necessity for Japan. A second world development is the increasing 
trade offensive by the Soviet bloc. The volume of East-West trade has 
been on the increase in recent years. However, this does not affect 
Taiwan and South Korea at all since these two countries are both dead 
set against any trading with the Soviet bloc. Japanese imports from 
the Sino-Soviet bloc have increased from $24 million in 1951 to $103 
TABLE 5. Japanese Trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1951-57 
(In millions of United States dollars) 
Year 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
(1) Japan's Exports
Soviet Bloc 
Export Value 
Total 
1,357.7 5.8 
1,272.9 0.8 
1,274.8 4.6 
1,629.3 24.1 
2,010.6 39.5 
2,500.6 73.3 
2,320.4 54.9** 
* Less than $50,000.
As% of 
Total 
Imports 
.4 
.1 
.4 
1.5 
2.0 
2.9 
2.4 
Bloc Satellites China 
European European U.S.S.R. Communist 
* * 0 5.8 
0.2 * 0.2 0.6 
0.1 0.1 * 4.5
5.0 5.0 * 19.1
11.0 8.9 2.1 28.5
5.9 5.1 0.8 67.4
9.4 5.2 4.2 45.4
** Includes shipments to North Korea valued at $0.1 million.
(2) Japan's Imports
Soviet Bloc 
As% of 
Year Total Total , Bloc Satellites China 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
Import Value Exports European European U.S.S.R. Communist 
2,047.9 24.0* 1.2 2.2 2.2 ** 21.6 
2,028.8 17.9 .9 3.0 2.5 0.5 14.9 
2,409.6 37.8 1.6 8.1 6.0 2.1 29.7 
2,399.4 48.4 2.0 7.6 5.3 2.3 40.8 
2,471.4 89.1 3.6 8.3 5.2 3.1 80.8 
3,229.7 102.5*** 3.2 10.9 8.0 2.9 83.6 
3,720.5 97.1 *** 2.6 14.4 4.0 10.4 71.3 
* Includes imports from Outer Mongolia of $200,000.
** Less than $50,000.
*** Includes imports from Outer Mongolia, North Korea, and North Viet-Nam.
Source: International Cooperation Administration: Mutual Defense Assist­
ance Control Act of 1951, 6th, 8th and 10th Report to Congress. 
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million in 1956. Japanese exports to this group also increased during 
the same period from $6 million to $73 million (see Table 5). It 
snould be noted that the balance of Japanese trade with this bloc has 
always been passive. The total import surplus for the six years from 
1951 to 1957 amounted to $171 million. The bulk of Japanese im­
ports from this bloc consisted of soybeans, coal and iron from Main­
land China. In fact, these things can also be supplied to Japan by the 
United States. The Soviet bloc has pushed its trade by means of bilat­
eral trade agreements, which have proved to be an effective weapon for 
attaining the objectives of Soviet policy. They permit trading to be 
conducted by one single government agency, include aids and loans in 
one blanket deal and obliterate the necessity for using cost and price 
as a basis for trade transactions. The West, including the United 
States, has yet to think out an effective means to counteract this trade 
offensive. Some other countries, such as Germany and Italy, have also 
had programs for aid in order to promote trade. Possibly, these pro­
grams may also affect United States trade relations with countries in 
the Far East. Finally, another important question in the wider field 
of international finance is exchange convertibility. Much of the present 
unnatural pattern of trade is due to the existence of inconvertible cur­
rencies. Japan has concluded several bilateral agreements which aim 
at bilateral balancing of trade with its trading partners. When more 
currencies in the world become convertible, the extent of trade for 
which bilateral balancing i-s sought will be reduced, and the volume 
and pattern of Japanese trade with the United States may be quite 
different. This may not be true for Taiwan or for South Korea which 
have no bilateral payments agreements with countries outside the Far 
East region. 
The essential facts of the trade relations of the United States with 
China (Taiwan), Japan and Korea (South) may be summarized as 
follows: Because of various special postwar political and economic de­
velopments, each of these countries has had a high import demand for 
United States commodities, a relatively low level of exports to the 
United States and consequently sizable trade deficits with the United 
States. A large volume of import demand is likely to be maintained 
by all three countries for some time to come, particularly in view of 
their great need for defense and development. The prospects for in­
creasing their exports to the United States appear favorable. Much 
depends on United States trade and aid policies, the movement of 
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foreign capital, the economic development plans and fiscal and credit 
policies of the Far East countries, the convertibility of currencies, the 
common market movements in the outside world and the trade offensive 
of the Soviet bloc. 
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PAKISTAN rs AT the moment g�ing through the slow and painful
process of transforming its economy in order to create the preconditions
for economic development. Some progress has already been made in
the years since independence. Various basic facilities have either been
created or expanded: railways, ports, communications, electric power,
etc. Dams are being built and various large-scale irrigation projects
are in the proc;ess· of being completed. In the private sector of the
economy, several industrial and commercial establishments have been
started and, to mention only two examples, the country is now self­
sufficient in textiles and is becoming an important exporter of jute
goods.
While these achievements are of obvious importance, the economy
is still far from the state that economists describe as self-generating
growth. Per capita incomes are exceedingly low - not more than $50
on an annual basis and, what is perhaps more important, up to the
present time they have not shown an upward rising trend. While in­
dustrial output is expanding, agricultural production is lagging. As a
result, the country is going through a serious food crisis which has
retarded the execution of the first five-year plan. Partly associated with
the failure of agriculture to meet the rising demand, but also because
of financial reasons, inflationary tendencies have been rather strong in
recent years. What these tendencies reflect is a great strain on the
country's resources, a strain which poses difficult problems of adjust­
ment.
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II 
All of this will probably sound familiar or should I perhaps say all 
too familiar. Development is not a simple and smooth process; his­
torically it has always been associated with various strains and stresses. 
In that respect Pakistan certainly is not an exception. At this time I 
would like to single out one particular problem which will undoubtedly 
be present for some years to come: Pakistan's external commercial 
and financial position. 
From the point of view of the development effort, the issue pre­
sents itself the following way: During the next several five-year plans 
the demand for imported goods for the development program can be 
expected to increase. At the present time the average foreign exchange 
component of the major development projects is at last 50 per cent. 
As domestic industry expands, this percentage will perhaps decline 
somewhat. On the other hand, and this is the more important trend, 
as the growth process gains momentum and the size of the plans in­
creases, a larger volume of imports of "development" goods becomes 
a necessity. While the import trend clearly will be rising for these 
goods, it may perhaps be argued that savings can be accomplished in 
imports of nondevelopment goods. It is true that there have been 
such savings in the past, especially in the imports of textiles, but further 
gains on this front are bound to be of limited importance outside the 
field of food imports. Imports of consumer goods are already cut to 
the bone, and if anything, they can be expected to rise with increasing 
population and incomes. Even more important, as the industrial base 
is broadened, this will of necessity lead to a higher volume of imports 
of raw materials and spare parts. 
What this means, then, is that an acceleration of Pakistan's de­
velopment will require a growth rate in the export sector high enough 
to provide the foreign exchange for imported capital goods. Leaving 
aside for the moment the question of foreign aid, the rate at which the 
domestic economy can grow will clearly depend upon the extent to 
which it is possible to develop export markets. Unless the export sector 
can keep pace with the domestic economy, tensions and imbalances 
will appear. This, I believe, will become a key issue in Pakistan's 
future development. 
III 
How likely is it that this problem can find a satisfactory solution? 
While it is by no means impossible that oil will be found, I shall leave 
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this possibility out of consideration and limit myself to the situation as 
it presents itself today. One element in the solution is obvious: an 
energetic attack on the food problem. Because of the food crisis an 
increasing proportion of aid imports consists of wheat and rice rather 
than of vital raw materials and development goods. Secondly, the 
country is using considerable amounts of its own foreign exchange for 
food purchases abroad. Needless to say, this recent development has 
upset the external balance and threatened the normal functioning of the 
economy as well as the development program. If nothing else, it high­
lights the importance of broadening the food base. Until that ob­
jective has been securely achieved the attempt to develop the economy 
will encounter constant dangers. 
On the export side the prospects will, at least for some time to 
come, depend upon the markets for cotton and jute, the two traditional 
export products. Without going into any detailed analysis or pro­
jection for these two fibers, which account for more than 70 per cent 
of Pakistan's commodity exports, it is unlikely that they alone will be 
able to carry the financing of the development program. It is true 
that in recent years exports of both cotton goods and jute goods have 
shown a sharply rising trend. The thing to keep in mind, however, is 
that in both case� exports of the manufactured goods rather than the 
fibers add comparatively little to total export receipts. This is so be­
cause the cost of the fiber is such a high percentage. of the final value 
of these products. The difference between exporting burlap bags and 
�aw jute is not great. 
This brief analysis of export earnings is clearly incomplete since 
it does not include any mention of potential exports of other com­
modities. Some so-called secondary exports, such as sports goods, have 
done well in recent years. The point here is that they are starting from 
a low absolute level and, at least for some years to come, their con­
tribution to total export earnings will not be considerable. 
To finish this part of the argument, I anticipate on the one hand 
an increased demand for imported development goods and on the other, 
exports which will display a slower rate of growth - still, of course, 
leaving out of consideration the possibility of the discovery of oil. 
IV 
Since it seems unlikely that Pakistan's exports will provide a 
sufficient foreign exchange margin for development, it may be asked 
what other sources of external finance will be available. One such 
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source is foreign private investment. However, up to now these in­
vestments have not been large. Some machinery and other equipment 
has been imported directly by foreign investors, especially in con­
nection with drilling of gas wells and the building of pipe lines. At 
the present there is also considerable scope for investments in con­
nection with the exploration for oil. Even so, the official estimate 
of the contribution such investments can make during the Plan period 
1955-60 is quite moderate - roughly $100 million. An amount of 
this magnitude will add about 5 per cent annually to Pakistan's own 
export earnings. 
At the moment an interesting attempt is being made to stimulate 
foreign investment through tax incentives. The United States govern­
ment or, more specifically, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
is contemplating a taxation convention with Pakistan* which in one 
important respect differs radically from the present arrangement. If 
this new provision is approved by the Senate, it is very likely that it 
will also be embodied in conventions with other nations. If for no 
other reasons it deserves brief consideration. 
Under the present system, which was introduced in 1918, an 
American corporation receiving income from foreign sources is given 
credit in the United States for income taxes paid in the country where 
the income originates. Assume, for example, that the foreign income 
is $100 and that the tax paid abroad on this income is $20. The 
American investor will then only have to pay $32 in United States 
taxes ($52-$20). His total tax burden is of course then $52, or the 
same as on income earned domestically. Let me only add that the law 
makes a distinction between foreign income earned by a branch and 
by a subsidiary. In the former case, the income is taxed when earned, 
in the latter only when the income is remitted to the United States. 
For this reason the subsidiary has become the predominant form in 
foreign business operations since the arrangement in fact means an 
interest-free loan extended by the government to the corporation until 
remittance is made. 
A chief purpose of this legislation is to eliminate double taxation. 
In those cases where the foreign tax is less than the United States 
rate, there is no double tax or, more accurately, the total tax burden 
*Ratified by the Senate July 9, 1958 with a reservation made necessary by the
intervening lapse of the Pakistan tax concession law-see below Part V, 
(Ed.) 
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is limited to 52 per cent, the same as the tax on domestic incom�. 
On the other hand, if the foreign rate is higher than the domestic, 
which is the case in Pakistan, the foreign investment is, other things 
being equal, less attractive than a domestic one. While the purpose 
of the tax credit system is clear enough, I would like to mention that 
one of its economic implications is that the United States Treasury is, 
in fact, helping or subsidizing the country in which foreign investments 
are made. This is so for the simple reason that the treasury accepts as 
a fact that foreign governments will collect revenues at the source 
which would otherwise have been collected at home. 
V 
So much for the present system. What about the new proposal 
in the tax treaty with Pakistan? The central idea or argument is that 
in those cases where foreign governments want to make tax concessions 
in order to attract foreign capital and know-how, the effect is often 
nullified because the investor loses the benefit of the tax credit. In
other words, while he pays less abroad his domestic taxes will increase 
correspondingly. Specifically, the government of Pakistan exempts 
from its income tax for a certain period, profits up to 5 per cent of 
invested capital earned by a manufacturing corporation over a certain 
minimum size. ,This provision has the effect of reducing the Pakistan 
tax on a United States corporation investing in Pakistan. While a 
certain part of the foreign tax is "spared," our domestic rate on branch 
income will go up immediately while a higher domestic tax is levied 
orr subsidiaries at the time foreign earned income is remitted to the 
United States. 
It is this principle the treaty with Pakistan proposes to alter. It 
is stated in the treaty that for the purpose of our foreign tax credit a 
United States corporation shall still be treated as having paid the 
Pakistan tax which was spared, that is, which was in fact not paid. 
It can apply a credit for the so-called "ghost" tax against its United 
States tax on income from Pakistan. As far as the present tax con­
cession in Pakistan is concerned, the proposal in the treaty may imply 
as much as a 14 point tax reduction. Cases are easily imaginable 
where other tax concessions, in Pakistan or elsewhere, will have the 
effect of reducing the United States rate to zero. 
In my opinion the tax credit device, as it has functioned up to the 
present time, is a sound one. In the first place it has eliminated double 
taxation on corporate income earned abroad. Secondly, and this is 
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perhaps not always appreciated enough, the United States government 
through this device is giving substantial aid to underdeveloped countries 
since the tax credit permits revenues to be collected in the foreign 
country without any deterrent effect on the flow of capital to these 
countries. While I fully approve of both these objectives, I have some 
serious misgivings about the new provision in the proposed tax treaty 
with Pakistan.1 It represents a radical departure from the present 
system which is perhaps not fully realized: 
1. The tax credit as it operates today maintains the principle of
equity or nondiscrimination. It does so because it eliminates double 
taxation and thus places taxation of foreign and domestic earnings on 
equal footing as far as the United States income tax is concerned. 
While the formula maintains the basic principle that a United States 
citizen is taxable on his world-wide income, it does recognize the 
right of foreign countries to tax incomes at the source. The formula 
does this by striking a balance between domestic and foreign tax claims 
on the American investor. The new proposal on the other hand in­
troduces an element of discrimination in American taxation: if adopted 
it will mean that corporate incomes earned at home will be taxed at 
a higher rate than those originating abroad. 
2. Not only will the proposal discriminate against domestic in­
vestments, it will also have the effect of favoring those countries which 
make tax concessions although their tax rates, after the concession, are 
not less than those in other countries which have not offered similar 
incentives, say, because their rates were already lower. 
3. The proposal does not apply to all types of income earned
abroad; patent and know-how royalties are not benefitted. Here again 
we have an example of unjustified discrimination. 
4. The formula does not distinguish between a tax concession
made on incomes derived from new investments and those on invest­
ments which have already been undertaken. By including this latter 
group the proposal is providing them with a windfall profit. Available 
statistics show that the beneficiaries will be a handful of large cor­
porations. 
1 A very penetrating criticism of the proposal has been made by Stanley S.
Surrey, professor of law, Harvard Law School. See his "Current Issues in 
the Taxation of Corporate Foreign Investment," Columbia Law Review, 
LVI (June 1956), 815 and his statement of August 9, 1957 before the 
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The next few para• 
graphs are greatly influenced by his argument. 
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5. Up to now, tax treaties have on the whole been prepared by
technicians. There is a very real danger that the new formula, if 
adopted, will result in intense lobbying activities with United States 
foreign investors and tax concession countries establishing a united 
front. 
6. Finally, it ought to be mentioned that the proposal introduces
a new procedure in tax policy: According to the present procedure, 
tax rates are, of course, determined in the course of legislative action 
which includes both the House and the Senate. The implication of 
what is now proposed is that tax rates on corporate income earned 
abroad will be determined by treaty action rather than legislation. 
VI 
It may be argued that even if these various criticisms are ac­
cepted as being valid, they are only of secondary importance and that 
the decisive question is to make private investment in Pakistan more 
attractive. While I am all in favor of stimulating such private invest­
ments in underdeveloped countries, I am by no means persuaded that 
tax concessions along the lines in the treaty with Pakistan will yield the 
desired results. There are a great many factors deterring American in­
vestments in such faraway countries as Pakistan. I shall not bother 
you with a listing of all of these factors. Let me only mention one: 
a general lack of knowledge among potential American investors of 
investment opportunities in Pakistan. The possibilities are clearly 
there; the real question is how to transmit this information to foreign 
investors. While it is true that taxes do play a certain role in the 
potential investor's calculations, it is, I believe, a minor one. This is at 
least the way I interpret the available material on foreign investment 
incentives. 
VII 
From my argument up to this point two conclusions can be drawn: 
1. Unless oil is discovered it is unlikely that the export sector of
the Pakistan economy will show a growth rate sufficiently high to 
finance an accelerated development program; and 
2. Although foreign private investments may go up in the future,
it would be unrealistic to expect this source of finance to cover more 
than a small part of total development requirements. 
From this general argument I am hence forced to conclude that 
for some time to come a substantial amount of foreign aid will be in­
dispensable. There is, of course, nothing new about this situation. 
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For some years now Pakistan has relied heavily on such aid. Broadly 
speaking, it can be said that what limited progress has been made so 
far has been financed almost exclusively through foreign aid. Apart 
from the Korean boom years, foreign exchange earnings have been just 
sufficient to finance normal import requirements; they have not pro­
vided a margin for development. It is both in Pakistan's own interest 
as well as in ours to accomplish a gradual tapering off of foreign aid. 
Unfortunately the prospects for such a development are not very good, 
at least not within the next decade or two. 
There is one additional point I should like to make in conclusion. 
The experience of a great many other countries tells us quite clearly 
that self-sustaining economic growth requires an annual minimum rate 
of saving and capital formation at least equal to l O to 12 per cent of 
the national product. In Pakistan today the rate of saving and invest­
ment is not more than one-half of this minimum requirement. With 
an annual population increase of about 1 ½ per cent, it follows that 
the economy is only succeeding in standing still. Development in the 
sense of increasing per capita income has not as yet taken place. And 
now I come to what I consider a crucial point in the present situation: 
Pakistan's military establishment is year in and year out absorbing 
something like 6 to 7 per cent of the national product. For a country 
this poor it may well be an excessive burden to carry. If a major part 
of the resources that are now being used by the military could be con­
verted into development goods, it would be possible for Pakistan to 
achieve an annual rate of capital formation sufficient to bring about 
self-generating growth. Or put another way: the present combination 
of military and economic targets is excessive in relationship to the 
country's resources. One or the other program must be cut in order 
to bring total requirements into line with available resources. This is 
the crucial decision which Pakistan must face up to. It is not too 
much to say that the economic future of the nation will depend upon 
the outcome of that decision. 
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As OF THE END of 1955 the total long-term private business in­
vestment in India by American firms and individuals totalled 455 
million rupees ( approximately 100 million dollars). This was almost 
entirely direct investment and was concentrated in two fields - manu­
facturing industry and trading - with about 40 per cent in the former 
and 50 per cent in the latter. The great bulk of the private investment 
in manufacturing is in the oil industry with Standard-Vacuum and 
Cal-Tex Companies owning refineries which will, on their completion, 
represent an investment of over 60 million dollars. Although the 
United States is the second largest source of foreign private business 
investment in India, it is far exceeded by the United Kingdom - the 
total American private investment was only about 12 per cent of the 
British investment in 1955. However, this country is probably the 
main potential future source of private business investment in India. 
The major question an American firm must answer before de­
ciding whether to make an investment in India is whether it would 
pay to do so. This in turn breaks down into several other questions: 
Will it pay more than if the American firm expands its foreign trade 
with India? How does investment in India compare with further in­
vestment in the United States, or in other countries? Is there much 
difference between the short-run and long-run opportunities for gain 
by foreign trade or investment? 
What are the foreign trade possibilities for American firms? Under 
this Second Five Year Plan, and the one that will follow it, it is hoped 
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to raise the annual per capita income of 400 million Indians from 
about $50 to approximately $100. While this is still a very low in­
dividual figure, nevertheless the total result in an economy of so great 
an absolute size will be large. At the end of the Plan periods the 
Indian population will obviously consume a much greater volume of 
consumer goods. There may also be some increase in the demand for 
consumer goods in the development period, but this is unlikely to be 
very significant. In the development period there will be a large de­
mand for imports of capital goods - especially machinery, chemicals, 
and industrial raw materials. However, at the end of the Plan periods 
India hopes to internally produce most of its own larger requirements 
of capital equipment and industrial raw materials. It also may be able 
to export these to other countries. 
How will this development affect American exports to India? I 
think there will be a greater short-run demand for imports of American 
capital equipment, but this increase will not be great. In 1955 and 
1956, American machinery in India was being undersold by as much 
as 25 to 50 per cent by comparable machines produced in England, 
Japan, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. This is the main reason 
Indian firms are not enthusiastic over American loans that have "tied 
purchase" requirements. It is possible that American-owned firms 
producing machines in Europe or Japan can compete on price terms; 
in such cases the price factor would be less important. However, 
there are machines which countries other than the United States simply 
do not produce - for example, the Barber-Coleman winding machine 
for cotton textiles - and either the promised gains from their use or 
the pressure of fashion leads Indian firms to import them. The demand 
for this type of machinery will probably increase, but this is a 
specialty product. 
With respect to consumer goods, the demand prospect in the 
short run is not good simply because, if the planning is effective, 
imports of such goods will be kept to a minimum. After fifteen to 
twenty years I expect there will be greater demand for American con­
sumer goods, but I think again this will be for specialty goods such as 
Cadillacs, expensive refrigerators, etc. The bulk of manufactured con­
sumer goods that Indians can buy can be produced at lower price else­
where; and it is doubtful that American firms will be producing the 
cheaper varieties which can sell in India. 
In the case of both consumer and producer goods in any case, if 
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recent experience is any guide, Indian producers will be given suuug 
protection either by tariffs or direct import controls. In such cases, 
imports to meet demand will not be very important. This means 
essentially that American firms, to maintain their present positions in 
the Indian market, or to gain from the growth in the market that is to 
be anticipated, will, almost of necessity, have to invest directly in 
India. There may also be some advantages in setting up a plant in 
India which would be able to export to other countries of Asia. 
If this is so, will it still pay an American firm to invest? What are 
the problems of investing? What are the profit rates in India? And 
what are the tax provisions in India? I am not going to discuss Ameri­
can taxes on the profits remitted here, nor am I going to attempt to 
compare profit rates in different countries. 
First, it is essential to discard one psychological bogey. The 
Indian government has as a goal a "socialistic pattern of society." This 
is essentially a welfare state idea. There has been no nationalization 
of existing manufacturing industry except in the case of one manifestly 
inefficient and corrupt firm; there have been nationalizations of some 
banks and insurance companies, but compensation was fair, and there 
were reasonable grounds. Under a treaty signed with the United 
States in 1957 it is possible for an American firm to insure against 
nationalization without adequate compensation. Certain industries such 
as atomic power, defense and transportation are reserved to the gov­
ernment, but in other industries, including steel, private firms are ex­
panding; and the government has in fact withdrawn the threat of 
nationalization after ten years. 
The main effect of government policy in the Five Year Plans has 
been to provide an increasing, and almost guaranteed, demand for 
industrial capital equipment and the raw materials for industrial ex­
pansion. Since 1954, the private sector has been expanding at a very 
rapid rate, largely by plowing back profits. In fact, the expansion of 
the private sector is contingent upon both the government continuing 
to provide demand, and expansion of the government projects which 
private firms cannot, for one reason or another, carry out - public 
utilities, railroads, irrigation, and hydroelectric projects, and the large 
government steel works. I will end this discussion of nationalization 
by quoting from a report of the Federation of British Industries to 
British firms on investment in India, as of 1956. 
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It will be seen that for all the paternalism of its approach and its 
committal to State ownership in important spheres of the economy 
it is difficult to accuse the Government of India of any neglect 
of measures to encourage and promote private enterprise in 
industry. In the ... Ministries of the Government which are 
concerned with industrialization the outlook which prevails is 
markedly empirical and pragmatic and generally speaking quite 
untinged by an doctrinaire preference for State action for its own 
sake. The attitude of mind is rather that the job to be done is 
one that is beyond the resources of privately owned industry 
as it exists in India, and one that must subserve certain broad 
social aims which have long since been achieved in Western in­
dustrialized countries whether they are capitalist or socialist. To 
the extent that private industry is willing and able to play its part 
it is to be encouraged to do so, but the Government is not willing 
to extend that encouragement so far as to wait upon private 
industrial initiative where it considers that development is urgently 
required, or to give it a completely free hand in an economy 
which is admittedly a controlled one. 
This quotation also indicates the main characteristic of the exist­
ing economic structure in India that is, its system of controls. For 
an American businessman these are not unfamiliar, since in many 
respects they resemble those in force here during the war years. There 
are controls over entry, controls over expansion, controls over imports, 
controls over foreign exchange use, controls over scarce raw materials, 
controls over many prices and controls over labor. Many of these are 
necessary; others reflect the welfare-state goal - all require dealing 
with government departments for permission. Indian firms of large size 
know how to operate within these controls. For a new firm there are 
other problems the requirement of "progressive manufacture of the 
product within India," which means that by the end of a certain period 
of time the product must be entirely produced rather than merely as­
sembled in India; the natural policy of "Indianization" of the firms' 
executive personnel in India, which means that there must be a pro­
gram to train Indians to take responsible positions with the firm, and 
that they must be given responsible positions. With respect to the lat­
ter requirement in the past ten years, far more Indians have moved 
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into middle-executive and scientific positions in foreign firms, while 
the number of foreign personnel in top positions has remained roughly 
constant. With respect to most of these controls the foreign firm deals 
with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the Finance Ministry. 
It is important to see the responsible officials in these ministries who 
can make decisions; the outlook of these officials is pragmatic. If the 
government feels an investment is sufficiently desirable, there is evi­
dence it will be prepared to make numerous concessions. (For example, 
the three oil companies building the refineries signed contracts with 
the government in 19 51 under which they retained all the voting stock, 
were assured of a protected market and were guaranteed against 
nationalization for a period of twenty-five years.) Today with the 
critical foreign exchange situation, the government is particularly will­
ing to encourage private foreign investment in those areas that are 
consistent with Plan goals. Finally, foreign firms are given privileges 
which are unavailable to domestic firms. The most important of these 
are the free convertibility of foreign exchange for repatriating both 
profits and capital. 
A related question is one of the type of investment in terms of 
participation with Indian firms. The government strongly prefers joint 
foreign-Indian in".estment, and in 1948 and 1949, policy statements 
announced that it would prefer an Indian majority. This policy has 
never been implemented by legislation and has in .fact been waived 
very frequently in practice. There are also some advantages in a foreign 
o/IIl associating itself with a reliable Indian firm. The large Indian 
firms have operated successfully within the network of controls and 
know how to function within the system. In terms of public relations, 
especially if a long-run investment is planned, it is also helpful to 
have some Indian participation. 
What has been the rate of return in Indian firms in the past five 
years? The Reserve Bank of India has made estimates which are 
based on the published balance sheets (which may understate profits) 
of 750 private Indian companies. It found that profits after taxes 
averaged approximately 8 per cent on a net worth from 1950 to 1955 
(it was over 9 per cent in 1955). This does not include "managing 
agent's commission" which is considered a "cost item" in Indian ac­
counting, but is really largely a profit; if this were included, it would 
raise the rate of return by about one-third. As another measure, "gross 
profits before taxes" ( which includes managing agent's remuneration) 
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averaged 9 per cent on gross sales, and 9 per cent on total net capital 
employed, from 1950 to 1955 (over 10 per cent in 1955). These 
averages include both profitable and unprofitable companies, efficient 
and inefficient with the rates for the profitable ones unquestionably 
much higher. Also since 1955 there is every reason to believe that 
profit rates in private industry have continued to increase. The rate 
of growth in industrial production has increased each year since 1951, 
and the investment carried out by the private organized industrial sector 
in the first years of the Second Plan up to September 1957 had al­
ready apparently reached two-thirds of the total projected for this 
sector for the entire five years of the Plan. With a large and almost 
guaranteed government demand for the output of the cement, steel, 
machinery and chemical industries especially, profits may be expected 
to be high for a reasonably efficient firm in these industries. 
How do profit rates for foreign-owned companies compare with 
those for Indian companies? The Indian Tariff Commission made a 
study of prices of rubber tires and tubes in 1955. The two largest pro­
ducers are foreign companies: Dunlop ( an English firm), and Fire­
stone. This study estimated that from 1946 to 1953 profits before 
taxes (after some adjustment) for Dunlop ranged from 18 to 37 per 
cent on total net capital employed; for Firestone the profits on total 
net capital employed were higher, ranging from 48 to 77 per cent. The 
companies concerned felt that these figures exaggerated the rate of re­
turn; nevertheless, it does present an order of magnitude on foreign 
investments before taxes. It also raises a problem all companies must 
face - that is, the possibility of periodic investigations, if the industry 
is tariff protected, and with only a few firms in it. This particular in­
vestigation concluded that the profits were too high and recommended 
a reduction in the selling price to a "fair" level. 
While profits may be potentially high in India, it is necessary to 
raise the question of taxes in that country. In any general discussion 
it is only possible to say that this is a most complex field, into which 
any firm planning investment must do its own investigation. Recently 
the Indian National Council of Applied Economic Research published 
a monograph entitled "Taxation and Foreign Investment" which sum­
marized most of the relevant material. In general, the burden of 
Indian taxation on both individuals and on foreign corporations work­
ing in India is heavier than in many of the capital-exporting countries 
and also heavier than in many other countries competing for foreign 
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investment. However, there are tax exemptions on some profits for new 
firms in certain desirable industries for limited time periods; there are 
extra depreciation allowances; there are tax exemptions on income of 
"technicians" and on perquisities. The effects of the new expenditure 
and wealth taxes are very slight. The relationship of these taxes to 
United States income taxes are complex and has to be explored if a 
company desires to transmit profits home rather than plow them back 
in India. 
At present there are no restrictions on transmission of profits or 
repatriation of newly invested capital beyond the normal ones of per­
mission from the Reserve Bank. In fact, in one or two cases during 
the past year, when there has been a serious foreign exchange crisis, 
American firms have deliberately tested the government's willingness to 
permit convertibility, and the government has allowed repatriation very 
quickly. Under the recent treaty between India and the United States 
it is also possible for an American firm to insure against suspension 
of convertibility. 
I conclude by summarizing what should be kept in mind: 
1. The Federation of British Industries concluded that
When every allowance is made, however, for the worst that can 
be foreseen, the basic fact remains that Indian industrialization has 
been set in motion. Its course may be rough or smooth, slow or 
fast, but it is set . . [The] assumption ... that in fifteen or twenty 
years time India will have become a major industrialized country 
is not an empty one. On the contrary it is the only safe working 
assumption that British firms can make. 
2. The Indian government's policy is to protect domestic producers,
and as industrial output expands it will be more difficult to import com­
peting goods. This means that direct investment will probably be nec­
essary to protect the existing market, and potentially larger market. 
3. The opportunities for making money in India by new invest­
ment in expanding manufacturing fields ( especially machinery and 
chemicals) are good. The Indian tax rates are high, but there are spe­
cial allowances and exemptions; convertibility is freely permissible. 
There are serious problems of operating a business in India. Nationali­
zation is not one of them, but there are numerous controls and require-
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ments which must be met. However, the Indian government does de­
sire foreign investment, and there is certainly a fund of respect for 
American firms. If the Indian government wishes an investment enough, 
it can, it has, and it will waive some of these requirements. In many 
cases it would be desirable to invest jointly with a reputable Indian firm 
that has dealt successfully with the government and to whom some of 
the burdens of operating in India can be shifted. The Federation of 
British Industries finally concluded that India has in the past given every 
evidence that it "is prepared to welcome foreign investment on terms 
which are not unreasonable, have been conscientiously adhered to, 
and compare well with those enforced by other underdeveloped coun­
tries." 
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MosT OF THE countries of Asia including India are engaged in 
heroic efforts to break the vicious circle of economic and social forces 
which have resulted in a chronically low level of per capita income. 
Low per capita income is responsible for these countries' low level of 
savings. These savings finance a relatively low amount of investment 
which, given the rate of growth of population, tends to accomplish 
little more than the maintenance of the per capita income level. The 
problem is to raise per capita income and to promote its continued 
rise at a rate comparable to that achieved in more fortunate countries. 
To solve this problem, many of these countries have embarked 
upon large and growing investment programs under the overall di­
rection of the state and with a great deal of direct participation by the 
state. Unfortunately, in many cases, the effort undertaken has been 
greater than could be financed from available resources, domestic and 
foreign, and inflation has set in. Miscalculations, erroneous assump­
tions about the costs of the programs, or about the availability of 
domestic or foreign resources, have usually been to blame, but resort 
to inflation has also been to some extent deliberate in the belief that 
a faster rate of development would result. In all cases, inflation has 
led to international financial difficulties. 
The international financial difficulties which India is facing today 
can largely be explained in these terms. They illustrate vividly the 
enormity of the problem of economic development when the rate of 
growth of population is high and the income base is small. They de-
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serve careful consideration, not only for the lessons which may emerge 
and which those interested in problems of economic development may 
find useful, but also because a study of these difficulties may help 
American businessmen engaged in day to day dealings with India, gov­
ernment officials concerned with the formulation of United States 
policy toward India, and the public at large anxious to gain increased 
understanding of India. 
THE RECORD, 1951-56 
In India, population is growing at an estimated rate of about 1.5 
per cent a year. The 1951 population was nearly 357 million and the 
390 million level should be reached before the end of 1958. For the 
year ended March 1956, national income in 1948-49 prices was esti­
mated at 104.2 billion rupees (about $21.9 billion), giving a per capita 
income of 272 rupees (about $57). In that year, consumption of 
foodgrains amounted to only about 400 pounds per capita. Domestic 
savings were only about 6 per cent of national income and the rate 
of investment, including investments financed by foreign resources, was 
only slightly higher. Unemployment and underemployment remained 
tragically high. 
Although the living standards of the Indian people were quite low 
in 1955-56, an encouraging improvement had occurred over the pre­
ceding five years. The estimate of national income in constant prices 
just given was 17. 7 per cent higher than in 1950-51 and the per capita 
income was 10.5 per cent higher. The index of agricultural production 
was about 19 per cent higher and that of industrial production about 
40 per cent higher. Low though the rates of saving and investment 
may have been in 1955-56, they too were higher than in 1950-51. 
The momentum of the economy which these figures reveal was 
partly attributable to the weather, as the droughts of 1950-52 were 
followed by good monsoons in 1953-55. However, it was also the re­
sult of the first five year plan, which extended from April 1951 to 
March 1956. Under the plan, a deliberate effort was made to increase 
production and to develop the basic facilities ( mainly power) needed 
for further growth. The central and state governments spent about 15 
billion rupees on public investment projects and an additional 4.6 bil­
lion rupees (not labeled investment) on other activities included in 
the plan. Private investment in this period totalled 16 billion rupees, 
making total plan outlay 35.6 billion rupees (about $7.5 billion). 
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The progress of this period was achieved under conditions of 
financial stability. Wholesale prices fell in the last half of 1951 and 
early in 1952 following the inflationary upsurge of the Korean war 
boom. Thereafter they fluctuated narrowly, except for a steady decline 
in 1954 and the first half of 1955 and an ensuing recovery. At the 
end of the plan period, in March 1956, wholesale prices were no higher 
than in 1949, a record matched by few other countries in the world.1 
Price stability was not purchased at the price of external imbal­
ance. The balance of payments remained in approximate equilibrium 
during the last four years of the plan following a large deficit in 1951 
associated with the Korean inflation and its aftermath. At the same 
time, import and exchange restrictions, which had been tightened as 
part of the post Korean readjustment, were gradually relaxed. 
This record was made possible by the fiscal and monetary policies 
followed by the authorities. The budget deficits, largely occasioned by 
growing developmental expenditures, were mostly financed in non­
inflationary ways. Inflationary financing, such as drawing down of cash 
balances and direct sale of treasury bills to the central bank, remained 
moderate, at least in the first four years of the plan. Over the five 
year period, it amounted to about 4 billion rupees ( about 20 per cent 
of the total public outlay under the plan), of which about 1.7 billion 
rupees was incurred in the last year of the plan alone. The central 
bank, after withdrawing its support of the government securities mar­
ket and raising the discount rate in November 1951, · undertook open 
market sales of securities on a significant scale, particularly in 1953 
and 1954. Under these policies, private bank credit as well as time 
and savings deposits of banks rose moderately after 1953, following 
the post Korean readjustment. In March 1956, money supply was 
only about IO per cent higher than five years earlier. 
THE SECOND .FIVE YEAR PLAN 
The remarkable performance of the Indian economy during the 
first five year plan led the Indian authorities to adopt a much more 
ambitious investment program for the ensuing five year period (April 
1956-March 1961). They decided that a total of 62 billion rupees 
should be invested under the second five year plan, twice the amount 
invested under the first five year plan. An additional 10 billion, not 
labeled investment, was also to be spent on activities included in the 
1 ln the United States, wholesale prices were about 15 per cent higher in 1956 
than in 1949. 
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plan, making total outlay under the plan 72 billion rupees, again about 
twice the total outlay incurred under the first plan. Of the proposed 
total outlay, the central and state governments together undertook to 
spend 48 billion rupees, about two and a half times the amount spent 
by them in the first plan. Private enterprise was to spend the re­
mainder, 60 per cent more than it spent under the first plan. 
The inventory of projects included in this plan differed from that 
of the first plan in that emphasis shifted sharply from agriculture to 
heavy industry. The relative share of the proposed total public outlay 
allocated to the development of industry and mining was nearly four 
times that of the first five year plan while the relative shares of all other 
sectors was lower, except for a small increase in the relative share 
going to transportation and communications. For all sectors, how­
ever, the absolute amount to be spent was well in excess of the amount 
spent during the first plan. 
Only about half of the public outlay was to be financed from 
taxation and by borrowing from the public. Another quarter was to 
be borrowed from the Reserve Bank of India. Another 8 billion rupees 
($1,680 million) represented foreign exchange requirements, and the 
balance was to be raised from the profits of state owned enterprises. 
Resources available to finance the private investment outlay were only 
partially indicated and included a substantial dependence on bank 
credit expansion. Foreign exchange requirements of the private sector 
were estimated at 3 billion rupees (about $630 million). To meet the 
foreign exchange requirements, it was planned to draw down foreign 
exchange holdings by 2 billion rupees ( $420 million) and to obtain 
the balance of 9 billion rupees ( $1.9 billion) from abroad as loans or 
grants from foreign governments or international organizations, and as 
foreign private investment. 
From the outset there were doubts as to whether the available 
resources would be adequate to finance the plan. The yield expected 
from taxation, borrowing from the public, and profits of state-owned 
enterprises appeared to have been estimated somewhat optimistically. 
The assistance required from abroad was more than three times the 
amount received from this source during the first five year plan and, 
as such, seemed to be well above what might reasonably be expected 
to be available. It was clear that, should these doubts become realized, 
borrowing from the Reserve Bank would have to be larger than 
planned. Even the planned amount of such borrowing seemed certain 
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to generate inflation, since it amounted to about three times the amount 
of inflationary financing incurred during the first five year plan. 
Moreover, the proposed total outlay was soon raised when it was 
estimated that the public investment program would cost at least 7 
billion rupees (about $ 1.5 billion) more than originally planned. This 
was the result of price increases, inclusion of additional projects and 
correction of certain underestimated items. Included was an upward 
revision of the foreign exchange requirements by 4 billion rupees 
($840 million). In spite of this revision, the foreign exchange cost of 
the public investment program was estimated at only about 21.5 per 
cent of the total and probably remained significantly understated. 2 
Resources to finance this increase were not indicated but it seemed 
clear that foreign sources were counted on to cover the rise in the 
foreign exchange requirements. This would raise the total assistance 
expected from abroad to 13 billion rupees (more than $2.7 billion), 
a sum even more unlikely to be available than the original requirement 
of 9 billion rupees. Although nothing was said to this effect, greater 
reliance on borrowing from the Reserve Bank than originally planned 
seemed to be implied. 
While the financial feasibility of the plan appeared open to ques­
tion, the objectives which it aimed to achieve seemed relatively modest. 
The proposed overall outlay was expected in five years to raise national 
income by 25 per cent, to increase per capita income by 16 per cent 
and to create only about as many new jobs as there would probably 
be new entrants to the labor force. No attempt was to be made in this 
plan to reduce the large amount of unemployment and underemploy­
ment which have plagued India for a long time. 
It seemed reasonable enough to undertake merely to prevent any 
further increase in unemployment and underemployment even though 
it was known that this would call for the creation of nearly twice as 
many new jobs as the first five year plan was thought to have created. 
The projected rate of growth of national income also seemed reason­
able in the light of the employment objective. It is true that this rate 
of growth exceeded the rates achieved by the developed economies of 
the West. However, since unemployment was understood to have in­
creased during the first plan in spite of an increase in national income 
2 The import content of development programs of underdeveloped countries 
has frequently been around 50 per cent of the total cost of the program. In 
some cases, it has been higher. 
140 American Trade with Asia and the Far East
of nearly 18 per cent, it was thought that the attainment of the em­
ployment objective would require a more rapid rate of growth than 
was achieved in the first plan. The apparent ease with which national 
income was raised by 18 per cent during the first plan made it seem 
as though the rate of growth projected for the second plan would be 
attainable. The relatively modest nature of the objectives was given as 
a justification for disregarding the warnings about the financial fea­
sibility of the plan. 
While these objectives might have been sought with a somewhat 
smaller outlay, the Indian authorities desired to lay the basis for future 
development by making a special effort to expand heavy industry. 
Since this did not involve the creation of much additional employment 
in relation to the outlay involved, it was decided to stress handicraft 
and small scale production of consumer goods, at the expense of fac­
tory production of these goods, in the belief that this would make up 
the deficiency in job creation. Both of these decisions had the effect 
of raising the outlay needed to bring forth the desired addition in total 
output. The expansion of heavy industry required large amounts of 
capital, while handicraft and small scale production of consumer goods 
was relatively less efficient than factory production. 
As had been feared, the attempt to carry out this plan and the 
resulting boom in private investment and consumption brought on a 
sharp increase in inflationary pressures. The growth of public and 
private investment spending increasingly financed by Reserve Bank 
advances to the government and by bank credit expansion boosted 
money incomes. The resulting increase in effective demand out­
stripped the rise in domestic production so that prices rose, imports 
increased sharply and foreign exchange reserves began to fall rapidly. 
FISCAL POLICY 
The public investment program extended and intensified the 
public investment activities of the first five year plan. It involved 
rapidly rising public expenditures, as a result of which the budget 
deficits, which had begun to grow in the latter part of the first five year 
plan, grew further. 
A courageous attempt was made to increase revenues through 
taxation. Excise duties on cotton cloth were raised in September 1956. 
A supplementary budget, adopted in December 1956, revived the 
capital gains tax which had been in effect briefly after World War II 
and raised the dividend tax and certain import duties. At the same 
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nme, businesses were required to deposit with the Reserve Bank sums 
equal to specified percentages of their depreciation and other company 
reserves. The 1957-58 budget, adopted in August 1957. raised a num­
ber of excise and import duties as well as certain postal rates, increased 
the corporate income tax rate, cut sharply the exemption level on the 
personal income tax, and introduced a new tax on railway fares, a 
wealth tax and a personal expenditure tax. Including tax increases 
adopted by several of the States of the Indian Union, these various 
measures are estimated to yield an additional tax revenue of about 
1.5 billion rupees ($315 million) per year.3 
In spite of this, the combined operations of the central and state 
governments continued to yield increasingly large deficits. Although 
non-inilationary means of financing (e.g. borrowing from the public 
and foreign assistance) yielded growing amounts, these were not 
enough to prevent a sharp rise in inflationary financing, principally 
government borrowing from the Reserve Bank of India. As shown in 
the following table, the inflationary impact of government activities, 
which was negligible in 1953, grew sharply each year thereafter until, 
in 1957, it was estimated at 4,822 million rupees ($1,013 million), 
TABLE I. Inflationary Impact of Government O[Jerations 
in India Since 1953* 
(In million dollars equivalent) 
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
Reserve Bank credit to 
government -81.5 -2.9 t--228.5 t--566.2 +904.5 
Scheduled bank holdings 
of govt. securities +26.9 +25.0 +78.1 --42.8 + 143.4 
Other bank claims 
on government + 1.9 +4.6 +12.2 +3.6 -28.7 
Government currency 
circulation -6.3 --4.2 +12.6 -4.8 -5.5 
Government rupee 
balances +97.4 + 122.6 +14.7 -6.5 -1.0 
Net inflationary 
impact +38.4 + 145.1 +346.1 +515.5 +1,012.7 
Source: Reserve Bank India Bulletin (various issues) 
* Change measured from figures as of last Friday of year.
s The personal expenditure tax did not become effective until April 1, 1958. 
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about 96 per cent larger than in 1956, nearly three times the 1955 
rate, and nearly seven times the 1954 rate. 
MONETARY POLICY 
At the same time, a monetary policy of controlled expansion was 
adopted toward the private sector. Under this policy, credit for pro­
ductive purposes along lines consistent with the five-year plan was 
allowed to expand, while credit for speculative purposes was curbed. 
The principal restraining instrument of the policy was a regulation ap­
plying to advances against foodgrains, sugar, and, for a short time, 
cotton textiles. With respect to these advances, the regulation set the 
maximum percentage of the value of the collateral which banks would 
be allowed to lend and fixed ceilings on the total of such loans as well 
as on individual advances. 
This policy of selective credit restraint, first introduced in the 
spring of 1956, was reinforced, in August 1957, by a request to the 
banks from the governor of the Reserve Bank that they bring down the 
overall level of advance by 10 per cent by mid-October from the level 
of early August. It was understood that banks which did not do so 
would find it more difficult to borrow from the Reserve Bank when the 
next seasonal increase in the demand for credit got underway. The 
banks were told to comply without reducing credit to the productive 
sector, in a continued attempt to limit the applicability of the restraining 
action to speculative activity. 
A further measure of restraint was introduced by moderate in­
creases in the Reserve Bank lending rates to banks. There were four 
such increases between March 1956 and May 1957, and the overall 
result was to raise the lowest lending rate from 3 to 4 per cent. How­
ever, the effect appears to have been limited. While the higher rates 
brought about some tightening of the money markets, the liquidity of 
the banks was never so strained as to retard significantly the growth 
of advances. In part, this is because the growing recourse by the gov­
ernment to borrowing from the Reserve Bank bolstered bank liquidity 
at an increasing rate. But in addition, the Reserve Bank increased its 
credit to the banks by 805 million rupees from March 1955 to March 
1957, nearly tripling it. This provided the basis for more than 40 per 
cent of the 2,839 million rupee expansion in bank credit which oc­
curred in these two years.• 
4 The calculation is based on these facts: for several years, about two-thirds of 
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Since earzy in 1957, there has been a substantial accumuration of 
rupee funds in commercial banks to the credit of the United States 
Government as the Indian Government beg:m paying for United States 
surplus agricultural commodities imported under a PL 480 agreement.' 
The commodities so imported were put on the market, the Indian Gov­
ernment being reimbursed from the proceeds, so that the transaction 
resulted in a transfer of funds from the public to United States ac­
counts. In the process, however, bank liquidity increased to the extent 
that the public paid for the commodities with currency. In addition, 
it increased even when the public paid with demand deposits, since the 
United States Government placed the funds in time deposits against 
which banks are not required to hold as large a minimum reserve ratio 
as they are against demand deposits. As it turned out, the expansion 
of bank credit was smaller in 19 57 thc:m in 1956, both in absolute 
additions to money supply each year have taken the form of currency, and 
about a third has been in bank deposits. For scheduled banks, each year in 
the last several years, about 60 per cent of additions to bank deposits have 
been in demand deposits and about 40 per cent in time deposits. Scheduled 
banks are required to maintain balances at the Reserve Bank equal to 5 per 
cent of demand liabilities and 2 per cent of time li.1bilitie,. Given the fi0-
40 ratio of demand and time deposits, this means that the effective overall 
reserve ratio for scheduled banks is about 3.8 per cent, (i.e., 60 per cent 
at 5 per cent and 40 per cent at 2 per cent). For cooperative banks, the 
effective overall reserve ratio works out at about 1.7 per cent. The rise in 
Reserve Bank credit of 805 million rupees in two years may be broken 
down into a 661 million rise in credit to scheduled banks and a 144 million 
rise in credit to cooperative banb. Given these facts, the expansion co­
efficient, A, is calculated as follows: 
I 
1-(1-R)x(l-C) 
A 
where R is the applicable reserve ratio and C is the percentage of leakage 
through increased currency circulation. On this basis. the expansion 
coefficient for scheduled banks is 1.465. For cooperative banks it is 1.48. 
The npansion of hank credit made possible by the growth of Reserve B,mk 
advances to the hanks works out at l.4fi5 X fifil + 1.48 X 144 1,187 
million rupees. 
5 PL 480 provides for the disposal of United States surplus agricultural com­
modities. Under Title I of this law, these commodities may be sold for 
foreign currencies. The United States reserves some of the proceeds of 
such sales for its own uses and makes the rest available to the foreign 
country. partly a1,; a loan and partly as a grant. Under a Title I agreement 
signed in August 1956, the United States is providing India with agricul­
tural commodities valued al $360.1 million over a three year period. Of the 
rupees paid by India, $72 million equivalent is reserved for United States 
uses, $234 million equivalent is to be loaned to India and the balance 
given to India as a grant for development. 
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terms and in relative terms, while liquidity created by continued gov­
ernment borrowing from the Reserve Bank grew more rapidly. As a 
result, the banks which, for a number of years before 1957, had been 
net sellers of government bonds and had received increasing advances 
from the Reserve Bank, were able to reverse this trend. They used 
nearly half of the total increase in their deposits in 19 5 7 to reduce 
their indebtedness to the Reserve Bank and to buy government bonds. 
Had the rupee funds arising from PL 480 sales been deposited in the 
Reserve Bank instead of in commercial banks, it is unlikely that the 
banks would have increased their holdings of government bonds or 
reduced their debt to the Reserve Bank, and the expansion of bank 
credit would probably have been much the same. On the other hand, 
the decline in reserve bank credit to the banks by nearly 30 per cent 
since March 19 5 7, which was made possible by the decision to de­
posit these funds in commercial banks, involved a weakening of the 
influence of the Reserve Bank over the money market. 
On balance, monetary policy toward the private sector appears 
to have been more expansionary than it was restrictive. It is true that 
advances against foodgrains were largely stabilized in 1957, but such 
advances account for only about 5 per cent of total bank credit and 
other advances continued to expand. Overall bank credit to the private 
sector, which had risen by 12.5 per cent in 1954 and by 14.4 per cent 
in 1955, expanded by 25.6 per cent in 1956 and by another 14.6 per 
cent in 1957. At the end of 1957, the level of bank credit outstanding 
was nearly double what it was four years earlier. Industry, particularly 
the iron and steel, engineering, and cotton textile industries, received 
about half of the additional credit granted by banks in these four years 
and another large share went to traders in non-agricultural commodi­
ties, especially traders in cotton textiles, and in machinery, engineering 
and chemical products. 
DEMAND AND SUPPLY 
Money incomes rose as public and private investment spending 
increased. However, part of the increase in incomes went into time 
deposits, thereby mitigating somewhat the inflationary pressures. Be­
tween the end of 1953 and the end of 1956, time deposits of banks 
rose by 1,411 million rupees (about 38 per cent), but this was only 
about 42 per cent as much as bank credit expanded in this period. 
In 19 57, they rose more than bank credit, but this was due to the 
accumulation of PL 480 funds to the credit of the United States Gov-
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ernment. Excluding this factor, they rose less, although they probably 
offset bank credit expansion to a greater extent than in each of the 
previous three years. 
It is not known to what extent, if any, the rising money incomes 
went into private hoards. Such hoards generally take the form of 
precious metals, which are largely smuggled into the country since 
their import is prohibited. It is also probable that the sectors of the 
economy where transactions have generally been on a barter basis are 
increasingly adopting money as a means of exchange. Nevertheless, 
it seems clear that the increase in money incomes generated a sub­
stantial rise in effective demand. 
To some extent, the goods for which demand was rising could be 
and were being produced domestically. Industrial production, which 
had risen about 40 per cent during the first five year plan, continued to 
rise. In the third quarter of 1957, it averaged about 50 per cent more 
than in 19 51. Its rate of growth, however, appeared to be relatively 
stable at 7 .5 to 8.5 per cent a year in the last four years, whereas the 
growth of effective demand seemed to be gathering momentum. 
At the same time, agricultural production rose less than 8 per 
cent from the crop year 1953-54 to the crop year 1956-57, the bulk 
of this rise being concentrated in the last year. Production of food­
grains actually fell ibout 4 per cent from 1953-54 to 1954-55 and did 
not recover this loss until 1956-57 when it exceeded the 1953-54 level 
by barely 1 per cent. While the production of fibers and of sugar 
cane rose sharply, that of tea appeared to have leveled off and that of 
oilseeds held well below its peak of 1954-55. 
Not only did the domestic demand-supply situation appear to be 
getting out of balance, but in addition, an increasing part of the rise in 
effective demand was directed toward goods that could not be pur­
chased except abroad. This was particularly true of a broad list of 
capital goods needed to carry out the investment program. As a re­
sult, not only did prices rise sharply, but in addition the international 
payments position deteriorated. 
PRICE DEVELOPMENTS 
Wholesale prices, which had begun to rise in May 1955 after a 
steady decline over the previous twelve months, continued to increase 
in 1956. In eighteen months, the rise amounted to 23 per cent and 
affected all commodity groups. In November 1956, food articles were 
about 30 per cent higher than in May 1955, industrial raw materials 
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were about 26 per cent higher, intermediate manufactured products 
were 16 per cent higher and finished manufactured goods were about 
8 per cent higher. The rise of wholesale food prices reflected in part 
the lower output of foodgrains in the crop years 1954-55 and 1955-56 
than in the crop year 1953-54, but the fact that the upward trend of 
prices affected all sectors suggests that the increase in effective demand 
was largely to blame. 
In 1957, wholesale prices levelled off. There was a brief spurt in
May, June and July, but this was followed by a steady decline in the 
last five months of the year. The decline extended into 1958 and in 
March, wholesale prices were 1 per cent lower than a year earlier, 7 
per cent lower than at their peak in August 1957. Wholesale prices 
of food articles, industrial raw materials and intermediate manufac­
tured products, in particular, were significantly lower. In part this re­
sulted from the steady arrival throughout this period of large shipments 
of surplus agricultural commodities from the United States and the 
recovery of foodgrain production in the crop year 1956-57 to a new 
record level, but, more important, it reflected the fact that the impact 
of inflationary pressures was being fully absorbed by the balance of 
international payments and the reserves of foreign exchange. 
THE INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS POSITION 
The balance of payments position, which had been one of ap­
proximate equilibrium in 1953, 1954 and 1955, deteriorated sharply 
in 19 5 6 and 19 5 7. The current account deficit grew steadily until, for 
the six months ended September 30, 1957, it ran at an annual rate of 
5,956 million rupees (about $1,250 million).6 In this six month 
period, the annual rate of imports was about 5 8 per cent higher than 
in the corresponding period of 1955. At the same time, exports showed 
almost no gain above the levels of 1955. As a result, the trade deficit 
rose from about 650 million rupees ($137 million) in 1955 to about 
2,100 million rupees ($440 million) in 1956, and to an annual rate of 
about 3,485 million rupees ($732 million) in the first nine months of 
1957.7 
6 Excluding the return to the United States of large amounts of lend-lease silver. 
1 Based on customs figures. Since July 1956, the payments deficit on merchan• 
dise account has been much larger than the trade deficit recorded by the 
customs, reflecting the fact that heavy payments were being made for mer­
chandise not currently being delivered. Advance payments on orders for 
capital goods are known to have been substantial. Most of these advance 
payments were undoubtedly required by the sellers, but some were probably 
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TABLE _2. Indian Foreign Trade, 1954-57 
- Exports Imports Trade 
� Percentage change Percentage change balance 00 
::i... 
Value (In from same quarter Value (In from same quarter ( In millions 
� Quarters millions of rupees) of previous year millions of rupees) of previous year of rupees) 
(1) 
1954 - I 1,319 -.5 1,321 -1.0 -2., t=;· 
l:i II 1,134 -5.2 1,520 -7.9 -386;::s 
1-.3 III 1,434 +10.0 1,595 +7.3 -161., 
l:i IV 1.740 +16.9 1,740 +40.2 0 � 
(1) 
1955 - I 1,628 +23.4 1,709 +29.4 -81� -. II 1,325 +16.8 1,624 +6.8 -299.... ;::s--
::i... III 1,611 +12.3 1,581 -.9 +30"' IV 1,513 -13.0 1,815 +4.3 -302-. l:i 
l:i 
;::s 
1956 - I 1,645 +1.0 2,028 +18.7 -383
� II 1,316 -.7 1,917 +18.0 -601.... 
III 1,423 -11.7 2,101 +32.9 -677;::s--(1) 
"l1 IV 1,658 +9.6 2,101 +15.7 -443
l:i 
1957 - I 1,637 2,280 +12.4 -643., -.5
t?j II 1,455* +10.6* 2,617 +36.5 -1162*l:i "' .... III 1,646* + 15.7* 2,455 +16.8 -809*
IV 1,536* -7.4* 2,182 +3.9 -646*
Source: International Financial Statistics * Estimated. Official figures are believed to include shipments of silver to the United 
States in repayment of silver obtained from the United States during World War II under a lend-lease agreement. Adjustment 
made on the basis of United States data on receipts from India under the agreement. 
The increase in imports was the most spectacular manifestation 
of the rise in effective demand. The bulk of it represented sharply 
stepped up deliveries of machinery, metals and metal products, and the 
arrival of surplus agricultural commodities from the United States be­
ginning in November 1956. Imports of machinery, metals and metal 
products accounted for about 86 per cent of the rise in total imports 
from 1955 to 1956 and may explain as much as 40 per cent8 of the 
rise from 1956 to 1957. These imports, largely on private account, 
were used primarily in the expansion of facilities and for current pro­
duction. However, a significant accumulation of inventories is re­
ported to have occurred in 1956 and the first half of 1957. The ship­
ments of United States surplus agricultural commodities, which appear 
to account for somewhat more than 50 per cent of the rise in total 
imports from 1956 to 1957,9 were originally intended to build up
stocks, but are said in fact to have been to a large extent put on the 
market to fight rising food prices. 
The deterioration of the trade position was largely financed by 
drawing down foreign exchange reserves. Between April 1, 1956 and 
the end of 1957, India's foreign exchange reserves were in fact reduced 
by 4,486 million rupees ( $942 million), more than twice the amount 
by which it had been planned to reduce them in the five year period 
beginning April 1, 1956. In addition, India drew $200 million from 
the International Monetary Fund in three installments in February, 
March and June 1957. Other assistance in this 21 month period 
totalled about $ 600 million, including $126 million drawn on Inter­
national Bank loans,10 about $136 million in the form of United States 
aid and an estimated $259 million representing the value of the ship­
ments of United States surplus agricultural commodities already men­
tioned. 
The bulk of this assistance, including the IMF drawing, 80 per 
cent of the drawings on IBRD loans and practically all of the United 
States agricultural surplus commodities, came in 1957. Without it, 
and without the very extensive utilization of foreign exchange re-
instigated by Indian buyers, partly reflecting a flight from the pound 
sterling in connection with the Suez crisis. Throughout this period, India 
has continued to earn a surplus on invisible account. 
8 Author's estimate.
9 Author's estimate based on United States data on such shipments.
10 Repayments of $6.5 million were also made to the Bank in this period, making
net Bank assistance to India in this period $119.5 million. 
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serves,11 wholesale prices would surely have continued to rise in 1957. 
Foreign exchange reserves and foreign assistance thus acted as cushions 
for the Indian economy. Their availability made it possible to face 
the growth of domestic demand with the minimum of internal price 
strains. But surely it could not be said that inflationary pressures were 
absent in 1957 and early 1958. Effective demand had reached a level 
at which it could be sustained only so long as the drain on foreign 
exchange reserves could continue and new foreign assistance could be 
obtained. 
REMEDIAL MEASURES 
To deal with the growing crisis, the Indian authorities began by 
tightening import restrictions. Import quotas were cut January 1, 1957, 
for 509 relatively nonessential items. At the same time, it was an­
nounced that, in general, import licenses for capital goods would be 
issued only to businessmen who either ( 1) secured foreign capital 
investment at least as high as the proposed imports, or (2) obtained 
credits from foreign suppliers, or ( 3) proposed to pay with the pro­
ceeds of loans from foreign and international lending institutions. 
Two types of supplier credits were specified; one provided that payment 
before shipment should not exceed 20 per cent of the f.o.b. price, the 
balance to be paid_ in seven annual installments; and the other limited 
initial payment to 10 per cent, the balance to be paid after the project 
had become a going concern, in installments not to exceed the net saving 
or earning of foreign exchange realized through the operations of the 
n�w plant. 
On July 1, 1957, the open general licenses for imports were 
abolished, except on certain imports from Pakistan. In addition, a 
moratorium on issuing new licenses was enforced during the third 
quarter of 1957, except for raw materials and for capital goods pro­
cured under deferred payment arrangements. Beginning October L 
1957, the import of a wide range of consumer goods was banned and 
quotas for many others were cut sharply. 
The effect of these restrictions was to bring about some decline in 
imports beginning in the third quarter of 1957. Concurrently the de­
mand for bank credit abated somewhat since importers unable to secure 
licenses no longer needed funds. Inventories accumulated earlier began 
to be drawn down, thereby providing a cushion thanks to which the 
11 About 51 per cent of the total decline in reserves in this 21 month period
occurred in 1957. 
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restrictions did not immediately bring about an upsurge in prices. Due 
to the high level of outstanding licenses which remain valid, imports 
may be expected to continue at a high level for some time. The bulk 
of these licenses is reported to be for the import of machinery and raw 
materials. 
Besides tightening import restrictions, the Indian authorities un­
dertook a comprehensive review of the Five Year Plan itself. They 
decided to reduce the physical targets in such a way as to ensure that 
the total public outlay on the plan would not exceed the original esti­
mate of 48 billion rupees. They established a set of priorities for the 
projects included in the plan and announced that they would concen­
trate on what they called the hard core of the plan (steel, coal, railways 
and certain power projects) and on such other projects as were so 
close to completion that the cost of completing them was low relative 
to the benefits to be derived from them. Other projects were to be 
implemented only as resources permitted. 
At the same time a concerted effort was made to secure increased 
foreign resources to finance the uncovered foreign exchange cost of the 
hard core of the plan estimated at about 7 billion rupees ($1,470 
million) . So far ( April 19 5 8) additional asistance has been announced 
by the United States, Western Germany and Japan. In addition, the 
Indian authorities made clear their intention to devote the country's 
remaining foreign exchange holdings to the support of the plan if neces­
sary. The minimum reserve of foreign exchange which the law required 
the Reserve Bank to hold was reduced from 4 billion rupees ($840 
million) to 3 billion rupees ($630 million) in August 1957, and to 
850 million rupees ($178.5 million) in November 1957. Even this 
latest minimum may be eliminated altogether under procedures pro­
vided for in existing statutes. 
CONCLUSION 
It is too early to tell whether sufficient foreign resources will be-
come available to finance the foreign exchange cost of the reduced plan. 
Even if they do, it remains to be seen whether internal inflationary 
pressures will thereby be fully absorbed. The past rate of spending on 
the plan suggests that public expenditures must rise sharply in the next 
three years if the projected five year expenditure total is to be reached 
or even approached. At the same time, there is little scope for further 
increasing government revenues. Under the circumstances, the Indian 
authorities may find it difficult to carry out their recent decision to 
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reduce the extent to which the plan would be financed by advances 
from the Reserve BanJc, unless foreign assistance well in excess of the 
amount now sought is forthcoming. 
If the authorities undertake to approach the projected five year 
expenditure total of 48 billion rupees under the plan, internal infla­
tionary pressures may be expected to continue and the need for severe 
import restrictions will remain. If on the other hand the authorities 
decide to bring the inflationary pressures to an end by further read­
justing the plan, it may eventually be possible to relax import restric­
tions. In either case, however, the level of Indian imports is likely to 
be lower than it was in 1957. 
India's biggest supplier is the United Kingdom. The rest of West­
ern Europe considered as a unit has recently become as big a supplier 
of India as is the United Kingdom, largely on the strength of a large 
increase in imports from West Germany. Including the United King­
dom, Western Europe supplied about 50 per cent of India's imports in 
1956. The United States provided only about 12 per cent of the total. 
Indian import cuts are likely to be made on a nondiscriminatory basis 
since its foreign exchange shortage is a generalized shortage rather than 
a shortage of any one currency. Therefore United States exports may 
be affected about in proportion to the total decline in Indian imports. 
United States· suppliers of machinery, vehicles and metals, the 
principal United States nonagricultural exports to �ndia, have fully 
shared in the increase in Indian imports. In 1956, shipments of these 
products to India, representing about half of total United States exports 
to· India, were valued at about $132 million, two and a third times as 
much as in 1953. They accounted for nearly twice as large a percent­
age of total Indian imports as in 1953, a performance almost as good 
as the improvement in the overall position of Wes tern Germany as a 
supplier of India. On the basis of data for the first nine months, it ap­
pears that some decline in these exports may have occurred in 1957. As 
import cuts and the readjustment of the plan assume their full effect, 
further declines seem inevitable, but the relative share of the Indian 
market held by United States suppliers need not fall if the terms offered 
to Indian buyers, including credit terms, are kept as attractive as those 
offered by other suppliers. At the same time, United States foodgrain 
exports to India are likely to be maintained close to the level of 1957, 
as the PL 480 agreement of 1956 continues to be implemented. What 
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happens thereafter will depend in part on whether or not a new PL 480 
agreement is negotiated. 
In the long run, however, Indian economic growth will provide 
the basis for a renewed rise in imports in which United States suppliers 
may share. The potential of the Indian economy is enormous and 
neither the government nor the people are disposed to leave it unex­
ploited. Progress may not, at first, be as rapid as they would like, but 
as they solve the many problems which confront them, particularly the 
population problem, and as they adopt wise policies, there is no reason 
why the rate of progress cannot eventually rise so that the vicious circle 
of poverty will at last be broken. 
The Indians have a long, hard road to travel and they know it. 
They have begun the journey with democratic institutions and with a 
system of government which respects the basic freedoms of the people 
and their human dignity. If they can reach a satisfactory and a sus­
tainable rate of development with these institutions and this system of 
government, they will probably have done more to rehabilitate demo­
cracy in the eyes of other Asian countries than can be done by any 
other means. 
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AMONG THE three countries of India, Pakistan and Ceylon-Ceylon 
is the smallest; but in its problems and possibilities, it invites study as a 
model of the kinds of issues that underdeveloped countries face. 
In the last several years, United States exports have been lower to 
Ceylon, per capita, than to Pakistan, but considerably higher than to 
India. Relatively heavy United States aid to Pakistan is one explanation 
of the comparison; another is the comparatively high income level of 
Ceylon, and perhaps its long pattern of net dollar earnings. 
Compared to population, United States imports from Ceylon are 
very large indeed-about as much as from Pakistan, with nine times 
. the population; and one-seventh that of India, with some 42 times the 
population. The explanation lies mainly in the United States taste for, 
and ability to buy, the high quality Ceylon teas; to a much lesser extent, 
it lies in United States purchases of rubber. From these two commodi­
ties alone come over 90 per cent of Ceylon's foreign earnings. Our 
total purchases from all three countries show much stability, though the 
downswing of 1954 in the United States had its effect in a moderate 
parallel downswing in imports from each country. 
Economic and financial policy in each of these countries is inti­
mately concerned with the amount of foreign assets. Within a country, 
even a highly inflationary policy-of rising money supply and rising 
money incomes--can be sustained for years without meeting any clear 
block. The experience of Chile, Brazil and other Latin American 
countries give example. But any such policy that involves as well rapid-
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ly falling foreign assets demands that prompt corrective measures be 
undertaken for the simple reason that countries, like individuals, can 
spend only so long as they have something to spend. 
Hence the fall in Indian foreign assets, from Rs 7.8 billion at the 
end of 1955, to Rs 4 billion last February (with a further concealed 
loss due to upward revaluation of gold balances in this period), is the 
clearest evidence possible of crisis in the development plan-that is, of 
the need for taking some action to check the drain. Pakistan has sus­
tained a more moderate drain, with foreign assets falling by only about 
18 per cent between 1956 (Rs 1.7 billion) and last February (Rs 1.4 
billion). 
Ceylon-with which I will be concerned primarily in the rest of 
this paper-has gone through remarkable experience with its foreign 
assets in recent years, with corresponding effects on the volume and 
types of its trade. 
Like other countries, Ceylon has been spending as much as it can 
on imports and other foreign charges. There is nothing reprehensible 
in this; in fact, to quote one eminent economist, probably the clearest 
root of economic progress lies in the persistent tendency of people to 
spend more than their incomes! Ceylon's effort to spend no more than 
its income is rendered difficult by the fact that its foreign earnings from 
exports are highly variable. Tea and rubber provide over 90 per cent 
of foreign earnings and their prices fluctuate widely. The price of tea 
is nearly three and a half times higher than in 1938, that of rubber four 
times higher. (At the same time the import price index is up four 
times.) But the price of tea rose 42 per cent between 1947 and the 
peak price of 1950; fell 9 per cent in two years; rose 30 per cent in 
four years (to 1956), and fell almost 30 per cent to winter 1957. As 
for rubber: its price rose nearly 250 per cent between 1947 and the 
Korean War peak of 1951, and fell 60 per cent to winter 1957. 
What does one do in the face of this instability? The students at 
the University of Ceylon are convinced that the way out is to diversify. 
But diversification carried on for its own sake means that the economy 
is on the average poorer, in order to avoid the risk of occasionally 
falling on bad times. The students do not phrase the issue in this 
tougher and accurate way. 
The problem is the greater for Ceylon, in that half of Ceylon's 
staple food (rice) is imported, and so must be paid for out of foreign 
earnings. The problem has been still greater in that this newly indepen-
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dent democracy during the l 940's had had a rice subsidy integrated 
into its budget, which at the maximum-in fiscal 1951-53-was absorb­
ing one-quarter of the government's revenues. So far as our inquiries at 
the time made out, this is a world's record for a consumer subsidy. 
Add to this the claims of an ambitious development program, 
aimed at increasing Ceylon's production at least as fast as the popula­
tion is rising ( about 2. 7 per cent a year) and it is easy to understand 
how Ceylon's foreign assets could fall from Rs 1185 million at the end 
of 1951, to Rs 607 million at the end of 1953. (Rs 450 million had 
been estimated by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel­
opment Mission as a reasonable minimum.) 
Notice the advantages with which Ceylon could meet these prob­
lems of rapidly falling foreign reserves and intractable needs for food 
imports for a steadily growing population. The country was reasonably 
united, quite peaceful, had no serious issues with its great neighbor, 
India; in addition, it had a sharp comparative advantage in tea produc­
tion, and a fully competitive position in rubber. It could meet its prob­
lems objectively: there was no antagonism to the British or other former 
colonial powers, it had trained leaders and an effective civil service. 
There was at the same time considerable Socialist sentiment among the 
intellectuals in the university, and to some extent in government also. 
These intellectuals had received, to a remarkable degree, their bent 
from the London School of Economics and the eloquence of Harold 
Laski. There was both a Stalinist Communist movement, and a Trot­
skyist group of size. 
In such circumstance, a Central Bank can strengthen the resolu­
tion of the minister of finance, and educate the public. It can do the 
latter by its monthly bulletins, annual reports and by clear essays in the 
editorial pages of the newspapers. It can do the former by pressing for 
more taxes, if possible, and for less spending in any case, on every pos­
sible occasion. One of the main functions of a Central Bank, when the 
government is over-spending, is to wheedle and coax and badger toward 
a check to expansion-though at last resort and if commanded, it must 
create money to finance government spending. This the Central Bank 
did, from the conviction both that Ceylon could not continue waiting 
and hoping for an improvement in its terms of trade, while its foreign 
assets ran out; and also that even if the terms of trade did improve ( or 
if depreciation or more drastic exchange restrictions were resorted to), 
the basis issue still remained that resources that should go to meet the 
158 American Trade with Asia and the Far East 
needs of development were being swallowed up in consumption, that is, 
tomorrow's food was being eaten up today. 
Meanwhile, (and this is an illustration of how the United States 
did much damage through a mistaken policy) rubber purchases in Co­
lombo for the United States stockpiling program were cut sharply. (The 
buying policy was to offer no higher a price in Colombo than was paid 
in Singapore; but there was a long standing margin of a fraction of a 
cent a pound higher price in Colombo; and so the United States policy 
led to little rubber being actually sold to the United States.) Hence 
United States dollar earnings dropped sharply. 
Ceylon has been, and is, in the sterling area but somewhat uneasily 
so. It has often been disposed to retain more dollars to its credit in 
New York, out of its dollar-area-surplus, than the Bank of England was 
inclined to think proper. Hence the loss of dollar earnings hurt, in 
those days when sterling was less nearly convertible than now-more 
than if dollars had been regularly all turned in for sterling balances. 
Ceylon was rescued from its crisis by three events. The first, curi­
ously enough, was an offer from Communist China. Ceylon was not in 
the United Nations, having been blackballed by Russia. Hence it was 
not bound by the strategic materials embargo of United Nations mem­
bers against Communist China. In 1952 China offered to swap Ceylon 
rubber for China rice at advantageous terms--a gain over world market 
prices of about $20 million dollars a year. No democratic government, 
and especially that of a poor country, would find it easy to reject such 
an off.er. Ceylon accepted. The second event involved the sharp cutting 
of the rice subsidy by Ceylon in 1953. The government for the time 
being weathered the resulting political storm and a trial insurrection 
staged under partly Communist inspiration. Some other contracting 
monetary and fiscal measures were carried into effect. Finally, the 
terms of trade improved: the prices of imports fell somewhat, and the 
prices of tea and rubber rose. External assets doubled between the end 
of 1953 and 1956 (though since they have fallen again by about one­
sixth). 
And so here was a trade crisis in a small and new nation, solved 
by a combination of external factors (the foreign contract and world 
price changes) and domestic economizing. 
What is the current position and prospect? The present govern­
ment, headed by Prime Minister Bandaranaike, is socialist-minded. It 
came into office with the support of a surprising combination of three 
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groups: (1) a nationalist (Sri Lanka) party, plus a Singalese Language 
Front that has merged with the Sri Lanka party; (2) a Trotskyist par­
ty; and (3) most crucially, the Buddhist priesthood. Mr. Bandaranaike 
is a moderate who says, "I pray God that this country will not have a 
Communist government. I want equality of justice for all.''1 His sup­
porters seem to think that nationalization of foreign-owned estates is 
desirable-but with compensation, and not now. 
His highly vocal Minister of Agriculture, Philip Gunawardena, 
holds views more alarming to private capital: 
I consider myself a Leninist ... All private enterprise in Ceylon 
must totaJly disappear ... The threat of the United States' trying 
to grab Ceylon by force for Wall Street is a real one. Of course 
I believe that.2 
The consequence of such views is . that capital is being withdrawn 
from Ceylon. Investors are afraid their holdings are not safe. Foreign 
investors, especially, worry about discriminatory taxation and other 
legislation, and they fear possible restrictions on the transfer of profit. 
Capital withdrawal exists despite the fact that ministers in the present 
government have .often stated that they would welcome foreign invest­
ment in certain fields. The Economist estimates that $78 million (Rs 
3 70 million) were withdrnwn in the years 1953 through 1956. Off­
setting this outflow, $4.2 million (Rs 20 million) came into the country 
ip the same years.3 The net loss for these four years has therefore been 
about $74 million (Rs 350 million), or over one-third of Ceylon's total 
current foreign assets. 
The data available in this country for Ceylon's 1957 balance of 
1 NEW YoRK TrMES, November 25, 1957, p. 10. 
2 Ibid. 
3 The Economist, (September 1957). p. 1038. Profits were excluded from this 
count; provident fund and insurance premiums included. 
The actual balance of payments figures in these years for net private 
capital outflows are Rs 163 million, and for net capital outflows attributable 
to official and banking institutions, Rs 362 million. These data are based on 
exchange control records, and hence have a bias toward understating capital 
outflows. The Economist's correspondent evidently thought that about half 
of the Rs 362 million-that is, Rs 187 million-represent capital withdraw­
als. (Sources: Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Ceylon, and various 
Central Bank Bulletins.) 
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payments suggest a checking of the capital outflow.4 On the other hand 
the outlook for private capital investment does not seem to have im­
proved: in the fall of 1957 two Canadian insurance companies with 
large ventures in Ceylon decided not to undertake new ventures there. 
Suppose Mr. Gunawardena and other left politicians could have 
anticipated the results of their publicized statements in losing for Cey­
lon so much of the foreign assets that might have gone into economic 
development. Would they nevertheless have persisted in them? It is a 
curious question of politics and national interest. 
The Ceylon Government have sometimes seemed rather to favor 
the selling off of British tea estates, and of British-owned shares, to 
Ceylonese. But this trend does draw down foreign assets that otherwise 
would be available for putting into economic development. The gov­
ernment recently embargoed the sending to London of money that had 
been received from the sale of British-owned estates. Such a policy 
diminishes, in the short run, a burdensome symptom of the disease of 
lack of investor confidence, at the expense of aggravating both the 
symptom and the disease in the longer run. 
Where does Ceylon go from here? 
One policy is to give up reliance on private investment, foreign 
and perhaps domestic, to try to insulate the economy completely against 
capital outflows, and to press forward rapidly with socialization mea­
sures for the tea and rubber estates and other businesses. One argu­
ment for such a policy is that the efficiency of government administra­
tion is greater than that in most underdeveloped countries. But my own 
estimate of the result is that, at the best, there would be ahead for 
Ceylon many years of sharply lower average incomes. For the efficiency 
of well-trained private estate managers, and the effectiveness of the 
judgment of private investors, are not to be underestimated. 
The other policy is for the government to assure foreign and do­
mestic investors indisputably that their investments will be secure. This 
policy could be the more effective since Ceylon is well removed from 
the borders of Communist states-in contrast with, say, Vietnam, Bur­
ma and South Korea. The result would be a reversal of the capital 
4 The most recent Central Bank Bulletin, that for February, 1958, carries tenta­
tive balance of payments estimates through the first three quarters of 1957. 
The totals that far, for private capital outflow, are Rs 37 million; and for 
"official and banking institutions" capital inflow, Rs 143 million. 
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flow-and not only more capital, but also more technical skills for 
Ceylon-with prompt beneficial effects on Ceylon's real income. 
The present ambivalent government measures and sentiments bid 
fair to make the worst of both worlds. 
Aside from this issue of confidence and capital flows and produc­
tive skills, Ceylon will continue to spend abroad as much as its foreign 
earnings will permit. Some one-third of Ceylon's gross national income 
originates in exports, matched by an equal flow of imports. 
The Ceylonese must decide on and work for their own future. 
Their essential problems lie in their rapid population increase and their 
need for rapidly increasing efficiency in agriculture. Such increased 
efficiency is technically very possible, and implies among other things, a 
major effort in public education. 
Aid is once again being provided by the United States, after an 
embargo of several years' duration under the Battle Act, caused by 
Ceylon's shipment of the "strategic good," rubber, to China. Such aid 
gives the Ceylon government more chance to experiment and to im­
prove policies, and so to increase efficiency in planning and executing 
economic development measures. 
162 American Trade with Asia and the Far East 
Development plans in Asia
H. W. Sin9er 
Bureau. of Economic Affairs, 
United Nations 
163 
T HE COUNTRIES OF South and South East Asia, with the exception 
of Thailand, all have development plans or programs of one sort or 
another. This is surely a significant phenomenon considering that these 
14 countries range in their political and economic philosophy from the 
extreme left of Communist Mainland China through the moderate left of 
Social-Democratic �ndia or Burma through the moderate right of Pakis­
tan or Japan to the conservative philosophies of the Philippines or 
Taiwan. The first fact to notice therefore is that development planning 
is universal, and that it is not a matter of political or economic philoso­
phy. 
What would a Western observer make of this phenomenon? It
would be easy to make light of iL It could be called a fashion, or a 
demonstration of "keeping up with the Joneses," or a symbol of nation­
alism, or a meaningless ritual, etc. It would not even be too difficult to 
support such views with quotations from the development plans them­
selves since these are sometimes somewhat naive or primitive; lack 
essential statistics or other information or are based on somewhat hope­
ful assumptions. 
Yet such an attitude would be neither farsighted nor sensible. It is 
better to take the development plans seriously, and treat them as the 
expression of something new and significant. They express an accept­
ance by the Asian countries of two fundamental propositions: ( 1) that 
the progress of the economy can be a matter of research, analysis, hu­
man action based on reasoning, rather than of preordained events or 
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revealed philosophical or religious patterns, and (2) that by looking at 
the economic environment as a whole, by looking at both policies and 
at investment projects as a whole, one can improve their total efficiency 
by forming consistent and complementary patterns or "packages" of 
such policies and projects. 
Both these ideas are essentially Western ideas: the belief that hu­
man action based on reason can mold the social environment and gain 
command over niggardly nature, as well as the belief in the complemen­
tarity and integration of dispersed action in social life. The difference 
is that in North America or Europe, with our developed economies, we 
are taking automatic economic progress, an increased capacity of over­
coming nature's scarcities by human action, and the formation of 
broadly based complementary patterns of investment and policies so 
much for granted that we do not, as a rule, consider it necessary to 
embody such aspirations in a deliberate program. Note, however, that 
when it comes to questions of individual policy decisions, whether re­
lating to private business decisions or to the preparation of public 
policy measures, we do go through exactly the same process of pre­
paring a complete conspectus, perhaps a market survey or a sales bud­
get or a production or development program for the business unit 
concerned, or hearings designed to bring to light in one single focus the 
possible repercussions of contemplated measures. 
A short review of the main advantages and benefits which the 
technique of development programming can bring also amounts to a 
review of the reasons why underdeveloped countries have been en­
couraged by such organizations as the United Nations, the International 
Bank, or the Colombo Plan to evolve development programs. 
In the first place, a development program forces a government and 
a country to make some sort of choice between a number of objec­
tives: Is the objective to create employment opportunities for a rapidly 
growing population? Is it to mitigate or abolish mass poverty in its 
worst form? Is it to diversify away from the heavy preponderance of 
agriculture? Is it to reconstruct a war-disrupted economy? Is it to make 
a new economy viable, as for instance in the cases of Korea or Vietnam, 
Laos, Cambodia or Taiwan or even Pakistan? Is it to deal with a 
chronic problem of instability, either external or internal? Is it to 
raise consumption in the near future? Is it to lay the foundations of 
long-term growth, by creating the essential economic infra-structure 
of transport, power, etc.? Is it to improve welfare by better health or 
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education? Is it to industrialize as fast as possible? Is it to solve a 
foreign exchange crisis, or to utilize existing assets or perhaps repara­
tions from Japan? Is it to reduce internal differences between different 
income classes or social groups or different regions of the country? 
This is a long list but by no means complete. A development program 
confronts a country with the need to make a choice, and the different 
Asian countries have made characteristically different choices. But the 
very process of making a choice is important. A country should know, 
and the outside world should know, what it is that is wanted, and what 
it is that a country is prepared to give up, at least for the time being. 
The development program should force a country to think in terms 
of a balance between available resources-which may, of course, in­
clude prospective foreign aid-and national ambitions. This confron­
tation of limited resources and unlimited ambitions admittedly is often 
evaded in development programs, but the very exercise of such a con­
frontation can be valuable. The idea of budgeting is basic to develop­
ment programming-the more familiar fiscal budget is part of it, but so 
is the idea of national income, of savings-investment budgets, of foreign 
exchange budgets, and of commodity balances for such strategic items 
as food, clothing, steel, coal, fertilizers, etc. The habit of formulating 
programs has already had an effect in drawing attention most forcibly 
to the great need in Asia for exploring, surveying, testing and mapping 
out the sources of raw materials as well as of energy and of the soil 
itself. 
The savings-investment balance is perhaps the most crucial of all. 
With the exception of Japan, and perhaps Burma, all the countries have 
a low savings ratio, both private and public. Economists have charac­
teristically differed on the reasons: overconsumption, low incomes, lack 
of institutions, lack of incentives--all have their champions. Others 
pin their hopes on public saving, an increase in taxation-but here 
again the difficulties are formidable; the nature of subsistence farming, 
problems of administration, the question of incentives (tax holidays), 
the incidence on savings. 
The best hope lies perhaps in a high marginal rate of savings and 
taxation-but this is a somewhat question-begging road to economic 
development, in the sense that if you could get your development first 
then you could finance it without inflation-a sort of aggregative pump­
priming. Unfortunately, the first step of increasing real supplies and 
real income is the great barrier, and pump-priming of the normal kind 
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is peculiarly ineffective and even dangerous in underdeveloped coun­
tries. 
As against these limited resources there stand the multiple claims 
of which the countries of Asia are all too conscious: (a) to produce the 
structural change which they desire, away from an 80 per cent agricul­
tural economy, in the name of "industrialization," and the creation of 
an economic framework corresponding to this change; (b) to expand 
agriculture, to supply food, raw materials, exports to the new industries; 
( c) to solve their marketing deadlock by a simultaneous advance in
different directions, through investment "packages" and "balanced
growth"; (d) to build up foreign exchange reserves, and invest in im­
port substitutes; ( e) to raise consumption levels as a political, social
and humanitarian requirement.
These formidable claims have to be reconciled with the scarce 
resources. If they are not, either inflation or a foreign exchange crisis 
or both will result, and in either of these two cases the efficiency of 
investment is reduced-probably below what it would have been with­
out the attempted "development." 
A development program, then, is an essential reminder of the 
needs of proper administration. The individual investment projects 
hatched by individual government departments and individual business 
sectors may form an aggregate which may be either too large or too 
small for the total available resources or which may be in need of some 
fitting together, like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. Similarly, the bits 
and scraps of policy proposals which come from this source or that 
need to be looked at together, and in their impact on each other. In 
doing this it should often become apparent that the summation of indi­
vidual projects is likely to vastly exceed the available resources, and it 
is also likely to be reduced in efficiency by unnecessary overlapping, 
competition for scarce resources and isolation. The very need to justify 
projects or policies by their favorable impact on the economy as a 
whole can have beneficial effects. In the process of development plann­
ing, groups or committees have arisen in the Asian countries whose 
job it is to think about the aggregate effect of what is proposed, and 
develop methods of cutting the coat according to the cloth by methods 
other than the blunt instruments of across-the-board slashing or the 
worse than blunt instrument of galloping inflation. Admittedly, again, 
the process of combining and cutting down policies and projects is often 
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either avoided or very crude-but no development program of any 
degree of realism can fail to impress at least the need for such processes. 
A development program-provided that it is realistic, and that 
people trust the government to carry it out--can give a whole economy 
a sense of moving forward. Such a sense of moving forward may be of 
crucial importance in an economy where people's expectations may 
have been shaped by a long history of stagnation and low-level equili­
brium. Unless there is some knowledge that other business projects 
are also going forward, that purchasing power is expanding, that essen­
tial public services are improved or going to be provided, many promis­
ing investment projects which otherwise could be undertaken even with­
in available resources may appear to be too risky or unprofitable, and 
the resources may instead be frittered away in speculation, monuments, 
or in building up bank accounts abroad. For this purpose of creating 
a sense of moving forward, it is not sufficient that a development pro­
gram exists, it must also be communicated to and underwritten by the 
general population. It is perhaps no accident that India ( where this 
process of communication and grass roots participation has perhaps 
gone furthest) is also the country where there has recently been a tre­
mendous and largely unforseen private investment boom. Even though 
this present investment boom has been quite unforeseen in the second 
Five-Year-Plan, and though it has led to great foreign exchange difficul­
ties and threatens to upset the apple cart, let there b� no mistake about 
the essentially desirable and healthy feature of this boom. It is a vote 
of confidence in the Indian economy and the Indian government based 
on the fairly successful conclusion of the first development plan. Once 
this sense of moving forward is created, the inherent high productivity 
of investment in the capital-short economies of Asia comes into its 
own-but so does the constraint of scarce resources, especially in 
foreign exchange. It should be noted, however, that while such a pri­
vate investment boom can create immediate foreign exchange difficul­
ties, it would also seem to offer much better assurance that external 
assistance, if it does come forward, will be more effectively used than is 
the case in a stagnation-ridden economy where this sense of moving for­
ward has not been created. 
This takes me to my next point in describing the potential benefits 
from a sound development program. By laying open the intentions and 
ambitions of a country, by describing the investment opportunities in 
relation to available resources, by indicating the methods by which 
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development is to be financed and the extent to which domestic re­
sources can be mobilized, a development program can give to foreign 
investors in the economy, whether they be aiding or loaning govern­
ments, private investors or the International Bank, a degree of assur­
ance of constructive use for any assistance given such as would not be 
available merely from an examination of individual projects. To give 
assistance merely on the basis of individual projects suffers from a fatal 
weakness: the soundness of a project is largely a function of the sound­
ness of the economy as a whole; and in any case, external assistance 
never helps with the sound high-priority project to which it may be 
ostensibly tied. Rather, it is the marginal project which is really in­
volved and the soundness of the assistance depends upon the sound­
ness of the marginal project. If a man comes to you and wants your 
assistance to educate his brilliant son and tells you that this is the most 
important thing in life to him, you will be rightly suspicious of him. If 
this is so important to him, would he not find the money himself and 
economize elsewhere? Perhaps what you really finance is this man's 
drinking and gambling which he otherwise would be forced to give up. 
Hence, any banker will want to look at a man's total expenditure pat­
tern. It is not different with countries, and a proper development pro­
gram provides the only sensible basis for such a banker's examination. 
This does not mean that tying assistance to sound projects is useless. 
On the contrary, it can have great practical and educational value. 
Of course, the habit of development planning also has its dangers, 
and these have perhaps been more publicized than the advantages. In 
development plans, there is often a somewhat unreal distinction be­
tween development and growth. The very fact of defining a segment of 
government activity as "developmental," and therefore implicitly an­
other segment as "nondevelopmental," is misleading. Government ac­
tivities designed to maintain law and order are just as important to de­
velopment as building a dam or railway; the construction of a fence or 
drainage ditch by a small farmer on his own land in his spare time is 
as much development as the installation of generators or turbines; an 
improvement in people's literacy or schooling or skill or health is as 
essential for development as new installations. Yet, development plans 
tend to concentrate on capital formation as against increases in produc­
tivity, on tangible things as against intangible things, on measurable 
things as against unmeasurable things. Furthermore, as I have already 
mentioned, the development plan - that visible expression of "the 
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revolution of rising expectations" - may all too easily become a shop­
ping list of everything that is desirable, including the kitchen sink. 
Development plans, since they are the product of a government 
which normally has to justify itself to be re-elected, may be too short­
term in their orientation. You remember what Keynes said: "In the 
long run we are all dead." That is certainly true of governments, and 
not such a long run either. Hence, a tendency to neglect the import­
ance of building up the foundations of economic growth which may 
make the economy more flexible and elastic in the future; hence, also, 
a tendency to spread investment too wide and too thin in order to give 
something to every social group, to every region, to every shade of 
opinion with electoral pull. Hence, the tendency for showy, impressive, 
monumental things. Politics and economics are uneasy bedfellows. 
Development plans may tempt governments to neglect things which 
are beyond their range of planning, and must be taken as given, like 
the monsoons and hurricanes. I refer here to the unpredictable ups 
and downs of world markets and world prices for the primary com­
modities on which most of the Asian countries depend for their export 
earnings - those economic monsoons and hurricanes sweeping over 
Asia. 
One could add to this list of weaknesses in present development 
plans, but I do not wish to conclude on this note. The weaknesses can 
be remedied. The Asian countries, under the auspices of the United 
Nations Regional Commission in Bangkok (ECAFE) as well as under 
the auspices of the Colombo Plan, are getting together to exchange 
their experiences, regarding the best way of setting about the business 
of drawing up and carrying out development plans, to avoid the more 
obvious incompatibilities in their respective plans, and to learn from 
their mistakes. We can do much to help in these efforts to make this 
approach (which in any case has come to stay) as constructive as pos­
sible. We have all reason to help. In the last resort, we have special 
moral responsibilities, quite apart from our general humanitarian as 
well as commercial motives. We have brought to Asian countries dis­
ease control and death control. This has certainly contributed im­
mensely to human welfare but the resulting explosion in the rate of 
population growth also has faced Asian countries with new economic 
problems and forced them out of their economic traditionalism. Their 
development plans are the expression of a "revolution of rising popu­
lations as much as a revolution of rising expectations." Having forced 
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them to run to keep in the same place, it seems a natural duty to help 
them in developing their capacity to run. We are giving to Asia the 
benefit of our technological development but this also is a double-edged 
gift. The technological development of the West has become increas­
ingly capital-intensive or mechanized; it is not ideal for the needs of 
poor overpopulated agricultural countries with rapidly increasing popu­
lations. We should help to adjust technologies to the specific needs and 
resource endowments of Asia. 
Thirdly, we have done next to nothing to help the underdeveloped 
countries to weather those economic monsoons and hurricanes which 
I mentioned earlier, of sharply fluctuating world markets and prices of 
their primary commodities on which they depend for their foreign ex­
change. Over the past year, we have seen once again the spectacle of 
falling commodity prices, and it is not unreasonable to consider this 
fall partly at least a reflection of our attempts in the West to preserve 
internal stability and combat inflation. Let us realize what this means 
to the underdeveloped economies of Asia. It is not easy to plan when 
you sit in a rickety boat tossed about by heaving waves. 
We thus have good reasons to encourage the movement of na­
tional economic self-expression through better development programs, 
to build upon their constructive features, to try to remedy their weak­
nesses and thus to help in making them a success. 
The world economy is not a game of poker, nor of musical chairs. 
It is much more like a party of mountaineers, roped together on their 
way to higher peaks. 
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THE PHILIPPINES 1s the one Asian country with which the United 
States has something akin to a blood relationship. From 189 8 to I 946, 
the seven thousand odd islands making up the Philippine archipelago 
were an American possession, acquired from the Spanish as spoils of 
war. American embarrassment at acquiring new territory in this way 
was reflected in the oft-forgotten fact that we paid $20 million, a fifth 
of the askin� price, to the defeated Spanish as compensation for the 
Philippines. 
The Filipinos did not exactly welcome the new colonial power 
with open arms. We had to fight for two years to subdue Filipino 
. opposition before American dominion could be firmly established 
throughout the islands. At the same time a most heated debate raged 
in this country over the desirability of our moving into Asia as a 
colonial power. Some American business interests aggressively favored 
the move, regarding the Philippines both as a profitable market and 
as a possible base for tapping the even larger market of neighboring 
China. The opposition was mainly based on moral grounds, many 
feeling that colonialism was inconsistent with American principles and 
that territorial aggrandizement by conquest was morally indefensible. 
The appeal of empire won out, and American enterprise and in­
vestment, combined with the introduction of reciprocal free trade be­
tween the United States and the Philippines in 1909, produced a re­
markable expansion of production and economic activity in the islands. 
It has been claimed that the Philippines made greater economic 
174 American Trade with Asia and the Far East
progress under three decades of United States rule than under three 
centuries of Spanish domination. Philippine exports rose from an an­
nual average of $12.7 million in the decade from 1880 to 1889 under 
the Spanish regime to $128 million during the years preceding World 
War II, a ten fold increase. Comparing the same periods, imports rose 
from $10.6 million to $120 million.1 
The increase in trade reflected an increase in investment, produc­
tion and incomes. With American capital and enterprise leading the 
way, the sugar industry was modernized, and by the 1930's the volume 
of sugar exports was more than triple the peak reached under the 
Spanish. The export of coconut products was insignificant under the 
Spanish, but it was developed into the second largest export before 
the war and has since become the largest. The main export during 
the Spanish era, abaca, was passed by both sugar and copra, but ex­
ports were expanded, and in the decade before World War II reached 
a level two and a half times as great as in the last decade of Spanish 
rule. 2 
The expansion in production and trade brought a rising standard 
of living for the Philippine people. Unlike Korea, which under the 
first twenty years of Japanese domination experienced a sharp reduc­
tion in per capita consumption of the preferred staple food-rice, the 
Philippines enjoyed an increase in per capita rice consumption. (Rice 
is the staple food for 7 5 per cent of the population.) The larger volume 
of imports consisted in large part of consumer goods. In 1939, at least 
half of the total imports by value could be so classified. 3 
ln addition to becoming an important supplier of food and raw 
materials for other countries, mainly the United States, the Philippines 
developed into an important market for the products of other coun­
tries, again mainly the United States. In 1939, nearly 70 per cent 
of the imports into the Philippines came from this country and we 
took three-quarters of the Philippine exports. The biggest import items 
were cotton textiles, iron and steel manufactures, petroleum products, 
machinery and parts, tobacco and foodstuffs. The Philippines was, 
after Japan, our largest customer in Asia, buying more from us than 
1 "American Philippine Trade Relations," Report of the Technical Committee
to the President of the Philippines, Washington, 1944, pp. 5, 22. 
2 Ibid. pp. 38-40, 70, 90. 
3 Mary A. Pugh, Preliminary Economic Survey of the Philippines (Washington,
D. C.: United States Department of Commerce, 1943), p. 57.
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China, whose tempting markets had been one of the chief factors luring 
us into our colonial venture in the Far East. 
Despite the undoubted benefits which accrued to both sides from 
this trade, the Filipinos waged an unceasing campaign for independence. 
Until the late 1920's the independence movement appeared to have 
little hope of immediate success, but the depression of agricultural 
prices that followed World War I brought demands from the American 
farm bloc for protection from Philippine competition. The most vocal 
interests in this campaign were the sugar growers, the producers of fats 
and oils and the dairy industry. When efforts to secure tariff protection 
from Philippine commodities failed, the farm bloc shifted its attack and 
demanded independence for the Philippines, with the object of eliminat­
ing the trading advantages enjoyed by the Philippines as a United States 
possession. 
This campaign met with success, since it harmonized with the ex­
pressed desire of the Filipinos for independence. The first independence 
bill was enacted in 1933 over the veto of President Hoover. Its pro­
visions were dictated chiefly by American rather than Philippine inter­
ests and it was less than enthusiastically welcomed by the Filipinos. 
They were successful in securing the consent of the United States to 
some slight cha�ges and the bill as modified was reenacted as the Tyd­
ings-McDuffie Act of 1934. 
This legislation provided for the establishment of a transitional 
government, with full independence to be granted on July 4, 1946. A 
. five year transition period from free trade to complete elimination of 
preferences was decreed. This was rather one sided. It provided for 
gradual imposition of export duties on Philippine exports to the United 
States during this period but gave the Philippines no right to charge any 
duty on United States imports until independence was achieved. Ad­
ditional immediate quota restrictions on Philippine imports into the 
United States were applied under the Jones-Costigan Act and the Agri­
cultural Adjustment Act of 1934.• 
It has been charged that our colonialist policy distorted Philippine 
economic development, retarding industry and leaving the Philippines 
ill-prepared for independence. The Philippine leaders had opposed the 
introduction of free trade with the United States from the beginning 
4 Grayson L. Kirk, Philippine Independence (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 
1936), pp. 73-135. 
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because they feared that it would result in the country's becoming so 
closely linked with the United States economy that independence would 
be harder to achieve. There is some sense and a good deal of nonsense 
in these arguments. It is probably true that it would have been difficult 
for the Philippines to accept independence if this had involved imme­
diate and complete loss of the rights and privileges enjoyed in the 
American market. This, however, has never been contemplated, even 
under the prewar independence legislation. Both that legislation and 
the Bell Trade Act which replaced it following World War II provided 
for a transitional period to ease the shock of the loss of free entry into 
the American market. 
The deterrent to industrial development in the Philippines did not 
consist of any prohibitions laid down in Washington similar to the pro­
hibitions that the British had once imposed on the North American 
colonies. Anyone was free to develop whatever enterprise suited his 
fancy in the Philippines. All that was required was the capital, the 
know-how and confidence that the product could successfully compete 
with imported goods. The fact that the Philippines produced sugar 
and copra rather than cotton textiles or iron and steel was because 
entrepreneurs believed the economic returns were greater in these lines. 
The fact that fish caught in Philippine waters were far more expensive 
than fish transported thousands of miles across the ocean to Manila 
reflected the fact that labor and capital could not be as efficiently em­
ployed in fisheries in this area as they could in agricultural pursuits. 
The fact that this relationship was partially the result of preferences 
enjoyed by some Philippine agricultural commodities in American mar­
kets means only that these preferences tended to raise the level of 
Philippine incomes above what would otherwise have been possible. 
That the Filipinos have been most anxious to postpone the termination 
of these preferences is additional proof of this fact. 
What the Filipinos have been most anxious to eliminate has been 
the other side of the free trade coin-the exemption from tariffs enjoyed 
by United States exports to the Philippines. It might be said that what 
was wanted was the right of every sovereign nation to establish tariff 
barriers to divert resources into less economic uses. This has for so 
many years been cited by Filipinos as a panacea for all their problems, 
that the Philippines is today one of the most protectionist minded 
countries in Asia. 
The Filipino leaders are intent upon effecting a change in the eco-
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nomic pattern of the country. They are dissatisfied with dependence 
upon the traditional exports, sugar, copra, and abaca and the commodi­
ties that have gained greatly in importance in the postwar period, 
minerals and logs and lumber. They hope to develop new industries 
in the Philippines that will either replace imports or provide new ex­
ports. They have chosen to use the weapons of protection and subsidy 
to hasten the realization of these dreams. 
The failure of the Philippine economy to achieve a firm footing in 
the postwar period led the Philippine leaders to begin to press for a 
revision of the Bell Trade Act in 1952, two years before the scheduled 
termination of the free trade period. What was desired was the right 
to introduce a greater degree of protection against American goods 
together with prolongation of the free access of Philippine exports to 
the American market. New negotiations were held which resulted in 
the Revised Trade Agreement, adopted in 1955. 
This agreement now governs Philippine-American trade relation­
ships. It provided substantial concessions to the Philippines in stepping 
up the rate at which American goods would become subject to Philip­
pine tariff duties and slowing down the application of United States 
duties to Philippine products. From the beginning of 1956 until the 
end of 1958 the Philippines were entitled to impose a duty on United 
States imports equal to 25 per cent of the duty applicable to imports 
from other countries. Beginning in 1959 this will rise to 50 per cent, 
in 1962 to 75 per cent, in 1965 to 90 per cent, and after January 1, 
1974 the full Philippine tariff will apply to American goods. The era 
of preferences will have been terminated. 
The progression in the percentage of United States duties ap­
plicable to Philippine goods is much more gradual. Through 1958 
5 per cent of the full duty was chargeable and from 1959 only 10 
per cent will be chargeable. In 1965, when the Philippines will be 
levying 90 per cent of the full duty against United States goods, this 
country will be imposing only 40 per cent of our full duty on imports 
from the Philippines. However, this rises to 60 per cent in 1968, 80 
per cent in 1971 and 100 per cent in 1974. 
The Revised Trade Agreement also provided for the elimination 
of the 17 per cent tax on foreign exchange adopted in 1950. The latter 
was replaced by a 25 per cent import tax which applied to imports 
from the United States as well as other countries. It was provided 
that this tax would be reduced by 10 per cent annually as revenues 
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from duties charged on imports from the United States rose. The rate 
of the import tax now stands at 13.6 per cent and it will be eliminated 
by 1966. 
American exporters still enjoy a substantial preference in the 
Philippine market, but it is going to disappear at a fairly rapid rate. 
Since the shipping cost for a ton of general cargo from an East Coast 
port to Manila is about four times the rate from Yokohama, Japan, 
the tariff preference will not in many cases offset the higher shipping 
cost, even now. The fact that the Philippines last year adopted new 
legislation imposing higher duties means that the margin enjoyed by 
American goods is somewhat greater than formerly, but our future 
trade will depend very largely upon the effort that American business­
men are willing to make to retain a major share of the Philippine market. 
They will start with certain advantages-Philippine familiarity 
with American goods, brands and specifications being perhaps the most 
important of these. However, this alone will not save the market. Ag­
gressive salesmanship and strong price competition can be expected 
from other countries, including Japan, Hong Kong and European lands. 
The appeal of Japanese goods has already been demonstrated by the 
fact that Japan's share of the Philippine market has risen from 6 per 
cent in 1954 to 12 per cent in the first nine months of 1957, despite 
the handicaps imposed by the preferential treatment accorded American 
goods and Philippine reluctance to permit Japanese businessmen into 
the country. 
It is very doubtful that the United States can long continue to 
supply as high a percentage of Philippine imports as was the case in 
the past. Indeed the percentage has already begun to slip, falling from 
68 per cent in 1954 to 55.5 per cent in the first nine months of 1957. 
However, the Philippines is a country with great potential for growth, 
and the coming decades may well see a considerable expansion of total 
imports as well as a switch in the pattern of trade. It is quite possible 
that in the long run while the percentage share of the United States in 
the Philippine market declines, the total volume of our exports will 
rise. 
Whether this happens will depend in part upon the attitude of 
American businessmen toward working and investing in this area. This 
in turn will depend in large part upon the economic policies of the 
Philippine government. The climate in the Philippines has never been 
as attractive to foreign investors as might be desired. Even when the 
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islands were an American possession without any problems of stability 
or exchange control, the Philippines were not looked upon as a par­
ticularly good field for investment in spite of the undoubted natural 
wealth to be found there. American capital, for example, found em­
ployment on a much larger scale in areas as similar to the Philippines 
as Cuba and Hawaii. 
Total American investment in the Philippines in 1940 was esti­
mated at $258.6 million, 60 per cent of total foreign investment in 
the Philippines. This represented only 1 per cent of the total foreign 
investment of the United States. 5 The main obstacles to greater capital 
inflow appear to have been restrictive land laws and uncertainties cre­
ated by the independence movement. The attitude of the "Philippines 
for the Filipinos" had been nurtured by years of nationalist agitation, 
and this was not calculated to breed optimism in the minds of potential 
investors about the treatment they were likely to be accorded if and 
when independence was achieved. 
The Philippines will constitute an expanding market for American 
goods only if the natural wealth can be efficiently exploited and the 
productivity of the people increased. What is required for this is an 
adequate supply of new capital combined with vision and enterprise. 
Unfortunately, the climate for private foreign investment in the Philip­
pines has deteriorated in the postwar period. Far from attracting the 
large amounts of new capital required, the policies adopted have actu­
ally repelled foreign investment and have even led many residents of 
the country to attempt to get funds out of the Philippines and invest 
them elsewhere. The policies that have created this unfortunate situ­
ation are in part traceable to the nationalistic distrust of foreign capital 
that has its roots in the long campaign for independence. This accounts 
for the fact that the Philippine constitution restricts the development 
of certain natural resources and public utilities to corporations having 
60 per cent Filipino ownership. Americans are guaranteed the same 
rights as Philippine citizens by the "parity provision" of the constitu­
tion until 1974, but this was forced upon the Philippines through the 
Bell Trade Agreement. Discrimination against alien capital is quite 
obviously widely accepted as sound policy in the Philippines even 
though it cannot at present be practiced against United States capital. 
5 Report of the Technical Committee to the President of the Philippines, op. cit. 
p. 229.
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As long as a basic hostility to foreign capital exists, investors will tend 
to be repelled rather than attracted. 
In addition to this, the climate for foreign investment in the post­
war period has been worsened by uncertainties about the future of the 
currency and the administration of foreign exchange controls. Exchange 
controls have been used as a protective device to encourage manu­
facturers to undertake production in the Philippines, and as a result, 
a substantial amount of private capital, some of it foreign, has been 
invested in assorted manufacturing enterprises in the Philippines in 
recent years. Though highly profitable, few of these enterprises have 
developed any export potential or the ability to survive without sub­
sidies and protection. On the other hand, it would be impossible to 
measure the amount of investment that has been discouraged by the 
existence of controls, but it is no doubt substantial. 
The Philippine use of exchange controls presents difficulties for 
the businessman, whether he be trader or manufacturer. The admin­
istration of the controls tends to be capricious. A plant that may have 
been warmly welcomed one year may find itself in difficulty a few years 
later because it hasn't qualified for an allocation to import replacement 
parts or even adequate supplies of raw materials. Balance-of-payments 
crises are recurring affairs in the Philippines and have necessitated 
frequent changes in allocations for imports. The most recent switch 
came in December 1957, when very severe import cutbacks were an­
nounced as a means of meeting the foreign exchange crisis. Some re­
laxation has since taken place, mainly because of the outraged protests 
of the business community. 
The foreign investor is subject to the additional hazard of having 
his right to remit profits curtailed and having his capital frozen. These 
uncertainties have tended to make the Philippines unattractive to for­
eign investors in spite of the advantage offered of a stable and friendly 
government and a labor force of good quality. However, American 
businessmen who know the country well believe that it has rich po­
tentialities. The Philippines should be capable of sound manufacturing 
development as well as considerable improvement and expansion in 
agriculture, fisheries and the extractive industries. The labor supply 
is good. The Filipino worker is intelligent and reasonably industrious. 
Although there appears to be surplus labor, wages computed at the 
present exchange rate are out of line with other Far Eastern countries 
and are held up by a minimum wage law. Adjustments which would 
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bring both Philippine prices and wages into line with those of other 
countries would provide a far sounder foundation for the development 
of new industries and the exploitation of resources than the existing 
network of government controls. 
The immediate outlook is not bright. In its efforts to spur rapid 
development the government has pursued unsound financial policies 
in recent years. Last year, foreign exchange payments for imports and 
services greatly exceeded current earnings, with the result that foreign 
exchange reserves were seriously depleted. Some efforts have been 
made to curb imports, but the government appears to be less than fully 
aware of the types of measures that are required to put the economy 
on a sound footing. An appeal for large scale United States aid is likely, 
but this, if granted, would probably delay the adoption of the required 
measures, and would therefore only postpone the day of reckoning. 
On the positive side it must be noted that Philippine export earn­
ings have held up well. It is one of the few countries in Asia that has 
managed to increase exports since 1952, the others being Japan, Ceylon, 
Malaya and Singapore. The elimination of duty-free entry into the 
United States market does not pose as great a problem for the future 
of Philippine exports as might be imagined. In the first place the Philip­
pines is already much less dependent upon the United States market 
than was the case prior to the war. In 1956, only 54 per cent of her 
exports were sold to us as compared with 83 per cent in 1938. In the 
second place, about 36 per cent of Philippine exports to this country 
are on the free list and will be in no way affected by the gradual ap­
plication of tariffs provided for under the Revised Trade Agreement. 
Finally, sugar, which constitutes about 40 per cent of the value of 
Philippine exports to this country, should be able to retain its share 
of the market even when subject to the tariff. When it is considered 
that the Philippines is physically well suited to the production of sugar, 
that sugar workers there are paid only 15 per cent of the wages of 
sugar workers in Hawaii, and that shipping charges from the Philippines 
to the East Coast are actually lower than the rates applicable to sugar 
growers in Hawaii who are compelled to use American bottoms, it is 
not conceivable that the Philippines could be priced out of the United 
States market by the imposition of a half cent a pound duty. 
Other countries have demonstrated that ambition to develop eco­
nomically at too fast a rate and perhaps in directions that are not en­
tirely sound, can endanger not only economic progress but the living 
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standards already attained. Whether or not the Philippines will pursue 
this course or switch to a policy that will stress a sustainable rate of 
growth and place more reliance on foreign capital and know-how can­
not now be foreseen. However, the expression of interest in this area 
on the part of American capital could be influential in steering the 
country toward the latter course. American business can do much in 
bringing to the people of this area an awareness of what American 
capital might mean to them, as well as an understanding of the condi­
tions that will have to be created to attract foreign capital in signifi­
cant amounts. 
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INDONESIA IS RICH in natural resource endowments but poor in terms 
of national product per capita. Human and natural resources are used 
ineffectively because Indonesia's capacity to introduce improved tech­
nology has been retarded by low rates of domestic capital formation. 
The volume of international trade per capita is relatively small; its 
growth has tended to follow inflows of foreign capital for developing 
sources of raw material supply for industrial countries. Low rates of 
domestic saving and capital formation have restricted the growth of 
exports supplied by domestically owned firms. Similarly, aggregate 
demand has been small and relatively stagnant so that Indonesian mar­
kets have not offered large and profitable outlets for foreign products. 
Indonesia's abundant but virtually untapped reserves of natural 
resources, her large population arid the existence of uninhabited fron­
tier areas present favorable prospects for rapid economic growth. These 
conditions also indicate latent capacity for a rising volume of inter­
national trade, if the present barriers to economic growth can be over­
come. As a major supplier of industrial products and an important 
market for raw materials, the United States would be likely to share 
a large part of growing Indonesian foreign trade. 
At the present stage of her economic development, Indonesia is 
not an important trading partner from the point of view of the United 
States. Indonesian demand for American products has fluctuated great­
ly, and less than 1 per cent of American exports have gone to Indonesia 
in recent years. Generally speaking, Indonesia is not even an important 
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supplier of primary products for the American market. The important 
exceptions are tin and crude natural rubber; about one-fourth of United 
States' imports of these strategic raw materials comes from Indonesia. 
Only a small part of United States' import needs for petroleum­
Indonesia's most important export-are supplied by Indonesia. Alter­
native sources of supply of tin, natural rubber and other United States' 
imports are available; Indonesian trade is not a matter of critical im­
portance for the American economy or national security. 
The reverse is not true, however. The United States is Indonesia's 
most important trading partner. In 1956, the United States was Indo­
nesia's second customer, absorbing about 16 per cent of Indonesian 
exports ( by value). Netherlands ranked first with 19 per cent while 
Japan was third with 9 per cent. As a source of supply for Indonesian 
imports the United States was first in 1956, providing about 16 per 
cent of the total, followed by Japan (15 per cent) and the Netherlands 
( 10 per cent). These facts support the view that the United States 
would very likely become an important beneficiary should Indonesia 
expand her share of Free World trade. 
Gunnar Myrdal has argued with considerable force that expan­
sion of profitable trade relations between developed and underdevel­
oped countries requires greater economic integration.1 The concept of 
integration as a prior condition to improvement of trade includes two 
important facets: ( 1) national integration as opposed to national disin­
tegration, and ( 2) international integration as opposed to international 
disintegration. Myrdal perceives an implicit danger in this approach, 
however, noting that we cannot assume that greater national integra­
tion among trading partners will necessarily promote a more vigorous 
and gainful pattern of trade. The two may conflict, and Myrdal ob­
serves that processes of national integration in both developed and 
underdeveloped countries have, by and large, hampered rather than 
promoted international integration since the end of World War I. 
Myrdal's provocative analysis provides a useful framework for 
studying the underlying factors which are apt to determine the future 
of trade between a developed country-the United States-and an un­
developed country-Indonesia. Despite the author's misgivings about 
venturing into a discussion of essentially noneconomic problems, such 
an approach appears to be the only realistic basis for analyzing Ameri-
1 Gunnar Myrdal, An International Economy: (New York: 1957). 
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can prospects for trade with Indonesia. Extrapolations from records 
of past trade are apt to be misleading unless the more basic determi­
nants of trade are explored. In Indonesia, the processes toward national 
integration and disintegration now underway dominate political and 
economic performance. More important, the results which emerge from 
the interplay of these forces may well reshape the contours of Indonesian 
trade from their historical (colonial) pattern into something quite dif­
ferent. While it is clearly too early to reach final conclusions about 
the implications of post-independence instability for Indonesian eco­
nomic development and trade, analysis of the underlying forces toward 
integration or disintegration is the only key to gaining even partial 
insight into a situation which is hopelessly complex when superficially 
viewed. 
Myrdal defines integration in terms of equality of opportunity. 
Some of the conditions for progress toward this goal, in My�dal's words, 
are: 
The emergence of a community with ever freer social mobility, 
based on a fuller realization of the norms of equality and liberty. 
In this community there must be a growing social cohesion and 
practical solid�rity. The members must increasingly come to feel 
that they belong together and have common interests and responsi­
bilities, and they must acquire a willingness to. obey rules that 
apply to the entire community and to share in the cost of common 
expenditures decided upon by political process. This political 
process must assure an ever wider participation on the part of 
all citizens. 2 
Our analysis proceeds on the assumption that future trade rela­
tions between the United States and Indonesia depend more on Indo­
nesian progress toward economic integration and the character of such 
integration than upon similar changes in the United States. It is pos­
sible that this assumption contains an element of ethnocentric orienta­
tion; it may even be a defense against subjecting one's own culture to 
the cold and uncomfortable knife of objective analysis. On the other 
hand, the assumption that the dynamics of Indonesian society will 
have greater weight seems to be supported by at least common sense 
2 Ibid., p. 11. 
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observation. Since Indonesian independence, the volume and composi­
tion of American-Indonesian trade have, in fact, been determined large­
ly by Indonesia's capacity to export and cyclical fluctuations in world 
demand for Indonesia's exports. Since Indonesia's capacity to export 
has remained relatively constant, Indonesia's total export earnings have 
risen or fallen mainly in response to fluctuations in the prices received 
for basic exports such as rubber, tin and copra. Similarly, Indonesia's 
imports from the United States have shown a strong response to the 
amount of foreign exchange made available to Indonesian importers. 
When high world prices for primary products have made more foreign 
exchange available, or when the government has allowed an expansion 
of imports by reducing foreign exchange reserves, the percentage of 
total imports obtained from the United States has risen. When less 
foreign exchange has been available for importing, the percentage spent 
in the United States has fallen. 3 In technical terms, Indonesian de­
mand for American exports has shown a high elasticity to availability 
of foreign exchange for import purposes. This is particularly significant 
in view of the fact that Indonesia has not had a dollar shortage prob­
lem. Rather, reduction in supplies of foreign exchange for import has 
tended to induce a shift of demand from American to lower price mar­
kets, even though this usually implied quality deterioration. This sug­
gests that the growth of Indonesian demand for United States products 
is singularly dependent upon Indonesia's obtaining a rising volume of 
foreign exchange earnings, not offset by deteriorating terms of trade. 
Indonesia's leadership has not yet squarely faced the problems of 
expanding the volume and diversifying the structure of exports which 
was inherited from colonialism. A broad attack upon these problems 
stands high on the reform agenda of the same Indonesian leaders who 
fought and won the Revolution. When action is ultimately taken on 
these problems it will be significant only if export diversification becomes 
an adjunct to a comprehensive development program. The adoption and 
prosecution of such a program, however, awaits progress on the more 
basic issue of Indonesian economic integration. We reach the conclu­
sion, therefore, that Indonesia's trade with the United States-in fact 
with Western developed countries as a whole-will tend to follow tra­
ditional patterns until Indonesian integration produces basic decisions 
3 cf,, Statistics on the geographical pattern of Indonesian trade presented in The 
Report of the Bank Indonesia, 1953-54, pp. 88-89 and ibid., 1956-57, pp. 
118-19.
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on the nature of the society to be molded from the fragments bestowed 
upon Indonesia's leadership by a colonial heritage. In the process of 
conquering the forces of disintegration set in motion by the withdrawal 
of colonial power, Indonesia's economic relations with the outside 
world may be in a constant state of flux. We must be cautious, there­
fore, not to generalize or predict from what are essentially transitory 
phenomena. Deflection of domestic energies in solving the fundamental 
problem of integration may well tend to reduce the volume of Indonesian 
trade with all countries (with the possible exception of those which 
seek to exploit local instability by encouraging purely political trade). 
Indonesia's foreign trade during the first seven years of independ­
ence (1950-1956) reflects the essentially stagnant nature of Indonesian 
political and economic life prior to the appearance of events (begin­
ning in 1956) which culminated in civil war and subsequent economic 
chaos. Following the transfer of sovereignty in the last week of 1949, 
Indonesia entered upon a period of rehabilitating her economy after 
almost a decade of political turmoil. The economic goals of the new 
Republic, however, have been expressed predominantly in terms of 
policies to destroy the vestiges of the colonial economy by "lndonesiani­
zation" of the existing productive apparatus rather than by economic 
development which could not fail to displace the economic hold of 
colonialism and its supporting groups. The economy has felt a series 
of abrupt shocks as a result of these Nationalistic policies, but we cannot 
observe progress toward effective economic development. The most 
that can be said is that while the economy may have become somewhat 
rriore Indonesian in name, its basic structure has not become less co­
lonial. In terms of the economy's performance, the evidence attests 
only to rehabilitation. Agricultural output was intermittently expanded, 
but Indonesia has not reached self-sufficiency in food. National income 
has grown fitfully, but when put into per capita terms, production for 
domestic use and exports have failed to raise the. standard of living 
above prewar levels. Statistics on the economy's net investment rate 
suggest that capital formation was scarcely adequate to maintain output 
per capita between 1951 and 1955 and that the rate of net investment 
has fallen since 1953.4 
4 cf., Douglas S. Paauw, "Savings, Investment and Inflation during the Pre-plan 
Period (1951-1956)" (Mimeographed, to be published as Chapter 3 in a 
study on Financing Economic Development in Indonesia). pp. 5-6. 
190 American Trade with Asia and the Far East
Similarly, the structure of Indonesian exports shows no evidence 
of domestic economic development. With the exception of sugar, an 
important prewar export that has virtually disappeared from the export 
account in the postwar period, the variety of Indonesia's exports has 
changed little since 19 3 8. Rubber, oil, tin and copra continue to be 
the major export products, but changes in their relative contributions 
reveal more narrow export specialization in a few primary products. 
In 1939, these four exports produced 57 per cent of total foreign ex­
change earnings. By 1956, their contribution had grown to 77 per cent, 
with rubber alone representing 40 per cent. 5 This is perhaps the most 
basic evidence of the society's failure to exhibit economic progress so 
far as its trade with the outside world is concerned. Indonesia has con­
tinued to produce primary products for export, and her specialization 
in a few, largely unprocessed, goods has increased rather than dim­
inished. 
Stagnation in Indonesia's export industries-or mere rehabilitation 
as opposed to structural change-is also apparent from the behavior of 
the physical volume of exports. To get useful data on this variable, 
petroleum exports have been eliminated since changes in exports of 
these products have, in Indonesia's case, little to do with domestic eco­
nomic development. Moreover, disposal of foreign exchange proceeds 
from petroleum exports have been subject to special arrangements with 
the petroleum companies. With this omission, we reach the conclusion 
that the Indonesian economy has failed to expand the physical volume 
of exports since independence. Excluding petroleum, exports are still 
well below the volume generated by the colonial economy just prior to 
World War II. The postwar high was recorded in the export boom 
year, 1951. Data on export volume, compared to the base year, 1939, 
are presented in Table I. 
Although the failure of the Indonesian economy to increase its vol­
ume of exports, and to diversify their composition can be attributed 
to the continuation of domestic economic stagnation, somewhat closer 
scrutiny of specific problems may be helpful. Indonesian literature 
suggests that the Indonesian leadership is both aware of and concerned 
about stagnation in the export industries. This literature emphasizes 
two basic problems: ( 1) failure of Indonesian exports to compete quali­
tatively with exports from other primary producing countries, and ( 2) 
5 Report of the Bank lndonesia, 1956-57, pp. 116-17. 
191 
1938 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
TABLE I 
Volume of Indonesian Exports, 1938 and 1950-57* 
Thousand tons 
4927 
2420 
3009 
2421 
2594 
2857 
2716 
2508 
2315 
Index number 
(1938=100) 
100 
50 
62 
50 
53 
57 
55 
51 
47 
* Excluding petroleum and petroleum products; Source: Reports of the Bank
Indonesia. (Published annually.) The index of crude petroleum products
is: 1938: 100; 1950: 87; 1951: 101; 1952: 115; 1953: 138; 1954: 146;
1955: 159; 1956: 165.
inability of export producers to maintain relative profits positions by 
offsetting rising labor costs by technological improvements. 
In part these immediate problems in the export industries are related 
aspects of an unfortunate Indonesian attitude toward foreign enterprise. 
As a strong, go_vernment-supported labor movement has demanded and 
obtained rising wages and greater fringe benefits from foreign planta­
tion and mining enterprises, some modern export industries have found 
profits so jeopardized that they have been forced to curtail their opera­
tions. Uncertainty about the future status of foreign enterprise in In­
donesia has also deterred cost-reducing improvements and expansion­
ary capital investment in these enterprises. Some of the slack has been 
taken up by a shift from estate production to smallholders' exports. 
The latter are generally inferior in quality and hence command lower 
foreign prices. This is precisely what has happened, for example, in 
the rubber export industry. In 1938, estate exports of rubber were 
slightly greater than small-holders' exports; throughout the period since 
independence, on the other hand, the volume of smallholders' exports 
of rubber has been almost double that of estates. Natural rubber has 
also encountered increasingly stiff competition from synthetics; the 
same observation could be generalized to explain the failure of other 
traditional exports to reach their prewar volume-fibers and coal may 
be cited as additional examples. In other cases, exports have failed 
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to reach prewar volumes because independence and subsequent popu­
lation growth have resulted in greater domestic consumption. This is 
true for sugar, which ranked fourth as a producer of foreign exchange 
in 1938, and for such traditional colonial exports as tobacco, spices, 
tapioca, tea and palm oil. 
This cursory survey does not exhaust the causes of stagnation in 
Indonesia's export industries which have, with the exception of petro­
leum, failed to attract foreign investment since colonial times. It does 
suggest, however, that Indonesia will probably not be able to signifi­
cantly expand her share of the world market until greater diversifica­
tion of export products is achieved and the growth of exports is de­
liberately encouraged in a general development effort. Here a caveat 
should be added. Successful diversification will involve substitution of 
processed goods for primary products, and, in addition, the develop­
ment of new export industries to replace those exports for which world 
demand is secularly falling or stagnant, e.g., natural rubber. Neither 
objective can be accomplished without accelerating capital formation, 
accompanied by the introduction of improved technology and increased 
supplies of human skills. This is tantamount to arguing that expansion 
of Indonesian foreign trade, with accompanying social gains, cannot 
be attained without a broad attack upon the problem of economic 
stagnation. 
This conclusion brings us back to the nub of our argument. Ab­
stracting from the many particular problems that have plagued In­
donesia's foreign trade, Indonesian prospects for obtaining a greater 
share of world markets-and increased trade with the United States­
will be determined by the degree of integration attained by Indonesian 
society and the purposes for which the resulting energies are har­
nessed. Prognostication on these basic issues, however, requires con­
sideration of the noneconomic parameters that lie behind economic 
change. 
It seems fair to assert that Indonesia's leadership has consistently 
sought an easy formula to encourage superficial national integration 
without resolving the basic problems obstructing Indonesian unity. The 
clear mandate desired from the first national election in 1955 as an 
escape from prolonged parliamentary temporization, initiation of a 
sanguine but almost painless Five-Year Plan in 1956 and the forced 
break with the Dutch over the West Irian issue can be best understood 
in this light. The national elections, however, served only to heighten 
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the society's political polarization and brought even greater political 
indecision than before. The announcement of the Five-Year Plan, 
without the capacity to bring it into effect, did little to rally national 
support around a central social goal. The last-ditch effort to divert 
internal controversy to an external issue by dramatizing the West lrian 
dispute, and the subsequent eviction of the Dutch, failed to halt the 
political fragmentation of the Republic. Meanwhile, Indonesia's lead­
ership has avoided coming to grips with the problems that have con­
sistently impeded progress toward the society's integration. The cen­
tral government's reluctance to face the issue of its relationship with 
the provinces demanding autonomy, as provided by Indonesia's con­
stitution, is a case in point. 
Indonesian integration and the formulation of prime social goals 
were temporarily hastened by the nationalistic fervor which accom­
panied the struggle for independence. The Indonesian elite emerged 
from this long struggle with a vision of a society to be built in con­
formance with traditional, almost intuitive Indonesian conceptions of 
democracy6 With the coming of independence, there was a rather wide 
measure of agreement among Indonesian leaders about the kind of so­
cial and economic integration they envisioned for the future. Apart 
from extremists of the right and left, Indonesian leadership acquiesced 
in accepting the- short-run prospect of a mixed economy organized along 
socialist, cooperative and capitalist lines. This sup�rficial unanimity 
postponed to the future settlement of the basic shape of the society's 
economic organization. The capitalist sector, virtually synonymous 
with foreign enterprise, was regarded as a necessary but temporary 
evil. 1 The cooperative sector was viewed as the main avenue through 
which traditional Indonesian society could partake of the fruits of in­
dependence in the immediate short-run, and dramatic growth of this 
sector was anticipated. In the longer-run, virtually all of Indonesia's 
leadership hoped to erect a more genuinely socialistic economy, al­
though the rate at which socialization should proceed came to be a 
moot political issue differentiating party groupings. 
Economic development came to be accepted among Indonesia's 
6 As formulated by Sukarno, for example, in terms of pantja si/a and gotongro­
jong. For details of the pantja sila see George Mc. T. Kahin, Nationalism 
and Revolution in Indonesia, (Ithaca: 1952), pp. 122-23. 
7 Kahin, op. cit., p. 476. 
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political elite as a major social goal.8 To some, eventual realization 
of economic development represented the second stage of the revolu­
tion. To many others, social and economic progress were construed to 
be almost automatic consequences of political independence.9 This 
superficial acceptation of economic development, it might be noted, 
led to the adoption of economic policies which have tended to confuse 
economic progress with redistribution of income and ownership. "Ben­
teng" policies and "lndonesianization" programs have proved to be dis­
appointing in promoting general economic improvement, and these 
failures help to explain why economic development goals have not 
cemented Indonesian integration. "Often," observed Sjahrir, "we hear 
the people's complaints that independence had not brought what they 
hoped for - improvement and progress in all fields of life. Many peo­
ple also say that the freedom we achieved until now has brought im­
provement and progress for a small segment of our community - the 
politicians and educated people who now occupy places which were 
formerly the monopoly of the colonialists - while for others the situ­
ation has grown worse."10 
This view leads to the suspicion that the leadership's early diagno­
sis of Indonesia's problem of economic development may have been 
a shade too superficial to serve as a basis for a program promoting 
national integration. Stripped of its usual emotional embellishment, 
the Indonesian elite's analysis of the causes of economic stagnation may 
be summarized in a few propositions. Indonesia's long history as a 
colony is given central importance. The heritage of an underdeveloped 
economy with positions of economic power awarded to the Dutch and 
their supporting minorities was construed to be the result of conscious 
imperial design intended to further the end of colonial exploitation. 
Undesirable export specialization in primary products, worsening terms 
of trade, unequal distribution of income and heavy profit remittances 
8 This conclusion emerges from a statement of findings by Mr. John Rodriguez 
who interviewed many political leaders about Indonesia's social goals. Of 
all the objectives mentioned, Mr. Rodriguez reports that concensus about 
the importance of economic development was greatest. 
9 For example, Sujono Hadinoto, former Minister of Trade and Industry (1951), 
observed that "national freedom is the gateway to prosperity. The social 
structure and the way of life we seek can only be realized after the achieve­
ment of independence." Quoted in Kahin, op. cit., p. 323. 
10 Sutan Sjahrir, and others, Symposion Tentang Kesulitan-Kesulitan Zamen­
Peralihan Sekarang, (Symposium on the Difficulties of the Present Transi­
tion Period), (Djakarta: 1953), p. 13. 
195 
to the mother country all were consequences of the past victimiza-
tion of a colonial economy by a metropolitan ruler .11 
In adopting this diagnosis of Indonesia's economic backwardness, 
the elite was already formulating its agenda for economic reform. It 
was believed that political sovereignty would provide the power to 
break the grasp of the Dutch and the favored minority groups upon 
the Indonesian economy. The policies through which Indonesian en­
terprise should be encouraged to replace non-Indonesian control, how­
ever, began to force a split among the small Indonesian elite where 
relative agreement had existed at the more abstract level. One group 
urged that the society's economic goals could be best realized through 
economic and social development along Western lines. Through the 
efforts of Western-trained intellectuals, such as Dr. Sumitro, a begin­
ning was made toward realizing this objective early in Indonesian in­
dependence. An "Urgency Industrialization Program" was adopted as 
a first step to alter the warped, colonial structure of the economy. 
Opposition to this sound but unduly optimistic approach culminated in 
the espousal of a fundamentally different approach during the tenure 
of the first Ali Sastroamodjojo cabinet (1953-1955). Spearheaded by 
Minister of Economic Affairs Iskaq, this group sought to displace 
foreign and minority dominance in economic activity by weighting 
political and economic advantages in favor of Indonesian entrepreneurs. 
Unfortunately, this approach tended to aggravate frictions between Java 
and the Outer Islands. By and large, Javanese entrepreneurs have been 
the beneficiaries of government largesse, and development of the Outer 
Islands has been overlooked in the heat of the struggle to strangle 
foreign enterprise (particularly Chinese and Dutch trading positions) 
on Java. Whatever else the "Indonesianization" programs have done, 
it seems clear that they have failed to promote the integration of Indo­
nesian society. 
During the years of independence which led up to the recent crisis, 
the dichotomy in the leadership's views about economic development 
became increasingly pronounced. By 1956, one Western observer, 
Benjamin Higgins, distinguished two major groups among "politically 
active and articulate Indonesians." One group was described as "eco­
nomics-minded," 
11 This analysis can be seen, for example, in Sujono Hadinoto, Ekonomi Indo­
nesia Dari Ekonomi Kolonia/ Ke Ekonomi Nasional, (Djakarta: 1949). 
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led by relatively young ( sometimes foreign-trained) intellectuals 
who attach high priority to economic and social development of 
the country, who feel that this development must follow Western 
lines in large measure, and who are willing to cooperate with the 
West, at least to the extent of seeking Western technical and 
capital assistance from the West, in order to achieve this goal. 
The second group was described as "history-minded," 
a mixture of Communists and of a larger number who are nation­
alist, conservative (in Western terms), and isolationist. Its leaders 
attach highest priority to 'completion of the revolution' in the 
sense of eliminating the control over Indonesian national life 
exerted by foreigners through economic activity. While favoring 
economic and social development, they attach great importance 
to the retention of the national culture, language and religion and 
to abolishing the remnants of foreign influence. The attitudes of this 
group spring in large measure from the country's long history of 
resistance to foreign invaders, culminating in the postwar revo­
lution.12 
At the time of Higgins' writing, he also noted a second cross-party 
split: "the Outer Islands against the Center." Higgins' analysis of 
these basic differences in the orientation of Indonesia's leaders appears 
to have been remarkably perceptive. From our point of view, emphasis 
upon growing polarization of the political elite is helpful in shedding 
light on what might superficially appear to be puzzling temporization 
on the central issues of economic development and the devolution of 
political power from the center to localities. In 1956, Indonesia an­
nounced its first Five-Year Plan for the development of the economy, 
and details of the nature and scope of the Plan were subsequently 
published. Later events suggest, however, that Indonesian society was 
not sufficiently integrated to enable the government to launch the Plan; 
policies inimical to the success of the Plan continued to dominate the 
political scene. Throughout 19 5 7, Indonesian political leadership 
wrangled over the adoption of President Sukarno's proposals for 
12 "Indonesia's Development Plans and Problems," Pacific Affairs, XXIX, (1956),
19. 
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"guided democracy" which some Indonesian leaders believed would 
seriously impair representative government in Indonesia.13 This con­
flict widened the rift between the two leadership groups and broadened 
the areas of disagreement to include a choice between pro-Communism 
and anti-Communism, a choice which Indonesia had previously sought 
to avoid by pursuit of an "independently active" foreign policy. The 
dispute over "guided democracy" also tended to promote coalescence 
between the two sets of issues which had previously been relatively 
unrelated: centralism versus regional autonomy and economic devel­
opment versus "Indonesianization." The pro-Western, development 
minded group began to join forces with the leaders who sought greater 
regional autonomy while the supporters of "Indonesianization" of the 
economy have tended to endorse centralization of political functions 
in Djakarta at the expense of local autonomy elsewhere. This polariza­
tion among Indonesian leadership was given considerable impetus by 
the withdrawal of Vice-President Hatta from the government in late 
1956. As a relatively pro-Western, moderate Sumatran, Hatta had 
undoubtedly restrained the Outer Island dissidents from directly chal­
lenging central authority so long as he was believed to be representing 
the viewpoint of this group in the Central government. Hatta's resigna­
tion was followed by declarations of partial autonomy in several areas 
of the Outer Islands·. Hatta's retirement from the active political arena 
found him as the leader of the opposition to Sukarno's proposals to 
circumscribe Indonesia's constitutional government.14 
The Indonesian army played a major role in bringing to a head 
the· conflicts implicit in the dichotomy of the political elite's basic so­
cial values. Significantly, much the same ideological cleavage has ex­
isted among the army's top officers since the "October 17, 1952 Af­
fair"; and a similar sharpening of issues has evolved during the past 
few years.15 The resentments of dissident army officers who have 
been highly critical of Central government policies-particularly on the 
matter of inclusion of Communists in the executive branch of the gov­
ernment-found a natural merger with local dissatisfactions in the 
Outer Islands. This merger led to the proclamation of autonomy from 
13 cf., Justus Van Der Kroef, "Guided Democracy in Indonesia," Far Eastern
Survey, XXVI, (1957), 113-24. 
14 /bid., p. 116. 
15 Justus Van Der Kroef, "Instability in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey, XXVI, 
(1957), p. 54. 
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Djakarta by military leaders in several outlying provinces and replacing 
central control with autonomous government by military junta. It is 
significant to note that the first autonomous junta, constituted in Central 
Sumatra on December 20, 1956, was reported to enjoy almost com­
plete support from local officials and the civilian population. 16 This
junta, known popularly as the Banteng Council, developed into the 
focus of resistance to the Central government. It became a rallying 
point for Indonesian leaders from many areas, including Java, who em­
braced ideological positions opposed to those apparently held by lead­
ers of the parties with the greatest national power. 
There are indications that the widening ideological cleavage 
among Indonesia's leaders and the ascendance of the history-minded 
group led to a course which placed prospects for economic develop­
ment-and even economic stability-in greater jeopardy. The Djuanda 
Cabinet was willing to countenance a wholesale eviction of Dutch 
civilians over the unrelated issue of the future status of West Irian. 
This step will inevitably increase the difficulty of the task of economic 
development; it may well place the capital requirements for a program 
adequate to break the cycle of economic stagnation beyond the reach 
of the Indonesian economy. The loss of Dutch entrepreneurs has re­
duced output, and foreign exchange earnings have fallen. These con­
sequences have produced greater economic and political instability, 
problems which have been the predominant national concern since 
1956. 
The widening rift between the two ideological camps has also 
bred indecision on major reforms which must be undertaken before the 
development Plan can be seriously begun. A foreign investment law, 
essential to insure at least moderate increases in the inflow of foreign 
capital to prosecute the plan, has been before the Indonsian Parlia­
ment for four years but favorable action has been obstructed by in­
volvement with issues which lie at the basis of Indonesian political am­
bivalence.17 Reform of Indonesia's tax structure, which must be used
as a major source of development finance-to say nothing of coping 
with inflation-has long been studied by Indonesian fiscal experts. De­
cision on this issue, however, concerns the problem of central-local 
relationships, and no cabinet, much less Parliament, has yet been able 
16 I bid., p. 52. 
17 Higgins, op. cit., p. 121. 
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to devise a means of escape uom this political cul-de-sac. Similarly, 
it has become politically impossible to plan for the participation of 
local communities in the national development plan pending some legal 
arrangements for inter-governmental fiscal relationships. Yet, in a 
country with Indonesia's historical background, this sector must clearly 
play a major role in the financing and prosecution of development 
projects - if a democratic model of development is to be successfully 
followed. 
While Indonesia's leadership has procrastinated in moving toward 
a solution of these fundamental problems obstructing national integra­
tion and economic development, efforts to build a "national economy" 
by replacing foreign entrepreneurs with Indonesians proceeded apace. 
Discriminatory and restrictive measures against Chinese and Dutch en­
terprises accompanied measures to encourage Indonesians to replace 
them. Liberal distribution of import licenses to Indonesians, free­
dom from restrictive government regulations, and outright provision 
of capital and credit were used to weight competitive advantages in 
favor of indigenous entrepreneurs. The "economics-minded" leader­
ship, viewing this trend with alarm, has been openly critical. Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara, the former Governor of the Bank Indonesia, and always 
an outspoken critic of bad government, declared: 
As a result of the substitution of foreign capitalists by Indonesian 
capitalists, enterprises which were formerly well run now deteri­
orate. . . . This transition is being stimulated by the government 
through the issuance of licenses and credits, which amounts to a 
large extent to so much squandering, even though it is admitted 
that of 100 beneficiaries . . . only 10 or 20 adequately utilize 
the chances offered them.18 
Former Vice-President Hatta has frequently deplored these na­
tionalistic excesses since benteng policies came to the fore five years 
ago. Last year (I 957), he charged that millions of rupiah of public 
funds were being wasted by businessmen in league with politicians, 
most of whom lack any commercial acumen.19 
It is impossible to conclude that the last few years' events have 
advanced Indonesian integration. Conditions in which to launch a pro­
gram for a take-off to sustained economic growth have not improved. 
18 As quoted in Van Der Kroef, "Instability in Indonesia," lac. cit., pp. 56-57. 
19 Ibid., p. 57. 
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In addition to the present political instability, the threat to short-run 
economic stability is greater than at any time since independence. The 
government deficit, which has consistently been a primary source of 
inflationary pressures, is greater than ever before about 8 per cent 
of national income. Prices are reported to have risen by 50 per cent 
during the past year-2° Foreign exchange and gold reserves have fallen 
to far below their legal minimum as Indonesia has lost foreign exchange 
at a more rapid rate than any other country during the past two years. 
As economic stability and civil strife have become the paramount prob­
lems, the current Five-Year Plan has been virtually abandoned. 
These events do not augur well for the growth of Western trade 
and investment in Indonesia. Without the persistent efforts of American 
petroleum companies to make a success of their Indonesian operations 
in spite of great difficulties, Indonesian trade with the West would 
already be smaller in volume than two decades ago. Until national 
integration is achieved, we may expect a continuation of this unfavor­
able trend. Even if integration is achieved, the question of whether 
development will follow lines consistent with international comparative 
advantages or autarchic patterns will remain. Expansion of Indonesian 
trade and investment relations with countries of the Free World will 
demand that Indonesia choose to develop in an atmosphere in which 
xenophobia and excessive nationalism are held in restraint. Indonesia's 
economic endowments provide the basis for considerable economic 
growth and vigorous and mutually profitable trade with the outside 
world. Whether or not this comes about, and when, depend on the 
success of Indonesia's leadership in providing social cohesion with a 
democratic basis, and proceeding with a sound development program. 
Some remarks, leading to prognostication on this fundamental 
question, seem to be called for by recent events which have occurred 
in Indonesia. The 1958 crisis appeared to draw the lines of ideological 
controversy so sharply that a dominant coalition of leadership groups, 
capable of wielding effective national power, may emerge. A number 
of Indonesia's most promising members of the "economics-minded" 
group joined the rebel government in Sumatra. This includes the for­
mer Governor of the Bank Indonesia, Sjafruddin; former Finance Min­
ister Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, who had long urged a responsible 
20 Greg McGregor, "Indonesia Sinks to Economic Low," New York Times, August
3, 1958. 
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approach to economic development; and Burhanuddin Harahap, a for­
mer Premier (1955-56), who during his brief tenure, initiated sweep­
ing political and economic reforms to reduce government corruption. 
Other political leaders representing the same position - Mohammed 
Natsir, a leader of the Masjumi party; former Vice-President Hatta; the 
Sultan of Djokjakarta (Hamengku Buwono) - while critical of the 
drift away from parliamentary government and excessive centralization 
of political functions, found their political influence temporarily 
eclipsed. The long-standing rift in the army's leadership also followed 
lines drawn by the civil war; the anti-Communist, development-minded 
group tied their fate to the Rebel government in Central Sumatra. 
This includes many who had long voiced their criticism of procrastina­
tion, corruption and anti-Westernism in Djakarta: Colonels Lubis, 
Simbolon, Husein, Sumual and Warouw. One of Indonesia's most 
brilliant and pro-Western army commanders, Colonel Kawilarang, was 
relieved of his command of West Java in 1957 and sent to Washington 
as a military attache. Kawilarang's reassignment was interpreted to be 
a move to avoid opposition to Sukarno's concept of guided democracy. 
In early 1958, Colonel Kawilarang left his post in Washington to sup­
port the cause of the Rebels. 
The fact that an important part of Indonesia's top leadership joined 
the group resisting the Central government by armed force, or sup­
ported the principle of their defiant opposition, seems to indicate that 
the crisis was something more than an expression of mere local dis­
satisfaction or a purely military shakeup. While the 1958 conflict may 
not have been the definitive struggle between the two ideological groups 
so clearly demarcated within Indonesia's political elite, the recent civil 
war can hardly fail to weaken prospects for economic growth, despite 
the apparent Central government victory. An important segment of 
Indonesia's development-minded leadership has been lost for purposes 
of National reconstruction. Yet such leadership appears to be the 
scarcest of key resources essential to the launching of a successful pro­
gram of economic development. 
Economic stabilization, as well as economic development, re­
quires the resurgence of an economics-minded group in positions of 
national leadership. The civil war of 1958 has brought the Indonesian 
economy to the brink of disaster. Government expenditures for mili­
tary purposes have continued to grow, while tax revenues have fallen. 
Deficit financing through the central bank has produced severe infla-
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tionary pressures; a combination of rising prices and lagging wage levels 
have reduced real income among wage earners by 35 per cent.21 For­
eign exchange reserves have fallen far below the minimum which In­
donesians themselves consider to be a safe buffer stock against short­
run fluctuations in export earnings. Indonesia's balance of payments 
position has been precarious for the past several years, but it is now 
so distorted that substantial external assistance is the only alternative 
to dangerous reductions in domestic consumption of foodstuffs and other 
necessities. While Indonesia was near self-sufficiency in rice supply a 
few years ago, maintenance of the present lower levels of per capita 
consumption will require the import of 700,000 tons of rice this year. 
A realistic analysis of the causes of Indonesia's unfortunate politi­
cal and economic situation should place considerable emphasis upon 
the liabilities with which Indonesia entered her new state of inde­
pendence in 1949. The terms of independence involved large annual 
foreign exchange obligations to the Netherlands. Indonesian nationals 
emerged from colonialization with little stake in the Westernized, capi­
tal-intensive sector of the economy. Indonesia's present leadership had 
virtually no experience in top government positions. The political and 
economic instability which the world has witnessed in Indonesia, there­
fore, are merely symptoms of a basic readjustment in Indonesian so­
ciety. They reflect the growing pains of a newly independent country 
without much capacity for short-run growth. 
There are encouraging signs that the domestic turmoil associated 
with civil war may lead to a new effort to achieve national integration 
through effective action on the home front and a foreign policy more 
cooperative with the West. In recent months Prime Minister Djuanada's 
government has made an effort to weed out from positions of power 
the individual leaders who have been most objectionable to the opposi­
tion groups.22 The Central government has also demonstrated a new 
willingness to make concessions to the Outer Islands' demands which 
led to revolt. A financial agreement between the Central and Regional 
governments has recently received Cabinet approval, and the Central 
government has announced a plan to allow localities to retain a part 
of the foreign exchange proceeds from regional exports. 23 If the way 
21 Ibid. 
22 Tillman Durdin, "Indonesia Facing Many Problems," New York Times, July
20, 1958, p. 6E. 
23 New York Times, July 30, 1958.
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to reconciliation of Central and Local government differences can be 
further opened, prospects for national integration will brighten. Dja­
karta officials have also appeared to place emphasis upon adopting a 
general program to restore economic stability through a sound approach 
to economic policy. 2• Finally, relations between Indonesia and the 
United States have improved during mid-1958 as a result of modera­
tion of official attitudes expressed by both countries. A veteran New 
York Times correspondent in Indonesia writes that: 
the (Indonesian) government hopes for new foreign credits and 
other economic aid, particularly from the United States ... Its 
foreign policy is still predicated on nonalignment with either the 
Communist bloc or the West, but the outlook is for more coopera­
tive relationships between Jakarta and the West than there has 
been.25 
The United States faces a new challenge in Indonesia. Substantial 
American economic assistance to promote the task of stabilizing the 
economy, and later for economic development, might well tend to alter 
the present uneasy balance of domestic forces toward integration and 
disintegration so thfit a greater measure of general social progress would 
be possible. If the United States accepts the challenge, prospects for a 
more vigorous and mutually beneficial pattern of trade between Indo­
nesia and the United States would tend to become progressively better. 
24 Greg McGregor, "Indonesia Sinks to Economic Low," loc. cit. 
25 Tillman Durdin, "Indonesia Facing Many Problems," loc. cit. 
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As REPRESENTATIVE of Thailand in the United States, I always 
welcome the opportunity of reviewing the possibilities of trade, invest­
ment and other activities in the field of business which already exist in 
Thailand or may offer themselves in the future to prospective American 
investors or business interests. 
Before I arrive directly at the core of the problem, however, let 
me briefly review· the conditions which now prevail in Thailand, so that 
their knowledge may help in the understanding of the whole situation. 
In the first place, calls for bids for the large amount of machinery 
and equipment we need in Thailand to implement our development 
projects have already been made by government departments in Thai­
land. Included is equipment needed for the construction of a large 
hydroelectric barrage for which the International Bank for Reconstruc­
tion and Development has loaned my country a sum of $66 million. 
Secondly, I feel compelled to put you on guard against the obses­
sion of huge markets represented by a multitude of hundreds of millions 
of people, who are pressing hard on the meager resources of their land, 
so that little if anything, is left for exchange with the outside world. 
My country may have a population of only 21 million, consequently 
it seems to offer only a small market to foreign business, but if we take 
into account the per capita income of our population, it will be realized 
that its purchasing power is proportionately larger than that of some 
of the big countries in the area. Thus it can be said that even though 
the population of Thailand is only one-eighteenth of another country 
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in the region, our national income amounts to as much as one-eighth 
of the income of the same country. Naturally, this income is modest 
compared with the economically advanced nations of Europe and Amer­
ica. That is why, if we try to give a comparative picture, we have to 
do it in relation with countries in the same area. 
But more importantly, the Southeast Asia region which includes 
Thailand contains resources on which the world depends. Besides food­
stuff and especially rice which Southeast Asia produces abundantly and 
exports to feed the deficit nations of Asia, this region holds an im­
portant place in the production of rubber, tin and other minerals such 
as tungsten, lead, zinc, copper, manganese, as well as petroleum prod­
ucts. By contrast, other regions of Asia seem to have a much less con­
siderable share in the supply to the world of international commodities. 
Consequently, their trade relations with the rest of the world cannot 
assume the same significance as in the case of Southeast Asia. 
Furthermore, although Southeast Asia and Thailand may not have 
such a huge resource in manpower as the other two big nations of Asia, 
China and India, our people are better educated; their literacy rate 
is the highest in the whole of the Asian continent. In consequence, 
they should be more apt to receive technological training and provide 
the skilled labor necessary for the operation of any industry. 
Finally, even though my country figures as recipient of foreign aid 
from the United States, the United Nations and other agencies such as 
the Colombo Plan, the amount of aid it has received is comparatively 
smaller than that given to other countries of similar size and popula­
tion. On the contrary, we have borne proudly our share of the cost of 
our development as may be seen by the loans amounting to some 110 
million dollars which have been granted us by the World Bank. In 
other words, we are also paying our way toward our development and 
do not depend exclusively on outside help. 
After giving the background information which, in my estimation, 
seems necessary for the understanding of the problem of trade and 
investment, let us now try to consider what elements are essential and 
perhaps indispensable for the normal development of trade and invest­
ment. In my opinion, there are at least three elements. They are: 
favorable political climate, adequate administrative policy and setup 
and, finally, human and material resources. 
When I come to these elements, it is obvious that I can speak for 
my country and my country alone. 
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With regard to the first element, those who are familiar with my 
country for having lived there either in official or private capacity 
know for certain that Thailand has been and always wants to be 
friendly with the United States and the West in general. Whatever 
internal changes may take place, this basic and fundamental policy of 
the Thai nation will not be affected, unless, of course, the United States 
or the West modifies its policy. At present, many treaties and agree­
ments bind our two countries, the most important of which, for our 
present purpose, is the agreement whereby investments from this coun­
try are guaranteed against all risks of nationalization or expropriation. 
American investors, therefore, are fully protected in their investments. 
As regards the Thai government itself, I can assert categorically 
that my government believes in the free enterprise system as much as 
any other country of the free world, It has not fostered socialism and 
it has not emphasized Communist achievements in economic or indus­
trial fields on the one hand and made urgent appeals to the investors in 
the free world on the other. Our trade with Communist countries is 
practically nonexistent and where it exists it is confined to nonstrategic 
materials, in conformity with our obligations to our allies and as a 
member of the United Nations. 
It is true, some may say, that the government in Thailand is en­
gaging in or has ·some businesses of its own. But any one who is 
familiar with the conditions in Thailand and in Southeast Asian coun­
tries in general will be able to see without difficulty that the lack of 
capital or the slow process of capital formation in those countries cre­
ates the necessity for government intervention. If the government 
should decide to leave the field of business entirely to private initiative 
while private concerns have no means of their own to do it, there will 
be no industries at all. But the present government has made it a clear 
policy of its own that the very moment private business can take over, 
it will completely and irrevocably withdraw itself from such business. 
In support of this policy, the government of Thailand has made deep 
and substantial cuts in funds allotted to the running of factories or 
industrial concerns owned by the government. 
A passage of the International Monetary Fund comments on 
Thailand: 
It is the general policy of the Thai Government to seek industrial 
development in the private sector, and to concentrate the Govern-
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ment's development efforts on the provision of social overhead fa­
cilities and services, especially in the field of transportation, power 
and irrigation. 
As to the second element which can help in the promotion of 
foreign trade and investment, namely adequate administrative policy and 
setup, the Thai government has adopted a number of measures to attain 
that objective. In the first place, foreigners and nationals of Thailand 
alike are allowed to make remittances abroad, for family maintenance 
or study or travel, without any kind of authorization up to a certain sum 
( $146 a month). Over and above those sums, foreign concerns are also 
allowed to repatriate not only their earnings but also their capital back 
to their original countries. The only formality they have to comply with 
is to obtain authorization from the Central Bank of Thailand which exer­
cises control not to prevent expatriation of capital but for statistical pur­
poses. In some cases, when remittances are too substantial, the Central 
Bank may ask that these remittances be spread out in successive install­
ments in order not to create harmful fluctuations in the exchange rate of 
the national currency. But never has the Central Bank refused to au­
thorize bona fide repatriation of dividends or capital to foreign enter­
prizes. This has been confirmed by a report of the International Mone­
tary Fund. Such a liberal policy with regard to exchange control where 
it exists is not so common in our present world. Thailand, I think, can 
afford to do that, because her financial position is basically sound and our 
national currency is backed by some 90 per cent reserves of gold and 
hard currency, mainly United States. dollars. It is also of interest to note 
that these reserves were increased during the past few years. 
In regard to new enterprises, whether foreign or domestic, there 
are legal provisions known as the Industrial Promotion Act exempting 
them from customs duties on machinery imported and from income tax 
for a prolonged initial period. These tax holidays and other measures 
which exist also in some other countries desiring foreign investments, 
are designed to encourage foreign investors. In Thailand, they begin 
to show beneficial effects. 
These incentives and encouraging measures for the promotion of 
foreign trade and investment, coupled with the guarantee agreement 
which the Thai government has signed with the government of the United 
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States should provide, so to speak, an iron-clad protection to American 
business interests. 
May I come now to the third element, namely, the human and ma­
terial resources. As I have said before, although my country does not 
possess a vast reservoir of human resources as some other Asian coun­
tries, our population is comparatively well educated. Provided with 
adequate training, our people can undertake any technical job as well 
as any other people in the world. There is no such thing, in my view, 
as the inherent incapacity of a certain race or a certain people to perform 
technical works. The example of Japan is, I believe, sufficient to convince 
any one who may have doubt about it. 
Our material resources, both tapped and untapped, are also abun­
dant. The high-grade iron ore deposits north and south of Bangkok, the 
capital city of Thailand, are being exploited on a small scale by a private 
Thai firm and possibly also with the co-operation of a well-known West 
German steel concern. Another Japanese firm has joined with Thai in­
terests to exploit shale oil. So far, few if any American firms have shown 
any disposition or interest in these fields. Other resources which I have 
mentioned earlier are being exported abroad as raw materials. Those 
are tin and rubber as well as some other minerals. They can, of course, 
be processed in Thailand with savings on freight charges which, as we 
all know, are extremely high. This is what we intend to do. 
What do we want in Thailand in terms of trade and investment? 
First, and as far as our agricultural products and especially rice are con­
cerned, we want to preserve and expand our traditional markets in the 
same manner as the United States wants to keep its traditional markets 
m this hemisphere. For the other main items of our exports, such as 
rubber and tin, we would like to see as do some of our Asian neighbors 
such as Malaya, a reasonably stable price maintained. We are apprehen­
sive, and I think justly so, of the strong and devastating competition 
offered by some synthetic manufacturing processes. For us, these prod­
ucts which we export form the mainstay of our economy upon which the 
livelihood of millions depends. A few cents fluctuation in price can 
cause untold sufferings to hundreds of thousands of families, while a 
more diversified economy of an industrially advanced country can ab­
sorb without too great effects even the shock of a mild and temporary 
decrease in income. It is clear, therefore, that for Thailand and other 
Asian countries placed in a similar position, the expansion of our foreign 
trade is a vital question on which depends our very existence, not to 
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speak of our healthy and normal growth. Consequently, we are willing 
to bear our share of responsibility and to go to a great extent to satisfy 
legitimate demands. 
At the same time, we also realize that trade alone, especially trade 
based on exports of primary commodities, can never endure the benefits 
that our people are entitled to expect. The undue dependence on far­
away markets beyond control or influence, or in fact under the control 
of others whose interests are not necessarily concordant with ours, can­
not and should not be accepted as an adequate life insurance for our 
nations. The real solution lies in gradual and orderly industrialization 
of our economy. Such a conclusion, as you may well understand, is 
not motivated by reasons of national pride or prestige, the prestige of 
possessing one's own industries, but truly by reasons of necessity, the 
necessity of our own survival. A nation that depends for its likelihood 
on exports of primary commodities to foreign markets will not only be 
impoverished because the income derived from the exports of raw ma­
terials will never match the high and always rising costs of manufac­
tured goods it requires for its consumption and development, but, worst 
of all, it will be subject to the whims and fluctuation of foreign markets 
and may prosper or starve as a result of administrative ukases which 
may be decided upon by some foreign nations. 
On the other hand, I think I need make it clear that in pointing 
to the necessity for the undeveloped nations to diversify their economy 
and engage in some form of industrialization, I do not advocate self­
sufficiency or what some European economists might call "autarky." 
Such a course of action would, in my opinion, be detrimental to un­
developed nations and may even hamper their normal and healthy de­
velopment. What those nations must try to do is to strike a happy 
balance between production of primary commodities and the setting up 
of basic industries and processing industries, especially those which can 
make use of raw materials locally available, so that the sharp fluctua­
tions in the prices of raw materials in markets abroad may be cushioned 
off and their intensity reduced on national markets by the existence of 
such industries. 
This is what my country intends to do and I do not believe we are 
alone in thinking in those terms. However, our financial and technical 
capacity is limited and whatever efforts we may exert ourselves will 
never be sufficient to enable us to attain our objective. Outside par-
211 
ticipation is therefore invited and welcome, especially from countries 
which are friendly to us and whom we can trust. 
What do the nations which invite outside participation have to 
offer? In the case of Thailand, I have already outlined the conditions 
which outside investors and especially American investors will find in 
my country, namely ( 1) a government and people friendly to the United 
States; ( 2) abundant natural resources, and ( 3) relatively educated 
human resources from which industries can draw an adequate labor 
supply. But most important of all, foreign and particularly American 
investors will find an almost virgin field for their operations. The in­
dustries now existing are so few and so undeveloped that they cater 
only to a small fraction of our national needs, the balance of which 
has to be satisfied by imports from abroad. New enterprises, therefore, 
will not have to face any kind of competition from local industries and 
can fully develop their productive capacity to meet ever growing de­
mands. 
Furthermore, what Thailand can offer which other countries can­
not is its centrally strategic position in the heart of surrounding mar­
kets of Southeast Asia. Once you are in Bangkok or generally speaking 
in Thailand, you are placed at a distance of about two hours plane 
flight in all directions from five other capital cities of Southeast Asia. 
That explains why many commercial firms, international organizations 
and diplomatic missions have chosen to establish themselves at Bangkok 
and from there radiate to the other countries of Southeast Asia. There­
fore, those enterprises which may open up in Thailand will be able to 
supply not only the Thai national market, but also the close-by mar­
kets of the surrounding nations of Southeast Asia with a total popula­
tion of some 180 million people. This, you will agree, is hardly a 
negligible proposition. Therefore, a new enterprise or a new industry 
centered at a base where the national government is friendly and as 
much dedicated to the concept of free enterprise as that in its homeland, 
can set itself up and take advantage of the enormous local needs as 
well as the growing demands of the whole region. 
American industries, because of their immense productivity, ap­
pear to have come to a point of satisfying the normal local consumers' 
demands. If such is the case, would it not be wise for America to start 
thinking of developing markets abroad which will be able to absorb 
some of American products. Asia and Southeast Asia in particular, 
for reasons I have already pointed out, seem to be the logical and normal 
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markets for overflowing American products. At present, they cannot 
properly perform such a role, because of the low income of their popu­
lation. But if adequate development is brought about through trade 
and investment in some fields of industries which, incidentally, are 
different from the more advanced industrial activities of the United 
States, greater income will be created in those parts of the world which 
will enable their population to buy manufactured products from the 
United States. Such an idea is not as theoretical as it appears at first 
sight, and if it can be properly explored and put into application, many 
of my American friends with whom I discussed this idea seem to agree 
with me that it can produce the desired results and bring mutual bene­
fits to both the United States and Southeast Asia. 
Another practical problem which seems to present an obstacle to 
the implementation of a program of foreign or American investment is 
the lack of predetermined conditions, well known in advance to foreign 
investors and offered to them by the host country. This point suggested 
to me by both government and private circles, is certainly well taken 
and I am ready, as far as I am concerned, to present to the authorities 
of my country any reasonable concrete suggestions. For the moment, 
I can say that my country has no objection to working out a reasonable 
standard statute to be offered to foreign traders and investors, in addi­
tion to the conditions relating to tax and customs duty exemption and 
repatriation of earnings and capital which are already known to foreign 
investors in Thailand and of which they have been taking advantage 
for some time already. Such a statute will have necessarily to be general 
in nature and character leaving the conditions specific to any trade 
or industry to be spelled out in detail by negotiation between those 
industries and the authorities concerned themselves. Such an obstacle, 
if it is one, can be surmounted and even easily removed if the two sides, 
the host country and the foreign trader and investor, seek mutual 
benefit and not one-sided and somewhat monopolistic advantage. Thai­
land for one will go a long way to meet any reasonable and legitimate 
demands of foreign investors and traders. If those who come to her 
are animated by regular business considerations and not by some ad­
venturous spirit of "making a fast buck," as we say here, my country 
is willing and ready to co-operate with them for mutual benefit. What 
we want from abroad, therefore, is not those fly-by-night businesses, 
but the sound, steady, and long-range business activities which will 
develop our own national resources, our productivity and consequently 
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the income of our people. Such development will bring benefit not only 
to the investors or traders themselves, but also to the land of their origin 
which will find a growing market for its products. 
Some of the countries which are not so friendly to the United 
States have clearly seen the advantages I have tried to outline and have 
already made important inroads in Asia. Should the United States and 
the free nations continue to neglect these warnings, this country, and 
indeed the whole world, may one day wake up and find that the field 
is already taken up by their challengers and antagonists. 
Thailand, through her representative, can categorically and sin­
cerely affirm that she prefers to do business with the United States 
and the free world, if the latter are animated by the same desire and the 
same willingness to agree to the reciprocity of our interests and reason­
able conditions in carrying out mutual obligations as well as in sharing 
benefits. But if we were asked to exceed these limits and to yield to 
foreign traders and investors one-sided or monopolistic advantages, my 
country, much as it desires to have foreign investments, will not be 
able to accept. The time of colonial-type exploitation is, I believe, com­
pletely superseded by economic co-operation on the basis of equality 
and profit sharing. On this basis, Thailand invites traders and in­
vestors of the United States and the free world to come to her soil. 
I hope they will hear and heed our appeal for the mutual advantage and 
benefit of our respective nations. 
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T HE ACCOMPANYING tables are intended to display some of the 
leading structural relations and recent trends in United States trade with 
Asia and the Far East. The explanatory note preceding the tables in­
dicates sources and limitations of the data and special meaning of some 
terms. It is to be noted that this paper is an analysis from the viewpoint 
of the United States and on the basis of United States trade returns. 
Many details 9f the trade are commented on in other papers from the 
viewpoint of the trading partners of the United States. 
Asian countries supply the United States with substantial propor­
tions of a dozen or so commodities, some of which are of considerable 
importance to the United States. These countries take a lesser volume 
of United States exports which range over a large variety of commodi­
ties. United States exports to these countries show an increasing excess 
of exports in recent years. Conditions which determine the trade are 
the natural endowments of the Asian countries, their increased pace of 
development, technological changes in the United States and United 
States aid and agricultural policies. 
United States imports from Asian countries are concentrated in 
a group of a dozen or so commodities. Table I shows that 10 com­
modity subgroups listed account for about half the total imports from 
the Asian countries - 45 per cent in the two end periods and 65 per 
cent in 1948. These same commodities, however, accounted for only 
12 per cent to 17 per cent of all commodities imported into the United 
States. Import trade with Asian countries is concentrated on fewer 
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commodities than import trade in general. The relative importance of 
Asian countries as the origin of United States imports has declined from 
26 per cent in 1938 to 15 per cent in 1955-57 of total imports. In 
1938, 78.3 per cent of these commodity subgroups came from Asian 
countries; in 1955-57 this proportion had fallen to 57.1 per cent. This 
figure is affected by the decline in the proportion of rubber and tin 
originating in Asian countries and by the fact that rubber and tin in 
1938 were a more significant component of the commodities listed than 
they were in 1955-57: 59.1 per cent as against 37.6 per cent. On the 
other hand, other commodities assumed increasing importance. While 
total United States imports increased more than six times in value be­
tween 1938 and 1955-57, imports of ferroalloys increased more than 
15 times, lead nearly 260 times and wool more than 10 times. These 
three commodities accounted for only 4 per cent of listed imports from 
Asian countries in 1938 but 24 per cent in 1955-57. 
Description of the export trade cannot be so readily condensed 
since a larger number of commodities are involved and concentration 
on a few is less notable. The listed commodities accounted in 1938 
for a third of total exports to Asian countries; in 1957 this proportion 
had increased to more than one-half - an indication of the shift in 
commodity composition of United States export trade to Asia. The 
listed commodities have accounted for more than one-half of total 
exports. The relative importance of Asian countries as destinations for 
United States exports has slightly declined; these countries now account 
for less than 15 per cent of total United States exports. 
The more important commodity classes were as follows, with 
exports to Asian countries as a percentage of exports to all countries: 
cotton unmanufactured, 25.7 per cent; petroleum and products, 20.4 
per cent; medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations, 24.6 per cent; 
machinery and vehicles, 17.9 per cent. These commodities in 1938 
constituted 55.6 per cent and in 1955-57, 39.0 per cent of all exports 
to Asian countries. Notable increases in proportions of exports destined 
for Asian countries occurred in the two subgroups, grains and prepara­
tions, and cotton unmanufactured, a result doubtless of aid and agri­
cultural surplus disposal policies ( Public Law 480). It is notable also 
that exports of autos, parts and accessories to the world between 1938 
and 1955 increased nearly five times while these exports to Asian 
countries increased only two and a half times. 
The United States balance of merchandise trade with Asian coun-
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tries shows a large export excess in postwar years. The ratio of imports 
to exports was 77 per cent in 1948 and 74 per cent in 1955-57. The 
largest excesses occurred with Japan, Republic of Korea and Taiwan. 
The surpluses with India, Pakistan and Republic of Philippines were 
also substantial, that of the latter however being much reduced from 
1948. 
Countries with which United States trade showed a substantial 
excess of imports are British Malaya, Republic of Indonesia and Thai­
land; smaller import excesses occurred with Ceylon and New Zealand. 
These excesses of imports are attributable to United States imports of 
rubber, tin, tea, spices and wool. 
In point of magnitude, Japan, except in 1948 before postwar 
economic conditions had been fully established, is our largest source 
of imports, accounting for almost a third of total imports from Asian 
countries; it is likewise the largest market for our exports, absorbing 
more than one-third of total exports to Asian countries. The largest 
single item of trade with Japan is presently the United States export 
of unmanufactured, and the import of manufactured cotton. 
United States aid has been a significant factor in recent trade with 
Asian countries. In the period 1955-57, one-half of all nonmilitary 
net grants and credits went to Asian countries, more than 60 per cent 
of this portion fo Republic of Korea and Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, 
and 30 per cent to Taiwan, Pakistan, Japan and India. 
The principal factors determining the character of United States 
trade with Asian countries may be briefly summarized: 
1. The United States imports are predominantly products or raw
materials in which the region has a natural advantage rubber, tea, 
spices, jute, tin, ferroalloys and lead. 
2. Technological changes in the United States have reduced the
relative significance of our dependence upon Asian countries for rub­
ber and tin, but other changes, together with depletion of United States 
domestic mineral sources have increased our dependence upon the 
region for ferroalloys and lead. 
3. There has occurred a net diversion of origin of United States
imports away from Asian countries, not only for the commodity classes 
listed in the tables, but for all commodities; the commodities listed, 
however, constituted in 1955-57 the same proportion of all imports 
from Asian countries as in 19 3 8. 
4. The United States aid programs together with crop failures
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in Asian countries are responsible for significant increases in the pro­
portion of exports of grains and preparations and cotton manufactures 
going to the region. 
5. Of the important group of machinery and vehicle exports, Asian
markets absorbed a smaller proportion of United States exports in 
1955-57 than in 1938. 
6. While the commodity classes listed constituted a slightly smaller
proportion of total United States exports in 1955-57 than in 1938, 
they constituted a substantially larger proportion of our exports to 
Asian countries. 
Explanatory Note to Accompany Tables 1-5. 
Sources of data for the tables are: 
United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 
Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1938 
Foreign Trade Reports, FT 100, FT 120, FT 410, FT 420, Annual 
Summary volumes, 1948, 1955, 1956, 1957. 
Foreign Grants and Credits by the United States Government, De­
cember 1957, March 1958. 
Survey of Current Business, April 1958, pp. 20-24. 
The term "Asian countries" or "Asia and the Far East" for the pur­
poses of this paper is taken to include the following countries, as desig­
nated and defined in the above foreign trade reports: India, Pakistan, 
Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, British Malaya, 
Republic of Indonesia, Republic of Philippines, Republic of Korea, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, Australia, New Zealand. Certain terri­
tories are not identical throughout the period of comparison used in this 
paper: Republic of Korea and Taiwan would be included in the Japa­
nese returns for 1938. The following territories have been considered 
equivalent for the pre and postwar comparisons: British India to India 
plus Pakistan; Siam to Thailand; French Indo-China to Vietnam, Laos 
and Cambodia; Netherlands Indies to Republic of Indonesia; Japan in­
cluding Chosan and Taiwan to Japan. 
Because of the changes in territory it is in some cases impossible 
to make pre and postwar comparisons and so these are omitted. In 
other cases the changes of territory do not seriously distort the com­
parison. The same statements apply to some of the commodity clas­
sifications. The returns are also somewhat distorted by sampling pro­
cedures for small-valued shipments and by exclusions of special cate­
gory commodities - these matters are explained in the Introduction 
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to the Foreign Trade Reports where detailed references are given. 
For the descriptive purposes of this paper, and especially for the per­
centage statements, these distortions are not of significant proportions. 
The particular years were selected to represent the typical pre­
war, early postwar and recent trade. The returns for these years are 
believed to be dominated by the more fundamental and at least semi­
permanent rather than by the accidental determinants of trade. 
A recent excellent brief summary and analysis of United States 
foreign trade, with which the present analysis of trade with Asia may 
be compared, is given in House of Representative Ways and Means 
Subcommittee on Foreign Trade Policy, Compendium of Papers on 
Foreign Trade Policy, 1957, United States Department of Commerce, 
"The Role of Foreign Trade in the United States Economy," pp. 15-22, 
and "Recent Developments in United States Foreign Trade," pp. 23-37. 
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TABLE 1. United States Imports for Consumption from Asian 
Countries, Principal Commodities, Selected Years, 
Proportion of Asian to Total Imports and of 
Listed Commodities to all Commodities 
(Values in Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
Commodity 
( Schedule A Commodity Year 
or Subgroup No.) 
Rubber, milk or latex; 1938 
crude n.e.s. 1948 
2011000; 2013000 1955-7 av. 
Tin, bars, blocks, pigs, 1938 
etc.; ore. 6550000; 1948 
6551300 1955-7 av. 
Tea, n. s. p. f. 1938 
]521000 1948 
1955-7 av. 
Jute & manufactures ]938 
Subgroup 37 ]948 
1955-7 av. 
Ferroalloys 1938 
Subgroup 63 1948 
1955-7 av. 
Lead, ores, flue dust & 1938 
matte, n.s.p.f.; pigs & 1948 
bars. 6503000; 6505000 1955-7 av. 
Mica, block Muscovite 1938 
over 15¢/lb.; films & 1948 
splittings over 12/ 10,000 1955-7 av. 
in. 5560940; 5561800 
Wool, unmanufactured 1938 
Subgroup 40 1948 
1955-7 av. 
Goat & kidskins, dry & 1938 
salted; green or pickled. 1948 
0241000; 0242000 1955-7 av. 
Spices 1938 
Subgroup 21 1948 
1955-7 av. 
Total above 
Commodities 1938 
1948 
1955-7 av. 
Total All 1938 
Commodities 1948 
1955-7 av. 
Commodities Listed 1938 
Above as per cent of 1948 
All Commodities 1955-7 av. 
Abbreviations: 
n.c.l.: no comparable listing
n.e.c.: not elsewhere classified
n.e.s.: not elsewhere specified
n.s.p.f.: not separately provided for
x sc: except special category
U.S. Imports from 
Total .US. Asian Countries 
Imports for Total % of Total 
Consumption U.S. Imports 
129.5 126.4 97.6 
309.1 294.9 95.4 
396.1 354.7 89.5 
44.9 38.5 85.7 
134.8 98.6 73.2 
152.8 102.5 67.1 
18.3 17.4 95.1 
45.1 42.1 93.3 
55.4 50.7 91.5 
37.5 31.2 83.2 
171.6 162.9 94.9 
]10.7 97.2 87.8 
]8.0 2.6 14.4 
86.8 10.8 12.4 
277.7 72.2 26.0 
0.5 
89.4 12.2 13.8 
129.7 28.5 22.0 
0.5 0.4 80.0 
14.0 12.2 87.1 
7.2 3.8 52.8 
22.6 7.0 31.0 
307.6 122.9 40.0 
271.2 97.9 36.1 
12.0 3.7 30.8 
40.8 13.8 33.8 
20.2 7.5 37.1 
11.1 3.8 34.2 
30.9 14.7 47.6 
36.1 16.4 46.0 
294.9 231.0 78.3 
1,230.1 785.1 63.8 
1,457. I 831.4 57.1 
1,949.6 508.4 26.1 
7,038.4 1,203.6 17.1 
12,281.7 1,825.2 14.9 
15.1 45.4 
17.5 65.2 
11.9 45.6 
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TABLE 2. United States Imports for Consumption from Asian 
Countries, Selected Groups, Selected Years, with Indexes 
of Value, 1938= JOO. 
(Values in Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
Group Year Total U.S. Imports Total U.S. Imports 
for Consumption From Asian Countries 
Value Index Value Index 
Total All Groups 1938 1,949.6 100 508.4 100 
1948 7,038.4 361 1,203.6 237 
1955-7 av. 12,281.7 630 1,825.2 359 
Group 2. Vegetable 1938 292.7 100 175.6 100 
products inedible except 1948 780.2 267 465.9 265 
fibers & wood 1955-7 av. 770.1 263 470.6 268 
Group 3. Textile Fibers 1938 280.8 100 154.0 100 
and manufactures 1948 863.6 308 364.8 237 
1955-7 av. 1,000.6 356 426.9 277 
Group 6. Metals and 1938 158.7 100 41.0 100 
Manufactures except 1948 832.7 525 133.5 326 
Machinery & Vehicles 1955-7 av. 2,219.3 1,398 296.2 722 
TABLE 3. United States Exports of Domestic Merchandise to 
Asian Countries, Selected Subgroups and Group 7, Selected 
Years; Proportion of Asian to Total Exports and of Listed 
Commodities to all Commodities. 
(Values in Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
Commodity 
Group or Subgroup 
Number 
130 Grains and Prepa­
rations 
Year 
1938 
1948 
1955-7 av. 
Exports to 
Total U.S. U.S. Exports Asian Countries 
Exports to Asian as % of 
223.5 
1,704.7 
1,215.5 
Countries Total Exports 
4.6 2.1 
266.6 15.6 
321.3 26.4 
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TABLE 4. United States Exports of Domestic Merchandise to 
Asian Countries, Selected Subgroups and Group 7, 
Selected Years, with Indexes of Value, 193 8 100. 
(Values in Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
Commodity Total U.S. Exports Total Exports to 
Group or Subgroup Year Asian Countries 
Number Value Index Value Index 
Total All 1938 3,057.2 100 518.0 100 
Commodities 1948 12,532.1 410 1,567.3 303 
1955-7 av. 18,286.0 598 2,476.3 478 
130 Grains and 1938 223.5 100 4.6 100 
Preparations 1948 1,704.7 763 266.6 5,796 
1955-7 av. 1,215.5 545 321.3 6,985 
330 Cotton 
unmanufactured 1938 224.3 100 57.6 100 
1948 511.0 228 53.3 91 
1955-7av. 754.8 366 268.2 466 
513 Petroleum and 1938 388.6 100 79.3 100 
Products 1948 657.1 169 66.1 83 
1955-7 av. 625.9 161 81.0 102 
Group 7 Machinery 1938 848.8 100 151.8 100 
and Vehicles 1948 3,718.7 438 313.1 206 
1955-7 av. 6,380.3 752 574.6 379 
850 Medicinal and 1938 17.1 100 4.2 100 
Pharmaceutical 1948 193.2 1,130 30.6 729 
Preparations 1955-7av. 252.2 1,475 44.6 1,062 
865 Chemical 1938 29.0 100 3.3 100 
Specialties 1948 156.6 540 12.8 381 
1955-7 av. 454.8 1,578 71.7 2,174 
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TABLE 5. United States Balance of Merchandise Trade with 
Asian Countries, Selected Years, and Net 
Nonmilitary Grants and Credits, 1955-57. 
(Values in Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
U.S. Imports U.S. Exports Excess Net Nonmili-
Country Year for Consump - of Domestic Exports+ tary Grants 
tion Merchandise Imports and Credits 
India 1938 58.0 33.4 14.6 
1948 267.7 297.5 .,. 29.8 
1955-7 av. 211.2 283.6 + 72.4 41 
Pakistan 1938 Included in India 
1948 24.9 17.0 7.9
1955-7 av. 34.8 102.6 + 67.8 75 
Ceylon 1938 16.3 1.3 15.0
1948 52.5 19.3 33.2
1955-7 av. 32.5 9.8 22.7
Burma 1938 0.2 2.3 + 2.1
1948 1.7 4.5 + 2.8
1955-7 av. 2.0 5.9 + 3.9
Thailand 1938 0.3 3.3 + 3.0
1948 49.2 16.3 32.9
1955-7 av. 95.5 56.5 39.0 28 
Vietnam, Laos , 1938 7.2 3.1 4.1
Cambodia 1948 3.3 14.3 + 11.0
1955-7 av. 27.3 61.7 ..- 34.4 291 
British Malaya 1938 112.1 8.8 103.3
1948 269.5 81.8 187.7
1955-7 av. 217.7 41.0 176.7
Republic of 1938 68.8 27.5 41.3
Indonesia 1948 76.9 91.5 + 14.6
1955-7 av. 205.3 108.0 97.3 8 
Republic of the 1938 94.2 86.3 7.9
Philippines 1948 227.5 467.8 + 220.3
1955-7av. 256.5 341.2 + 84.7 20 
Republic of 1938 
Korea 1948 
1955-7 av. 6.1 186.8 + 180.7 301 
Hong Kong 1938 3.4 21.0 + 17.6
1948 3.6 82.9 + 79.3
1955-7 av. 22.4 64.6 42.2
Taiwan 1938 
1948 1.0 5.7 + 4.7
1955-7av. 7.6 105.3 + 97.7 99 
Japan 1938 131.6 238.8 + 107.2
1948 59.7 322.9 + 263.2
1955-7 av. 521.9 918.6 + 396.7 59 
Australia 1938 8.8 68.8 + 60.0
1948 131.8 113.8 18.0
1955-7 av. 168.3 197.2 + 28.9
New Zealand 1938 7.4 23.4 + 16.0
1948 32.8 33.9 + 1.1 
1955-7av. 55.4 30.4 25.0
Total All Asian 1938 508.4 518.0 + 9.6
Countries 1948 1,203.6 1,567.3 + 363.7
1955-7 av. 1,825.2 2,476.3 + 651.1 922 
Total All 1938 1,949.6 3,057.2 + 1,107.6
Countries 1948 7,038.4 12,532.1 + 5,493.7
1955-7 av. 12,281.7 18,286.0 + 6,004.3 1,811 
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FOR THE PURPOSE of this discussion the Asian countries will be con­
sidered as those belonging to the United Nations ECAFE group ex­
cluding the China mainland. The period since the late war has seen 
the rise of twelve new countries in Asia, all encouraged and in most 
ca.ses actively supported by the United States in their struggle toward 
independence. W�th the possible exception of Japan, all of the countries 
in the ECAFE group base their economies on agricultural and ex­
tractive industries. Exports to the United States consist primarily of 
petroleum, rubber, teak, coconut products, tea, hides, tin, fish, chro­
iµite, abaca, spices and rice. In most of the countries, one, or at best 
two, of these primary commodities are the chief means of acquiring 
foreign exchange. Imports from the United States into these countries 
have consisted chiefly of consumer and industrial goods with the chief 
exception being agricultural exports under our PL 480. During 1957, 
the United States trade with Asia consisted of imports amounting to 
$1.7 billion and exports of $2.86 billion, 13 and 15 per cent respec­
tively of the United States total trade. 
Two key points stand out as having affected the balance of this 
trade in the last ten years. The first, concerning exports from Asia, 
is that the primary commodities produced there and exported have 
all been victims of severe price fluctuations. Variations of up to 15-20 
per cent in a year's time have not been unusual. The volume of these 
exports has fluctuated in almost a parallel manner. The result has 
been an unstable foreign exchange return to the individual countries 
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and a resultant imbalance in their payments accompanied by disloca­
tions in the internal economy. Secondly, the price of exports from 
the United States has risen almost continuously in the last ten years. 
The pressure of the rising United States price structure on the manu­
facturer here has resulted in higher and higher export prices on the 
commodities required by Asia. This squeeze, namely an uncertain for­
eign exchange return for the Asian countries and the steadily increasing 
cost of the goods they wish to import, is further aggravated by problems 
of population increase and inadequate food supplies. Almost without 
exception, Asian countries have tried to remedy their reliance upon 
exports of one or two primary commodities by industrialization. The 
problem of increased industrialization is fraught with all too numerous 
road blocks. The import of capital goods and know-how is only the 
first step in solving this problem. Centuries old patterns of social and 
economic reform must necessarily be disrupted and such progress calls 
for knowledge far beyond the simple ability to manufacture and dis­
tribute industrially produced goods. 
It is axiomatic, however, that industrialization is brought about 
by the import of capital goods and/ or know-how and that these im­
ports must be paid for by exports. Asia's share of the world's exports 
has declined from 10.7 per cent in 1950 to some 6.6 per cent in 1957. 
Further, private commercial investment in Asia by American firms has 
been strikingly limited. Even in Japan, the most highly industrialized 
country in Asia, while the number of accepted investments has been 
high, the total dollar value of these investments has been low. In most 
instances, investments have merely complemented existing industries 
and have not produced new exchange earners or conversely exchange 
saving production facilities. From the standpoint of its trade with Asia, 
the United States is faced with the enigma of Asia's continually growing 
population clearly aware of its need to buy the consumer and industrial 
commodities best produced here, yet at the same time frustrated by 
rising prices in the United States, as well as Asia's disability in selling 
commodities at steady prices which would make for economic develop­
ment and an accompanying rising standard of living. 
In order to fill this gap in trade between the United States and 
Asia, the United States has undertaken an extensive program of foreign 
aid. In 19 5 6 this aid amounted to $1,600 million and in 19 5 7 ap­
proximately $1,790 million. Of this, military supplies and services 
amounted to $643 million and $819 million respectively and other aid 
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to $959 million and $972 million respectively. Only about $100 mil­
lion of the total aid can be considered as private capital investment, 
half of which probably consisted of reinvested earnings produced by 
some $700 million presently invested in Asia by United States private 
entities. The International Cooperation Administration's grants and 
loans amounted to $460 million during 1957 while the Export Import 
Bank of Washington, D.C. authorized credits totaling about $260 mil­
lion. The remaining balance was chiefly made up by the economic 
aid portions of our Mutual Security Program. The major portion of 
United States aid in recent years has come from our export of agri­
cultural commodities under PL 480. These commodities went toward 
filling the gap in the supply of foodstuffs. The majority of the Asian 
countries are traditionally net importers of foodstuffs. Two years of 
crop failures in India and increased populations of other countries 
have resulted in a need for vast amounts of rice and wheat which nor­
mally would not be required. The Eximbank cotton loan to Japan 
and similar shipments of cotton to India have been yearly features of 
this disposal of our surplus agricultural stores. The balance of the 
Eximbank loans has been spent to purchase industrial goods primarily 
of a development nature. Large projects for power development, land 
reclamation and ir�igation programs have been featured in recent years. 
Loans of this type have been the chief source of sales of American 
industrial products to Asia. 
On the face of it our aid in terms of both loans and grants 
al?-ounts to a sizeable figure and has been increasing over the last five 
years. Unfortunately, however, foreign aid in total and United States 
foreign aid in particular has not been sufficient to make up the differ­
ence in balance of payments dislocations caused by the severe fluctu­
ations of basic export commodity prices. The United Nations Economic 
Survey of Asia and the Far East for 1957 clearly states that: 
. . . the average year-to-year fluctuations in the export earnings 
of Asian primary exporting countries were in all cases above 10 
per cent, foreign aid received by these countries amounted to no 
more than around 5 per cent of their total export earnings in the 
postwar period. 
While general statements always bear the burden of possible in-
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accuracy when applied to a specific situation, this does not appear to 
be the case when one reviews the area country by country, commodity 
by commodity. Without fail, actions by the individual governments 
such as export tariffs, import tariffs, foreign exchange restrictions, fixed 
and multiple exchange rates, government stockpiling programs, fixed 
internal wage rates and other similar control measures have been un­
able to produce a stable balance of payments situation. International 
commodity agreements such as are presently enforced for wheat, tin 
and sugar have not been successful. Price differences within the agree­
ments due to the lack of homogeneity of the products controlled con­
tinue to thwart the best efforts resulting from the agreements. 
Unfortunately the area of solution to the problem of increasing 
United States trade with Asia does not lie simply in the problem of 
competitive export prices for our goods. Indeed, the problem does not 
lie wholly in the area of economics. While a stable, healthy economy 
in the United States would serve as a reliable base for the sale of 
Asia's primary exports and steady prices would be an important factor 
in increasing United States-Asian trade, this solution is not sufficient 
to alleviate the problem. Foreign aid and chiefly United States foreign 
aid is and will continue to be an absolute requirement. Admittedly an 
easing in world tensions could divert substantial amounts of our mili­
tary aid into the social and economic areas. While this would be a 
most welcome change, its possibility in the immediate years seems 
rather remote. Concentration of a sizeable portion of the aid extended 
toward increasing local production of foodstuffs through intensive and 
extensive methods of cultivation would be one first step and a most 
fruitful one. This, coupled with apportioning of aid into the develop­
ment of industries designed to process the traditionally exported raw 
materials and thereby to encourage a greater use of the all too numerous 
labor force in adding value to export products, could produce the great­
est economic progress in the shortest period. Lastly, a technical as­
sistance program such as has been begun in India based on country 
to country needs should prove most beneficial for the long term. 
While we accept the fact that private investment can show the 
greatest short run results, it appears, in solving the problem of aid and 
trade between the United States and Asia, that government programs 
intelligently planned and executed are the only practical means of ef­
fecting a long run solution. Unfortunately, government to government 
programs are too frequently the children of vested political interests 
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with the resulting tendency towards large scale projects of a monu­
mental nature. Industrialization in Asia must be accomplished on a 
highly selective basis through government financial aid and technical 
assistance and through the encouragement of private entities to invest 
whenever possible. A straightforward, step-by-step program, tightly 
administered, will achieve the desired results to the benefit of all 
concerned. 
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INTRODUCTION 
T HE CAUSES oF and cures for the current international economic 
problems of the Far East have consumed reams of paper and many 
hours of discussion in the last few years. That conditions of trade in 
which imports have totalled an annual amount nearly twice that of ex­
ports cannot continue indefinitely has received much attention. Eco­
nomists, usually· emphasizing "pet" theories, have proposed nearly as 
many solutions as there are economists. Most of these proposals have 
turned on the need to remove restrictions on the import of Far Eastern 
products into the United States, on the encouragement of more foreign 
·investment in Asia, or on the admittance of the nations as full members
of various international economic and financial agencies. Some, especi­
ally "leftish" theoretical economists, have advocated as the solution a
greatly expanded trade with Communist China and the Communist
area in general. Some, and even perhaps all, of these "pet" theories
may have validity; but they tend to be expounded somewhat unrealisti­
cally. They do not explain how their proposals can be achieved in
practice. They do not point out, for instance, that the United States
government is strongly politically influenced by special interest groups
and that the practical possibility of lowering restrictions is very remote.
They do not point out that Communism exists only for the benefit of
the Communists. They do not understand or discuss the difficulties of
business organizations which in themselves have no direct influence
over governmental policy. They do not mention, perhaps most im-
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portant of all, that in the final analysis trade depends upon successful 
selling by individual business firms. 
In this paper no "pet" economic theory will be proposed. Rather, 
economic and political theories and policies will be accepted as they 
exist-and probably will continue to exist for some time in the future­
and the problems of the individual business organization engaged in 
trying to export to the United States will be emphasized. As these are 
discussed, solutions, where such are possible, will be suggested. Re­
member, however, that if the problems of individual firms can be rec­
ognized and improvements made, a major step will be taken by the 
resultant increase in successful, efficient trade toward solving the inter­
national economic problems of the Far East. 
The comments which follow are based not only upon the writer's 
experience and knowledge as a professor of marketing, but also on 
practical experience in foreign trade, including such activities as mem­
bership on the Board of Trustees and the Merchandising Committee 
of the Washington State International Trade Fair Corporation, an or­
ganization established for the primary purpose of increasing Far Eastern 
imports into the United States, and a past presidency of the business­
men's foreign trade association of Seattle. They also summarize reports 
received from businessmen regularly engaged in trade with the Far East. 
Some General Economic Considerations 
Before particular export problems are discussed some general eco­
nomic considerations must be mentioned because of their influence on 
solutions of the practical problems. First, the Far East generally is 
faced with an ostensibly serious situation in the absence of modem 
capital equipment. As a result, much production is carried on with 
outmoded machinery or must even rely upon handicraft for the creation 
of export commodities. Yet, surprisingly. in part this may be a benefit 
rather than a hindrance. Second, for a number of reasons typical en­
terprises are operating under unduly high costs of production. This 
only naturally tends to cause an impairment in the quality of products. 
Third, business is hampered by some unrealistic economic policies, 
many of which unfortunately were recommended to the governments 
by American economic advisors who had no knowledge of basic eco­
nomic conditions in the Far East. Fourth, all countries are highly 
dependent upon commodity trade to achieve equilibrium in the balance 
of payments. Unlike other areas, few "services" can be rendered to 
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others. And fifth, the area is faced with important changes in the nature 
of world demand, changes which must be accepted as there is no way 
in which they can be influenced. For instance, American women today 
prefer nylon stockings to silk with the resultant loss of the previously 
highly important market for raw silk; synthetic rubber is gradually re­
placing natural rubber; and consumers today want high quality products 
of original design rather than the cheap imitations of American products 
which sold so extensively in the 1930 decade. 
All of these make it difficult for the countries concerned to develop 
their export potential. But it makes it more vital that there be a 
thorough understanding of marketing methods and techniques and that 
intensive effort be devoted to the marketing of their products in the 
United States, for only by doing so can these difficulties be overcome. 
Marketing Research 
Significance of Marketing Research - To plan marketing pro­
grams effectively, especially in foreign countries, it is necessary to 
know what products customers desire, how many they desire, why they 
buy, where they buy and other similar facts. The importance of such 
research as an essential of successful selling cannot be stressed suf­
ficiently. 
One of the most important export problems of producers in the 
Far East has been a failure to recognize this need for marketing re­
search or to use it extensively. To date, only a few firms have done 
anything at all which even remotely could be so classified. 
The results of not using this essential tool are readily observed. 
'For example, in the last decade in the United States there has been 
a notable increase in the knowledge of foreign products as a result of 
a number of factors, including residence of service personnel overseas 
and increased interest in the Far East in our educational system. Con­
sequently, American consumers have come to desire products of the 
Far Eastern civilizations and cultures. Yet quality products of those 
civilizations are not available in more than limited quantities. No longer 
does the consumer want large quantities of cheap imitations of Ameri­
can produced products; but Far Eastern producers, particularly those 
in Japan, still tend to concentrate on these cheap imitations. 
Some Essential Aspects of Marketing Research - One of the 
most essential bases for successful selling is to develop products in 
accordance with consumer desires. Few firms in the United States try 
to market a product without a considerable period of study concerning 
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appropriate design. From numerous inspections of Far Eastern prod­
ucts at international trade fairs both in the United States and in Japan 
there is ample evidence that little product research is undertaken. 
Changes in desires in the last twenty years - in fact, even in the last 
five years - have not been recognized. Not only do products continue 
to be predominantly imitations of American products, but also they 
are imitations of products which have not been purchased in large 
quantities for some period of time. 
Only a modicum of research would quickly reveal the current 
consumer preference for products of other cultures. And such research 
would have disclosed the more important fact that there are no re­
strictive tariffs imposed on such products, for they do not compete 
with American production. Hence, exports of these derivatives of well­
developed civilizations, produced by highly skilled craftsmen, would 
not only add immeasurably to foreign currency earnings but also would 
provide a maximum of employment for a skilled labor force. 
An aspect of product design necessary for consumer acceptance is 
correct naming and packaging. Since a large part of total retail buying 
in the United States today is done on a "self-service" basis, packaging 
must be such as to attract the customer in the self-service store. Many 
hours and many dollars are spent even by small manufacturers in ar­
riving at a "brand name" which will be acceptable and will stimulate 
purchasers to buy. Even more research is devoted to packaging. Only 
a few Far Eastern products are marketed with appealing brand names 
or contained in attractive packages. Commonly a plain paper or wooden 
box is used which detracts from the salability of the merchandise rather 
than adding to it. 
Another important objective of marketing research is to establish 
a sound price policy. It is axiomatic to American manufacturers and 
sellers that product prices must be similar to those of competitors and 
discounts or allowances granted to middlemen must be in accordance 
with established practices. Of course, if a product is priced too high 
it will not sell. But more important, a commodity which is priced too 
low also will not sell, for a low price indicates to buyers that it is of 
poor quality, and American consumers no longer want low quality 
products. Moreover, and of particular significance to Far Eastern pro­
ducers, an unduly low price for a product is considered by competitors 
to be prima-facie evidence of dumping with consequent pressure placed 
on the government for import restrictions. An outstanding example of 
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this occurred not long ago in textiles. The Japanese textile industry 
produces large quantities of well made fabrics. As a result of failure 
to engage in research as to proper prices to charge in the American 
market, products were being sold at prices substantially below those of 
American manufacturers. Strong pressure for restrictions were exerted, 
and this pressure was temporarily alleviated only by the Japanese gov­
ernment imposing "voluntary" restrictions on exports. Had the Japa­
nese textile industry undertaken marketing research to determine ap­
propriate prices and established a sound price policy as a result of the 
findings of this research, there would have been no move for import 
restrictions. 
Marketing research is further essential in determining ways of cre­
ating a desire for products. Desire for specific products is fundamentally 
created by advertising. Few Far Eastern exporters have discovered the 
essential need for advertising for marketing success; those which have 
engaged in advertising have paid little attention to appropriate appeals 
to stimulate demand. Commonly, advertising by Far Eastern producers 
has consisted merely of listing the company name and products pro­
duced. This differs widely from methods and techniques used in the 
United States. Furthermore, American techniques change rapidly as 
new ways of stimulating demand are discovered. Yet as far as can be 
determined no :research is being conducted by Far Eastern firms to 
ascertain ways in which they can utilize advertising more effectively. 
The foregoing paragraphs summarize merely a few ways in which 
marketing research can be of great value to producers and exporters 
· from the Far East. There are many others which cannot be discussed
here because of limitations on the length of this paper. However, these
paragraphs will serve to point out that, though marketing research is
absolutely essential, it is not being utilized to develop the all important
American market.
Problems of Marketing Research - It may appear difficult for a
business organization in the Far East to engage in analysis of the Ameri­
can market. The great majority are small and have available only lim­
ited financial resources. Moreover, few businessmen are experienced
in marketing research methods. However, there are a number of ways
in which it can be done even by small firms.
There are in existence in the United States a number of firms which 
specialize in marketing research for manufacturers and middlemen. 
They adjust their charges for their services depending upon the extent 
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of the program desired. This may range from a few dollars to many 
thousand. Some of these firms maintain offices in the leading cities 
of the Far East and would welcome the opportunity of carrying out a 
project for a Far Eastern producer. Any enterprise seriously consider­
ing developing its sales in the United States can easily contact one of 
these specialist research organizations. Their names and addresses are 
available from many sources. 
A more immediate method of utilizing the benefits of research is 
through seeking the advice and assistance of American sales outlets. 
They want to carry products which will sell, and will readily advise 
as to what must be done to make products salable. They will advise 
on kinds and styles of merchandise which are selling well including 
such things as appropriate packaging. But from information furnished 
the writer by a number of American organizations specializing in sell­
ing Far Eastern products, rather than seeking advice, many Far Eastern 
producers have been unwilling to accept suggestions forwarded to 
them. Recommendation for creation of new designs have been refused, 
proposals to share jointly the costs of advertising have been turned 
down, and suggestions as to the best market area in the United States 
in which to concentrate sales of products have been ignored. 
A preliminary form of marketing research could be carried on at 
no expense. In every major city in the countries concerned there are 
American cultural centers. These centers maintain extensive libraries 
of periodic publications which show not only products currently in 
demand but also contain articles explaining successful marketing meth­
ods. For those desiring information on the techniques of marketing 
research, almost all have the latest textbooks on the subject. Moreover, 
in all the embassies and most consulates there are economic and com­
mercial libraries which contain many highly useful reference volumes. 
For instance, one volume which the writer has found in almost all the 
libraries referred to is a United States Department of Commerce publi­
cation, Market Research Sources. And all have another extremely valu­
able publication by the Department of Commerce, Selling the United 
States Market. But it is interesting, though disturbing, to note that these 
cost-free sources of information are not being used by those to whom 
they would prove most useful. Inquiries made of a large number of 
businessmen not only in Japan but also in other countries have revealed 
that few had ever been in a cultural center or an embassy commercial 
library, and those who had visited these sources had done so for pur-
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poses other than engaging in research concerning marketing of products 
m the United States. 
Until the need for marketing research by Far Eastern business­
men is recognized, and until some preliminary education is furnished 
as to simple, elementary ways in which research can be undertaken 
and utilized, the export potential of the Far Eastern nations to the 
United States will not be adequately developed. If and when it is recog­
nized that continuous study is necessary concerning marketable products 
and methods of marketing products, a long step will have been taken 
to reduce existing serious dollar shortages and remove the necessity of 
drastic dollar exchange controls. 
Product Distribution 
Let us turn now to another problem of marketing Far Eastern 
products in the United States. This is the physical distribution of prod­
ucts. It is apparent from discussions with a large number of Far Eastern 
businessmen that a general belief exists that all that is necessary is to 
produce; and once the products are created buyers will come to pur­
chase. As Peter Drucker ably pointed out in a recent article, one of 
the most common weaknesses of underdeveloped areas is a failure to 
provide for adequate marketing of products.1 "Yet marketing occupies 
a critical role in respect to the development of . . 'growth' areas. In­
deed marketing· is the most important 'multiplier' of such develop­
ment." Even Japan, which is by far the most advanced of the Far 
Eastern nations, has not recognized the significance of providing ap­
propriate means of physical distribution. 
· Domestic Channels of Distribution - One of the major shortcomings
of producers in the area is continued reliance on traditional domestic
channels of distribution. With few exceptions, exports are sold through
"trading companies" rather than directly to importers. Though a few
of the trading companies have modernized their methods slightly, con­
servatism and traditionalism continue to dominate their business ac­
tivities. Study of their marketing policies indicates that they are re­
luctant to handle the sale of products other than those which sold
readily in the nineteen-thirties and for which orders can be obtained
without exerting any extensive sales effort. Moreover, rather than
going out and promoting the sale of the products they tend to sit and
wait for buyers to come to them. Until manufacturers abandon these
1 "Marketing and Economic Development," The Journal of Marketing, XXII, 
No. 3 (January, 1958) 252-59. 
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tradition-bound organizations and directly promote sales in foreign 
countries, or until they can convince the trading companies to give up 
their traditional conservatism, their export potential will not be devel­
oped to the fullest. 
Foreign Channels of Distribution - In the years since World War II 
many reliable foreign businessmen have visited the Far East to place 
orders and establish dependable channels of distribution. But unfortu­
nately there have also been a large number of unreliable businessmen. 
They are what can only be called "carpet baggers." These latter busi­
nessmen have been interested only in making a quick profit for them­
selves without regard to the effect on the economies of the exporting 
countries or on the long run development of export potential. Most 
of these carpet baggers have not had established sales outlets in the 
United States and were basing their activities on an opportunity to make 
a quick profit by buying cheap and selling dear. 
Businessmen in the Far East, unacquainted with fundamental 
marketing principles and unable to see the need for long range sound 
market development rather than merely making quick sales, commonly 
accepted the offers received without questioning the implications in­
volved. As long as payment was tendered at the time an order was 
placed no questions were asked. They did not realize that such buyers 
should have been required to furnish financial references and other 
evidence of reliability as is normally provided by reliable American 
importers. Nor did they see that, rather than developing export trade, 
these unreliable importers were tending to destroy export potential 
through failure to establish sound channels of distribution. 
Typically, Far Eastern exporters consider the United States as 
one market rather than a number of separate and distinct markets. 
Moreover, they do not analyze the relation of their productive capacity 
to the size of the market with the result that as demand develops they 
find they cannot fill orders received within time limits specified. When, 
as a result of delayed deliveries of promised quantities, orders are can­
celled and importers refuse to engage in further business, they do not 
understand that the fault lies in poor selection of channels of distribu­
tion rather than in decline in market demand. 
Striking in Far Eastern exporters' selection of channels of dis­
tribution is an almost universal insistence on selling through importers 
located only in the major eastern American cities, particularly New 
York and Chicago. With only a quick, superficial glance at population 
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distribution and business organization they tend to believe these are the 
best outlets for their commodities. Consequently, there is a tendency 
to concentrate on establishing contact with buyers in those areas and 
to disregard other parts of the country. Actually, in many instances 
attempting to develop channels of distribution only through New York 
and Chicago is an extremely unwise policy. In the first place, should 
an undeveloped market exist in these areas for their products, it would 
probably be far in excess of productive capacity. But more important, 
by focusing in the eastern half of the United States they are competing 
with European producers, many of whom have far more experience in 
selling to the United States. Breaking into the market in the face of 
such competition is extremely difficult. 
The Middle West and Far West remain largely an untapped mar­
ket for Far Eastern products; yet it is a market which is potentially 
highly desirable and in which channels of distribution could be estab­
lished easily. Because of the distance from Europe, producers in that 
area have tended to prefer to let the West remain a latent market, at 
least up to the present. Because of the geographical proximity of the 
western part of the United States to the Far East, substantial distribu­
tion cost savings could be effected. Moreover, as a result of closer 
cultural contact� with the Far East there has been a larger penetration 
of products of that area into the mode of living than has occurred in 
the eastern part of the. United States. And Far Eastern products are 
better suited to the simplified, functional styles of Western homes and 
dress. 
One final problem which stands out in foreign channels of dis­
tribution for Far Eastern products has been a tendency to insist on 
selling only through large national wholesalers or retailers. Inquiries 
received from small, though reliable, regional wholesalers located in 
cities in such states as Wisconsin and Minnesota are frequently ignored. 
Japanese producers and exporters in particular appear uninterested in 
developing sales outlets other than such large organizations as Macy's, 
Sears Roebuck, Woolworth's, or the Allied Mercantile Corporation. 
Yet these organizations are not suitable for developing the exports of 
those products having the greatest potential for a balanced economy. 
Local or regional wholesalers would be much more suitable for market 
development of fine quality products of the essentially handicraft proc­
esses. 
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Other Marketing Problems 
In addition to inadequate marketing research and lack of attention 
to appropriate channels of distribution there are a number of other 
problems which tend to limit the market development possibilities for 
Far Eastern products. It is impossible to present all of them fully; but 
they should be mentioned at least briefly. 
Quality Maintenance-Most domestic purchasing in Far Eastern coun­
tries is based on physical inspection of commodities offered for sale. 
Hence, variations in quality are permissible as they can be observed 
readily. As a result, far less emphasis is placed on quality control than 
in American production. One of the most frequently expressed diffi­
culties in buying from Far Eastern sources has been the failure to secure 
products of uniform quality. In fact, some American marketing or­
ganizations now are reluctant to buy Far Eastern products because of 
previous unfavorable experiences. Far Eastern producers must be 
made to realize that, since American buyers usually order on the basis 
of specification or sample, quality control must be carefully observed. 
Delivery - In Far Eastern markets there is much less variation in 
volume of sales throughout the year than is usual in the United States. 
Time of delivery is of less importance and marketing organizations are 
set up with the expectation of irregular delivery. American buyers 
place orders and specify delivery dates in anticipation of peak selling 
seasons; a failure to receive delivery by the time specified can prove 
quite disruptive. A number of importers have advised the writer that 
one reason they prefer to buy from European sources is that promised 
delivery dates are frequently ignored by Far Eastern sources, with com­
modities arriving some time after the selling season has passed. Con­
siderable education is needed on the necessity to deliver at promised 
times and especially on the importance of not accepting orders unless 
it is certain that a specified delivery date can be met. 
Guarantee and Servicing - It is relatively uncommon when buying 
commodities in Far Eastern markets to receive a guarantee or have the 
seller provide for servicing. Rather, a policy of caveat emptor still 
tends to persist. With a few notable exceptions, such as the guarantees 
and servicing facilities of the Canon and Nikon cameras, this policy 
carries over into exporting. But the American buyer knows that from 
time to time products of even the best production methods will have 
defects or need servicing. Unless confidence is established by furnishing 
guarantees, buyers will hesitate to place orders. Abandonment of caveat 
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emptor in exporting will serve in large measure to build up confidence 
in Far Eastern products and stimulate increased purchasing by Ameri­
can importers. 
Price Maintenance - In Japan at least, and it is believed in other Far 
Eastern countries, the one-price system is almost as universal as in the 
United States. Of course, "discounting" of prices is practiced as it is in 
the United States; but with few exceptions stores in Japan follow a 
one-price policy quite closely. Japanese sellers, having had experience 
with American tourists and the carpet bagger importers, seem to have 
come to believe that price negotiation is expected when doing busi­
ness with the United States. Partly because of this and partly because 
of an inadequately developed system of cost accounting and cost con­
trols, an initial price will be quoted which they believe to be the highest 
they might secure. If this price is not accepted, it will be lowered until 
a sale is made. They apparently do not realize that confidence will not 
be created by failing to adhere to a one-price system. Furthermore, 
Japanese business closely guards business secrets, especially prices paid 
for purchases. They apparently do not realize that much price informa­
tion is exchanged in the United States between otherwise close com­
petitors. When it is determined that sellers are quoting different prices 
to buyers in the same class, reliable American firms tend to lose con­
fidence and .hesitate to place orders. Reliable American businessmen 
can be a great help to the inexperienced Far East.em exporter if they 
will do their utmost to ·educate their sources of supply on the adverse 
effects of entering into price bargaining. 
Conclusions 
Of all the aspects of business in the underdeveloped nations of the 
Far East marketing is perhaps the most underdeveloped. Yet with few 
exceptions, future economic development rests upon successful export 
marketing of their products. At the present time their export potential 
is being seriously limited because of problems created through lack 
of knowledge of modern marketing methods. Education in marketing 
cannot come overnight and is not easily acquired. Moreover, educa­
tion will not develop until the need is clearly recognized. 
Although adequate capital accumulation is an essential problem 
of all the countries, it is no greater a problem than adequate market 
development. But up to the present time attention of economists and 
other experts has been centered in discovering means for providing 
for capital accumulation. A shift in emphasis is now needed to place 
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equal responsibility on developing efficient marketing methods. And 
as the United States is the most advanced nation of the world in devel­
opment of marketing methods, the initiative must come from this source. 
Initial steps in marketing education must come from American 
businessmen doing business with the Far Eastern countries. Sugges­
tions for the direct solution of the problems discussed in the previous 
pages, including correction of existing disruptive or uneconomic prac­
tices, can easily be made. As the importance of marketing research, 
appropriate channels of distribution, quality controls, delivery, sound 
price policy and other aspects comes to be recognized strong stimula­
tion will be provided for internal education by governmental agencies 
and educational institutions - education almost totally lacking at 
present. 
Finally, as the benefits of improved marketing methods in export­
ing are observed, these same methods will come to be adopted in do­
mestic marketing. At that time the marketing multiplier in economic 
development will begin to exert its full force and the countries of the 
Far East will experience an era of unprecedented economic advance­
ment. 
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POTENTIALS DISCERNIBLE IN 1920's 
THERE WAS ALMOST universal dependence on agricultural produc­
tion in all countries of Asia in the decade immediately preceding the 
first world war. Total needs for subsistence of the many were great. 
So were the demands for conspicuous consumption by the rest. Most 
processes of production were backward, as measured by standards in 
industrialized Western countries. Exceptions were to be found in some 
Japanese industries. In the larger countries, India and China, goods such 
as textiles, chinaware and jewelry, in the production of which more 
of artistic skill than technical or mechanical efficiency was required, had 
become well known in international trade. 
The use of savings for investment for production of goods and 
services had not been widely institutionalized. This may be explained, 
in part, in terms of scarcity of money and a propensity to conserve 
savings. Many loans were secured by property or other tangible assets, 
but even so, interest rates for most purposes were very high. It is 
also true that demand for savings for investment was deficient, relative 
to needs of income. 
Surprisingly, several of the countries were able to achieve an ex­
cess of the value of exports to the United States, Britain and other 
countries over the value of imports. However, the difference was not 
largely used to purchase capital goods. In nearly all of the countries 
harsh restriction of consumption of the one class and self-denial most 
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objectionable to the other would have had to be imposed if savings were 
to increase at reasonable rates. 
The shortage of vitally needed savings may be better explained in 
terms of tradition and culture than in economic terms. Inherited status 
in most Asian societies had precluded or severely narrowed possibilities 
for distinction by individual initiative and achievement, and most of 
the higher education had been of a philosophical character. 1 
There were other specific reasons why the contributions of Asia 
to world trade in this period consisted mainly of agricultural and un­
processed mineral products. There was no lack of mineral and poten­
tial power resources in Asia, taken as a region. In fact, the countries 
of the region are complementary in so far as availability of these re­
sources is concerned. As reasons for the slow rates of economic growth 
we are to set down instead: (a) lack of skills, (b) shortage of capital, 
(c) traditions which emphasized community solidarity and well-being
more than individual initiative and achievement, (d) colonialism, which
required accelerated production of some goods for export without proc­
essing or with only the preliminary stages done, and ( e) a sense of
sufficiency.
Three examples drawn from widely separated areas of Asia may 
be given in some detail: Australia, Indonesia and India. It will be 
shown that relatively late or limited development or underdevelopment 
in each of these countries has been due to one or more of these causes. 
Australia: About 70 per cent of Australia's exports between 1900 
and 1914 consisted of wheat, wool and metals. The country was de­
pendent on imports for most manufactures. Home factory production 
was limited largely to woolen textiles, clothing and foodstuffs. The 
war of 1914-1918 was to prove that this dependence, mainly on Britain, 
was not inevitable. But the industrial activities of Australia during the 
war also proved that a country which industrializes prematurely may 
attain to an apparently significant position in international trade only 
to have it wrested away by competitors. 2 Trade diversion results and 
countries which had participated in promoting the premature growth 
may lose much of their gains. 
In the immediate prewar era Australia had a sufficient proportion 
1 Maurice Zinkin, Development for Free Asia (London: Chatto & Windus, 
1956), pp. 6-7, 179,207. 
2 Kate L. Mitchell, Industrialization of the Western Pacific (New York: In­
stitute of Pacific Relations), pp. 241-42. 
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of the prerequisites for industrialization, but lacked some essential skills, 
and also drive. But under pressure of sheer need, due to isolation, 
manufacturing was accelerated. By 1920 the value of manufactured 
goods produced in a year had increased from £63.3 million to £81.4 
million. But more important than this was the fact that heavy industry 
had been fairly established. From 1921 until the depression after the 
first world war manufacturing processes made the largest contribution 
to the value of production. 
However, the hastily established wartime industries were unable 
to compete, even in the home market, with reviving British and foreign 
export industries, and as early as 1921 the government resorted to 
tariff protection which was extended to a wider range of industries in 
the late 1920's. Moreover, high cost of industrial production, a con­
sequence of mushroom growth, required Australia to practice price 
discrimination in favor of external markets, if the country was to es­
tablish an export trade in manufactures. There appears to be no evi­
dence, however, that this was practiced as policy, but the export trade 
in manufactures was negligible at the end of the l 920's. The largest 
single group of items was raw materials and pastoral goods. 3 The be� 
ginning of industrialization in textiles and metals was not an initial 
failure. It is clearly evident that the setback which Australia suffered 
was due to ins.ufficiency of skills. 
Indonesia: The Dutch had established a "culture system" in this 
group of colonies as far back as 1830-1870. A land revenue was 
exacted in the form of export crops, and additional quantities of these 
crops were purchased by the government at prices calculated to bring 
large profits when the goods were resold. The only other form of pro­
duction encouraged under this, the Van den Bosch Plan, was sub­
sistence crops. The plan worked so well that the Dutch treasury, en­
riched by the revenue from land, had difficulty in finding ways of in­
creasing its expenditure on the same scale. The Dutch, at home, were 
not a very enterprising people and seemed to lack the initiative neces­
sary to use effectively all the new revenue obtained from sale in Holland 
of the crops collected as tax and the quantities purchased at govern­
ment prices. So the plan conceived by Joannes Van den Bosch under 
pressure from William I to get more profit out of the East Indies re-
s Ibid., pp. 242-43. 
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sulted, in conspicuous part, in the famous Treasury surpluses, which 
were rather embarrassing. 
The plan was ill-conceived. Importation of the cheap agricultural 
products, of which coffee was the most sought after, could have resulted 
in reduction of Dutch cost of living and consequently production costs, 
if there were a wide variety of these products or if they included some 
of the main articles of consumption or raw materials for production. 
Coffee could not make much of a contribution of this character.4 But 
more important still was the fact that apart from shipping, in which 
the Dutch were unusually competent, they were not establishing many 
industries that seemed destined to occupy any significant competitive 
place in world markets. Holland has grown up mainly as an efficient 
agricultural country, with some manufacturing industries, using farm 
products. 
The peculiar form of prosperity generated by government enter­
prise in Indonesia actuated Dutch businessmen to claim a major role. 
At the same time a change in organization of production was socially 
desirable, for the prosperity which was enjoyed in the colony was not 
shared by the growers of the crops compulsorily produced. Thus, a 
"Liberal System" was instituted which allowed private enterprise to 
acquire plantations formerly managed by the government. A conflict 
then arose between planting and manufacturing interests. The planters 
could gain by paying low wages and exporting the products, but the 
manufacturers, particularly of cotton goods, were interested primarily 
in markets, which, it was held, could be expanded by increase in wages. 
Hence, chambers of commerce emphasized welfare, which became the 
economic objective of an "ethical policy" which succeeded the liberal 
policy. Thus at the beginning of this century development by modern 
means was avowed as essential policy for promotion of welfare, which 
became mixed with ethics. 5 
Nevertheless the Dutch government's interest in developing mod­
ern industries, or even in improving handicrafts, flagged, up to the end 
of the 1920's. Netherlands India was still to be preserved as market 
for Dutch manufactures. What capital investment there was in the 
4 J. S. Furnivall, "Colonial Policy and Practice," and A. M. Joekes, "Develop­
ments in the Administration of Indonesia," in Colonial Administration by 
European Powers (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946), 
pp. 21-23, 220-23. 
5 Ibid., pp. 223-26. 
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1920's was shared by several foreign countries, the largest investments 
being those of Holland, Britain and the United States, in that order. 
More than half of the external capital was invested in agriculture and 
most of the rest in transportation, extractive industries and banking. 
The main products were sugar, rubber, tea, coffee, oil palms, to­
bacco, cinchona and coconuts. It was an unbalanced economy, based 
on foreign needs of raw materials and a few other products. While 
dependence on exports was great there was not a sufficient variety of 
goods exported for substantial competition in foreign markets when the 
prices of some declined. Thus Netherlands India's economy became 
very vulnerable to fluctuations in world prices. Even Dutch govern­
ment officials were gravely concerned about its unstable character. 6 
Inevitably, in the world depression of the early 1930's the value of 
Indonesian exports fell. very low, by as much as 67 per cent, while 
their volume declined by 17 per cent. This meant, in effect, that a very 
unfavorable change in the terms of trade had taken place. 
The trade of Netherlands India need not have come to this pass. 
Its people, particularly the Javanese, are industrious. The soil and 
climate are most favorable to tropical agriculture. There was a very 
considerable export trade in sugar with India while the United States 
imported $2,500,000 worth of kapok annually. Indonesia was third 
in the world as· an exporter of tea, the world's most important source 
of quinine, the major tobacco-producing area in the East Indies, and 
the chief producer of rubber. To these palm oil may be added, as a 
growing industry, in the 1920's.7 The United States also imported rub-
. ber, copra, tapioca and spices. 
But manufacturing industries had not achieved much more than to 
supply the home market with basic needs, except in the production of 
hats. Bergsmark makes the paucity of mineral resources a sufficient 
condition for minimizing the prospects of industrial growth. This could 
be true of any country in the short run. Thereafter the development 
of skills and the rate of increase in productivity may become the deci­
sive factors, as they have been in Japan. The Japanese home market 
is now approximately the same as Indonesia's, in terms of population 
although not of income. Agricultural productivity is in the main greater, 
6 Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 197-200. 
7 Daniel R. Bergsmark, Economic Geography of Asia (New York: Prentice Hall, 
Inc., 1935), pp. 306-07, 314-18. 
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but there is greater diversity of substantial crops in Indonesia. And as 
an industrialized country Japan is very deficient in minerals. 
India: The potentials of India, which were clearly discernible in 
the 1920's, are little realized even today. It was amply evident that 
India was not a country whose well-being depended only on agricul­
tural improvement and only negligible industrial activities. This had 
been its type of economy so long, under colonialism, that it was widely 
assumed that the country could have no other. Actually the potentials 
for industrial growth, as could be seen in the 1920's, were impressive: 
a) The cultivated land of India was approximately nineteen times
that of Australia. This was less than proportionate, but Australia was 
able to export more agricultural products than India. The country's 
300,000,000 acres of arable land made it, potentially, a leading agri­
cultural country, but only in some fields did performance justify its 
place among leaders. Toward the end of the 1920's India was the 
world's second largest producer of cotton and sugar cane and was pro­
ducing 95 per cent of the jute entering international commerce. It 
was among the largest producers of tea, grain, sorghums, flax, rice, barley 
and corn, and fifth largest producer of wheat. 8 
b) India's industrial possibilities in the 1920's could have been
seen in the variety and quantities of mineral resources, the large pro­
portion of raw materials in this country's exports, and the population 
of 350,000,000, which could become the second largest market in Asia. 
In Bergsmark's work, published in 1935, India was credited with 
possession of "the materials that go to build up commerce." He was 
satisfied that "the products of the geographical regions are sufficiently 
varied to encourage domestic trade," and there was excess for export. 
A comprehensive picture of industrial activities is presented. The num­
ber of workers in manufacturing industries in the late 1920's and early 
1930's was about three times the number so engaged in the British 
Isles. There were artistic tastes of a high order, but industry generally 
was at the workshop stage.9 
Works of a less geographical character than Bergsmark's, and of 
more economic and social interest, show the possibilities of develop­
ment more fully. They note, for example, that mineral resources in­
clude superior quality iron ore equal to three-fourths of the reserves 
in the United States, large deposits of manganese, bauxite, chromite, 
8 Ibid., pp. 172, 186, 196. 
9 Ibid., pp. 240, 227-30. 
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mica, copper, coal and other minerals. India also possesses sources of 
hydro electric power second only to those of the United States. Largely 
because of these resources and a heritage of skilled craftsmanship, one 
of the later writers, Kate Mitchell, reached the conclusion that India 
was, potentially, "one of the most powerful industrial areas of the 
world."10 This was much the same as Hubbard's evaluation four years 
earlier.11 
Why, then, was India's industrial progress so slow? The answers 
seem obvious: lack of capital was noted earlier as a disadvantage in 
Asia as a whole, insufficient variety of skills, a capacity to endure 
privation, and, most important of all, colonialism. Lack of skills, and 
capital are not very satisfactory explanations, for an Indian iron and 
steel industry was started as early as 1911, and we have seen that arts 
and crafts had been developed, although large-scale production was 
not typical. The slow rate of progress from the cottage and workshop 
to the modern factory has been due largely to colonialism. 
Before India became a British colony there was a widely distributed 
handicraft industry which, with agriculture, provided modest living 
standards. Colonialism severely disturbed this without improving it, 
until wartime needs made improvement imperative but for reasons 
other than Indian needs. Instead of importing surplus raw materials 
from India and 'investing there in more efficient production of them and 
selling manufactured goods to workers engaged in such production, 
which could have been· temporarily viable, Britain 'enforced almost free 
entry of her manufactured goods, raised high British tariffs against In­
dian products and restricted Indian trade with other countries. An 
outstanding example of the change in the character of India's foreign 
trade was cotton. India had exported cotton goods to the world for 
centuries but became an importer of 25 per cent of British cotton 
exports.12 
The British economic policy was probably more successful than 
could be hoped for. Many handicraft skills were lost to India. This 
vital part of the country's economy was virtually destroyed in some 
areas and no manufacturing industries were established which replaced 
the craftsmen by workers with factory skills. Thus India's production 
10 Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 275-77.
11 G. E. Hubbard, Eastern Industrialization and its Effect on the West (Oxford 
University Press, 1938), p. 304. 
12 Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 279-80.
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in some areas became one-sided and the economy resembled that of 
Netherlands India, but more needlessly unbalanced. The policy not 
only impoverished the country, thus making it a lesser market for Brit­
ish manufactures, but also created the delusion that India must always 
be in the main a producer of food and raw materials. That miscon­
ception still exists. 
It has been mentioned that British wartime needs in the East in 
1914-1918 brought a change of policy in favor of Indian industrial 
development, but imperial tariff preference which became the dominant 
colonial policy from the late 1920's was unfavorable to this change. 
This well-known policy, which culminated in the protective decisions 
reached at the Imperial Economic Conference held in Ottawa in 1932, 
required India, as other colonies, to give tariff preference to British 
manufactures in exchange for British preference given to Indian raw 
materials. Thus was India's dependence on raw materials again em­
phasized, while Indian manufacturing industries, such as they were, 
had to compete with British industries at technical disadvantages. 
It was obvious that the British policy was directed to the most 
advantageous competition possible, with Indian and foreign industries 
in the Indian market, when the depression set in. This was part of 
an empire-wide effort to secure a larger part of a smaller world trade. 
It was impossible of success. The prices of many Indian products fell 
very low, so that exports to India could be increased only if British 
prices were reduced. 
Ceylon: Separation of Ceylon from India, as a region, does not 
seem to be fully justified, but there was little choice if India was to be 
kept distinct. Ceylon had gained a place in international markets mainly 
by exporting rubber, tea, graphite ( which declined in competition), coco­
nut products, cinnamon and citronella oil. As a British colony it did not 
find a market for most of its exports in Britain. The United States was a 
large buyer of Ceylonese rubber and tea. 
Siam: Of this country's products which were traded internationally, 
teak was very important to Europe as a rot-resisting timber; rice was 
an important source of wealth, largely as an export to other Asiatic 
countries. Tin and rubber also entered international trade. Manu­
facturing had hardly begun, in the 1920's. Trading interest in the 
United States was small. 
Malaya: Until quite recently a British colony, this country is well 
known as a major source of rubber and tin. The United States had 
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become the largest importer, mainly of rubber. The consequences of 
expansion of production of synthetic rubber to rubber-producing coun­
tries were probably greater in the case of Malaya than in that of Indo­
nesia or Ceylon. A partial analysis of this is given in a later section. 
French Indochina: This country was an exporter of rice in the 
1920's, and, of lesser importance, coal and rubber. As in Siam and 
Malaya, the prospects for manufacturing seemed to be almost entirely 
prospects for establishment of light industries. 
Philippines: These islands, too, had essentially an agricultural eco­
nomy in the 1920's, but as a colony of the United States they had made 
more progress than European colonies in Asia. Although there was 
restriction of trade, the United States, as the metropolitan country, took 
most of the exports and the Philippines were thus able to consistently 
achieve an excess of the value of exports over the value of imports. 
The exports were mainly such agricultural products as sugar, hemp, 
coconuts, coconut oil, tobacco and timber. There was mutual tariff 
preference, but the preference could hardly have had serious adverse 
effects, for the Philippines were thus assured of a very large market 
and the United States was the most efficient producer of many of their 
imports. Thus prices in the United States, of both Philippine exports 
and imports, remained the main determinants of the terms of trade. 
The islands ·were better endowed with the material prerequisites 
for manufacturing industry than most if not all of the countries in this 
region of Asia. Typical industries were homecrafts, such as needlework, 
and some factories processing agricultural products. The Philippines 
possessed iron ore, but the quantities had not yet been established. 
Sources of water power existed. 
Japan: The story of dependence on agriculture in the 1920's 
could be repeated here. The two most important items in the external 
commodity trade of this country were raw silk, for which the United 
States was the best market, and raw cotton, for which Japan was one 
of the best markets of the United States. But Japan had begun to make 
active use of the resources it had for industrial development, and by 
the end of the 'twenties there was a significant increase in exports of 
manufactured goods and imports of raw materials. 
The most valuable resources were coal, copper, and sources of 
hydro-electric power. In addition, climatic conditions were favorable 
to the production of raw silk. But there were some deficiencies which 
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were serious disadvantages. The first of these, in order of indispens­
ability, was the supply of iron ore. 
Industrial growth started with a double dependence on foreign 
countries: for metals which were most essential, and for markets. The 
latter is always to be expected when a country industrializes faster than 
its population acquires new tastes. The dependence was somewhat 
offset by three advantages: ( 1) production at home, by intensive cul­
tivation, of about 90 per cent of the food consumed, (2) a large labor 
force which could be quickly trained, and ( 3) active government aid 
to and support of industry. 1 ' It is also to be observed that the textile
industry, in which Japan was gaining most of her industrial successes, 
required less steel than other industries which were less important then. 
Exports other than raw silk were tea, paper, camphor, menthol 
and fish products. 
Industrialization in Japan was accomplished under more govern­
ment control than is generally known. This began with the rise of the 
Meiji after 1868. Government ownership included railways, postal, 
telegraph and telephone services, dockyards, clothing factories, and 
monopolies of tobacco, camphor and salt. Moreover, extensive control 
of industrial financing was instituted. This was done by giving gov­
ernment financial support to twenty-five special banks, which enabled 
the government to appoint personnel and control policy, including de­
termination of priorities. 
The beginnings of industrial competition within Asia could be 
seen in the I 920's, even though there was little variety in industrial 
production there, outside of Japan. China was both market for, and a 
competitor of Japan, in the production of raw silk; and India, a large 
source of raw cotton, showed evidence of becoming an equally strong 
competitor of Japan in the production of cotton textiles. With increased 
industrialization in both India and China it could be foreseen that the 
rising prominence of Japan in the silk and cotton industries would be 
effectively challenged. 
It was also evident that Japan was fast becoming a serious com­
petitor of both Britain and the United States in the export of cotton­
piece goods. The Japanese exports of this commodity rose to 2.8 times 
the United States exports and 40 per cent of the exports of Britain. 14 
13 Bergsmark, op. cit., pp. 413-15. 
14 Ibid., pp. 415, 419, 431. 
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In fact Japanese sales of cotton-piece goods increased to such an extent 
that it was decided to exclude them at the Imperial Economic Confer­
ence held in Ottawa in 1932. Tariffs and quotas were later used for this 
purpose in British colonies although the measures also applied to United 
States cotton goods, in some colonies, as part of the total foreign sup­
ply. The measures failed because the Japanese gained in world markets 
as a whole.15 
Formosa: Formerly Chinese, this island was captured by the 
Japanese in 1894 and made a colony of the typical European model of 
the eighteenth-nineteenth century. By 1929, Japanese capital virtually 
monopolized all industry and mining, and averaged about 50 per cent 
of all investments in agriculture, commerce, communications and fish­
eries. Most of the Chinese, who constituted 94 per cent of the popula­
tion, had to earn their living by work in mines and factories. This was 
a consequence of monopoly in industry and active government support 
of monopoly in Japan. Japan made the country a source of raw ma­
terials and food, largely rice and sugar. Other exports of Formosa 
were tea, bananas, camphor, coal and ores. 
Formosa's trade with Japan increased rapidly, and the sugar pro­
duction demanded by Japan made the Japanese self-sufficient in this 
product. This _was accomplished by means of subsidy and tariffrn so that 
the sugar trade did not result in all the gains which were possible from 
it, through competition, for the countries in the. area which had ob­
tained the best results. 
The Japanese, in adopting the well-known European colonial 
policy of obtaining raw materials and foodstuffs from colonies by the 
cheapest means possible, discriminated, in effect, against Indonesian 
sugar which was obtainable at half the price of the sugar produced in 
and imported from Formosa. Thus the self-sufficiency was achieved 
at the expense of the Chinese workers in Formosa and the Japanese 
consumers. 
The large increase in sugar production in Formosa, so that it might 
be sold in Japan at artificially high prices, was unfavorable to world 
trade in sugar, for toward the end of the nineteenth century world sugar 
production was already becoming excessive. 
15 Japanese exports had increased by 326 million square yards by 1938, while 
British exports had declined by 615 million square yards. See F. V. Meyer, 
Britain's Colonies in World Trade (Oxford: 1948), p. 84. 
16 Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 49, 50, 55. 
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Korea: Japan made a colony of Korea, too, in 1910, and ordered 
production there so as to conform to the same policy that was applied 
to Formosa. At first the country was a large exporter of rice to Japan. 
It became one of the largest suppliers, and rice was its principal export. 
Others were iron ore, soy beans and raw silk, which became an im­
portant Korean industry in the 1920's. Its imports were typically those 
of a colony. Its external trade was monopolized by Japan. 
There was, however, a significant difference. Industrial growth 
was permitted because this was expedient for Japanese imperial plans 
in China and in Korea itself, and Korea's proximity to China and its 
power resources, textile skills and some achievements in the textile in­
dustry were favorable conditions. It seems that the plan had a two-fold 
objective: first, to accelerate extractive production in Korea for the 
purposes of light industries there and in China, and secondly, for use 
of heavy Japanese industries at home. There seems to be difference 
of judgment as to the stage to which such a plan was carried by the 
Japanese. Thus Hubbard, in discussing the industrial future of Japan 
gives it no space, while Kate Mitchell emphasizes it.11 
Japanese industrial control in Korea was not dissimilar to their 
control in Formosa. In the 1920's, Korean capital investments were 
already giving way in remarkable degree to Japanese capital in a wide 
range of Korean industries. With freedom in Korea and administrative 
change in Formosa, Japan has had to face a large decrease in its 
measure of self-sufficiency. The Japanese seem to have realized since 
that they had little choice in industrial planning, in so far as foreign 
markets were concerned. It was evident in the 1940's that they were 
unlikely to enjoy the same rate of increase in world textile markets 
that they had in the late 1930's. As far as Asian markets were con­
cerned, two directions for progress appeared to remain: ( 1) supply of 
capital goods to newly industrializing countries in Asia, and ( 2) diversi­
fication of manufacturing industries so as to increase exports to these 
countries. In both, increasing competition with the United States and 
Europe was inevitable. 
II 
PERIOD 1930-1949: PAINS OF GROWTH AND DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE
Resources and Uses 
Several countries of Asia faced a difficult problem of allocation 
17 Hubbard, op. cit., ch. III; and Mitchell, op. cit., p. 58.
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of resources, toward the end of the 1940's, when outputs of food and 
other agricultural products varied from 86 to 94 per cent of prewar 
production. There are several explanations: ( 1) China had not recov­
ered from the ravages of war and there were floods and other causes 
which slowed the rates of production; (2) because of wartime imposi­
tions and expediencies, India, Indonesia, Japan and Pakistan were able 
to produce only prewar quantities of coarse grains; (3) Indonesia and 
the Philippines, for similar reasons, produced much less than prewar 
quantities of sugar.18 
The consequent shortage of food caused priority to be given to 
investments in irrigation. This enforced use of resources of itself de­
layed progress in industrial production of goods traded internationally. 
The following is a summary of the mineral resources and their 
uses, in the countries in which they were found in significant quantities. 
It is to be observed that in 1949 geological surveys had not been com­
pleted in some of the countries: 
Coal: China, India and Indochina ( in this order of importance). 
China's reserves were estimated to be second only to those 
of the United States. Coal had been found in several other 
countries of Asia, but most of it is of low grade. In India, 
about 5,000,000 tons p.a. and in Indochina an unspecified 
quantity are used for other than metallurgical purposes. 
Petroleum: In Indonesia (including North Borneo, Brunei and 
Sarawak), production in 1949 exceeded the prewar rate and 
justified at least consideration of plans to build a large mod­
ern refinery. 
In Burma (including Assam and Thailand) it was not yet 
possible to resume commercial production. Estimates could 
not be made with reasonable accuracy. 
Pakistan: in moderate quantities. 
China: the United Nations' Survey included the following 
statement: Northwest China might become "one of the most 
important oil-bearing zones of the world." 
Oil Shale: China was the first of Asian countries to produce oil 
from shale. It was estimated in 1949 that the reserves of oil 
in this form were 521,000,000 tons. A plant had been con­
structed for the production of 70,000 tons per annum, and 
18 United Nations, Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1949, pp. 3, 5-6. 
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there were by-products of ammonium sulphate, crude paraf­
fin and coke. 
Oil shale was also found in Burma and India, possibly in 
commercial quantities. 
Iron Ore: It was estimated that the iron ore deposits in Asia were 
10,000 million tons, of which China and India possessed 
two-thirds. China had reserves estimated at 4,179 million 
tons, including 103 million tons of high grade ore. This ex­
cluded 10 million tons in Taiwan (Formosa). India's ore 
was reported to include numerous high-grade hematitic bodies. 
The Philippines: 21 million tons hematitic and magnetic ores 
and 1,000 million tons of laterite. 
Malaya exported as much as 2 million tons per annum before 
World War II. One deposit was estimated at 30 million tons. 
Indochina had planned to produce 400,000 tons per annum. 
North Korea was far better supplied than South Korea, but 
estimates did not appear to be satisfactory. 
Burma had several deposits but it was not clear that their 
quality or even quantity had been satisfactorily estimated. 
Ceylon had some deposits, which had not been estimated. 
Japan was very deficient. 
Manganese: India: about 29 million tons, of which large quanti­
ties had been exported to Japan, which was deficient. 
Philippines, Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Malaya and Indo­
nesia also had deposits. 
Molybdenum: China had the largest known reserves in Asia, 
about eight million tons. 
Nickel: Large deposits had been found in Indonesia, and there 
were some deposits in the Philippines. It was reported that 
in both countries, taken together, millions of tons of laterite 
ore existed which contained 0.7 per cent of nickel. 
Titanium: Ilmenite is the "chief ore" of titanium. It is used in the 
manufacture of alloy steel and high-grade paints. India was 
one of the largest producers in 1949. The total reserves of 
India, Ceylon and Japan were estimated at 250 to 300 mil­
lion tons. 
Tungsten: China was the most important producer in the world 
and in Asia, and the Soviet Union was China's principal mar-
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ket. Other producers and exporters were Burma, Malaya, 
Indochina, Thailand and Korea. 
Vanadium: There were substantial deposits in India and other 
countries of Asia. Japan was deficient. 
Source: summarized from United Nations' report cited, pp. 332-50. 
Asia is rich in nonferrous metals too: 
Antimony: China was the world's largest producer since 1920. 
Japan's small reserves were nearly exhausted at the end of 
the 1940's. There were then some deposits in Thailand and 
Indochina. 
Copper: This and zinc were the only minerals of which Japan was 
one of the major producers in 1949. The Japanese reserves 
were estimated at 2,750,000 metric tons. Other producers 
were the Philippines, India, Korea, Burma and China. The 
resources of India and China were not being exploited on 
a large scale. 
Lead and Zinc: Burma led in the production of lead and Japan 
in zinc. China was a small producer of both. Indochina was 
a large producer of zinc and Thailand a considerable pro­
ducer of lead. Indian reserves were reported to be small, but 
further surveys seemed necessary. 
Tin: Most of the world's reserves of tin had been found in Asia, 
mainly in Malaya, Indonesia, Thailand,. China, Burma and 
Indochina. Malaya was the world's largest producer. Japan, 
a large consumer, had small deposits. 
This study was not intended to include all nonmetallic minerals, 
yet it may be added that with the exception of sulphur, commercial 
quantities of nearly all of them were to be found in Asia in the late 
1940's, and the larger quantities of most of them were reported in 
India and China. 
The minerals listed here include nearly all the more important 
minerals traded internationally, as listed by the League of Nations.19 
Some valuable minerals found in Asia, such as manganese, were not 
included in the League's list as being among the 23 most important 
products in world commodity trade. When two important nonmineral 
products of Asia, cotton and tea, are added, 12 of the 23 are found 
to have been listed. Asia's share of the exports of some of them was 
19 See Network of World Trade, p. 30. 
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not large, and the quantities produced in each of the countries of the 
world, whether Asian or not, were not separately listed. 
Evidence of Industrialization 
It must have been realized in reading Section I that in the 1920's 
the United States' share of Asia's foreign trade was less than it would 
have been but for colonial connections of European countries, and 
possibly more than it might have been without the United States' co­
lonial connection with the Philippines. In the period to be studied in 
Section III, 1951-1956, some changes in the direction of the external 
trade of Asiatic countries are to be expected, as results of emergence 
of several of the countries from a colonial status, and for other reasons 
such as financing by the United States. We may therefore fruitfully 
examine some evidence of these changes in the immediate postwar 
period. 
The table below shows changes in production in major industries 
between 1938 and 1949. They are to be considered with due reference 
to difficulties and disadvantages already mentioned. 
Major Industrial and Mineral Production in 
ECAFE Countries, 1938 and 1949 
(Thousands of Metric Tons) 
Relative Change: 1938=100 
Product 1938 1949 Tapan Excluded Japan Included 
Coal ......... 70,294 50,396 72 79 
Electricity 
(million KWH) 2,710 5,550 205 151 
Tin Concentrate 103 100 97 97* 
Iron Ore . . . . . 7,717 3,193 41 48 
Pig Iron ...... 1,572 1,572 100 87 
Steel Ingots and 
Castings . . . . . 984 1,380 140 72 
Cement . . . . . .  1,952 2,615 134 78 
Cotton Yam . . 985 817 83 59 
Sulphuric Acid ...... 95 
* Japan's production of tin concentrate was negligible.
Source: United Nations, Economic Survey of Asia and the Far 
East, 1949, p. 22. 
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Changes in production usually precede or occur simultaneously 
with major changes in the direction of trade. Therefore, due attention 
is to be directed to the former, in the late 1940's, when Asian coun­
tries were endeavoring to reconstruct their economies. Because of the 
emphasis on the ECAFE countries, in the most reliable sources of 
information, and as these countries include those which will be most 
important, industrially, in the future, we shall be concerned mainly with 
this group: India, China, Indochina, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaya, 
Pakistan and the Philippines. Data on production in Japan will be 
used mostly for purposes of comparison because its greater progress 
has placed that country in a separate category. 
Some reasons for the slow progress shown have already been given 
in this Section, and we are to be mindful also of the five reasons given 
in Section I. For further comparison with Japan, with due allowance 
for the circumstances of that country then, it may be mentioned that 
industrial activity in Japan, as shown by the Index, was 94 in 1949. 
The base period used was 1932-1936. 
Some of the changes shown might have been reflections of alterna­
tive growth. For example, the decline in coal production might have 
been due to the increased use of electrical power in India, Pakistan, 
the Philippines and Thailand. 
It is also necessary to consider the number of these basic products 
in the output of which each country, with a substantial potential in­
ternal market for consumer goods, achieved a significant increase: 
a) China accomplished this in the production of four of these
nine basic products: coal, tin concentrate, iron ore and cotton
yarn.
b) India's ratio was seven of the nine: coal, electricity, iron ore,
pig iron, crude steel, cement and cotton.
c) Pakistan had a ratio of two to nine: coal and electricity.
d) Indonesia, also two: coal and tin.
e) The Philippines, four: coal, electricity, iron ore and cement.
These ratios will assume more significance later, and perhaps most
in Section III. However, it may be observed here that, with the pos­
sible exception of the Philippines, the countries which had the larger 
ratios were the ones which will be shown, in a subsequent period, to 
have accomplished most in industrialization. 
As some of these basic products are used to produce machines, 
and forecasts or estimates of future trade with other regions must be 
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potential internal markets; and ( b) the ability of these countries to ob­
tain foreign exchange with which to import capital goods, with some 
reference to the ability of other countries in the area which are dif­
ferently endowed and which adopted different trade policies in the 
immediate postwar period. 
The main factors seem to be: (I) absorptive capacity for their 
products in the countries producing capital goods, world competition 
in supplying them, and prices; (Il)variety of exports; (III) sufficiency 
of production for internal markets; and (IV) total assets possessed. 
Of the five countries selected, China has to be excluded again for 
lack of information. This makes for unreality, because of the large 
and varied mineral resources, very large potential internal market, and 
the beginnings of industrial production, notably textiles, iron ore and 
pig iron, steel ingots and heavy chemicals. Also, China had established 
considerable trade with some ECAFE countries: Burma, Hong Kong 
and Thailand. 
India's deficit of $526 million was due mainly to decline in the 
rate of production of jute, which was not offset by increase in exports 
of cotton and cotton textiles. In less degree it was due to a decrease 
in demand in the United States. Another important cause was increase 
in imports of capital goods. It seems, therefore, that factors (I) and 
(IV) were _the· most effective for the purpose of obtaining foreign cur­
rency with which to import capital goods.
India's deficit may be compared with the surplus of $103 million 
achieved by Burma, which is not one of the selected countries. First, 
the Burmese surplus was of a negative character. It appeared as a re­
sult of a people's decision to live within their income, in so far as 
imports of manufactures were concerned, rather than to seek to develop 
with any sense of urgency, viz. by obtaining loans to purchase capital 
goods. It is to be noted, however, that Burma's exports had declined 
by $39 million from the total for 1948. Also, imports of its main 
export, rice, into the United States, had been decreasing since 1935-
1938. None was imported into this country in 1948-1957, and Euro­
pean imports were greatly reduced in the same period. Then petroleum 
products, which were second in order of value of Burma's exports, 
could be sold in international markets only very competitively. 
Burma was still a typical exporter of raw products. Its supply 
of iron ore was still doubtful. It possessed some tungsten, copper and 
tin, but of the minerals listed in this Section, Burma was a large pro-
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ducer of lead only, and it had only one other relatively minor export, 
cotton. Yet Burma would have had to depend mainly on factor (IV) 
to raise foreign loans. 
There being no other large surplus with which to compare deficits 
of any of the selected countries, we proceed with the discussion of 
Pakistan, Indonesia and the Philippines. 
Pakistan's deficit of $158 million was a result of an almost con­
stant value of exports in 1948 and 1949, and a very large increase in 
imports in the latter year, including capital goods. The decline in jute 
production has already been noticed. Raw jute was Pakistan's second 
most important export, and India was practically the whole market. 
Therefore, the decline in India's exports of processed jute could have 
meant even greater adversity to Pakistan than to India. Imports of raw 
jute into Europe decreased greatly in 1935-1938 and 1948-1951, while 
imports into the United States increased only slightly. And imports 
of processed jute into both Europe and the United States declined in 
the same period. Pakistan's only export of comparable value, raw 
cotton, had no market in the United States. And the European market, 
in quantity terms, was incomparably larger in 1928 than in 1948-1951. 
As cotton is sold very competitively in international markets, Pakistan 
could hardly depend on this crop to earn a large part of its foreign 
currency, when world production was rising again in the late forties 
and early fifties. 
Therefore, dependence on factor (I) was greatest in so far as ex­
port of jute was concerned, and dependence on (IV) was considerable. 
Indonesia's export surplus of $27 million in 1949 was remark­
able. It was a change from a deficit of $36 million in 1948. Of its 
seven more valuable exports, petroleum, which was the first in 1938, 
as a percentage of total exports, and second in 1950, was not listed by 
the United Nations as having a market in the United States or in Eu­
rope. Rubber, the second in 1938 and first in 1950, found a rising 
market in both the United States and Europe, but it had to be sold in 
competition with rubber from several other countries of Asia, especially 
Malaya. This country's other important exports, copra and palm oil, 
tea, sugar, tobacco and tin, also were sold competitively. In the import­
ing countries there were shortages in the supplies of rubber and tin 
but it is unlikely that eager buying produced any very favorable price 
effects. The shortages were explained by the United States Depart-
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ment of Commerce as relative to potential rather than to actual de­
mand.20 
The explanation given by the United Nations was that Indonesian 
output of petroleum, vegetable oils, rubber and tin increased rapidly 
and there was a "slackening of United States demand,"21 a situation in 
which there could have been competition among sellers. 
At the end of the 1940's, then, Indonesia could depend on factors 
(IV) and (II) and, in lesser degree, on factor (I) for purchase of
capital goods.
The Philippines' large deficit of $416 million had become charac­
teristic of its external trade. This is to be explained with reference to 
its trade relations with the United States. Sugar, which was 43 per cent 
of total exports in 1938 was only 15 per cent in 1950. The percentage 
of copra and coconut oil, however, had risen from 23 to 54 per cent. 
Abaca, the only other principal export, had increased from 9 to 12 
per cent. 
Reserves of iron ore, manganese, nickel and copper had been 
found, but as the main imports of the United States from the Philippines 
did not include these, they could not be regarded as immediate means 
of obtaining capital goods. However, as Japan is deficient in practically 
all minerals except copper, the Philippines could obtain Japanese capital 
goods by export ·of some of these products. 
The United States could be expected to sustaiq a large Philippine 
deficit indefinitely for reasons of defense, but on economic grounds 
alone reliance on factor (I) would be doubtful, for purposes of earning 
foreign currency, largely on account of world overproduction of sugar 
and United States investments in sugar at home and in Cuba. The 
three other factors were not much more dependable. 
Japan has to be placed in a separate category, as a matured in­
dustrial country. Its deficit of $355 million and paucity of material 
resources were not light disadvantages, but the country possessed nu­
merous industrial skills and already had achieved a wide diversity in 
manufacturing. In the period studied in this Section, Japan had already 
established large foreign markets and was able to obtain materials from 
several foreign sources, including large supplies of raw cotton from the 
United States. 
20 Survey of Current Business, (March, 1948), p. 21. 
21 Ibid., p. 21. 
268 American Trade with Asia and the Far East
Ratios of Asia's Trade to World Trade 
The absolute changes in the total annual values of Asia's foreign 
trade appear to be more reliable information than the ratios of these 
values to values of world trade, for the largest ratios have appeared 
when the totals of world trade were smallest, in 1928 and 193 8. This 
is particularly true of exports, in the period of this Section. In the 
case of imports, the ratios for 1949 and 1951 are comparable with 
those for 1928 and 1938. The following table shows these relationships: 
Trade of Countries of Asia and the Far East 
in Relation to World Trade 
(Billions of Current Dollars 1953) 
World Imports 
Asian Imports 
Percentage 
World Exports 
Asian Exports 
Percentage 
Source: United Nations, 
1953, p. 1. 
1928 1938 1949 1950 1951 
33.6 22.9 59.2 58.9 80.8 
4.6 2.8 7.3 6.2 9.9 
13.7 12.2 12.3 10.6 12.2 
30.8 20.5 54.3 56.1 75.9 
4.8 3.0 5.4 6.8 9.7 
15.4 15.0 9.9 12.1 12.8 
A Study of Trade between Asia and 
1952 
79.9 
9.6 
12.0 
71.9 
7.4 
10.3 
Europe, 
To attempt to show all the causes of fluctuations in the ratios and 
in the totals would be a fruitless effort. Explanation of the failure of 
Asia to maintain its ratios of world trade as trade increased, after 1949, 
has already been furnished in part, in terms of rates of recovery from 
the effects of war, and so on. To these must be added the competition 
of other regions in external markets for Asian exports, in Europe, the 
United States and in Asia itself. 
So much for generalization. A study of trade in the principal 
commodities exported should yield specific evidence. For this purpose 
the table below should be helpful. In its compilation, the trade records 
of British Borneo were included with those of ECAFE countries already 
mentioned: Burma, Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Indochina, Ma­
laya, Philippines and Thailand. 
The United Nations estimated exports of these products as ap­
proximately 80 per cent of the total exports of the ten countries in 1938, 
1950 and 1951, and placed them in the following order of importance: 
rubber, jute and jute products, fats and oils, tea, rice, cotton and cotton 
products, tin, metal and other concentrates, petroleum and derivatives, 
tobacco and pepper. Thus it can be seen that the principal exports of 
Asia consisted almost entirely of raw materials and semi-processed prod-
ucts, up to seven years ago. 
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Export Trade of Ten Asian Countries by 
Principal Commodities 
(Percentages based on 1953 value and total 
values in millions of 1953 dollars) 
Percentage share of total exports 
Commodity 1938 1950 1951 
Food Products 
Rice 9.4 6.2 5.4 
Vegetable Oils and Seeds: 
Coconut Oil 1.1 1.5 1.6 
Copra 2.5 4.4 4.6 
Soybeans 
Groundnut 2.1 0.2 0.1 
Palm Oil 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Linseed and Linseed Oil 1.0 0.3 0.2 
Groundnut Oil 0.1 0.6 0.1 
Total 7.5 7.7 7.3 
Sugar 4.1 1.0 1.1 
Aromatic Crops 
Coffee 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Tea 10.5 7.5 6.5 
Tobacco and manufactures 2.1 1.1 1.0 
Pepper ( other spices) 0.4 1.6 1.1 
Natural Rubber and Fibre Crops 
Cotton and manufactures 5.3 7.2 5.5 
Jute and manufactures 8.3 9.1 14.4 
Hemp/abaca 0.8 0.9 1.1 
Rubber and manufactures 14.1 27.1 29.7 
Coir Fibre 0.1 0.1 
Tin 
Metal 3.2 3.3 2.9 
Concentrate 1.9 1.5 1.2 
Metallic Ores 1.7 0.3 0.1 
Petroleum and Derivatives 8.0 4.5 4.1 
All Other Commodities 22.3 20.5 18.1 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
Value (millions of dollars) 1,709 4,764 6,460 
Source: United Nations, A Study of Trade Between Asia and Eu-
rope, 1953, p. 11. 
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This evidence although not conclusive as to the rate of indus­
trialization five years after the war, is nonetheless of considerable use­
fulness. When it is taken together with the disclosure in the table that 
the values of most of the principal commodities exported in 1951, 
as percentages of the value of total exports, were less than, equal to, 
or only slightly greater than the percentages for 1938 or 1950, it does 
appear that need of improvement in productivity was very great. 
It is to be observed at once, however, that the evidence was not 
equally significant for all the countries. While the value ratio of ex­
ports of rice to total exports, in 19 51, was 13 per cent less than in 
1950 and only slightly more than one-half the 1938 ratio, Burma's 
ratio in 1950 was 35 per cent greater than in 193 8. Rice was a princi­
pal export of two other countries in the group selected, Indochina 
and Thailand, and the ratios for these countries had declined in 1950 
by 6 per cent and 4 per cent respectively. In Burma the increase 
offset in part the ratio decline of 25 per cent in exports of petroleum 
products and 10 per cent in metals and ore. In Indochina there was 
a ratio decrease of 14 per cent in exports of maize. Of the three prin­
cipal exports only that of rubber increased, by 12 per cent. In Thailand 
the relatively small decrease in the export ratio for rice was offset by 
an increase in the ratio for rubber, but there was a large decrease in 
the ratio for tin. 
The export value ratio for petroleum and derivatives for all the 
selected countries, for 1951, was 9 per cent less than for 1950 and 49 
per cent less than for 1938. The effect on the external trade of Burma 
was severe. In Indonesia it was less. The 1950 export ratio was 5 per 
cent less than that for 1938. 
The 1951 ratio for all countries, for rubber and manufactures, 
was more than double the 1938 ratio, and 2.6 per cent greater than 
the ratio for 1950, which was 13 per cent greater than that for 1938. 
Five of the ten countries were affected, all favorably. This showed that 
stability of the foreign markets for, and of the price of, rubber in the 
short run, and expansion of these markets as well, were among the 
most important immediate needs of Asia in the early 1950's. The five 
countries affected were Ceylon, Indonesia, Indochina, Malaya and 
Thailand. 
The importance of the rubber exports, as a percentage of total 
exports, differed widely from country to country. For example, the 
1959 ratio for Malaya was 76 per cent. In Indonesia the increase in 
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ratio was from 20 per cent in 1938 to 50 per cent in 1950. But Ceylon 
had only a modest increase of 4 per cent. 
There remain to be discussed ( 1) the shares of importing coun­
tries in the principal exports of the countries of Asia, (2) the principal 
exports which the United States and other industrialized countries sent 
to Asia, (Japan is here included for reasons of comparison), and (3) 
the products of Asia most needed or sought in the United States. 
In reading the data immediately following this paragraph it may 
be well to keep in mind some known facts: ( a) the main part of the 
Western European market for Asian goods in the period which this 
Section covers was the United Kingdom, France and Germany, and 
these countries had greatly to reduce external trade in 1940-1945, 
(b) the United States' trade with Asia had to be reduced in the latter
part of this period, but recovery in the United States required much
less time, ( c) Japanese external trade, too, had to be curtailed, and
recovery seemed to require less time than Western Europe needed but
more than was necessary for the United States, and (d) some countries
of Asia which were not involved in military operations needed time
for recovery from the consequences of restricted trade. For these rea­
sons, mainly, the fluctuations shown between 1938 and 1951 occurred:
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Imports of Selected Products from Asia Into Western c,urope attd the U11ited States ( Thousands of Tons) 
Western Europe United States 
Commodity ]928 1935-38 1948 1949 1950 1951 1928 l 935-38 1948 1949 1950 1951 
Food and Feeding-stuffs 
Rice 855 1074 73 105 153 151 12 10 
Beet and cane sugar 87 140 14 2 9 29 524 855 219 479 427 619 
Soybeans 1286 714 12 7 38 372 
Groundnuts 985 807 57 23 111 73 
Groundnut Oil 1 15 21 19 12 66 
Copra 447 372 294 367 341 680 174 202 405 386 423 408 
Coconut Oil 37 41 77 83 61 113 132 156 48 52 63 51 
Palm Oil 8 82 78 140 157 136 14 118 10 16 
Oilcake and Meal 366 592 90 54 66 84 71 107 13 45 65 59 
Aromatic Crops 
Tea 208 229 189 219 171 198 29 34 40 40 48 36 
Coffee 65 48 2 4 IO 10 23 12 1 1 
Tobacco 45 55 15 21 31 27 
Natural Rubber and Fibres 
Natural Rubber 99 306 446 406 489 614 388 495 723 646 784 705 
Raw Jute 560 523 250 284 346 464 91 77 75 62 75 106 
Jute Yams and Manufactures 58 120 127 87 47 82 258 439 247 216 199 158 
Hemp and similar Fibres 132 140 52 50 58 57 66 69 49 30 46 75 
Raw Cotton 237 257 112 73 93 68 
N Raw Wool 29 26 12 14 16 15 30 18 17 11 20 6 
Raw Silk 14 5 1 2 2 2 38 27 3 1 4 3t;l 
Other Commodities 
Tin ( metal and concentrate) 41 23 22 36 49 62 57 57 68 22 
Source: United Nations, A Study of Trade Between Asia and Europe, 1953, p. 129. 
Some of the consequences of the fluctuations, to individual coun­
tries, are to be added to the general explanations: 
1) Imports of rice from Asia into Western Europe recovered very
slowly and were still relatively small in 1951. This was adverse main­
ly to Burma, Indochina and Thailand, for rice was the principal com­
modity export of these countries, both in 1938 and in 1950. However, 
the ratio of exports of rice to total Burmese exports rose from 44 in 
193 8 to 79 in 1950. The ratios for the two other countries decreased 
considerably. It was obvious that new imports into the United States 
and increase in the imports into Europe were desirable, but in the early 
1950's production and export of rice within Asia as a region were 
deficient and rice became very expensive. 
2) The same analysis could be applied to the Western European
market for tea, but it would have been much less true of the United 
States. It was true of coffee in both markets, due, of course, to South 
American competition. 
3) Imports of natural rubber increased rapidly in Western Europe
and in the United States, but while the increase in European imports 
was sustained in all the years for which information was given by the 
United Nations, except 1949, and was great in 1950-1951, the imports 
into the United States in 1951 were considerably less than in 1950. 
It has already been shown that rubber is a principal export of Ceylon, 
Indonesia, Indochina, Malaya and Thailand, and .it is known that all 
these countries are concerned about the competition of synthetic rubber 
in the United States. In so far as it is true that any choice to produce 
more synthetic rubber and import less natural rubber was made by 
the United States instead of individual producers, security could have 
been the sole reason, since reduction of imports from Asia, as else­
where, must result at some time in reduction of exports. Moreover, 
the short-run market prospects for Asian producers might not diminish 
considerably for any appreciable time. For these countries, with the 
possible exception of Thailand, do not seem to have any ideological 
preference for markets, so that a climinishing market in the United 
States and Europe might be offset by an increasing market in the Soviet 
Union and/or China, in adclition to whatever sales were possible in 
Japan. 
4) Imports of raw jute into Western Europe were recovering in
1950-1951, but imports in 1928 were still much larger. Imports of 
jute yarns and manufactures in 1951 were larger than in 1928, but this 
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increase did not seem sufficient to offset the decline in the imports of 
the raw jute. United States imports of raw jute had increased, but im­
ports of yams and manufactures had decreased by several times the 
difference in weight. In terms of value, the difference was of course 
greater still. The countries affected were India and Pakistan. The 
decrease in sales was due in large part to decline in production of jute. 
In this case as in some others, stability of markets in the importing 
countries could have had only a limited effect in sustaining incomes 
in the exporting countries. It is impossible to escape always from the 
hazards of dependence on a very few export crops to obtain a wide 
range of essential imports. 
5) The rapid decline in imports of raw cotton into Western Eu­
rope may be explained in part as a consequence of increased output 
of cotton textiles in India and China, partly as due to slow recovery 
of markets for European textiles, when Japanese competition was ris­
ing again at the beginning of the 19 50's. The United States was not 
an importer, but an exporter of raw cotton, largely to Japan, in that 
period. The Asian countries to which cotton was one of the most 
important exports in 1950 were Burma, India and Pakistan, but India 
had long been exporting cotton textiles, so that the value of Indian 
raw cotton as an export was to be expected to decrease. Japan had 
regained some of its export markets for textiles in Asia, for example 
in Indonesia, where the United States was an effective competitor 
with both Japan and the United Kingdom. 
For a study of the exports of Western Europe, the United States 
and Japan, to Asia, the following table of selected data should suffice 
as an aid for the present purpose, the main interest being in indus­
trialization and related <:ignificant change: 
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Exports to Asian Countries from Western Europe 
the United States and Japan 
(Millions of dollars at constant 1950 prices) 
Commodity Western United 
Year Europe States Japan 
Food, drink and 1928 91.6 101.9 53.4 
tobacco 1938 76.8 39.4 69.6 
1949-51 112.1 182.4 4.3 
Crude and finished 1928 164.8 39.3 0.7 
steel 1938 50.9 37.9 
1949-51 77.1 42.7 16.9 
Iron and steel 1928 113.9 10.9 5.8 
manufactures 1938 74.7 6.9 10.4 
1949-51 83.6 16.5 5.1 
Nonferrous metals 1928 18.2 11.2 3.0 
and manufactures 1938 26.5 10.1 0.2 
1949-51 28.5 17.1 1.0 
Electrical goods and 1928 31.1 12.9 
apparatus 1938 39.5 14.6 5.8 
1949-51 61.4 39.3 5.0 
Other machinery 1928 184.8 34.1 2.8 
1938 142.1 38.2 67.2 
1949-51 214.6 99.5 29.3 
Transport equipment 1928 87.1 52.8 2.9 
including tires 1938 75.0 72.5 3.0 
1949-51 149.8 83.7 7.1 
Textiles 1928 768.5 41.1 264.9 
1938 251.4 54.5 274.8 
1949-51 280.0 146.9 147.2 
Chemicals 1928 106.1 23.6 
1938 86.5 24.9 
1949-51 139.1 112.9 
Source: United Nations, A Study of Trade between Asia and 
Europe, 1953,p. 132. 
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These items were selected for the purpose of this paper. Some 
sub-items and some other items were excluded as unimportant 
or less important for the discussion that follows. 
If the total values of exports of Western Europe, the United States 
and Japan were compared it would be seen that while the value of 
Western Europe's exports was greater than that of the United States, 
the value of the United States' exports to Asia had increased in 1951 
to double the value for 1928, while the values of European and J apa­
nese exports had declined. Also, the increase which the United States 
enjoyed was very much greater than the total decrease in Japanese and 
European export values combined. 
A trend in exports to Asia appeared discernible. If we put aside 
for a moment the trade in food and drink and some other items, and 
consider mainly textiles, metals, fertilizers ( which are included with 
chemicals) and a few other commodities, we should see some evidence 
of such changes in the content of Asian imports ( other than Japanese) 
from the most industrialized countries, as would be a consequence of 
industrial progress in Asia. We may again take as examples countries 
with substantial potential internal markets, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, 
the Philippines and China. 
Exports of crude and finished steel from the United States and 
Japan increased, especially the Japanese exports, while European ex­
ports declined. This change may be explained in terms of differences 
in freight costs and price competition. Of all these countries only the 
Philippines imported a larger value of these products in 1951 than in 
1928. 
Iron and Steel manufactures: There was a large decline in Asia's 
imports from Europe. Imports from Japan also decreased, but imports 
from the United States increased. The Philippines was the only country 
to import a larger value of these products too. 
Nonferrous Metals and Manufactures: Imports from both Europe 
and the United States increased. Those from Japan declined. India's 
and Pakistan's imports, taken together for 1949-19 51, were of a larger 
value than for 1928. Those of the other countries, except China, in­
creased. 
Electrical Goods: Imports from the United States increased three­
fold, those from Western Europe doubled, and imports from Japan 
declined (from 1938). India's imports of these and other machinery 
increased significantly, Indonesia's had recovered and reached the rate 
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in 1928; imports into the Philippines increased largely, while those of 
China were much less. Imports of electrical goods and other machinery 
from Western Europe were still greater than those from Japan and the 
United States, but the rate of increase of imports from Europe was less. 
Transport Equipment: India and Pakistan were importing a large 
part of the increase. Indonesia's imports had declined, the Philippines' 
increased and China's decreased. 
Textiles: The great decline in exports from Western Europe and 
the considerable decrease in Japan's exports (from 1938) were not 
offset by the rapid rise in exports from the United States. There was 
an almost corresponding decrease in Indian imports, even when Pakis­
tan's share was added to India's. Indonesia's imports, too, were less 
and China's very much less. Only the Philippines had increased imports. 
Chemicals: The increase in imports from the United States was 
greater than the increase from Western Europe. Japan did not export 
any of these products to Asia. A very large part of these exports went 
to India and Pakistan. In 1949-1951, Indonesia's share was the same 
as in 1928. The Philippines' imports were more than quadrupled. 
China imported considerably less than in 1928. 
Placed in order of value importance (at the constant 1950 prices), 
the six most important imports of eleven countries of Asia (India, 
Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Malaya [including Singapore], Indonesia, 
Indochina, Thailand, the Philippines, Hong Kong and China) from 
Western Europe, the United States and Japan, in 194 9-19 51, would 
be ( 1 ) textiles ( consisting largely of yarns and tissues of cotton and 
of silk, and artificial fibres), (2) machinery (including electrical goods), 
( 3) food, drink and tobacco, ( 4) chemicals, ( 5) crude and finished
steel, and ( 6) iron and steel manufactures. Retaining the years selected
for comparison, 1928 and 1949-51, we find the following significance:
a) Imports of textiles by the eleven countries from the United
States, Western Europe and Japan had declined by about one-half 
due to recovery of and increase in production in Asia. The United 
States had a two-fold share in the exports to Asia: first, as a large ex­
porter of raw cotton to Japan, and secondly, as a competitor of Japan 
and Western Europe. For example, the United States' share in ex­
ports to Indonesia in 1951 (at t�e constant 1950 prices) was $42.4 
million worth, and Japan's $51.1 million. Of the rest of the total of 
$121.7 million imported by Indonesia from the five most important 
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exporters to that country, the United Kingdom's share was $3.9 mil­
lion. This may be a partial explanation of Britain's active efforts to 
increase textile exports to China. 
b) The largest increase was in imports of machinery. This in­
crease was to be seen in the imports of all but three of the eleven 
countries. The exceptions were Burma, Indonesia and China. Also, the 
decrease in Burma's imports was relatively small, by comparison with 
imports in 1938. Indonesia's was very small. China's was large, but 
the value of that country's imports in 1938 was two and one-third 
times the value for 1928. 
c) There was a fairly large increase in imports of food, drink and
tobacco, but the difference was smaller than the sum by which the im­
ports of these items in 1928 exceeded imports in 1938. 
d) A large increase in imports of chemicals, too, was widely dis­
tributed among the eleven countries. The exceptions were Indonesia, 
which barely maintained its imports, and China, whose imports de­
clined considerably, but were double in value the imports for 1938. 
e) There was a large decrease in imports of crude and finished
steel. This was noticeably greater in the imports of the larger countries, 
India and China. But there was some increase in the imports of 
smaller countries, such as Thailand, Indochina, Ceylon and the Philip­
pines. 
f) Imports of iron and steel manufactures were comparably less.
The distribution was similar to that of crude and finished steel, but in 
this case Indonesia has to be included among the larger countries im­
porting less. To the smaller countries importing more there must be 
added Malaya (including Singapore) and Hong Kong. 
III 
PERIOD 1951-1956: REAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES 
Evidence of Needs 
The final Section of this paper may well begin with a discussion 
of the United States' needs of Asia's goods. This arrangement is ap­
propriate especially in view of the fact that Asia's needs of some of 
the principal exports of the United States were shown at the end of 
the previous Section. It will be shown presently that of the twelve 
Asian products which are most essential to the United States, all but 
three - tea, pepper and coconut oil - are raw materials. Greater 
quantities of these raw materials will be required in Asia as indus­
trialization proceeds and markets expand, particularly in the larger 
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countries. Larger markets should afford the United States more op­
portunities for export, when trade is free or not unduly restricted. It 
is difficult to think of prosperity in Asia through industrialization, and, 
at the same time, of smaller markets there for United States' machinery 
and durable consumption goods. The United States may have sufficient 
markets in Asia to pay with commodities for its needs of Asian goods 
for a long time. In fact, the manner of taking payment for exports, 
if less of the raw materials needed should be available, is a much more 
important consideration. The prospect is to import more of Asia's 
processed goods. 
There are several factors which limit United States' imports from 
Asia and would limit exports more than at present, but for loans from 
the International Bank, the Export-Import Bank, and, we may add, 
the International Finance Corporation: 
a) rates of increase of consumption in the United States, of the
products which are Asia's principal exports. The meaning of
consumption here includes use in the processes of production. If,
as Business Week economists have been forecasting in special re­
ports to business executives, production in the United States by
1975 will be for 650 million customers abroad and 200 million
at home, thep. we should expect imports from Asia to be greatly
increased,· as the main form of payments. But if, as they also fore­
cast, most United States' foreign investments are to be made, in­
evitably, in Canada, South America, the Middle East, Africa and
Australia, then Asia's share would be only supplementary.
b) Competition from other countries or regions in markets in the
United States.
c) Competition of United States' producers.
d) Asia's capacity to earn imports: this must be determined in 
any country by first, ability to produce and export, and secondly,
eligibility for loans for purchase of producers' goods which would
improve its productivity and consequently its ability to export.
With due reference to these factors, the real needs of the United
States, in the early 1950's may be stated precisely: 
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United States Needs of Principal Exports of Asia 
Commodity 
Percentage of Total 
Needs, imported from Asia Limits Imposed 
Natural rubber 
Manganese 
Tin 
Mica 
Burlaps 
Abaca or manila 
Hides and skins 
Tea 
Pepper 
Coconut Oil 
Chromite or 
chrome ore 
Tungsten ore 
89 
27 
54 
88 
95 
65 
20 
73 
93 
94 
13 
10 
(a) The rate of increase must be
expected to decline because of
decrease in the rate of output
in the motor vehicle industry.
(c) U.S. synthetic rubber is a com­
petitor.
( b) Competition of foreign coun­
tries, mainly Ghana, place an
important limit on imports
from Asia, most of which come
from India.
(b) Competition of other countries,
mainly Bolivia, is effective.
(a) Most imports come from India.
There is little competition,
therefore any increase in im­
ports depends on use in U.S.
( b) This Indian export, too, has
little competition.
( b) Competition is considerable.
( b) Imports are from India. Com­
petition is great.
(b) India and Ceylon have com­
petition in the U.S. market.
(b) From India and Indonesia.
Competition from outside of
Asia is small.
(b) Ceylon, Indonesia, Malaya and
the Philippines have little com­
petition in the U.S.
(b) The Philippines have much
competition, from Turkey and
elsewhere.
(b) There is little competition.
Sources: International Development Advisory Board, Partners in Progress, (March, 
1951 ); and l'.niteu Nations, A Study of Trade Between Asia ,.mJ Europe, 
(November, 1953). 
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The extent of competition in the United States involves internal 
markets which the United States is prepared to concede, as may be 
necessary, so that Asia might pay for more exports with commodities. 
In so far as we regard needs of Asia's products as vital or essen­
tial, and some of them are not obtainable in quantity from other re­
gions, our imports must depend on production and use in Asia. Of the 
dozen products listed, the United States imports of only five which may 
be considered vital amounted in 1950 to 30 per cent or more of total 
needs. These are natural rubber, manganese, tin, mica and burlap. 
Of the principal exports of Burma, Ceylon, India, Pakistan, In­
donesia, Indochina, Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand, which are 
most of the countries usually selected by the United Nations as ex­
amples for purposes of economic studies and reports, six are not in­
cluded among vital or essential needs of the United States as listed 
in the sources mentioned above. These are rice, petroleum products, 
cotton and cotton manufactures, sugar, tobacco and maize. Rice and 
cotton are not produced in Asia in sufficient quantities for a large ex­
port trade outside of that region. The shortages may be overcome but 
the United States is a producer of both these products and a large ex­
porter of cotton and cotton manufactures, even to Asia, so there is 
little prospect of any considerable imports of them. Moreover, the 
United States is also a producer of the remaining four principal products 
of Asia, which are not deemed essential or vital by the authorities 
quoted. 
It is also noticeable that mineral imports from Asia are mostly 
manganese and tin, and that the quantities are, respectively, less than 
30 per cent and only slightly more than 50 per cent of total needs. It 
is obvious, then, that imports of minerals, too, from Asia are not likely 
to increase in large measure in the short or intermediate run because 
of imports from other sources and production in the United States. 
Need and Progress of Industrialization 
There is thus only one course for the future of the external trade 
of Asia (with the exception of Japan) with the United States and West­
ern Europe, but it may be a broad one. Since the products now avail­
able for export will not enable Asian countries in the ECAFE group 
to obtain any large increase in incomes, they must diversify production 
as speedily as possible, utilizing larger quantities of these products and 
exporting less of them. This affords greater rather than less opportuni-
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ties for direct investments in individual countries, conceived for growth 
as well as for the benefit of the investors. 
There are two forms of investment which are, possibly, being over­
looked: ( 1) production of equipment which can be employed effec­
tively on small farms, and (2) machinery for small-scale processing 
units, both for the countries discussed in this Section and Section II, 
and also for those discussed more briefly in Section I. The demand is 
likely to increase quickly because several ECAFE countries have 
adopted a policy of supporting small producing units and small farms 
are typical in many areas. Also, because transition from the workshop 
to the factory stage of production will evidently not be a very short-run 
process, particularly in the smaller countries which are least endowed 
with resources. 
Since industrialization in different degrees and for different ob­
jectives will become inevitable in practically all the countries of Asia, 
the evidence of its progress in 19 51-19 5 6 should be examined here 
for indications of the main directions of investment and comparison of 
growth in the main industrial areas. By the mid-1950's it had become 
clear that the agricultural base in several of the countries and in the 
region as a whole was adequate as a prerequisite for industrialization. 
For example, cereal production in the ECAFE countries increased by 
10 per cent above the average for 1934-1938. This included an equal 
percentage rise in the output of rice, and it was nearly equal to the 
rate of increase of world production although production in some 
other countries had recovered earlier than in Asia. 22 
There are broad similarities in the industrialization, especially 
in the larger countries. The rates of growth must be expected to be 
greater than individual initiative, as has been noticed in Section I, 
would have achieved. In the period between the end of World War II 
and the early 1950's lack of individual initiative became a lesser dis­
advantage. But more important than this for growth was increase in 
public investment, which substituted for private investment in varying 
degrees and also stimulated it. 
The three main industrial areas of Asia ( excluding Australia), 
Japan, India and China, have been rapidly expanding textile production. 
India has surpassed Japan in the production of cotton-piece goods. By 
19 51 Indian exports of these goods, within the region, were much 
22 United Nations, Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1954, pp. 1-3. 
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larger, as a ratio of Japan's., and its exports to countries outside ex­
ceeded Japan's. In 1954 Japan's regional exports were less and India's 
had increased, while India's excess of exports over Japan's, to other 
regions, was greater. Production in China increased rapidly in the 
early 1950's. the rate of output seemed sufficient for competition with 
India and Japan but there were no recorded exports, probably because 
of the large internal market. 
Japan is the leader of the three in iron and steel production, pro­
ducing 7.6 million tons, or 70 per cent of the region's total, and was 
increasing its rate of output. China became the second largest producer 
of steel in the region in 1954. The data published for China were 3 
million tons of pig iron and 2.2 million tons of steel ingot. India's 
capacity was less than 2 million tons of pig iron, and its production 
of steel ingots was 1.5 million tons. 
In the production of electric power, too, Japan leads, but rates of 
increase in India and China have been very great, 46 and 64 per cent, 
respectively, whereas the rate of increase in Japan, which already had 
an output incomparably larger than either, was 9 per cent. 
Japan produced 50-60 per cent of all cement made in the ECAFE 
countries, in 1954. The rate of increase in production was 21 per cent. 
China, reported as the second largest producer, had increased its output 
by 100 per cept in six years. In about the same period India's output 
had increased by 50 per cent. 
The engineering industry may show the most significant changes: 
in Japan the value of products of engineering was 15 per cent of the 
total for manufactures. In northwest China it was 14 per cent. The 
index number for engineering industries in India was 131 in 1954, 
100 in 1948. The table which follows shows a wider range of indus­
trial production: 
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Index Numbers of Production 
(1948=100) 
Weight 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 
CHINA (Taiwan only) 
Industrial production 100 157 175 184 238 323 
Public utilities 8.6 124 168 192 202 214 
Electricity 3.8 101 123 152 168 186 
Mining and Quarrying 3.7 87 86 106 138 121 
Coal 1.8 98 85 100 139 145 
Manufacturing 87.7 166 182 189 249 348 
Food 29.1 221 215 147 198 336 
Textiles 14.6 193 276 421 660 918 
Chemicals 8.1 104 130 216 238 263 
INDIA 
Manufacturing and mining 100 98 97 108 119 125 
Mining (coal) 12.0 106 107 115 122 120 
Chemicals & allied trades 4.9 114 129 145 204 260 
Metal manufactures 
( not machinery) 9.3 108 114 119 121 114 
Engineering and 
electrical goods 5.6 121 146 189 170 190 
Textiles 61.4 90 82 90 100 102 
Cotton textiles 43.5 91 84 93 104 110 
Jute 16.5 85 77 80 87 80 
Paper 1.5 105 111 135 140 142 
Manufacture of non-
metallic mining 
products (not 
coal and petroleum) 1.7 107 149 171 173 229 
Manufactures of wood 0.2 89 93 132 168 114 
Food (sugar) 3.5 93 91 104 139 120 
INDONESIA ( 1938=100) 
Export products 
General 69 89 105 108 108 
Estate 46 49 63 71 75 
Peasantry 103 194 228 184 156 
Mining 85 93 103 116 132 
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JAPAN 
Industrial Production 100 124 142 193 213 261 
Public utilities 4.3 113 122 134 146 160 
Manufacturing & 
Mining 95.7 130 153 210 232 284 
Mining 12.9 115 121 138 142 153 
Manufactures 82.8 131 156 219 244 304 
Nondurable 47.8 134 190 254 298 375 
Textiles 17.1 128 186 261 298 345 
Chemicals 16.7 140 203 277 332 423 
Durable 35.0 134 147 220 230 281 
Metals 12.9 176 242 360 386 459 
Machinery and trans-
port equipment 14.6 124 117 184 191 248 
PHILIPPINES ( 1952=100) 
Manufactures 100 113 
Nondurable 100 111 
Tobacco products 100 114 
Textiles 100 96 
Footwear and wearing 
apparel 100 116 
Chemicals 100 111 
Durable manufactures 100 118 
Stone, clay and glass 
products (including 
cement) 100 108 
Metal products 100 152 
Electrical appliances 100 96 
Source: United Nations, Economic Survey of Asia and the Far
East, 1954, p. 201. 
The table is, of course, quite incomplete; China ( other than Tai­
wan) had to be excluded for reasons already given. Data for Pakistan 
would have been helpful, and one of the countries of intermediate area 
and population, such as Thailand, must have shown progress well 
worth inclusion for comparison. 
The data presented here should be studied with reference to the 
roles of governments, as public planning and investments are to be 
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m
et with in practically all the countries. 
The oppo
rtuni
ties in
di
cated 
m
ust be regarded as opportunities to contribute, through private in
vest­
m
ent, to the success of broad plans for growth. Depende
nce on private 
ini
tiative is still less in m
ost of the countries, than on state plannin
g. 
Although private enterp
rise is welcom
ed, there are controls an
d re­
strictions, particularly in Southeast A
sian countries. 
There see
m
s to 
be three
 very prevalent reasons: a tradition of authoritarian politics, 
inadequate and therefore unreliable entrepreneurship for the responsi­
bilities of developm
ent, and intellectual relations with the W
est at a 
tim
e when state responsibility and state planni
ng were em
phasiz ed. 23 
The industri
al stru
ctures indicated in the table above appeared 
to be quite established, as judged by the resul
ts for 1955. In the fin
al 
table which follows, inform
ation for 1956 is included, partl
y by estim
at­
ing. The m
ain im
portance of th
is table is that it enables us to discern
 
a change in the content of A
sia's external trade which m
ay becom
e 
very
 im
portan
t wi
thin a decade. 
C
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ECA
FE REGION (U
.S. dollar) 
1954 
3,144 
2,478 
889 
1,427 
1955 
2,983 
2,770 
975 
1,648 
1956 (first half) 
1,560 
1,529 
673 
1,035 
B
urm
a (kyat) 
1954 
476 
174 
59 
264 
1955 
362 
170 
67 
261 
1956 (first half) 
181 
69 
42 
158 
23 Claude A
. Buss, "Econom
ics and D
iplom
acy in Southeast A
sia," and Charles 
J.Shohan, "N
ational Econom
ic Planning," in Sou
theast A
sia in the C
om
ing
W
orld (John H
opkins Press, 1953), pp. 90-91, 97-99.
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Co
Materials for 
capital goods 
Capital goods 
ds 
Ceylon (rupee) 
1954 952 128 130 186 
1955 890 142 164 233 
1956 (first half) 448 82 75 148 
India (rupee) 
1954 2,366 1,759 633 1,797 
1955 1,441 2,031 556 2,746 
1956 (first half) 632 1,034 357 1,902 
Indonesia (rupiah) 
1954 3,051 1,418 459 1,977 
1955 2,641 1,535 670 1,902 
1956 ( first half) 2,302 777 530 1,299 
Japan (yen) 
1954 252,419 412,705 125,824 72,677 
1955 240,071 457,778 134,706 56,477 
1956 ( first half) 108,434 276,212 117,570 34,878 
Malaya (Malayan dollar) 
1954 1,669 624 454 389 
1955 1,905 904 539 474 
1956 ( first half) 1,062 441 287 291 
Pakistan (rupee) 
1954 162 187 129 398 
1955 206 164 155 412 
1956 (first half) 133 81 87 166 
Philippines (peso) 
1954 460 168 112 225 
1955 519 181 125 272 
1956 (first half) 188 79 63 155 
Thailand (baht) 
1954 3,248 665 565 2,186 
1955 3,476 794 763 2,166 
1956 ( first half) 1,674 409 383 1,295 
Source: United Nations, Economic Survey of Asia and the Far 
East, 1956, p. 185. 
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The figures given for 1956 must be approximately doubled. When 
this is done it becomes clear that while the value of imports of con­
sumption goods into several of the countries were about the same in 
1956 as in 1954, the values of imports of materials for production of 
these goods were considerably greater. There is indication, therefore, 
that the ratios of imports of consumption goods to total consumption 
had declined. So we should have expected the accompanying evidence 
of a large increase in imports of materials for the production of capital 
goods, and of capital goods as well. 
This change is to be observed in the figures for most of the indi­
vidual countries, and it is most noticeable in the data for the countries 
where industrialization is increasing most. Even in the figures for some 
countries where industrialization is proceeding only moderately the 
trend is discernible, and it is to be seen in the values of imports into 
the ECAFE region as a whole. 
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I 
INTRODUCTION 
0i--E OF THE international economic issues that has lately begun 
to command increasing interest, thanks to Soviet achievements in other 
fields and to the popular press, is the so-called economic offensive of 
the Soviet Bloc. Realization of the fact that the Soviet Bloc1 has in­
tensified its foreign economic activities, particularly in the less developed 
countries of Asia ,and the Middle East, has already posed some hard 
and searching questions to this country as to the effectiveness of Ameri­
can foreign economic policy and the manner in which adjustments in 
the latter may have to be made. Obviously, the economic actions of 
the Soviet Bloc, insofar as they do represent a conscious policy and 
are integrated with foreign policy in a broader sense, may continue to 
gather momentum as time passes. Thus the problems for the United 
States, both as the only effective political counterpoise to the Soviet 
Bloc and as a leading nation in world trade, have probably only just 
begun. In these circumstances, the need for carrying out a searching 
appraisal and analysis of this "offensive" should be quite obvious and 
will need no further supporting argument. 
Parts of this paper were presented to the 1958 annual meeting of the Asso­
ciation for Asian Studies at New York City. 
1 The term Soviet Bloc is used here to indicate what is sometimes described as 
the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The European Bloc thus includes the USSR and the 
European satellites-Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Zone of 
Germany, Hungary, Poland and Rumania. The entire Soviet Bloc also in­
cludes North Korea and, since 1955, North Viet-Nam, but the extra-Bloc 
trade of the last two areas is unimportant so far. 
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Although newspaper reports have tended to highlight the spec­
tacular and have thus concentrated publicity on a few cases where actual 
or potential competition between the United States and the Soviet Union 
appears on the surface, such instances merely serve to dramatize a 
development originating from the Soviet Bloc which, in order for it to 
constitute a "threat," must at once be broader and more sustained. 
In other words, if, for instance, the Soviet offer to build a steel 
mill in India with an annual capacity of one million tons and the vague 
talk about the construction of the Aswan Dam were merely isolated 
examples, the evidence of a Soviet "economic offensive" would not be 
conclusive. The problem assumes a different dimension only when a 
determined effort on a broad front to strengthen the economic relations 
of the less developed countries with the Soviet Bloc can be discerned. 
II 
PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF THE SOVIET BLOC'S "ECONOMIC 
OFFENSIVE" 
That there is strong evidence of the Soviet Bloc's intention to 
maneuver itself into a favorable economic position vis-a-vis some of 
the less developed nations and to make itself indispensable may be seen 
in two respects. Limiting ourselves in this paper to the Asian countries 
only, we may first point to the fact that credit and technical assistance 
arrangements have been made with some of the Asian countries not 
only by the Soviet Union itself, but also by the European satellites and 
Communist China. As examples we may cite the offers of credit and 
technical assistance by East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czecho­
slovakia to India and Indonesia and similar aid provided by Communist 
China to Burma and Cambodia, as well as a Chinese grant to the King­
dom of Nepal. All of these were made during the last few years.2 
That there is a conscious and concerted effort to lure the Asian coun­
tries with financial and technical assistance can hardly be denied. In the 
second place, partly as a result of these pacts, but to an even larger 
2 For a comprehensive listing of the trade and aid agreements concluded by the 
Soviet Bloc with Asian countries see the Council for Economic and In­
dustry R(&Search (CEIR) study on "Foreign Assistance Activities of the 
Communist Bloc and Their Implications for the United States" prepared 
for the Senate Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid program, 85th 
Congress, Washington, D.C., 1957. Cf. also the various reports to Con­
gress by the Administrator of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act 
of 1951. 
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extent due to the operation of the many trade and payments agree­
ments between the Asian countries and the Soviet Bloc, there has been 
a sizable increase in the volume of trade between them. This claim 
may, in the first instance, be substantiated by studying the available trade 
statistics of the Asian countries for recent years. In a study of these 
statistics several factors should be fully considered, however. 
First, to be meaningful, a comparison of the flow of trade between 
non-Communist Asia and the Soviet Bloc at different dates must be 
based on a judicious selection of the time period to be examined. For 
our purpose we have chosen to make the comparison between 1952 
and 1956. The 1956 figures are used simply because they represent 
the most up-to-date complete returns available at this writing. On 
the other hand, the year 1952 is used as the initial benchmark for a 
number of reasons. First, if a specific date is to be chosen to mark 
the launching of the recent foreign economic efforts of the Soviet Bloc, 
the International Economic Conference held at Moscow in April 1952 
would probably present a most convenient and logical starting point. 
Moreover, at least one major reason for the Soviet Bloc's efforts in 
this field was the adoption of countermeasures in the face of the tighten­
ing of export controls by the United States and the Western world in 
1952. Although postwar American export controls directed against 
the European Soviet Bloc dated from the end of 194 7, while the present 
15-nation Consultative Group at Paris and its Co-ordinating Commit­
tee (COCOM) were organized as early as January 1950 to exercise
international export controls, the Mutual Defense Assistance Control
Act (Battle Act) of 1951, which imparted a sense of seriousness and
urgency to American export control and facilitated its extension to a
multilateral basis, did not go into full effect until January 24, 1952.3
It was only in April 1952 when the Moscow Economic Conference
was in full swing that the international lists of commodities subject to
total embargo or quantitative control began to resemble closely the
American security lists at that time. Thirdly, as far as the Asian coun­
tries are concerned, trade with the Soviet Bloc has largely consisted
of trade with Communist China. Here again, although the United Na­
tions decision to impose an economic embargo on Communist China
and North Korea was reached in May 1951, the China Committee
3 For a historical sketch of the United States and international export control 
systems see the Ninth Report to Congress under the Mutual Defense As­
sistance Control Act of 1951. 
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(CHINCOM) of the Paris Consultative Group was established only in 
September 1952. As we have pointed out in another connection,4 Com­
munist China's trade with the free world actually took a significant 
spurt during 1951 in anticipation of further trade controls by the West­
ern world following America's lead in introducing economic sanctions 
at the beginning of the year. Finally, 1952 was also the last year pre­
ceding the five year plan ( 1953-1957) of Communist China during 
which radical changes in the structure of the economy and less radical, 
but nonetheless significant changes in the country's foreign trade po­
tentials took place. 
Next, bearing the preceding observations in mind, we are probably 
justified in stating that whatever changes there may have been since 
1952 in the economic relationships between the Asian countries and 
the Soviet Bloc in general and Communist China in particular, they are 
not the outcome of a single factor, but actually reflect the result of 
several diverse, though related, developments. The reaction of the Sino­
Soviet entente, along with the European satellites, to the free world's 
trade controls which gained in effectiveness in 1952; their autonomous 
and aggressive efforts to cultivate economic relations with the Asian 
countries and regions, especially those that have "neutralist" political 
tendencies and/or are not really parties to the UN embargo; the eco­
nomic growth of Communist China and the attending changes in the 
composition and volume of its imports and exports; the economic condi­
tions of the Asian countries themselves, and the successive revision and 
relaxation of the international export control system - all these have 
contributed to the expansion of Soviet Bloc trade with Asia. Thus it 
would be an oversimplification to attribute this trade expansion en­
tirely to the "economic offensive" of the Soviet Bloc although it remains 
to be seen whether the other factors have not been in part fostered and 
exploited by the Bloc's maneuvers. 
4 Yuan-Ii Wu, "Communist China's Trade with the West," The Pacific Spectator, 
Stanford, 1953. 
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TABLE I - Trade Between Selected Asian Countries and Areas with 
the Soviet Bloc-1952 and 1956. (Values in Millions of U.S. Dollars.) 
Importing Countries 
Communist China Euro2ean Soviet Bloc Total Soviet Bloc 
N Exporting Countrie� Index for I 956 Jndex for 1956 Index for 1956 IO 
0\ and Areas 1952 1956 1952=100 1952 1956 1952=100 1952 1956 1952=100 
Burma 0.1 14.4 14400.0 20.3 0.1 34.7 34700.0 
:.i:.. Ceylon 26.0 38.3 147.3 2.9 0.2 6.9 28.9 38.5 133.2 
� India !0.2 13.8 127.5 6.2 36.5 588.7 16.4 50.3 306.7 
('ti Indochina 0.1 0.1 
,;;· Indonesia (a) 11.7 9.8 11.9 121.4 9.8 23.6 240.8 
i:::, Japan 0.6 67.4 11233.3. 0.2 5.9 2950.0 0.8 73.3 9162.5 
;3 Malaya (a) 7.8 30.3 34.4 113.5 30.3 42.2 139.3 
'--3 Pakistan 83.9 15.9 19.0 35.7 4.5 12.6 119.6 20.4 17.1 
i3 Hong Kong 91.0 23.8 26.2 91.0 23.8 26.2 
Aggregate 211.9 193.1 91.3 85.1 113.7 133.6 297.0 306.8 103.3 ('ti 
s. Total ( Excluding Hong: Kong) 120.9 169.3 140.0 85.1 113.7 133.6 206.0 283.0 137.4 s.. Exporting Countries 
:.i:.. Communist China Euro2ean Soviet Bloc Total Soviet Bloc 
i:i' Importing Countries Index for 1956 Jndex for 1956 Index for 1956 
i:::, and Areas 1952 1956 1952=100 1952 1956 1952=100 1952 1956 1952=100 
;3 Burma 2.4 22.2 925.0 0.3 l 5.3 5100.0 2.7 37.5 1388.9 i:::... Ceylon 6.9 28.1 407.2 1.1 1.6 145.5 8.0 29.7 371.3 ..... India 34.0 21.5 63.2 6.4 52.2 815.6 40.4 73.7 182.4 
('ti Indochina 7.4 4.1 55.4 0.8 0.1 12.5 8.2 4.2 51.2 
� Indonesia 1.9 30.2 1589.5 3.4 14.5 426.5 5.3 44.7 843.4 ... Japan 14.9 83.6 561.1 3.0 10.9 363.3 17.9 102.5 572.6 
t-r, 
Malaya 39.5 43.1 109.1 3.0 5.3 176.7 42.5 48.4 113.9 
� Paki.,tan 3.7 8.8 237.8 13.9 2.3 16.5 I 7.6 11.1 63.0 ..... Hong Kong 145.3 181.7 125.1 1.3 0.5 38.5 146.6 182.2 124.3 
Aggregate 256.0 423.3 165.4 33.2 102.7 309.3 289.2 534.0 184.6 
Total (Excluding 
Hong Kong) 110.7 241.6 218.2 31.9 102.2 320.4 142.6 351.8 246.7 
(a) indicates "under $50,000''
.... indicates '·no information" 
- indicates "nil"
For 1956, ''Indochina" refers to south Viet-Nam
Source: "·Values Series," International Economic Analysis Division of The Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department o( Com-
merce.
., 
Thus qualified, a comparison of the trade statistics of the Asian 
countries in 1952 and 1956 shows the following results: 
1 ) In the case of imports from the Soviet Bloc, the total value 
rose by 84.6 per cent between 1952 and 1956 (from US $289.2 million 
to $534.0 million) if we include as importing nations and areas Burma, 
Ceylon, India, the Indochinese states outside Communist control, In­
donesia, Japan, Malaya ( and Singapore), Pakistan and Hong Kong. 
These areas constitute the entire group of free-Asian countries other 
than Thailand, the Philippines, Taiwan and South Korea, none of which 
reports any direct, overt trade with the Communist countries, as well 
as Afghanistan which we shall disregard for our present purpose. If 
Hong Kong is excluded, inasmuch as a sizable portion of its imports 
is for re-export, total imports of the remaining Asia countries listed 
above from the Soviet Bloc increased even more rapidly, i.e., from 
$142.6 million in 1952 to $351.8 million in 1956, or by 146.7 per cent. 
2) As for individual Asian countries and areas, of the nine listed,
imports from the Bloc rose during this period from 13.9 per cent in 
the case of Malaya to a whopping 1,288.9 per cent in the case of 
Burma. The only exceptions to this rule of spectacular advances were 
Indochina and Pakistan, the former attributable to a contraction of the 
reporting area to southern Viet-Nam, the latter reflecting the indirect 
effect on Pakistan's imports of a drop of cotton purchases by the Euro­
pean Soviet Bloc possibly as a result of switching their business to 
Egypt and an even larger drop of cotton imports by. Communist China 
following the expansion of China's domestic cotton production. 
3 ) In the case of exports to the Soviet Bloc, the increase between 
1952 and 1956 was 37.4 per cent or from $206.0 million to $283.0 
million if exports from Hong Kong are disregarded. If Hong Kong is 
included, the change was an increase of only 3.3 per cent, believed 
to be due to the expansion of South and Southeast Asia's direct exports 
to mainland China, thus bypassing the Hong Kong entrepot. 
4) For individual countries with the exception of Hong Kong and
Pakistan which suffered a drop of 73.8 per cent and 82.9 per cent 
respectively in their exports to the Bloc during this period, the increase 
ranged from 33.2 per cent in the case of Ceylon to 34,600 per cent in 
the case of Burma. (The latter's exports to the Bloc rose from a mere 
$100,000 in 1952 to $34.7 million in 1956.) 
These general observations on Asia's trade with the Soviet Bloc 
as a whole may now be further supplemented by the following points 
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dealing with trade between the Asian countries and the major com­
ponents of the Soviet orbit; namely, Communist China and the Euro­
pean Soviet Bloc, the latter including the USSR and the European 
satellites. In this respect we may note: 
1) In the case of exports from the Asian countries, between 1952
and 1956, of the nine countries and areas all but Ceylon followed a 
common upward trend both in their exports to Communist China and 
in their exports to the European Soviet Bloc. Even in the case of 
Ceylon, although exports to Communist China in 1956 exceeded the 
corresponding figure in 1952 and 1955, they were actually much smaller 
than in 1953 and 1954. Thus one might say that the exception was 
more illusory than real. As for imports from Communist China and 
the European Soviet Bloc, all the Asian countries and areas under 
consideration save India, Pakistan and Hong Kong exhibited a common 
trend during this period. Hong Kong's declining import volume from 
the European Soviet Bloc may be safely disregarded as it was never 
large. As for India's imports from Communist China, the apparently 
smaller volume in 1956 as compared with that of 1952, in contrast to 
the large increase of India's imports from the European Bloc, conceals 
the fact that there was actually a rising trend from 1953 on.5 The 
apparently divergeqt trends followed by Pakistan's imports from the 
European Bloc and the corresponding imports from Communist China 
can perhaps be explained by China's need to narrow .the gap between 
her trailing exports to Pakistan and her much larger but fluctuating 
import volume from Pakistan, the latter being directly influenced by 
the size of China's own cotton and jute crops. Thus, allowing for these 
relatively unimportant exceptions, it may be said that Communist China 
and the European Soviet Bloc showed the same general movement in 
their trade relations with the Asian countries under consideration. 
2) Although the European Bloc plays the leading role in expanding
trade between the entire Bloc and the free world, the dominant position 
in Asia is occupied by Communist China. 
5 See the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act reports for figures in 1953-1955. 
298 American Trade with Asia and the Far East
TABLE II - The Role of Communist China in Asia's Trade with the 
Entire Soviet Bloc-1952 and 1956. 
Export& to Communist China Imports from Communist 
as Per Cent of Exports to China as Per Cent of Imports 
the Soviet Hloc from the Soviet Bloc 
1952 1956 1952 1956 
Burma l 00.00 41.5 88.9 59.2 
Ceylon 90.0 99.5 86.3 94.6 
India 62.2 27.4 84.2 29.2 
Indochina 100.0 90.2 97.6 
Indonesia 49.6 35.8 67.6 
Japan 75.0 92.0 83.2 81.6 
Malaya 18.5 92.9 89.0 
Pakistan 70.2 77.9 21.0 79.3 
Hong Kong 100.0 100.0 99.1 99.7 
Aggregate 71.3 62.9 88.5 79.3 
Total (Excluding 
Hong Kong) 58.7 59.8 77.6 68.7 
.... indicates "no information" 
Source: "Value Series," International Economic Analysis Division 
of the Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce. 
As Table II clearly shows, of all the Asian countries and areas under 
consideration, India was the only one that imported more from the 
European Bloc during 1956 than from Communist China. In the case 
of exports from the Asia countries in 1956, Burma, India, Indonesia 
and Malaya presented the four cases out of nine that showed a larger 
volume of exports to the European Bloc than to Communist China. 
Moreover, only in the case of Burma and India do we observe during 
this period any appreciable deterioration of the relative position of 
Communist China vis-a-vis the European Bloc both as a customer and 
as a supplier. In most other cases, the Chinese were able to improve 
upon their initially favorable position relative to the European Bloc. 
It is not hard to explain the exceptional cases furnished by India and 
Burma as the concentrated effort of the USSR and the European satel­
lites in offering them credit, grants and technical assistance far exceeded 
similar efforts that were made in other Asian conntries,6 and one is 
6 CEIR, op. cit. 
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strongly tempted to suggest that the larger imports of Burma and India 
from the European Bloc were essentially a result of the extension of 
economic aid by the European Bloc while, in the case of India at any 
rate, the larger exports to the European Bloc were to a considerable 
extent a consequence of the growth of imports from the same quarter. 
Accordingly, we may summarize our preliminary findings by stat­
ing ( 1) that on the basis of the trade statistics of the nine Asian coun­
tries and areas in 1952-1956 there is, with the exception of Pakistan, 
a notable to spectacular advance in the volume of trade with the Soviet 
Bloc as a whole; (2) that the same trend is seen both in trade with the 
European Bloc and in trade with Communist China; (3) that Com­
munist China enjoys a predominant position in the expanding trade 
between the Soviet Bloc and its Asian trade partners, the only significant 
exceptions being Burma and India; ( 4) that in the case of Burma and 
India the dominating position of the European Bloc is probably at­
tributable to the latter's greater economic assistance programs; and (5) 
that the decline of Hong Kong's exports to the Soviet Bloc, primarily 
Communist China, is a result of China's diminishing dependence upon 
the British colony as an enterpot and should not therefore be inter­
preted as an exception to the general trend. Clearly, even though these 
developments cannot be wholly accounted for by the "economic of­
fensive" of th� Soviet Bloc, and that of Communist China in particular, 
they are sufficiently suggestive of a deliberate "offensive" as to chal­
lenge the imagination. 
III 
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE GROWING ECONOMIC TIES BETWEEN ASIA 
AND THE SOVIET BLOC 
However, one must not be carried away by the "impressive" gains 
of Soviet Bloc trade and immediately jump to the conclusion that 
strong economic ties have already been established with the Asian 
countries. 
First, let us dispose of a fairly simple matter by pointing out that 
the rapid growth of trade with the Bloc was possible partly, if not only, 
because the initial volume of trade was extremely small. The aggregate 
exports of the nine Asian countries and areas to the Soviet Bloc in 1952 
amounted to $297 million only or no more than 4.6 per cent of their 
total exports to the world. If Hong Kong is excluded, their total exports 
to the Soviet Bloc in 1952 ($206 million) would be less than 3.5 per 
cent of their total exports to the world. Similarly, the aggregate im-
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ports from the Soviet Bloc (including Hong Kong's imports) were 
$289.2 million in 1952 or only 3.5 per cent of their aggregate imports 
from the world. If Hong Kong is excluded, the corresponding ratio 
in 1952 would be about 1.9 per cent of their aggregate imports from 
the world. It is not surprising, therefore, that a high rate of growth 
could be achieved within a short time. 
However, one should immediately note that although the ratio of 
the aggregate exports of these Asian countries and areas to the Soviet 
Bloc had dropped by 1956 to less than 4.1 per cent if Hong Kong's 
exports to the Bloc are included, the ratio, excluding Hong Kong, had 
risen to slightly over 4 per cent as compared with less than 3.5 per cent 
in 1952. The ratio of aggregate imports from the Bloc to total imports 
from the world in 1956 reached 5.9 per cent including Hong Kong or 
4.2 per cent excluding Hong Kong. Compared with the 1952 figures -
3.5 per cent including Hong Kong and only 1.9 per cent excluding Hong 
Kong - there were definitely some very significant advances in the 
relative sense. 
TABLE III - The Relative Importance of Trade with the Soviet Bloc 
in the Foreign Trade of Selected Asian Countries. 
Imports from the 
Exports to the Soviet Bloc as 
(Millions of U.S. Dollars) Soviet Bloc as Per Cent of Total 
Exports to Imports fromPer Cent of Total Imports from 
World World E'l{oorts to World World 
1952 1956 1952 1956 1952 1956 1952 1956 
Burma 266.1 242.7 192.5 197.4 (a) 14.3 1.4 18.9 
Ceylon 315.5 364.3 357.5 342.3 9.2 10.6 2.2 8.7 
India 1303.3 1272.1 1688.0 1715.5 1.3 3.9 2.4 4.3 
Indochina 116.7 42.0 448.4 210.7 0.1 1.8 2.0 
Indonesia 907.5 882.0 924.0 853.1 I.I 2.7 0.6 5.2 
Japan 1272.9 2500.6 2028.8 3229.7 0.1 2.9 0.9 3.2 
Malaya 1239.7 1360.9 1256.9 1356.8 2.4 3.1 3.4 3.6 
Pakistan 532.5 340.2 609.7 355.0 22.5 6.0 2.9 3.1 
Hong Kong 507.3 561.7 661.4 799.1 17.9 4.2 22.2 22.8 
Aggregate 6461.5 7566.5 8167.2 9059.6 4.6 4.1 3.5 5.9 
Total (Exclud-
ing Hong 
Kong) 5954.2 7004.8 7505.8 8?60.5 3.5 '1.0 1.9 4.2 
.... indicates "no information" 
(a) indicates "under $50,000"
Source: "Value Series," International Economic Analysis Division of the
Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce. 
As of 1956, the Soviet Bloc was among the most important trading 
partners of only two Asian countries; namely Burma and Ceylon. It 
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supplied Burma with 18.9 per cent of the latter's total imports in that 
year and took 14.3 per cent of the latter's total exports. Communist 
China was primarily responsible for Burma's imports from the Bloc 
while the European Bloc was primarily responsible for Burma's exports 
to the Bloc. In the same year, the Soviet Bloc was responsible for 10.6 
per cent of Ceylon's total exports and 8.7 per cent of the latter's total 
imports, with virtually the entire trade carried on between Ceylon and 
Communist China. 
Certain factors in the Bloc's trade with these two Asian countries 
resemble each other closely. The Ceylon trade is conducted principally 
under a five-year, renewable barter agreement between Ceylon and 
Communist China providing for an annual exchange of 50,000 tons of 
Ceylonese rubber for 270,000 tons of rice with any balance to be settled 
in sterling. As a result of this agreement, rubber exports to the Soviet 
Bloc averaged about 50 per cent of Ceylon's total rubber exports in 
1954-56.7 Because of the large rubber export which was especially 
attractive to Ceylon at the time the agreement was first put into opera­
tion in 1953, as the price paid for the rubber was higher than the then 
world market price while the price of rice was lower, China's sterling 
indebtedness to Ceylon increased gradually, reaching, according to the 
London Economist,8 13.5 million pounds ($37.8 million) by 1957. 
When the renewal of the agreement was under discussion in 1957, 
China was in a position to demand another long-term agreement, as 
well as more favorable terms, by using this debt as a bargaining counter. 
To quote the Economist: 
Ceylon now risks losing this credit balance and the Chinese market 
if it refuses the Chinese demand, but by accepting, will have to 
restrict its imports from other countries, disregard its GATT ob­
ligations and become more vulnerable to Chinese pressure in the 
future. 
The Burma trade follows a similar pattern except that in this case 
Burma's problem began with a rice surplus which could not be profitably 
disposed of on the world market. Confronted with an estimated export-
1 The Economist, London, August 31, 1957, p. 675. 
B Ibid. 
302 American Trade with Asia ana the Far East 
able surplus exceeding 2 million long tons in 1955,9 Burma was under­
standably receptive to suggestions from Communist China and the 
USSR each to purchase 150,000 to 200,000 tons of rice from Burma 
annually. These figures were subsequently incorporated in separate 
trade agreements with the two principal Bloc countries in 1955, and 
the USSR quota was later raised to 400,000 tons per annum. 10 The 
rice sale to the USSR led to sizable imports from the European Soviet 
Bloc, including the notorious case of hardened cement blocks on the 
Rangoon docks when they arrived during the monsoon rains. Even in 
the smaller deal with Communist China, while the latter was supposed 
to provide 60 per cent of the value of the imported rice in Chinese 
exports, 20 per cent in re-exports of goods of Russian and Eastern 
European origin and 20 per cent in sterling, protracted negotiations by 
the Burmese in Peking in 19 55 failed to find enough Chinese goods to 
buy, and it was under these conditions that the much-vaunted sale of 
Chinese textile machinery was finally concluded with Burma. 11 
The experience of Burma and Ceylon, reminiscent of Nazi Ger­
many's machinations in an earlier decade,12 points to the conclusion 
that countries depending upon the export of a few primary products 
and therefore vulnerable to the latter's often large price fluctuations are 
usually in an unenviable bargaining position in dealing with large foreign 
state trading organs. On the one hand, they are often lured by the 
apparent attraction of long-term bulk purchases. On the other hand, 
the possibility of their trading partners' sudden withdrawal of a bulk 
purchase, which the government trading agencies are capable of doing, 
and the need to settle credit balances owed by their trading partners, 
which readily accumulate as a result of the domestic pressures to export, 
tend to increase their dependence on their trading partners. This effect 
of long-term bulk purchase of some key export commodities by the 
Soviet Bloc can be serious even though the amount directly involved 
o Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, July 28, 1955, Vol. XIX, No. 4,
p. 110.
10 CEIR, op. cit. See also the Oriental Economist: Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 
Tokyo, September 1956, pp. 10-11. 
11 Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, February 24, 1955, Vol. XVIII,
No. 8, p. 250 March 31, 1955, Vol. XVIII, No. 13, p. 408; and July 28, 
1955, Vol. XIX, No. 4, pp. 109-110. 
12 Yuan-li Wu, Economic Warfare, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952), and es­
pecially the Tariff Commission's study quoted therein. 
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may be relatively small when compared with the volume of the export­
ing country's total exports to the world. 
IV 
ECONOMIC INTER-DEPENDENCE AND STATISTICS OF THE DIRECTION 
OF TRADE 
A country's economic dependence upon imports from another 
country may be measured by the extent to which domestic consumption 
and production would immediately suffer if such imports were no longer 
available, the cost at which alternative sources of supply, domestic or 
foreign, could be developed, and the length of time required for making 
the adjustment. Similarly, a country's economic dependence upon ex­
ports to another country may be measured by the extent to which do­
mestic income and employment would immediately suffer, the cost at 
which alternative markets or areas of production can be found, and the 
length of time required to make the adjustment. This concept of a 
country's economic dependence upon another may be applied gener­
ally except in those cases where the principal economic activity consists 
of transit trade such as Hong Kong and, to a lesser extent, Malaya and 
Singapore. Bearing in mind the qualitative importance that some com­
modities might possess in an economy even when they are traded only 
in very small quantities internationally and given the economy's ability 
to make adjustments in production and consumption, it is of course 
true that the degree of a country's economic dependence upon another 
varies with the volume of its imports from the latter that are actually 
retained for its own consumption or further production and the volume 
of its exports to the latter that actually originate from the stream of its 
own production. The question is whether in the case of the Asian 
countries and areas the direction of trade statistics we have can provide 
such a quantitative index, and in what way it may have to be modified. 
As we examine the statistics that purport to show a country's di­
rection of trade, we can readily see that as far as export statistics are 
concerned, the inclusion of re-exports, without subjecting the previously 
imported goods to any substantial transformation, would be a source of 
overstatement. In addition, if the direction of trade is based on the 
consignment method so that a partner country is credited with an export 
if it is the country to which the goods are directly consigned, the re­
corded export trade data would tend to be overstated in so far as there 
are some exports which are credited to the partner country but which 
are destined for further shipment to a third country and are not re-
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corded as goods in transit. On the other hand, the recorded export 
figures tend to be an underestimate in so far as there are indirect ex­
ports to the partner country via some third country. In theory, these 
inaccuracies would not arise if the production-consumption basis is 
used in recording the direction of trade so that exports are credited to 
the partner country only if the latter is actually the country where the 
goods are ultimately consumed or substantially transformed. But in 
the case of exports this is not necessarily true in practice as the exporter 
is frequently not aware of the final destination of his shipments, this 
being so especially when the exports are primary products. The possi­
bility of inaccuracy increases if there is some special incentive for the 
exporters to make false reports on purpose, such as the existence of an 
embargo of certain types of exports to a particular country. Under such 
conditions the same reasons would prevail for the possible overestimate 
or underestimate of exports as mentioned under the consignment method. 
As for the crediting of imports to a particular country, the degree 
of economic dependence tends to be overstated when the consignment 
method is used if the recorded imports include imports that actually 
originate from a third country but are credited to the partner country 
as the latter happens to be the place from which the goods are last 
directly consigned. On the other hand, the consignment method tends 
to underestimate imports from a partner country by omitting indirect 
imports via a third country. These sources of inaccuracy do not exist 
if the production-consumption basis is used so that imports are credited 
to a partner country only if the latter is the primary origin of the im­
ports. Since it is generally easier to determine the primary origin of 
imports than the place of consumption of exports, the possibility of 
inaccuracy through ignorance is minimized. But it should be added, 
regardless of the basis of crediting imports to a partner country, where 
the system of general imports is used, the import data tend invariably 
to overstate the degree of the country's economic dependence on a 
partner country if some of the imports are destined for re-export with­
out substantial transformation. Fortunately, this source of overestimate 
is unlikely to be large except when we deal with countries having a 
large entrepot trade. But in such cases, especially if the entrepot trade 
is the main economic activity, our concept of economic dependence no 
longer applies. 
According to their respective national statistics in the case of the 
nine Asian countries and areas under study, Ceylon did not include 
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re-exports in reporting exports in 1956 while Indonesia and Vietnam 
followed the practice of recording "special exports" only. All the other 
countries and areas include re-exports in their reported export trade. 
The same applies to the Philippines and Thailand which have not been 
included in our analysis. As for the basis on which destination and 
provenance are determined, India follows the consignment method in 
both exports and imports, while Burma, Ceylon, Hong Kong, Japan, 
Pakistan and Thailand use the consignment criterion in exports only. 
Malaya and Indonesia employ the consumption-production criterion 
throughout.1·1 
On the basis of the practice of these individual countries, the logical 
conclusion seems to be that as far as imports from the Soviet Bloc are 
concerned the figures reported by India tend to understate the extent 
of its trade and hence the degree of its economic dependence on the 
Bloc as a whole mainly because of the existence of indirect imports 
from Hong Kong. 
In regard to exports, Japan's exports to the Bloc tend to be under­
stated because any re-exports that may be included tend to be small 
while there may be a fair amount of indirect exports via Hong Kong. 
On the other hand, Malaya's reported exports to the Bloc may be an 
overestimate to. some extent as the volume of re-exports tends to be 
fairly large in view of the area's entrepot trade while actual, if not re­
ported, indirect exports to Communist China via Hong Kong have in 
all probability declined following the lifting of the rubber export em­
bargo in mid-1956. As for Burma, Ceylon, India and Pakistan, two 
opposite influences prevail. First, some indirect exports to Communist 
China via Hong Kong undoubtedly exist. Second, there may be some 
re-exports included in the reported exports to the Bloc in each case. 
Lastly, in the case of Ceylon and Burma, a portion of these exports 
to the Bloc may eventually end up in third countries. Thus, Burmese 
rice shipments credited to China may actually find themselves in Ceylon 
while some of the primary products shipped to Communist China may 
be re-exported or transshipped to the USSR. Accordingly, only if we 
assume that the indirect trade via Hong Kong is larger than the other 
two items combined can we conclude with some assurance that the 
13 See United Nations, Direction of International Trade, Vol. VIII, No. 7, pp. 
326-28. Cf. also R. G. D. Allen and J. Edward Ely (ed.), International
Trade Statistics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1953 ), where the criteria
reported are somewhat at variance with the later UN publication.
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reported export figures to the Soviet Bloc of these countries are under­
estimates. While such an assumption is probably correct, the element 
of conjecture cannot be removed entirely. But it is fairly safe to say 
that with the possible exception of Malaya and excluding Hong Kong 
it is exceedingly unlikely that the reported exports of all the remaining 
countries are overestimates of the true volume which must be con­
sidered in evaluating the economic interdependence of the Asian coun­
tries with the Soviet Bloc. 
Thus we may summarize our findings by stating that both with 
respect to exports to the Bloc and with respect to imports from the 
Bloc, if Hong Kong is excluded, the total reported figures for the re­
maining countries and areas are probably underestimates, but certainly 
not overestimates, the probability being somewhat stronger in the case 
of imports from the Bloc. The inherent overestimate in the case of 
Hong Kong, in the sense the term is used here, is irrelevant as Hong 
Kong's main economic role is still that of an entrepot. To this general 
conclusion we may append the note that the underestimate in the re­
ported figures applies also to Thailand and the Philippines. 14 
Since the underestimate, in so far as it exists, is due to indirect 
trade via Hong Kong, and since such indirect trade is mainly with Com­
munist China, it follows further that Communist China's relative im­
portance in the Bloc's trade with the other Asian countries must also 
have been understated. In view of the fact that Communist China's 
share in this trade is already large on the basis of recorded statistics, 
it will be well to examine the Chinese trade efforts a little further. 
V 
COMMUNIST CHINA'S POLICIES AND PROBLEMS IN TRADING WITH 
THE REST OF ASIA 
While it would be a serious mistake to regard Communist China's 
growing trade with other Asian countries entirely as one of the natural 
results of an expanding economy, it would be equally fallacious to treat 
it as the outcome of a carefully engineered Chinese plot and nothing 
else. Moreover, insofar as Communist China's deliberate policy has 
been responsible for the actual pattern and trend of non-Communist 
14 A report in Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, October 4, 1955, Vol. 
XXI, No. 13, p. 435, indicated the presence of a fairly flourishing smuggling 
trade between Communist China and the Philippines. Thailand's trade with 
Communist China has been conducted indirectly but actively through Hong 
Kong. 
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Asia's trade with the Chinese mainland, the basic structure of this policy 
has not remained stationary. This very flexible policy has therefore 
not always taken a consistent course in dealing with the individual Asian 
countries. 
There is little doubt that the predominant motives in Communist 
China's attempts to develop trade with other Asian countries immedi­
ately after 1951 were, first, to beat the embargo and secondly, to earn 
foreign exchange to add to its then depleted reserves. As Ceylon was 
not yet a member of the United Nations and did not agree to the em­
bargo, the rubber-rice agreement with China was a natural outcome, 
especially as the terms of trade appeared to be extremely favorable to 
Ceylon at that time.15 The desire to replenish the Communist state's 
coffers with foreign exchange, on the other hand, clearly account for 
the policy to permit exports to Hong Kong and Japan to exceed the 
level of Chinese imports from these two areas year after year .10 Since 
the Hong Kong currency earned can be converted into United States 
dollars on the free market, while the credit balance with Japan can be 
settled in sterling, China's purpose is well served in this manner. 
Moreover, as long as Chinese exports to Japan are greater than 
Chinese imports from Japan, the impression is given that the Chinese 
market is by no means limited by China's ability to pay and the small 
volume of trade· between Japan and China can then be blamed upon 
Japan's participation in the embargo. Perhaps a similar consideration 
entered into Communist China's calculations in allowing Indonesia to 
build up a fair-sized indebtedness to China which it must then try to 
·settle through the export of rubber and possibly also oil and tin, an of 
which were banned items. 11 
If the cultivation of Indonesia's trade is built upon the latter's desire 
to expand its export of a few primary products, the same may be said 
16 Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, March 31, 1955, Vol. XVIII, 
No. 13, p. 408; May 26, 1955, Vol. XVIII, No. 21, p. 671; October 20, 
1955, Vol. XIX, No. 16, p. 508; and November 24, 1955, Vol. XIX, No. 
21, p. 659. 
10 The several semi-official trade agreements between Communist China and 
Japanese businessmen have always provided for a trade turnover in which 
exports and imports are equal on paper. Actual experience has consistently 
resulted in much larger Chinese exports than Chinese imports, a situation 
which Communist China could easily have put a stop to if it had desired 
to do so. 
11 Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, July 5, and 12, 1956, Vol. XXI, 
No. 1, p. 29 and No. 2, p. 62. 
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of China's dealings with Burma, Malaya and Ceylon. With the lifting of 
the ban on rubber exports to the Chinese mainland by Malaya and 
Indonesia the rubber and rice exchange was turned into a more attrac­
tive proposition for China and a questionable blessing to Ceylon. Under 
the same conditions, the Malayan businessmen's mission to Peking in 
1956 was induced to sell rubber to China without any Chinese guaran­
tee that the product would be used for nonmilitary purposes only. 18 
The case of Burma's rice barter with Communist China and the Euro­
pean Bloc has already been mentioned. 
A few seemingly curious phenomena stand out in the labyrinth of 
trade agreements that Communist China has set up with its neighbors. 
Thus, cement was imported from Japan at the same time it was sold 
to Hong Kong and Malaya,19 while rice was purchased from Burma 
when it was being sold to Ceylon. One may well wonder why, for in­
stance, neither Ceylon nor Burma undertook to effect a triangular ex­
change in a way similar to that engineered by the Chinese. The only 
logical explanation would appear to be that Communist China, by vir­
tue of its monopolization of foreign trade by the state and its control 
of domestic prices, is able to pay higher prices for imports and to accept 
lower prices for its exports, absorbing the loss domestically through the 
government budget or allowing the export producers to be indirectly 
subsidized by the buyers of imports while hoping to offset the external 
loss through future manipulations of the payments and barter agree­
ments, such as by holding up export shipments. 
In fact, in order to gain a larger political or economic objective, 
Communist China is reported to have employed many of the known 
techniques either to reduce foreign competition or to exploit a local 
semi-monopoly and an inelastic demand. Trade reports from Hong 
Kong have, for instance, repeatedly mentioned the practice of Chinese 
"dumping" of light manufactures and other consumer products in Thai­
land and Indonesia with its detrimental effect on Hong Kong's own ex­
ports. 20 The same effects are also felt by Japan in Southeast Asia. 
18 Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, October 18, 1956, Vol. XXI,
No. 16, p. 515. 
19 Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, October 25, 1956, Vol. XXI,
No. 17, p. 541. 
2° Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, July 5, 1956, Vol. XXI, No. 1, 
p. 29.
21 Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, August 23, 1956, Vol. XXI, No. 8, 
p, 257. 
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Similarly, Chinese rice was reportedly sold in Malaya in 1956 at well 
below the price of both local and imported Thai rice. 21 On the other 
hand, Communist China is accused by Hong Kong to have time and 
again held up shipments of live hogs and other farm products to the 
colony in order to secure higher prices and greater profits. 22
Lest the above instances should convey the impression that Com­
munist China's external economic relations are managed without a 
hitch, let us quote the Communist Minister of Trade in his statement 
to the Chinese Communist Party's Eighth Congress in September, 19 5 6: 
Sometimes when a temporary surplus was found in certain prod­
ucts in the country, the foreign trade department,& were immedi­
ately requested to export them. As an example, in 1954, the 
reduced output in agriculture affected the production and earnings 
of certain industrial undertakings, and capital construction projects 
were curtailed. So in 1955 there was found a surplus of such items 
as steel products, cement and pig iron. This was only a temporary 
phenomenon. But the production departments were afraid lest there 
be accumulated stocks, and repeatedly requested the foreign trade 
departments to export the said items in quantity in order to support 
domestic pro_duction. However, by this year, when the high tide of
socialism· arrived, the domestic needs for those items greatly in­
creased, and there was a request for the revision of the export plans 
which had already been decided upon.23
According to a recent article in the Communist T a-kung pao, 24
31.5 per cent of China's exports in 1957 consisted of products of in­
dustry and mining as compared with only 17.9 per cent in 1952, and 
there is a great deal of evidence that products of light manufacturing, 
as well as a few simple engineering products, are now entering the 
Chinese export market. There are certain advantages to produce con­
sumer products for export, 25 and the progress of China's industrializa­
tion has definitely enhanced China's export capability. Given this back­
ground and the apparent decision of the Soviet Union to give more 
22 Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, July 26, 1956, Vol. XXI, No. 4, 
p. 124, and November 15, 1956, Vol. XXI, No. 20, p. 642.
23 Jen-min jih-pao (People's Daily). Peking, September 28, 1956. 
24 Article by Wang Ti, Ta-kung pao, Peking, October 13, 1957.
25 Yuan-Ii Wu, "Communist China's Economic Challenge," Current History,
January, 1957. 
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impetus to the strengthening of economic ties with the less developed 
countries of Asia and the Middle East for political ends, it is indeed 
not surprising that we should find developments in China's external 
economic relations that lend support to such a policy. But as the 
Communist foreign trade minister has pointed out, fervent and capricious 
activities in foreign trade do not always reflect astute and devious plan­
ning. Occasionally, at any rate, they are actually the result of poor 
planning. 
VI 
THE SHORT-TERM EFFECT OF SOVIET BLOC TRADE WITH ASIA ON THE 
UNITED STATES. 
From the point of view of the United States, the preceding ap­
praisal of the Soviet Bloc's "economic offensive" in Asia and its basic 
techniques calls neither for hysterical alarm nor for indolent com­
placency. Obviously, the Bloc's expanding economic relations with Asia 
must have certain economic effects on the United States, and these must 
now be assessed. 
We may begin with a short-term analysis, assuming that the eco­
nomic structures of the Asian countries in question remain relatively 
unchanged and that there is no spectacular economic development. 
Within this framework a series of questions may then be posed. Would 
trade between the Asian countries and the United States be appreciably 
larger in the absence of the former's trade with the Soviet Bloc? Would 
there be a change in the nature of their trade with the United States? 
What conclusions, however tentative, can be drawn from the develop­
ments between 1952 and 1956? As a matter of convenience we may 
deal with the problem of the degree to which trade with the Soviet 
Bloc has substituted for potential trade with the United States by first 
considering the case of Asian exports and then the case of Asian imports. 
In selecting one foreign country in lieu of another to sell one's 
products to (or to place one's orders in), the principal considerations 
are prices ( allowing for quality differences), availability or usefulness 
of the means of payment involved, established contacts, and extra­
economic preferences. Disregarding any extra-economic preference for 
the Soviet Bloc on the part of the Asian countries, we can readily see 
that established trade contacts, even up to the end of our period, would 
tend to favor the United States. There is relatively little information 
on the prices of imports from the Soviet Bloc as compared with United 
States prices, and we are perforce unable to take this factor into con-
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sideration. Thus the chief economic factor is reduced to a problem of 
payments. 
If exports to the Soviet Bloc result in smaller exports to the United 
States, given the same volume of "compensatory financing,"26 the smaller 
dollar earnings would tend to lead to lower imports from the United 
States while the higher exports to the Soviet Bloc would induce larger 
imports from the Bloc. Similarly, it may be argued that if imports from 
the Bloc should result in lower imports from the United States, the 
smaller demand for dollar expenditures may lead to smaller exports to 
the United States while the larger demand for rubles or the JMP would 
lead to larger exports to the Bloc and hence a smaller export capacity 
to the American market. Thus, where currency inconvertibility and 
trade agreements necessitate bilateral balances, it is not inconceivable 
for an all-round reduction of trade between the Asian countries and the 
United States to originate either through an initial substitution of Soviet 
Bloc products for United States products or through the substitution 
of Soviet Bloc markets for the American market. 
There are, however, some good reasons to believe that we can go 
beyond the preceding general proposition. First, for most Asian coun­
tries bent on economic development, the demand for United States 
capital goods and other materials is probably so high that while imports 
from the Soviet ·Bloc may replace specific imports from the United 
States, they are not an active restraining factor in limiting the total 
volume of dollar imports. Rather, dollar imports are limited by the 
volume of exports to the dollar area, which is true especially in coun­
tries having a deficit balance on current account with the United States, 
and by the desire to increase dollar balances because of their con­
vertibility, which is generally true even in countries enjoying a favorable 
balance on current account with the United States. The widespread 
practice of exchange restrictions against dollar imports in Asian coun­
tries testifies to this situation. Secondly, even if total imports from the 
United States are in rare instances reduced as a result of imports from 
the Soviet Bloc, the desire to increase dollar holdings alone would 
preclude any serious weakening of the desire to export to the United 
States. Any reduction of exports to the United States would have to 
be explained by a reduction of the capacity to export to the dollar area 
following the expansion of exports to the Soviet Bloc. The key to the 
26 This should be interpreted to include any planned net addition to the country's 
foreign exchange assets. 
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problem appears to be whether the Soviet Bloc market has taken Asian 
exports away from the American market. What can be said on this 
possibility? 
Since a full examination of all the exports to the Soviet Bloc from 
the Asian countries in question is beyond the scope of the present 
paper, we shall limit ourselves to the principal exports of a few coun­
tries on which data are readily available. Furthermore, we shall assume 
that the "substitution effect" on potential exports to the United States 
may be judged according to ( 1) whether the particular export is one 
of the Asian country's "important" exports to the United States, (2) 
whether its export to the Soviet Bloc is larger than that to the United 
States, and (3) whether its export to the Bloc has increased since 1952. 
A commodity is regarded as one of the country's "important" exports 
to the United States if its value approaches, say, 5 per cent ( arbitrarily 
chosen) of total United States imports from that country that year. 
To simplify description and classification the following number code 
is used: 
I. ... an "important" export to the United States
II .... not an "important" export to the United States 
A .... export to the Bloc exceeding that imported by the 
United States 
B .... export to the Bloc less than that imported by the United 
States 
i .... 1956 export to the Bloc greater than the corresponding 
value in 1952 
ii .... 19 5 6 export to the Bloc less than the corresponding 
value in 1952 
We further reserve the A category for commodities that are imported 
by the United States in noticeable quantities. Goods that are imported 
in negligible amounts by the United States or are not imported at all 
and that otherwise fall into the A category are described by A1• Thus 
the "substitution effect" on the United States may be ranked for indi­
vidual commodities as follows:
Large positive effect . . . . . . . . . . . . .. IAi 
Some positive effect .............. IBi, IIAi, and IIBi 
No effect. ...................... IIA 1i 
The remaining four categories (IAii, IBii, IIAii and IIBii) may be 
treated as cases where the "substitution effect," if any, may have actu-
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ally worked the other way, i.e., against the Soviet Bloc, and, as we shall 
see, are of no practical significance in our case. 
The five largest (in value) commodity exports to the Soviet Bloc 
from Japan, India, Malaya and Ceylon and the three largest commodity 
exports from Indonesia are individually examined for 1956 and clas­
sified according to the preceding grouping. These commodities con­
stituted respectively 36.7 per cent, 30.2 per cent, 95.4 per cent, 100 
per cent and 91.1 per cent of the above five countries' total exports 
to the Soviet Bloc. The result is rather illuminating, to say the least: 27 
IAi 
IBi 
IIAi 
IIBi 
IIA'i 
IBii 
Japan Tndia 
Goat skins 
Shellac, pepper 
Woolen and 
worsted fabrics 
Calcium super- fron ore, 
phosphate, cement, tobacco 
ammonium sul-
phate, synthetic 
yarns and threads 
Indonesia Malaya Ceylon 
Rubber 
Rubber Rubber 
Copra, Coconut oil, Cocobeans, 
Sugar copra, coconuts, 
oil bunker pepper, 
coir 
Tin 
Apparently, by far the largest group of important exports in 1956 
from the five Asian countries examined was composed of items little 
if any of which was imported by the United States at all and it is doubt­
ful that more, if any, could have been sold to the United States if they 
had not been exported to· the Soviet Bloc or if they had been exported 
in smaller volumes. As for all the other commodities, exports of 
which to the Soviet Bloc showed an increase between 1952 and 1956, 
one must also refrain from jumping to the conclusion that curtailment 
of exports to the Soviet Bloc would have meant larger exports to the 
United States in value terms. Where the United States demand is rela­
tively important in the world market and where price elasticity may 
be small, curtailment of exports to the Soviet Bloc may simply result 
in a collapse of prices and even a smaller dollar volume of exports to 
the United States. This consideration is particularly relevant in the case 
27 The original Asian export figures which are not given here are based on the 
Country-by-Commodity Series of the United States Department of Com­
merce. The corresponding United States import figures are based on the 
Bureau of the Census, United Statese Department of Commerce, United 
States Imports of Merchandise for Consumption, Commodity by Country 
of Origin, Report No. FTllO, 1956. 
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of rubber. Nor should one overlook the potentially restrictive effect 
of the sentiments of United States manufacturers whose products may 
compete with these Asian exports. Finally, the state of business ex­
pansion and government purchases (for stockpiling, for instance,) in 
this country cannot but be a decisive factor. While these conclusions 
must remain essentially tentative, it would appear that the most im­
portant impact of Asia's expanding export trade to the Soviet Bloc 
lies in the development of complementary economic relationships be­
tween the two areas, marked by an increase in the number of exports 
the Soviet Bloc will, while the United States will not, purchase. 
To the extent that the limited volume of Asian exports to the 
United States independently of the "substitution effect" of exports to 
the Soviet Bloc acts as a restraint on the expansion of United States 
exports to Asia, it is obvious that the latter could be increased if credits 
or grants were available. The relevant point in this connection is whether 
the Soviet Bloc's offers of credit to the Asian countries have in any 
manner reduced the volume of U.S. investments and grants in the same 
area. More precisely, the question is whether specific projects in Asian 
countries now receiving Soviet aid would have received American capi­
tal in one form or another on comparable terms had Soviet Bloc as­
sistance been unavailable. Lack of detailed information on the terms 
of such agreements with the Soviet Bloc precludes an unequivocal 
answer on this point. But a plausible conjecture is that few of the 
projects receiving Soviet capital are such that American private capital 
would have been forthcoming on terms that would be even remotely 
comparable to Soviet terms and that only governmental credit or grants 
might have been made. Moreover, there might conceivably be some 
projects that are receiving Soviet instead of United States aid for the 
simple reason that regardless of its availability the latter has never been 
sought. Such cases would, however, have lo be explained by political 
considerations on the part of the Asian countries and not by economic 
factors. 
VII 
THE LONG-TERM EFFECT OF SOVIET BLOC TRADE WITH ASIA ON THE 
UNITED STATES 
It remains to be seen whether the long-term effect of the Soviet 
Bloc's economic and technical assistance to some of the Asian countries 
in their economic development is more detrimental to United States 
trade with Asia than the short-term effect apparently has been. This is 
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particularly significant inasmuch as the Bloc's grants and credits to 
Burma, Cambodia and Indonesia alone amounted to an estimated mini­
mum sum of $165.4 million during 1956 and 1957 alone while similar 
aid to India had reached an estimated cumulative total of $368 million 
by the end of 1956.28 It is reasonable to assume that such aid has not 
been provided for humanitarian reasons. But granted that some po­
litical and economic advantage may accrue to the Bloc, the question 
here is whether United States trade will suffer as a result. 
Let us assume that in the long run the Asian countries now re­
ceiving Soviet Bloc aid will find themselves economically more devel­
oped in the minimal sense of a higher national output, with or without a 
per capita increase, marked by the successful completion of at least 
some of the projects in which aid receipts have been employed and the 
consequent transformation of the economic structure through the re­
allocation of available resources. Such economic development has both 
its trade-creating and its trade-destroying effects. If, as one may safely 
assume on the basis of past experience, the net effect should be trade­
creating, there is no prima f acie case for projecting that this expanded 
trade would fall upon one country instead of another or that, as far as 
the United States and the Soviet Bloc countries are concerned, it would 
be apportioned behyeen the two according to some formula based on 
the relative volumes of assistance they have individually provided in 
the past. Thus it is at least theoretically possible for economic develop­
ment in Asia promoted by Soviet Bloc assistance to benefit United 
Sta�es trade with Asia even more than it will benefit the Bloc's own 
trade with Asia. (The same possibility, of course, also exists for United 
States aid indirectly to benefit the Bloc's trade with Asia!) 
However, we are compelled to take a less sanguine view if as a 
result of the Bloc's economic and technical aid to the Asian countries 
there is a political reorientation so that discrimination against United 
States trade will increase. Alternatively, discrimination against trade 
with the United States may be increased if Soviet Bloc trade succeeds 
in rising to such a level as to give the Bloc sufficient leverage to exert 
economic pressure toward this end. Finally, United States trade with 
Asia will suffer if the Bloc's economic assistance helps to transform the 
economies of the Asian countries in such a way that expansion of trade 
28 See Ui:ited States Department of State, The Sino-Soviet Bloc Economic Of­
fem ive in the Far East, February, 1958; also CEIR, op. cit., 1957. 
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with the United States would be economically unprofitable. The last 
point is worthy of another moment of thought. 
As far as we know, a common feature of most economic aid 
agreements between Asian countries and the Bloc is the provision of 
loan repayments in commodities which are the debtor countries' tradi­
tional exports and of which they often have surpluses that cannot be 
profitably disposed of elsewhere. While the Bloc's offer of long-term 
purchases with or without price stabilization may appear to be a bless­
ing in the short run, the long-term effect on the Asian countries may 
be the further expansion of the same industries. On the one hand, this 
will increase their dependence on the Bloc as a market and hence as 
a source of imports. On the other hand, it will weaken the drive for 
export diversification on which greater capacity to export to the United 
States depends. If the demand for capital goods import can be satisfied 
by the Bloc, and if any increase in the demand for consumer goods 
import consists mostly of demand for goods that do not belong to the 
"luxury" trade which the United States is in a better position to supply, 
this failure to expand the capacity to export to the United States may 
be accompanied by a lessened demand for imports from the United 
States. The dollar shortage suffered by some of the Asian countries 
would then disappear, but only because they have become economically 
aligned with the "ruble bloc." 
Fortunately, none of these effects are inevitable. The United 
States' own policy in facilitating the expansion of imports from Asia, 
its policy in stepping up economic aid to the Asian countries aimed at 
both development and export diversification, and the maintenance of 
a high level of economic activity at home will do much to counter the 
Soviet Bloc's efforts. One takes pleasure in noting that all these policies 
can be defended on grounds independently of the exigencies of the 
Soviet "economic offensive." 
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